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My
abridged
version of the Deleuze lectures on Spinoza.
[My paragraphs indicate
the points of abridgment - ideally, each one
should end with an ellipsis but I forgot to do
that.The strange punctuation
( eg commas instead of apostrophes, the curious
diphthongs) is in the original – all the words
cited except for those in square brackets
are Deleuze’s (in translation, of course
--translator is unknown). The real thing is
available here: http://deleuzelectures.blogspot.com/2007/02/on-spinoza.html
and there is a French version too]
Offers very good
ilustrations of the problem identified by
Zizek – general
propositions about essences can’t lead to a
judgement between
good and bad essences without some tinkering and
shifting of levels. Clarifies a lot of terms
which are just used in the other texts -- eg
affect. Also shows
Deleuze’s interest in connections between maths
and philosophy in the C17.
Deleuze insists all this is concrete, simple and
relevant (so he had problems
engaging the audience too?). Deleuze needs but
does not have any sociology when
the concrete really comes to call though]
Thus we start from a quite
simple thing: the idea is a mode
of thought defined by its representational
character... we call affect any mode
of thought which doesn't represent anything.
There is a primacy of the
idea over the affect for the very
simple reason that in order to love it's
necessary to have an idea, however
confused it may be, however indeterminate it may
be, of what is loved.
Yet an idea not only has
an objective reality but, following
the hallowed terminology, it also has a formal
reality... the idea has a formal
reality since it is itself something insofar as
it is an idea... this formal
reality of the idea will be what Spinoza very
often terms a certain degree of
reality or of perfection that the idea has as
such... The idea of God and the
idea of a frog have different objective
realities, that is they do not
represent the same thing, but at the same time
they do not have the same
intrinsic reality, they do not have the same
formal reality, that is one of
them—you sense this quite well—has a degree of
reality infinitely greater than
the other's. The idea of God has a formal
reality, a degree of reality or
intrinsic perfection infinitely greater than the
idea of a frog, which is the
idea of a finite thing.
one idea chases another,
one idea replaces another idea for
example, in an instant. A perception is a
certain type of idea..Or else things
change: I look at the sun, and the sun little by
little disappears and I find
myself in the dark of night; it is thus a series
of successions, of
coexistences of ideas, successions of ideas. But
what also happens? Our
everyday life is not made up solely of ideas
which succeed each other. Spinoza
employs the term “automaton”: we are, he says,
spiritual automata, that is to
say it is less we who have the ideas than the
ideas which are affirmed in us...
There is a regime of variation which is not the
same thing as the succession of
ideas themselves.
I would say that for
Spinoza there is a continuous
variation—and this is what it means to exist—of
the force of existing or of the
power of acting... In other words there is a
continuous variation in the form
of an increase-diminution-increase-diminution of
the power of acting or the
force of existing of someone according to the
ideas which s/he has.... his kind
of melodic line of continuous variation will
define affect (affectus) in its
correlation with ideas and at the same time in
its difference in nature from
ideas.... When I pass from the idea of Pierre
[he likes Paul but not Pierre] to
the idea of Paul, I say that my power of acting
is increased; when I pass from
the idea of Paul to the idea of Pierre, I say
that my power of acting is
diminished. Which comes down to saying that when
I see Pierre, I am affected
with sadness; when I see Paul, I am affected
with joy... Sadness will be any
passion whatsoever which involves a diminution
of my power of acting, and joy
will be any passion involving an increase in my
power of acting.
Inspiring sad passions is
necessary for the exercise of
power.
As such spiritual
automata, within us there is the whole
time of ideas which succeed one another, and in
according with this succession
of ideas, our power of acting or force of
existing is increased or diminished
in a continuous manner, on a continuous line,
and this is what we call
affectus, it's what we call existing.
The three kinds of ideas
that Spinoza distinguishes are
affection (affectio) ideas; we'll see that
affectio, as opposed to affectus, is
a certain kind of idea. There would thus have
been in the first place affectio
ideas, secondly we arrive at the ideas that
Spinoza calls notions, and thirdly,
for a small number of us because it's very
difficult, we come to have essence
ideas.
Affection is what? In a
first determination, an affection is
the following: it's a state of a body insofar as
it is subject to the action of
another body. What does this mean? “I feel the
sun on me,” or else “A ray of
sunlight falls upon you”; it's an affection of
your body. What is an affection
of your body? Not the sun, but the action of the
sun or the effect of the sun
on you. In other words an effect, or the action
that one body produces on
another, once it's noted that Spinoza, on the
basis of reasons from his
Physics, does not believe in action at a
distance, action always implies a
contact, and is even a mixture of bodies.
Affectio is a mixture of two bodies,
one body which is said to act on another, and
the other receives the trace of
the first. Every mixture of bodies will be
termed an affection.... It's obvious
that it's the lowest because these ideas of
affection know [connaissent] things
only by their effects: I feel the affection of
the sun on me, the trace of the
sun on me. It's the effect of the sun on my
body. But the causes, that is, that
which is my body, that which is the body of the
sun, and the relation between
these two bodies such that the one produces a
particular effect on the other
rather than something else, of these things I
know [sais] absolutely nothing
To the extent that I have
affection-ideas I live chance
encounters. [and] I can merely say that it does
not agree with me, but by
virtue of what constitution of the two bodies,
of the affecting body and the
affected body, of the body which acts and the
body which is subjected, I can at
this level know nothing.... it is a knowledge
[connaissance] of effects
independent of the knowledge of causes. Thus
they are chance encounters.
But what is a body?.. It's
the permanence of a relation of
movement and rest through all the changes which
affect all the parts, taken to
infinity, of the body under consideration....
Spinoza says that evil is not
difficult, evil is a bad encounter. Encountering
a body which mixes badly with
your own. Mixing badly means mixing in
conditions such that one of your
subordinate or constituent relations is either
threatened, compromised or even
destroyed.
how could one rise to a
knowledge [connaissance] of causes?
For the moment we see clearly that all that is
given to us is ideas of
affection, ideas of mixture. For the moment we
see clearly that since birth we
have been condemned to chance encounters, so
things aren't going well.... Spinoza
will affirm strongly, in book two, that we can
only know [connaÓtre] ourselves
and we can only know external bodies by the
affections that the external bodies
produce on our own. For those who can recall a
little Descartes, this is the
basic anti-cartesian proposition since it
excludes every apprehension of the
thinking thing by itself, that is it excludes
all possibility of the cogito. I
only ever know the mixtures of bodies and I only
know myself by way of the
action of other bodies on me and by way of
mixtures.
[Getting back to sadness
and joy] Spinoza will engender all
the passions, in their details, on the basis of
these two fundamental affects
[and because the 2 fundamental emotions are
related to the body and its powers
to act after mixing etc] As long as you don't
know what power a body has to be
affected, as long as you learn like that, in
chance encounters, you will not
have the wise life, you will not have wisdom....
It's obvious that the
racehorse and the draft horse are the same
species, two varieties of the same
species, yet their affects are very different,
their maladies are absolutely
different, their capacities of being affected
are completely different and,
from this point of view, we must say that a
draft horse is closer to an ox than
to a racehorse.... These are very concrete
things: you have a headache and you
say, “I can't even read anymore”; this means
that your force of existing
invests the trace of the migraine so fully, it
implies changes in one of your
subordinate relations, it invests the trace of
your migraine so fully that your
power of acting is diminished accordingly
whether the power of
acting increases or diminishes, the
corresponding affect (affectus) is always a
passion. [IN the Ethics, though]
{Spinoza is]
going to speak to us of
active affects where there are no longer
passions, where the power of acting is
conquered instead of passing by all these
continuous variations.
Spinoza doesn't make up a
morality, for a very simply
reason: he never asks what we must do, he always
asks what we are capable of,
what's in our power, ethics is a problem of
power, never a problem of duty. In
this sense Spinoza is profoundly immoral.
Regarding the moral problem, good and
evil, he has a happy nature because he doesn't
even comprehend what this means.
What he comprehends are good encounters, bad
encounters, increases and
diminutions of power. Thus he makes an ethics
and not at all a morality. This
is why he so struck Nietzsche.
Already at the level of
notion-ideas a kind of escape from
this world is going to appear. One is completely
smothered, enclosed in a world
of absolute impotence, even when my power of
acting increases it's on a segment
of variation [but] ... A notion-idea no longer
concerns the effect of another
body on mine, it's an idea which concerns and
which has for its object the agreement
or disagreement of the characteristic relations
between two bodies.... I would
say that the nominal definition of the notion is
that it's an idea which,
instead of representing the effect of a body on
another, that is to say the
mixture of two bodies, represents the internal
agreement or disagreement of the
characteristic relations of the two bodies....
An example: if I knew enough
about the characteristic relation of the body
named arsenic and the
characteristic relation of the human body, I
could form a notion of the
disagreement of these two relations to the point
that the arsenic, under its
characteristic relation, destroys the
characteristic relation of my body.... the
notion is raised to the comprehension of the
cause...We are not far from an analytical
geometry.
He always defines a common
notion like this: it's the idea
of something which is common to all bodies or to
several bodies—at least
two—and which is common to the whole and to the
part. Therefore there surely
are common notions which are common to all
minds, but they're common to all
minds only to the extent that they are first the
idea of something which is
common to all bodies. Therefore these are not at
all abstract notions.
If you consider yourself
as affected with sadness, I believe
that everything is wretched, there is no longer
an exit for one simple reason:
nothing in sadness, which diminishes your power
of acting, can induce you from
within sadness to form a notion common to
something which would be common to
the bodies which affect you with sadness and to
your own. For one very simple
reason, that the body which affects you with
sadness only affects you with
sadness to the extent that it affects you in a
relation which does not agree
with your own. Spinoza means something very
simple, that sadness makes no one
intelligent... nothing in sadness can induce you
to form the common notion,
that is to say the idea of a something in common
between two bodies and two
souls.... In an affect of joy, therefore, the
body which affects you is
indicated as combining its relation with your
own and not as its relation
decomposing your own. At that point, something
induces you to form a notion of
what is common to the body which affects you and
to your own body, to the soul
which affects you and to your own soul. In this
sense joy makes one
intelligent.... One never makes progress on a
homogeneous line, something here
makes us make progress down there, as if a small
joy here had released a
trigger.... f you succeed in forming a common
notion, at whatever point you
yourself have a relation with such a person or
such an animal, you say: I've
finally understood something, I am less stupid
than yesterday. [sounds like US
pragmatism!!]... You formed it quite locally, it
didn't give you all the common
notions. Spinoza doesn't think at all like a
rationalist... being reasonable,
or being wise, is a problem of becoming, which
changes in a singular fashion
the contents of the concept of reason.
The most beautiful thing
is to live on the edges, at the
limit of her/his own power of being affected, on
the condition that this be the
joyful limit since there is the limit of joy and
the limit of sadness
But if we knew in what
order the relations of the whole
universe are combined, we could define a power
of being affected of the whole
universe, which would be the cosmos, the world
insofar as it's a body or a
soul. At this moment the whole world is only one
single body following the
order of relations which are combined. At this
moment you have, to speak
precisely, a universal power of being affected:
God, who is the whole universe
insofar as He is its cause, has by nature a
universal power of being affected.
You leave joyful passions,
the increase in the power of
acting; you make use of them to form common
notions of a first type, the notion
of what there was in common between the body
which affected me with joy and my
own body, you open up to a maximum your living
common notions and you descend
once again toward sadness, this time with common
notions that you form in order
to comprehend in what way such a body disagrees
with your own, such a soul
disagrees with your own.
You can already say that
you are within philosophy. One
single thing counts, the way of living.... One
has left the passions behind.
One has acquired formal possession of the power
of acting. The formation of
notions, which are not abstract ideas, which are
literally rules of life, gives
me possession of the power of acting.
Only Spinoza has entered
into the third kind. Above the
common notions... Beyond even the compositions
of relations, beyond the
internal agreements which define the common
notions, there are the singular
essences.... The common notions or the relations
which characterize me still
concern the extensive parts of my body...
Whereas the singular essence is a
degree of power [puissance], that is to say
these are my thresholds of
intensity.... Thus it would be necessary to
conceive the singular essence of
each one as this kind of intensity, or limit of
intensity. It's singular
because, whether it be our community of genera
or species, we are all human for
example, yet none of us has the same threshold.
[Then a digression into
the influence of God even on Spinoza.
Via a digression into painting...] It's true
that there are constraints from
the Church which operate on the painter, but
there is a transformation of
constraints into means of creation. They make
use of God in order to achieve a
liberation of forms, to push the forms to the
point where the forms have
nothing to do with an illustration.... Just as I
said that God and Christ
offered an extraordinary opportunity for
painting to free lines, colors and
movements from the constraints of resemblance,
so God and the theme of God
offered the irreplacable opportunity for
philosophy to free the object of
creation in philosophy?... The concept is freed
at the level of God because it
no longer has the task of representing
something... That's why what Spinoza is
going to name God, in the first book of The
Ethics, is going to be the
strangest thing in the world. It's going to be
the concept insofar as it brings
together the set [ensemble] of all these
possibilities.
[For Leibniz, on the
compossibles etc] So then which set of
possibles will pass into existence? Only that
set of possibles that, on its
own, has the greatest quantity of perfection
will pass into existence. The
others will be repressed [refoulés]. It's
God's will that chooses the best of
all possible worlds
It's not a matter of
asking oneself what a concept
represents. It's necessary to ask oneself what
its place is in a set of other
concepts... You never say that a philosopher
contradicts himself; you will ask
such-and-such page, in what sequence to put it,
at what level of the sequence?
[so apparently contradictory statements should
really be read as describing
transformations] ... Until Spinoza philosophy
proceeded essentially by way of
sequences. And on this road the shades
concerning causality were very
important. Is original causality or the first
cause emanative, immanent, creative
or something else again?... Treating God as an
emanative cause can fit because
there is still the distinction between cause and
effect. But as immanent cause,
such that we no longer know very well how to
distinguish cause and effect, that
is to say treating God and the creature the
same, that becomes much more
difficult. Immanence was above all danger. So
much so that the idea of an
immanent cause appears constantly in the history
of philosophy, but as
[something] held in check, kept at such-and-such
a level of the sequence, not
having value... you confuse God and the
creature. That's the fatal accusation
Spinoza arrives.... the
immanent cause, that is to say this
cause that's quite bizarre in that, not only
does it remain in itself in order
to produce, but what it produces remains in it.
God is in the world, the world
is in God.... Spinoza's speculative proposition
is: there is only one single
absolutely infinite substance, that is one
possessing all attributes, and what
are called creatures are not creatures but modes
or manners [manières] of being
of this substance. Therefore one single
substance having all attributes and
whose products are the modes, the ways of being.
Hence if these are the manners
of being of the substance having all attributes,
these modes exist in the
attributes of the substance.
If substance possesses
equally all attributes, there is no
hierarchy among the attributes, one is not worth
more than another.... First
consequence: he's the one who dares to do what
many had wanted to do, namely to
free the immanent cause completely of all
subordination to other processes of
causality. There is only one cause, and it's
immanent... he substituted a
veritable plane of immanence for the sequence...
extract the concept from the
state of variations of sequences and project
everything onto a fixed plane
which is one of immanence
In my view it's the most
fundamental attempt to give a
status to the univocity of being, an absolutely
univocal being. Univocal being
is precisely what Spinoza defines as being the
substance having all attributes
equal, having all things as modes... Geometric
exposition is no longer the
expression of a moment in a sequence at all, it
can be completely extricated
since the geometric method is going to be the
process which consists in filling
in the fixed plane of absolutely infinite
substance
Power (puissance) is not a
quality, but neither are they
so-called extensive quantities. Then even if
they are intensive quantities, it
is a very special quantitative scale, an
intensive scale. This would mean:
things have more or less intensity, it would be
the intensity of the thing
which would be, which would replace its essence,
which would define the thing
in itself, it would be its intensity. You
understand perhaps the link to
Ontology. The more intense a thing is, [the]
more precisely is that intensity
its relation to being: the intensity of the
thing is its relation with
being.... what things will is power [doesn’t
mean that everything wills power
etc, but rather] this conversion [in
philosophy?] where things (?) are no
longer defined by a qualitative essence, man as
reasonable animal, but are
defined by a quantifiable power (puissance).
[To see this we need to
lpok at the history of philosophy,
including the now discredited notion of natural
law or natural right]:
On the whole, I would say
that, in this whole conception,
natural right, that which constitutes natural
right is that which conforms to
the essence. I would almost say that there are
several propositions, in this
classical theory of natural right. I would just
like you to retain them,
because when I return to power‚(puissance) I
would like you to have in mind
these four propositions. Four basic propositions
which are the basis of this
conception of classical natural right.
First proposition: a thing
is defined by its essence.
Natural right is therefore that which conforms
to the essence of something. The
essence of man is: reasonable animal. This has
defined his natural right.
What‚s more, in effect, to be reasonable‚ is the
law of his nature. The law of
nature intervenes here. There is the first
proposition; thus preference is
given to the essences.
Second proposition, in this classical theory:
from now on, you understand,
natural right can not refer, and it is striking
that for most of the authors of
Antiquity it is very much like this, natural
right doesn't refer to a state
which would be supposed to precede society. The
state of nature is not a
pre-social state, certainly not, it could not
be. The state of nature is the
state that conforms to the essence in a good
society. What do we call a good
society? We will call a good society, a society
where man can realise his
essence. So the state of nature is not before
the social state, the state of
nature it is the state that conforms to the
essence in the best possible
society, that is the most apt to realise the
essence. There is the second proposition
of classical natural right.
Third proposition of classical natural right,
they emanate from it: what is
first is duty: we have rights only insofar as we
have duties. It is very
politically practical, all this. It is duties.
Indeed, what is duty? Here,
there is a term, there is a concept of Cicero in
Latin, which is very difficult
to translate and which indicates this idea of
functional duty, the duties of
function. It is the term officium‚. One of the
most important books of Cicero
from the point of view of natural right is a
book entitled De officiis‚ On the
Subject of the functional duties‚.
And why is it this that is first, duty in
existence? It is because duty is
precisely the conditions under which I can best
realise the essence, i.e. to have
a life in conformity with the essence, in the
best possible society.
Fourth proposition: there
follows a practical rule which
will have a great political importance. We could
summarize it under the title:
the competence of the sage. What is the sage? It
is somebody who is singularly
competent in the research that relates to the
essence, and all that follows
from it. The sage is the one who knows what the
essence is. Thus there is a
principle of competence of the sage because it
is the sage who tells us what
our essence is, what is the best society, i.e.
the society most capable of
realizing the essence, and what are our
functional duties, our officia‚, i.e.
under which conditions we can realise the
essence. All this is the competence
of the sage. And to the question: to what does
the classical sage lay claim?
One must reply that the classical sage claims to
determine what the essence is,
and consequently all kinds of practical tasks
follow from this. Hence the
political claims of the sage. Therefore, if I
summarize this classical
conception of natural right, as a result you
understand why Christianity will
be very interested by this ancient conception of
natural right. It will
integrate it into what it will call natural
theology, making it one of its fundamental
parts.
[But then Hobbes says]
that things are not defined by an
essence, they are defined by a power
(puissance). Thus natural right is not
what is in conformity with the essence of the
thing, it is everything that the
thing can do. And in the right of something,
animal or man, everything that it
can do. And in its right everything that it can
do. It is at this time that the
great propositions of the type, but the large
fish eat the small ones start. It
is its right of nature.... Hobbes comes along
and says: natural right equals
power, therefore what you can do is your natural
right....[thyen he says] in
the social state, there are prohibitions, there
are defenses, there are things
that I can do but it is defended. That means
that it is not natural right, it
is social right. It is in your natural right to
kill your neighbor, but it is
not in your social right.... That means that you
can only think society as a
product of becoming... And in the same way,
nobody is born reasonable.... what
is first is right‚. Consequently, duties will
only be secondary obligations
tending to limit the rights for the becoming
social of man... all kinds of
questions are put between brackets. Why do they
have to become social? Is it
interesting to become social?
there is no difference
between the reasonable man and the
madman from the point of view of natural right.
Why? Because each one does
everything that he can. The identity of right
and power ensures the equality,
the identity of all beings on the quantitative
scale. Of course, there will be
a difference between the reasonable man and the
madman, but in the civil state,
in the social state, not from the point of view
of natural right...[so]... Nobody
is competent for me.... you have the development
and all the seeds of a
juridical conception of Ethics: beings are
defined by their power.
Spinoza takes up this
whole conception of natural Right in
Hobbes...the essence of things was nothing other
than their power... existing
things are not defined by an essence, but by
power and they have more or less
power. Their right will be the power of each
one, the right of each one will be
the power of each one, they have more or less
power. There is thus a
quantitative scale of beings from the point of
view of power....[so] you are
not defined by an essence, or rather your
essence is identical to that which
you can do, i.e. you are a degree on a scale of
powers... you don’t have an
essence or you only have an essence identical to
your power
It is what Nietzsche also
said with his story of the Eternal
return, he said: it is not difficult to know if
something is good or not, this
question is not very complicated; it is not an
affair of morals. He said make
the following test, which would only be in your
head. Do you see yourselves
doing it an infinite number of times....
Whatever I do, whatever I say, could I
make of it a mode of existence? If I couldn‚t it
is ugly, it is evil , it is
bad
[Spinoza asks] So, what is
this trick of the strong man? It
is a way of life, it is a mode of existence that
is opposed to the mode of
existence which he calls the slave or the
impotent... the resemblances to
Nietzsche are fundamental... Slavery as a way of
life and not as social
status.... But on the same side, the impotent or
the slaves, he puts who ? It
will become more significant for us: he puts
tyrants.
what is there in common
between a tyrant who has political
power, a slave, and a priest who exercises a
spiritual power?... they need to
sadden life!... because the power that they have
can only be founded on sadness
[For Nietzsche] He will say that it is saddening
life, it is always about
saddening life!, somewhere. And, indeed why?
Because it involves judging life.
Now, you will not judge life.You won’t submit it
to judgment. Life is not the
object of judgment, life is not able to be
judged, the only way in which you
could pass judgment on it is first of all to
inject it with sadness
For the slave, whatever
the situation, it is always necessary
that he sees the awful side. The nasty stuff
there. There are people who have a
genius for this: these are the slaves
[Spinoza’s] , first
innovation, to have conceived the state
of nature and natural right in a way that broke
entirely with the Ciceronian
tradition. Now, on this point, Spinoza entirely
ratifies Hobbes‚ revolution.
Second point: consequently, to have substituted
the idea of a pact of consent
as the foundation of the civil state for the
relation of competence such as it
was in traditional philosophy, from Plato to
Saint Thomas. Now, on these two
fundamental points, the civil state can only
refer to a pact of consent and not
to a relation of competence where there would be
a superiority of the sage, and
the whole conception, in addition, of the state
of nature and of natural right
as power and exercise of power, these two
fundamental points belong to Hobbes.
in what sense can Ontology
entail or must it entail a
political philosophy? Do not forget that there
is a whole political path of
Spinoza,... His political problem arises in a
very beautiful, still very
current, way; yes, there is only a political
problem that it would be necessary
to try to understand, to make ethics into
politics. To understand what? To
understand why people fight for their slavery.
They seem to be so content to be
slaves, that they will do anything to remain
slaves. How to explain such a
thing?... The whole of the seventeenth century
is full of reflections on how a
revolution can not be betrayed... Now, the
recent example for Spinoza‚s
contemporaries is the revolution of Cromwell...
Nobody [at the time] speaks
about revolution, not at all because they do not
have an equivalent in mind, it
is for a very different reason. They won‚t call
that revolution because the revolution
is Cromwell.
[Spinoza’s position looks
conservative]: What does a
political philosophy which is placed in an
ontological perspective consist of?
Is it defined by the problem of the state? Not
especially, because the others
too. A philosophy of the One will also pass by
way of the problem of the state.
The real difference does not appear elsewhere
between pure ontologies and
philosophies of the One. Philosophies of the One
are philosophies that
fundamentally imply a hierarchy of existing
things, hence the principle of
consequence, hence the principle of emanation:
from the One emanates Being,
from Being emanates other things, etc. the
hierarchies of the Neo-Platonists.
[But] ... What appears to me striking in a pure
ontology is the point at which
it repudiates the hierarchies. In effect, if
there is no One superior to being,
if being is said of everything that is and is
said of everything that is in one
and the same sense, this is what appeared to me
to be the key ontological
proposition: there is no unity superior to being
and, consequently, being is
said of everything that of which it is said,
i.e. is said of everything that
is, is said of all being [étant], in one
and the same sense... we will say that
evidently a practical hierarchy is needed, [so
where does that come from and
how can it be explained? –Zizek’s critique]
ontology does not lead to formulas
which would be those of nihilism or non-being,
of the type where everything is
the same [tout se vaut]. And yet, in certain
regards, everything is the same,
from the point of view of an ontology, i.e. the
point of view of being...The
stone, the insane, the reasonable, the animal,
from a certain point of view,
from the point of view of Being [être],
they are the same. Each is as much as
there is in it, and being is said in one and the
same sense of the stone, of
the man, of the insane, of the reasonable
In Hobbes, the political
relation is the relation of
somebody who commands and of somebody who obeys.
This is the pure political
relation. From the point of view of an ontology,
it is not that. There, Spinoza
did not go along with Hobbes at all. The problem
of an ontology is,
consequently, according to this: being is said
of everything that is, this is
how to be free. I.e. how to exercise its power
under the best conditions. And
the state, even more the civil state, i.e. the
entire society is thought like
this: the ensemble of conditions under which man
can exercise his power in the
best way. Thus it is not at all a relation of
obedience. [looks like left
Hegelianism] ...[Obvedience] it will have to be
justified by what it inscribes
in a system where society can mean only one
thing, namely the best means for
man of exercising his power... [Obedience] is
second compared to this
requirement. In a philosophy of the One,
obedience is obviously first, i.e. the
political relation is the relation of obedience,
it is not the relation of the
exercise of power.
We will find this problem
again in Nietzsche: what is equal?
What is equal is that each being, whatever it
is, in every way exercises all
that it can of its power, that, that makes all
beings equal. But the powers are
not equal. But each endeavours to persevere in
its being, i.e. exercise its
power. From this point of view, all beings are
the same, they are all in being
and being is equal. Being is also said of
everything that is, but everything
that is is not equal, i.e. does not have the
same power. But being which is
said of everything that is, that, that is equal.
With that, it doesn't‚t
prevent there being differences between beings.
From the point of view of the
difference between beings a whole idea of
aristocracy can be established,
namely there are the better ones. [formal
equality in philosophy, inequality in
politics – how come?]
judgment is done in the
name of a superiority of the One
over being. We can judge being precisely because
there is an authority superior
to being. Thus the hierarchy is inscribed as of
this difference, since the
hierarchy, even its foundation, is the
transcendence of the One over being....
[differences
– the philosophical category that explains
hierarchy]
will be conceived in a hierarchical way
very,
very secondarily, to catch up with, to reconcile
the things. But in the first
intuition, the difference is not
hierarchical.... they often speak as if there
had been a hierarchy, they will say that the
reasonable man is better than the
malicious one, but better in what sense and why?
It is for reasons of power and
exercise of power, not for reasons of
hierarchy.[so impure as to be capable of
being ignored then?]
[Further example of the
Zizek question] In a pure Ontology,
where there is no One superior to being, I say
evil is nothing, there is no
evil, there is being. Okay. But that engages me
with something completely new,
it is that if evil is nothing, then the good is
nothing either... How is
[Spinoza’s} ethics made if there is neither good
nor evil?... On
the project of a pure ontology, how is it
that Spinoza calls this pure ontology an Ethics?
[to keep out of the controversies
raging in the Netherlands at the time, said
Deleuze earlier – Spinoza was seen
as denying God as first cause].
Spinoza’s pure Ontology is
presented as the absolutely
infinite single position. Consequently, the
beings (étants), this absolutely
infinite single substance, is being. Being
(être) as being. Consequently, the
beings (étants) will not be Beings
(êtres), they will be what Spinoza calls
modes, the modes of absolutely infinite
substance. And a mode is what? It is a
manner of being. The beings (étants) or
what exists (existants) are not Beings
(êtres), there is Being only in the form
of absolutely infinite substance.
Consequently, we who are beings (étants),
we who are what exists (existants),
we will not be Beings (êtres), we will be
manners of Being (être) of this
substance. And if I ask myself what is the most
immediate sense of the word
ethics, in what way is it already other than
morality, well, ethics is better
known to us today under another name, the word
ethology.
I do not believe that a
morality [different from ethics] can
be made from the point of view of an ontology.
Why? Because morality always
implies something superior to Being; what is
superior to Being is something
which plays the role of the One, of the Good, it
is the One superior to Being.
Indeed, morality is the enterprise of judging
not only all that is, but Being
itself. Now one can only judge Being in the name
of an authority higher than
Being.
Even if man is in essence
a reasonable animal, he does not
cease to behave in an unreasonable way. How does
that happen? It is because the
essence of man, as such, is not necessarily
realised. Why? Because man is not
pure reason, and then there are accidents, he
doesn’t cease being diverted. The
whole classical conception of man consists in
inviting him to agree with his
essence because this essence is like a
potentiality, which is not necessarily
realised, and morality is the process of the
realization of the human essence.
[typical – to see departure from reason as a
kind of deviance thus
inexplicable]... Therefore, to behave in a
reasonable way, i.e. to carry out
the essence is the task of morality. Now the
essence taken as an end is value.
Note that the moral vision of the world is made
of essence. The essence is only
potential, it is necessary to realise the
essence, that will be done insofar as
the essence is taken for an end, and the values
ensure the realization of the
essence. It is this ensemble which I would call
morality.
There is no general idea
in an Ethics. There is you, this
one, that one, there are singularities. The word
essence is quite likely to
change sense. When he speaks about essence, what
interests him is not the
essence, what interests him is existence and
what exists...In other words, what
is can only be put in relation to Being at the
level of existence, and not at
the level of essence.... Not at all an essence
common to several things, but a
quantitative distinction of more and less
between existing things, that is
Ethics.... there is also a qualitative
opposition between modes of existence.
Two criteria of ethics, in other words, the
quantitative distinction of
existing things, and the qualitative opposition
of modes of existence, the
qualitative polarization of modes of existence,
will be the two ways in which
existing things are in being...These are going
to be the links of Ethics with
Ontology.
It is completely the world
of immanence. Why?... it is
different from the world of moral values such as
I have just defined them, the
moral values being precisely this kind of
tension between the essence to be
realized and the realization of the essence....
In an ethics, it is completely
different, you do not judge. In a certain
manner, you say: whatever you do, you
will only ever have what you deserve. Somebody
says or does something, you do
not relate it to values.... The point of view of
an ethics is: of what are you
capable, what can you do? Hence a return to this
sort of cry of Spinoza’s: what
can a body do?
When it is suggested to us
that, between you and me, between
two persons, between a person and an animal,
between an animal and a thing,
there is ethically, that is ontologically, only
a quantitative distinction,
what quantity is involved?... People, things,
animals distinguish themselves by
what they can do, i.e. they can't do the same
thing.... Never would a moralist
define man by what he can do, a moralist defines
man by what he is, by what he
is by right. So, a moralist defines man as a
reasonable animal. It is
essence....[Ethics by contrast says]
unreasonable is also something that man
can do. To be mad is also a part of the power
(pouvoir) of man... It is
necessary to see people as small packets of
power (pouvoir) [earlier he tried
to finesse this by saying that a reasonable man
has more power than an insane
one and so is to be preferred]... all beings
(étants) are related to a
quantitative scale which is that of power
(puissance). They have more or less
power... When, well after Spinoza, Nietzsche
will launch the concept of will to
power (volonté de puissance), I am not
saying that he intends to say this, but
above all, it means this... Making power the
object of the will is a
misunderstanding, it is just the opposite. It is
according to power that I
have, that I want this or that. The will to
power means that you will define
things, men, animals according to the effective
power that they have.
we find ourselves faced
with Blyenbergh’s two
objections[Spinoza and Blyenburgh corresponded,
apparantly] . The first
concerns the point of view of nature in general.
It comes down to saying to
Spinoza that it’s very nice to explain that
every time a body encounters
another there are relations that combine and
relations that decompose,
sometimes to the advantage of one of the two
bodies, sometimes to the advantage
of the other body. But nature itself combines
all the relations at once. Thus
in nature in general what doesn’t stop is the
fact that all the time there are
compositions and decompositions of relations,
all the time since, ultimately,
the decompositions are like the other side of
the compositions. But there is no
reason to privilege the composition of relations
over the decomposition since
the two always go together... For example: I
eat. I compose the relation with
the food I absorb. But this is done by
decomposing the food’s own relations... Thus
nature, says Blyenbergh, nature such as you
conceive it is nothing but an
immense chaos. [with no good and bad bits]
Spinoza sees no difficulty
and his reply is very clear. He
says that it is not so for a simple reason: it’s
that from the point of view of
the whole of nature, one cannot say that there
is composition and decomposition
at once since, from the point of view of the
whole of nature, there are only
compositions. There are only compositions of
relations. It’s really from the
point of view of our understanding [entendement]
that we say that such and such
relations combine to the detriment of another
such relation, which must
decompose so that the two others can combine.
But it’s because we isolate a part
of Nature. From the point of view of the
complete whole of Nature, there is
never anything but relations that combine with
each other... the decomposition
of relations does not exist from the point of
view of the whole of nature since
the whole of nature embraces all relations. Thus
there are inevitably
compositions, and that is all [definitional
reply really decompositions are
really compositions – based on an assertion
about ‘real’ nature]
[But, Blyenbugh says,
according to Deleuze] let’s approach
the other aspect, a particular point of view, my
particular point of view, that
is to say the point of view of a precise and
fixed relation. Actually, what I
call ME [Moi] is a set of precise and fixed
relations which constitute me. From
this point of view, and it’s solely from a
particular, determinable point of
view, you or me, that I can say that there are
[both] compositions and
decompositions.... I would say that there is
decomposition when the external
body acts on me in such a manner that one of my
relations, or even many of my
relations, is destroyed, that is, ceases to be
carried out... Hence
Blyenbergh’s objection, which consists in saying
that ultimately what you call
vice and virtue is whatever suits [arrange] you.
You will call it virtue every
time you compose relations, no matter what
relations you destroy, and you will
call it vice every time that one of your
relations is decomposed. In other
words you will call virtue whatever is agreeable
to you and vice whatever is
not agreeable to you... you reduce morality to a
matter of taste.
[In reply, Spinoza] wants
to show that not only does he have
a criterion for distinguising vice from virtue,
but that this criterion applies
in cases that appear very complicated, and that
further it is a criterion of
distinction, not only for distinguishing vice
from virtue, but if one
comprehends this criterion well, one can make
distinctions in cases of crime.
Evil isn’t anything. Thus
insofar as an act is positive it
cannot be a crime, it cannot be evil. Therefore
an act as a crime, if it is a
crime, it’s not so insofar as it contains
something positive, it’s from another
point of view. [so some murders are worse than
others]... Nero showed himself
to be ungrateful, unmerciful and disobedient
[when he killed his mother, unlike
Orestes]." The act is the same, the intention is
the same, there is a
difference at the level of what? It’s a third
determination...[but]... Ungrateful,
unmerciful, none of these characteristics
expresses anything to do with an
essence.
[In another relevant text]
One gets the impression that
Spinoza has acquired a kind of diabolical humor
or has gone mad.... Everything
that we do when pushed by passion, we can do
when pushed by pure reason. [as an
example, beating somebody “which is conceived
from the structure of the human
body."is a virtue] He does not cheat with the
word virtue, it’s an
exercise [effectuation] of the power of the
body, it’s what my body can do,
it’s one of the things it can do. This makes it
part of the potentiae of the
human body, of this power [puissance] in action,
it’s an act of power, and for
that very reason this is what we call virtue.
[Then it gets odd] The
determination of the action is the image of a
thing to which the image of the
act is linked. It’s truly a relation that he
himself presents as being a
relation of association: one and the same action
can be associated with any
image of a thing whatever.... Spinoza continues:
"And so we can be
determined to one and the same action both from
those images of things which we
conceive confusedly and from those images of
things we conceive clearly and
distinctly. It is evident, therefore, that every
desire which arises from a
feeling which is a passion would be of no use if
men could be guided by
reason.",,, the same action can be associated
just as well with images of
confused things as with images of clear and
distinct things. [introduction of a
value judgement to save the case here –
‘confused’ = bad]
if, between the action and
the object on which it bears, the
relation is associative, if it’s a relation of
association, then Spinoza is
quite right. That is, it’s clearly the same
action, whatever the variants might
be, which in one case is associated with my
mother’s head and in the other case
is associated with a bass drum....w hat bad is
there when I do this thing that
is an exercise [effectuation] of the power of my
body and which, in this sense,
is good? I do that, I simply give someone a blow
on the head. What is bad: that
I decompose a relation, namely my mother’s head.
In beating like that on my
mother’s head I destroy the constituent relation
of the head: my mother dies or
passes out under the blow. In Spinozist terms, I
would say that in this case I
associate my action with the image of a thing
whose relation is directly
decomposed by this action. I associate the image
of the act with the image of
something whose constituent relation is
decomposed by this act.... if the power
of a [drum]head is to produce harmonics, here
I’ve associated my action with
the image of something whose relation combines
directly with this action. That
is, I have drawn harmonics out of the drumhead.
[ie if you do harm and limit
the power of others that is bad –or as Deleuze
puts it So by convention the
actions of direct composition will be called
GOOD and the actions of direct
decomposition will be called BAD.] [here the
word ‘direct’ modifies the sense
in an important way – the first reply claimed
that in nature as a whole there
are no decompositions –now he needs them and has
to call them direct
decompositions]
we now have the method of
the analysis of action according
to Spinoza. Every action will be analyzed along
two dimensions: the image of
the act as power of the body, what a body can
do, and the image of the
associated thing, that is to say the object on
which the act bears. Between the
two there is a relation of association. It’s a
logic of action.... In killing
his mother, Nero associated his act directly
with the image of a being whose
relation would be decomposed by this act: he
killed his mother. Thus the
relation of primary, direct association is
between the act and an image of a
thing whose relation is decomposed by this
act...Orestes kills his mother
because she killed Agamemnon, that is to say
because she killed Orestes’
father. In killing his mother, Orestes pursues a
sacred vengeance. Spinoza does
not say vengeance. According to Spinoza, Orestes
associates his act, not with
the image of Clytemnestra whose relation will be
decomposed by this act, but
rather he associates it with the relation of
Agamemnon which was decomposed by
Clytemnestra. In killing his mother, Orestes
recomposes his relation with the
relation of his father. [so its a fancy way of
referring to motive or
understanding – one can kill for a good reason?]
okay, at the level of a
particular point of view, you or me,
there is always composition and decomposition of
relations at once; does that
mean that the good and the bad are mixed up and
become indiscernible? No,
replies Spinoza, because at the level of a logic
of the particular point of
view there will always be a priority [primat].
Sometimes the composition of
relations will be direct and the decomposition
indirect, and sometimes, on the
contrary, the decomposition willl be direct and
the composition indirect.
Spinoza tells us: I call good an action that
implements [opre]
a direct composition of relations even if it
implements an
indirect decomposition, and I call bad an action
that implements a direct
decomposition even if it implements an indirect
composition.... there are two
types of actions: actions in which the
decomposition comes about as if in
consequence and not in principle, because the
principle is a composition - and
this has value only for my point of view,
because from the point of view of
nature everything is composition and it’s for
that reason that God knows
neither evil nor the bad - and inversely there
are actions which directly
decompose and imply compositions only
indirectly. [of course only a philosopher
could decide which is which, and probably only
backwards or tautologically]
There is clearly a theory
of the sign in Spinoza, which
consists in relating the sign to the most
confused understanding and
imagination in the world, and in the world such
as it is, according to Spinoza,
the idea of the sign does not exist. There are
expressions, there are never
signs. When God reveals to Adam that the apple
will act as a poison, he reveals
to him a composition of relations, he reveals to
him a physical truth and he
doesn’t send him a sign at all [so a reversion
to pragmatism again]
When one is very
restricted one cannot comprehend laws as
laws. How does one comprehend them? 2 + 2 = 4 is
a composition of relations.
You have the relation two plus two, you have the
relation four, and you have
the relation of identity between the relation
two plus two and the relation
four. If you comprehend nothing, you hear this
law as an order, or as a
commandment. The little child at school
comprehends the law of nature as a
moral law: it is necessary that it be so, and if
he says something else he will
be punished. It proceeds like that according to
our restricted understanding.
If we were to grasp the laws as what they are,
as physical compositions of
relations, compositions of bodies, then notions
as strange as command and
obedience would remain completely unknown to us.
It’s to the extent that we
perceive a law that we don’t comprehend that we
apprehend it as an order; God
forbade absolutely nothing, Spinoza explains on
the subject of Adam.... The
prophet is someone who, not grasping the laws of
nature, will just ask for the
sign that guarantees to him that the order is
just.... The true language is
that of expression. The language of expression
is that of the composition of
relations to infinity.
Signs are a vital
necessity because we comprehend only a
very few of the things in the world. That’s the
way Spinoza justifies society.
Society is the institution [instauration] of the
minimum of signs indispensible
to life. [ a kind of Durkheimian idea here? Or
Althusser on the necessity of ideology.
The justification of the priesthood too]
A basely sensual appetite,
even the mere expression, one
feels that it is not good, that it is bad. It is
bad in what sense? When I am
led by a basely sensual appetite, what does that
mean? It means that: within it
there is an action, or a tendency to action: for
example desire. What happens
to the desire when am I led by a basely sensual
appetite? It is the desire of.
Good. What is this desire? It can only be
qualified by its association with an
image of a thing, for example I desire a bad
woman.
[Screwing bad women] is in
my body’s power. So it is a
virtue, and in this sense it is the expression
of a power... But if I remained
there with it, I would have no means of
distinguishing the basely sensual
appetite from the most beautiful of loves.
[classic -- finds a problem that
must be solved and modifies the philosophy to
suit it --=claiming to be all
first principle axiomatic stuff first though]...
It is because, in fact [sic],
I associate my action, or the image of my
action, with the image of a thing
whose relation is decomposed by this action. In
several different ways, in all
ways, for example if I am married, in the very
example that Spinoza took, I
decompose a relation, the relation of the couple
The difference is, simply,
that in the most beautiful of
loves, my action, the same, exactly the same, my
physical action, my bodily
action, is associated with an image of the thing
whose relation is directly
combined, directly composed with the relation of
my action. It is in this sense
that the two uniting individuals lovingly form
an individual which has both of
them as parts, Spinoza would say. On the
contrary, in the basely sensual love,
the one destroys the other, the other destroys
the one, that is there is a
whole process of decomposition of relations... All this
is very concrete. So it works.
[pathetic argument by common sense or common
acclamation now]
[However] Spinoza tells
us: you don't choose, in the end,
the image of the thing with which your action is
associated. It engages a whole
play of causes and of effects which escape
you.[unless you are a philosopher of
course]... Spinoza is not one of those who
believes in a free will. No, it is a
whole determinism which associates the images of
things with the actions. Then
what’s more troubling, the formula: I am as
perfect as I can be according to
the affections that I have. [If Iwish
otherwise]... It merely means that my
mind compares a state that I have to a state
that I don't have, in other words
it is not a real relation, it is a comparison of
the mind. A pure comparison of
the mind. And Spinoza goes so far as to say: you
might as well say at that
moment there that the stone is deprived of
sight. You might as well say at that
moment there that the stone is deprived of
sight. Indeed, why wouldn‚t I
compare the stone to a human organism, and in
the name of a same comparison of
the mind, I would say: the stone doesn't see,
therefore it is deprived of sight
[But this must be just a provocation by Spinoza]
is the comparison of the mind
of the same type? Evidently not! Why? To say
that the stone is deprived of
sight is, on the whole, to say that nothing in
it contains the possibility of
seeing. While, when I say: he is deprived of
true love, it is not a comparison
of the same type, since, this time, I don’t rule
out that at other moments this
being here has experienced something which
resembled true love.
it is just as stupid to
say that the blind man is deprived
of sight as it is to say: the stone is deprived
of sight. And the blind man,
then? He is as perfect as he can be, according
to what? You see even so,
Spinoza doesn't say to us: according to his
power (puissance); he says that the
blind man is as perfect as he can be according
to the affections of his power,
that is according to the images of which he is
capable. [Pangloss lives]
Blyenbergh retorts: you
cannot assimilate the blind man not
seeing and the stone not seeing, you can only
make such an assimilation if, at
the same time, you pose a kind of pure
instantaneity of the essence, namely:
there belongs to an essence only the present,
instantaneous affection that it
experiences insofar as it experiences it.... If
indeed I am saying: there
belongs to my essence only the affection that I
experience here and now, then,
indeed, I am not deprived of anything... And
Spinoza answers quietly: yes,
that’s the way it is... He began by telling us:
the essences are eternal, and
now he tells us: the essences are instantaneous.
[so Spinoza must be weaselling
again –now there are two bits to an essence –so
much for monism] -- the
essences are eternal, but those things which
belongs to the essence are
instantaneous; there belongs to my essence only
what I experience actually
insofar as I experience it actually
Blyenbergh protests here,
he says: but in the end, you
cannot define the essence by instantaneity, what
does this mean? Then it is a
pure instantaneity? Sometimes you have a basely
sensual appetite, sometimes you
have a better love, and you will say each time
that you are as perfect as you
can be, there as in a series of flashes!...
There is an irreducibility of
duration. In other words the essence cannot be
measured in its instantaneous
states.... On this point no response from
Spinoza... I think, ...[because]... Spinoza
above all doesn't want to give Blyenbergh, for
reasons which are his own, he
above all doesn't want to give Blyenbergh the
idea of what this book [the
Ethics, which would explain] is, this book of
which everyone is speaking at the
time, that Spinoza experiences the need to hide
because he feels that he has a
lot to fear. He doesn't want to give Blyenbergh,
whom he feels to be an enemy,
he doesn't want to give him an idea of what the
Ethics is. So he stops the
correspondence.
But it is up to us to try
to reconstitute this response.
Spinoza knows very well that there is duration.
You see that we are now in the
process of playing with three terms: eternity,
instantaneity, duration.... What
is instantaneity? Instantaneity is the modality
of affection of essence.
Formula: I am always as perfect as I can be
according to the affections that I
have here and now. Therefore affection is
actually an instantaneous cut. In
effect it is the species of horizontal relation
between an action and an image
of a thing. Third dimension, it is as if we were
in the process of constituting
the three dimensions of what we could call the
sphere....[Further]... Spinoza,
if only by his terminology, distinguishes well
between the affectio and the
affectus, the affection and the affect
The affection envelops an
affect. You recall, the affection
is the effect ˜ literally if you want to give it
an absolutely rigorous
definition ˜ it is the instantaneous effect of
an image of a thing on me. For
example perceptions are affections. The image of
things associated with my
action is an affection. The affection envelops,
implicates, all of these are
the words Spinoza constantly uses. To envelope:
it is necessary to really take
them as material metaphors, that is that within
the affection there is an
affect.... What does my affection, that is the
image of the thing and the
effect of this image on me, what does it
envelop? It envelops a passage or a
transition... Duration is the lived passage, the
lived transition. What is
duration? Never anything but the passage from
one thing to another, it suffices
to add, insofar as it is lived.
When, centuries later,
Bergson will make duration into a
philosophical concept, it will obviously be with
wholly different influences.
It will be according to itself above all, it
will not be under the influence of
Spinoza. Nevertheless, I am just pointing out
that the Bergsonian use of
duration coincides strictly. When Bergson tries
to make us understand what he
calls duration‚, he says: you can consider
psychic states as close together as
you want in time, you can consider the state A
and the state A‚ as separated by
a minute, but just as well by a second, by a
thousandth of a second, that is
you can make more and more cuts, increasingly
tight, increasingly close to one
another. You may well go to the infinite, says
Bergson, in your decomposition
of time, by establishing cuts with increasing
rapidity, but you will only ever
reach states. And he adds that the states are
always of space. The cuts are
always spatial. And you will have brought your
cuts together very well, you
will let something necessarily escape, it is the
passage from one cut to
another, however small it may be. Now, what does
he call duration, at its
simplest? It is the passage from one cut to
another, it is the passage from one
state to another. The passage from one state to
another is not a state... In
one sense duration is always behind our backs,
it is at our backs that it
happens. It is between two blinks of the eye. If
you want an approximation of
duration: I look at someone, I look at someone,
duration is neither here nor
there. Duration is: what has happened between
the two?... It is this that every
affection envelops. I would say: every affection
envelops the passage by which
we arrive at it. Or equally well: every
affection envelops the passage by which
we arrive at it, and by which we leave it,
towards another affection, however
close the two affections considered are.... The
essence belongs to itself under
the form of the eternity, the affection belongs
to the essence under the form
of instantaneity, the affect belongs to the
essence under the form of duration.
[so we have weaselled out two aspects of the
essence – three in fact]
[Spinoza says] Every
affection, that is every determinable
state at a single moment, envelops an affect, a
passage.... But the passage, I
don't ask what it envelops, it is enveloped; I
ask of what does it consist,
what is it? And my response from Spinoza, is it
obvious what it is? It is
increase and decrease of my power (puissance).
It is increase or decrease of my
power, even infinitesimally.... Suppose that in
the dark you were in deep state
of meditation. Your whole body was focused on
this extreme meditation. You held
something. The other brute arrives and turns on
the light, if need be you lose
an idea that you were going to have. You turn
around, you are furious.
Every affection is
instantaneous, he will always say this,
and he will always say: I am as perfect as I can
be according to what I have in
the instant. It is the sphere of belonging of
the instantaneous essence. In
this sense, there is neither good nor bad. But
in return, the instantaneous
state always envelopes an increase or a decrease
of power, and in this sense
there is good and bad... not from the point of
view of its state, but from the
point of view of its passage, from the point of
view of its duration, there is
something bad in becoming blind, there is
something good in becoming seeing,
since it is either decrease of power or else
increase of power.[ shifts the
issue of good and bad to duration, passage –
growth is the good?]... The
affects which are increases of power we will
call joys, the affects which are
decreases of power we will call sadnesses.
[circle is complete]... Sadness is a
affect enveloped by an affection. The affection
is what? It is an image of a
thing which causes me sadness, which gives me
sadness... The thing which gives
me sadness is the thing whose relations don't
agree with mine. That is
affection. All things whose relations tend to
decompose one of my relations or
the totality of my relations affect me with
sadness. In terms of affectio you have
there a strict correspondence, in terms of
affectio, I would say: the thing has
relations which are not composed with mine, and
which tend to decompose mine.
Here I am speaking in terms of affectio. In
terms of affects I would say: this
thing affects me with sadness, therefore by the
same token], in the same way,
decreases my power.
There are joys of hate.
Are these joys? We can at least say,
and this is going to advance us a lot for later,
that these joys are strangely
compensatory, that is indirect. What is first in
hate, when you have feelings
of hate, always look for the sadness at base,
that is your power of acting was
impeded, was decreased. And even if you have, if
you have a diabolical heart,
even if you have to believe that this heart
flourishes in the joys of hate,
these joys of hate, as immense as they are, will
never get rid of the nasty
little sadness of which you are a part; your
joys are joys of compensation. The
man of hate, the man of resentment, etc., for
Spinoza, is the one all of whose
joys are poisoned by the initial sadness,
because sadness is in these same
joys. In the end he can only derive joy from
sadness.... These are indirect
joys. [the more empirical cases appear to
contradict the general principles the
more you have to qualify and extend the
principles ad hoc]
What happens when I
encounter a body whose relation doesn't
compose with mine?... a phenomenon happens which
is like a kind of fixation.
What does this mean, a fixation? That is, a part
of my power is entirely
devoted to investing and to isolating the trace,
on me, of the object which
doesn't agree with me... this quantity of power
that I‚ve devoted to investing
the trace of the disagreeable thing, this is the
amount of my power that is
decreased, which is removed from me, which is as
it were immobilized.... This
is the tonality affective sadness‚: a part of my
power serves this unworthy
need which consists in warding off the thing,
warding off the action of the
thing. So much immobilized power. To ward off
the thing is to prevent it from
destroying my relations, therefore I‚ve
toughened my relations;
The experience of joy as
Spinoza presents it, for example I
encounter something which agrees, which agrees
with my relations... music that
I like, there, my whole body, and my soul ˜ it
goes without saying ˜ composes
its relations with the resonant relations. This
is what is meant by the music
that I like: my power is increased [entirely
tautological]... when the
relations are composed, the two things of which
the relations are composed,
form a superior individual, a third individual
which encompasses and takes them
as parts... individual of which me, or the
music, are no more than a part. I
would say, from now on, that my power
(puissance) is in expansion, or that it
increases. [entirely imaginary wholeness here –
what happened to materialism?
Just another way of saying I empathise with the
music]... to increase one‚s
power (puissance) is precisely to compose
relations such that the thing and I,
which compose the relations, are no more than
two sub-individualities of a new
individual, a formidable new individual.... it
is always by composing my
relations with other relations, and it is under
such a profile, under such an
aspect that I invent this third individual of
which the other and myself are no
more than parts, sub-individuals. [hints of US
prag again]
there are people who are
so impotent that they are the ones
who are dangerous, they are the ones who take
power (pouvoir)... There are
people who can only reign, who only acquire
power (pouvoir) by way of sadness
and by instituting a regime of sadness of the
type: repent‚, of the type hate
someone‚ and if you don't have anyone to hate,
hate yourself, etc. [But] in a
happy love, in a love of joy, what happens? You
compose a maximum of relations
with a maximum of relations of the other,
bodily, perceptual, all kinds of
natures
How to live? You don't
know beforehand which are the
relations. For example you are not necessarily
going to find your own music... One
goes along feeling one‚s way, one goes along
blind. That works, that doesn't
work, etc. {prag]... it is no longer at all the
domain of morality. It is not
necessary to do anything at all, it is necessary
to find. It is necessary to
find his thing, that is not at all to withdraw,
it is necessary to invent the
superior individualities into which I can enter
as a part, for these
individualities do not pre-exist
I am a degree of power and
it is in this sense that I am
eternal. No one has the same degree of power as
another. See, we will have need
of it later, the fact that it is a quantitative
conception of individuation.
But it is a special quantity since it is a
quantity of power (puissance). A
quantity of power we have always called an
intensity.
[In correspondence with
Meyer, Spinoza drew] Two
[non-]concentric circles of which one is inside
the other. Note the greatest
and the smallest distance from one circle to the
other... it seems to me, he
tells us: in the case of this double figure, you
can not say that you don't
have a limit or threshold. You have a threshold,
you have a limit. You even
have two limits: the outer circle, the inner
circle, or what comes down to the
same thing, the greatest distance from one
circle to the other, or the least
distance. You have a maximum and a minimum....
you trace all the lines, all the
segments which go from one circle to the other.
You evidently have an infinity....
And yet there is a limit. There is a limit since
you have the limit of the big
circle and the limit of the small circle. So
there is something infinite and
yet it is not unlimited. [and hte implication
is]... Essences are degrees of
power, but what is a degree of power? A degree
of power is a difference between
a maximum and a minimum. It is in this way that
it is an intensive quantity. A
degree of power is a difference in itself.
He thinks that nothing at
all belongs to the nature of man.
He is an author who thinks everything, really,
in terms of Becoming.... We are
completely at the mercy of encounters, that is:
we are completely at the mercy
of decompositions.... Hence I said: there is a
first aspect of reason. The
first effort of reason, I believe, is very
curious in Spinoza, it is a kind of
extraordinarily groping effort... It is all a
kind of apprenticeship in order
to evaluate or have signs, I did say signs, to
organize or to find signs that
tell me a little of which relations agree with
me and which relations don't
agree with me.... This is already what Spinoza
will call, and it will be the
first aspect of reason, a kind of double aspect,
selecting-composing. [all prag
to me]... at this level, we have no previous
knowledge, we have no preexisting
knowledge, we don't have scientific knowledge.
It is not about science. It is
really about living experimentation. It is about
apprenticeship: I never stop
deceiving myself, I never stop running into
situations which don't agree with
me, I never stop etc., etc...And little by
little is sketched out a kind of
beginning of wisdom
Jaspers had launched, and
which was a theme, it seems to me,
which was very profound: he distinguished two
types of situation, limit
situations and simple everyday situations. He
said: limit situations could
befall us at any time, they are precisely
situations which we can’t
anticipate... I learn at the last moment,
sometimes too late, what I was
capable of. What I was capable of for better or
worse... someone who, at the
limit, renders himself impotent... manages to
put himself in states where he
can no longer budge,... I destroy myself because
if I can no longer budge at
all, in the end I risk dying of it, in the end I
would have the boredom of
another nature that I would not have
foreseen....
I would call reason, or effort of reason,
conatus of reason,
effort of reason, this tendency to select, to
learn the relations, this
apprenticeship of the relations which are
composed or which are not composed...
how can this long apprenticeship lead me to a
more sure stage, where I am more
sure of myself, that is where I become
reasonable, where I become free. How can
this be done?
The individual insofar as
relation refers us to a whole
plane that can be designated by the name of
composition [compositio]. All
individuals being relations, there is a
composition of individuals among
themselves, and individuation is inseparable
from this movement of composition.
Second point, the individual is power [puissance
ö potentiae]. This is the
second great concept of individuality. No longer
composition that refers to
relations, but potentiae. We find the modus
intrinsecus quite often in the
Middle Ages, in certain traditions, under the
name gradus. This is degree. The
intrinsic mode or degree.
it's by virtue of this
that the individual is not
substance.... because substance concerns a term
and not a relation... If it's
power it's not substance either because,
fundamentally, whatever is substance
is form. It's the form that is called
substantial. And lastly, if it's degree
it's not substance either since every degree
refers to a quality that it
graduates, every degree is degree of a quality.
Now what determines a substance
is a quality, but the degree of a quality is not
substance....
The intellect has often
been defined as the faculty of
setting out relations. Precisely in intellectual
activity there is a kind of
infinite that is implied [impliqué]. At
the level of relation the implication
of the infinite occurs through intellectual
activity... mathematical means [are
required] .. to find a first statute of relation
independent of its terms... The
infinitesimal calculus puts into play a certain
type of relation.... a
differential relation, and a differential
relation is of the type dy/dx
=...Whatever quantity of y you are given, dy
will be smaller than this value.
Thus I can say that dy as a vanishing quantity
is strictly equal to zero in
relation to y. In the same way dx is strictly
equal to zero in relation to x...
The relation subsists and the differential
relation will present itself as the
subsistence of the relation when the terms
vanish. They have found the
mathematical convention that allows them to
treat relations independently of
their terms. Now what is this mathematical
convention? I summarize. It's the
infinitely small. Pure relation thus necessarily
implies the infinite under the
form of the infinitely small since pure relation
will be the differential
relation between infinitely small quantities...
One comprehends that dy/dx = z,
that is to say the relation that is independent
of its terms will designate a
third term and will serve in the measurement and
in the determination of a
third term: the trigonometric tangent. In this
sense I can say that the
infinite relation, that is to say the relation
between the infinitely small,
refers to something finite.... a formula of the
infinite from the seventeenth
century, I would say that something finite
consists of an infinity [infinité]
under a certain relation
How is the individual a
relation? You will find, at the
level of the individual, a limit. This does not
prevent there having been some
infinite, this does not prevent there being
relations and these relations being
composed, the relations of one individual are
composed with another; and there
is always a limit that marks the finitude of the
individual, and there is
always an infinite of a certain order that is
involved by the relation.
One does not comprehend
the infinite because it is
incomprehensible, but one conceives it...
Comprehending would be grasping the
reason for being, but we cannot grasp the reason
for being of the infinite
because to do so we would have to be adequate to
God; but our understanding is
merely finite. On the other hand, one can
conceive the infinite, conceive it
clearly and distinctly, thus one has a reason
for knowing it....
I return to my second
theme: the individual is power
[puissance]. The individual is not form, it is
power. Why does this follow?
[like the notion of calculus], which is not
equal to zero but tends towards a
limit.[?] [Tension towards a limit can also be
thought of via another]
Spinozist concept, that of conatus. Each thing
tends to persevere in its
being... The limit is being defined according to
an effort, and power is the
same tendency or the same effort insofar as it
tends towards a limit. If the
limit is grasped on the basis of the notion of
power, namely tending towards a
limit, in terms of the most rudimentary
infinitesimal calculus, the polygon
that multiplies its sides tends towards a limit,
which is the curved line. The
limit is precisely the moment when the angular
line, by dint of multiplying its
sides, tends towards infinity [lâinfini].
It's the tension towards a limit that
now implies the infinite. The polygon, as it
multiplies its sides to infinity,
tends towards the circle.
And why can this
conception of the limit as outline be
considered as the basis for what one could call
a certain form of idealism? The
limit is the outline of the form, whether the
form is purely thought or
sensible, in any case one will call "limit" the
outline of the form,
and this is very easily reconciled with an
idealism because if the limit is the
outline of the form, after all what I can do is
what there is between the
limits... In other words, essence is the form
itself related to its outline. I
could speak of the pure circle because there is
a pure outline of the circle. I
could speak of a pure cube without specifying
what it involves. I would name
these the idea of the circle, the idea of the
cube
Henceforth the individual
will be the form related to its
outline.... Statuary has the greatest importance
in this optical world [of classical
Greek philosophy] ; it's an optical world, but a
world of sculpture, that is to
say one in which the form is determined
according to a tactile outline.
Everything happens as if the visible form were
unthinkable outside of a tactile
mold. [In later thought] The outline of
something is what? It's non-being, say
the Stoics. The outline of something is the spot
where the thing ceases to
be... The Stoics are in the process of getting
hold of something very strong,
life does not proceed by molding... What is
their example, opposed to the
optical-tactile figure? They will oppose
problems of vitality. Where does
action stop? At the outline. But that, that
holds no interest. The question is
not at all where does a form stop, because this
is already an abstract and
artificial question. The true question is: where
does an action stop?... The
Stoics cry out triumphantly: things are
bodies...Bodies and not ideas. Things
are bodies, that meant that things are actions.
The limit of something is the
limit of its action and not the outline of its
figure... It's a dynamic limit
that is opposed to an outline limit. The thing
has no other limit than the
limit of its power [puissance] or its action.
When they [Stoics]
say that all things are bodies, they mean
that all things are defined by
tonos, the contracted effort that defines the
thing. The kind of contraction,
the embryonic force that is in the thing, if you
don't find it, you don't know
[connaissez] the thing. What Spinoza takes up
again with the expression "what
can a body do?"
It's with Plotinus that a
pure optical world begins in
philosophy. Idealities will no longer be only
optical. They will be luminous,
without any tactile reference. Henceforth the
limit is of a completely
different nature. Light scours the shadows. Does
shadow form part of light?
Yes, it forms a part of light and you will have
a light-shadow gradation that
will develop space. They are in the process of
finding that deeper than space
there is spatialization... The discovery of a
pure light, of the sufficiency of
light to constitute a world implies that,
beneath space, one has discovered
spatialization. This is not a Platonic idea
For Byzantine mosaic it's
light-color, that is to say that
what defines, what marks the limits is no longer
form-outline but rather the
couple light-color, that is to say that the
figure goes on as far as the light
that it captures or emits goes, and as far as
the color of which it's composed
goes.... In other words there is no longer an
outline of the figure, there is an
expansion of light-color. The figure will go as
far as it acts by light and by
color. It's the reversal [renversement] of the
Greek world.... light and color
are spatializing. Thus art must not be an art of
space, it must be an art of
the spatialization of space... There is an
outline-limit and there is a
tension-limit. There is a space-limit and there
is a spatialization-limit.
[Back to the individual] I
will always return to the theme:
it is as if an individual, whatever individual,
had three layers, as if it was
composed, then, of three layers. We have
advanced, at least into the first
dimension, into the first layer of the
individual, and I say: oh yes, all
individuals have an infinity of extensive parts.
This is the first point: an
infinity of extensive parts. In other words,
there are only individuals that
are composite. A simple individual, I believe
that, for Spinoza, it is a notion
lacking in sense...Every individual, as such, is
composed of an infinity of
parts... I‚ll try to summarize very quickly:
What does this mean this idea that
the individual is composed of an infinity of
parts? What are these parts? Once
again, they are what Spinoza calls Œthe simplest
bodies‚: all bodies are
composed of an infinity of very simple bodies.
But what are these: Œvery simple
bodies‚? We have arrived at a precise enough
status: they are not atoms,
meaning finite bodies, and neither are they
indefinites. What are they? And
there Spinoza belongs to the 17th century [so he
thinks via the notion of ] the
notion of the Œactual infinite
the formula of the finite,
it is: there is a moment where
you have to stop yourself. That is to say: when
you analyse something there
will always be a moment where it will be
necessary to stop yourself. Let‚s say,
and for a long time, this moment of the finite,
this fundamental moment of the
finite which marks the necessity of finite
terms, it is all of this which
inspired atomism since Epicurus, since
Lucretius: the analysis encounters a
limit, this limit is the atom. The atom is
subject to a finite analysis. The
indefinite is as far as you can go, you can‚t
stop yourself. That is to say: as
far as you can take the analysis, the term at
which you arrive will always be,
in turn, divided and analysed. There will never
be a last term.
What it tells us is that:
there are last terms, there are
ultimate terms ˜ you see, this is contrary to
the indefinite, it is not the
indefinite since there are ultimate terms, only
these ultimate terms are ad
infinitum. Therefore, they are not the atom.
They are neither finite nor
indefinite. The infinite is actual, the infinite
is in action. In effect, the
indefinite is, if you like, infinite, but
virtual, that is to say: you can
always go further. This is not it; it (the
actual infinite) tells us: there are
last terms: Œthe simplest bodies‚ for Spinoza.
These are the ultimate terms,
these are the terms which are last, which you
can no longer divide. But, these
terms are infinitely small. They are the
infinitely small, and this is the
actual infinite.
There are ultimate terms,
but these are not atoms since they
are the infinitely small, or as Newton will say,
they are vanishings, vanishing
terms. In other words, smaller than any given
quantity.... This too is a
non-sense: to speak of an infinitely small term
that I would consider
singularly, that makes no sense. The infinitely
small, they can only go by way
of infinite collections. Therefore there are
infinite collections of the
infinitely small. The simple bodies of Spinoza
don‚t exist one by one. They
exist collectively and not distributively. They
exist by way of infinite
sets.... And I cannot speak of a simple body, I
can only speak of an infinite
set of simple bodies. Such that an individual is
not a simple body, an
individual, whatever it is, and however small it
is, an individual has an
infinity of simple bodies, an individual has an
infinite collection of the
infinitely small [a singularity?]... : a theory
of infinite sets. The
infinitely small enter into infinite sets and
these infinite sets are not the same.
That is to say: there is a distinction between
infinite sets.
The simple bodies have
only strictly extrinsic relations,
relations of exteriority with each other. They
form a species of matter, using
Spinoza‚s terminology: a modal matter, a modal
matter of pure exteriority,
which is to say: they react on one another, they
have no interiority, they have
only external relations with one another...
under what aspect does an infinite
set of very simple bodies belong to either this
or that individual?... it is
another way of asking what allows me to
distinguish such an infinite set from
another such infinite set.
It is always under a
relation that the parts belong to me.
To the point that, if the parts which compose me
take on another relation, at
that very moment, they no longer belong to me.
They belong to another
individuality, they belong to another body.
Hence the question: what is this
relation? Under what relation can the infinitely
small elements be said to
belong to something?... Spinoza‚s answer, if I
stick to the letter of Spinoza,
is: under a certain relation of movement and
rest... [For Gueroult] Individuals
for Spinoza would be kinds of compound
pendulums, each composed of an infinity
of simple pendulums. And what defines an
individual is a vibration. [but] suppose
that the very simple bodies were really
infinitely small, that is to say that
they have neither shape nor magnitude. At that
moment then the model of the
simple pendulum cannot work, and it cannot be a
vibration that defines the
relation of movement and rest. [A better
alternative is to argue that] between
infinitely small terms, there can only be one
type of relation: differential
relations.
[Fractions help us grasp
this –but they refer to actual
terms as well as relations] When I take an
algebraic relation of the type x
over y, this time I don‚t have given terms, I
have two variables. I have
variables... But that doesn‚t allow me to avoid
the fact that it is again
necessary that my variables have a determinable
value. In other words, x and y
can have all sorts of singular values, but they
must have one.... What is very
new with the differential relation is that it
takes something like a third
step.... when the terms vanish, when the terms
vanish, the relation subsists...
Only the relation between its terms is
determined. It is here that logic is
going to make a leap, but a fundamental leap.
Under this form of the
differential calculus is discovered a domain
where the relations no longer
depend on their terms: the terms are reduced to
vanishing terms, to vanishing
quantities, and the relation between these
vanishing quantities is not equal to
zero.... In other words, the differential
relation tends towards a limit. When
the terms of the relation vanish, Œx‚ and Œy‚,
and become dy and dx, when the
terms of the relation vanish, the relation
subsists because it tends towards a
limit, Œz‚. When the relation is established
between infinitely small terms, it
does not cancel itself out at the same time as
its terms, but tends towards a
limit. This is the basis of differential
calculus such as it is understood or
interpreted in the 17th century.... Now you
obviously understand why this
interpretation of the differential calculus is
at one with the understanding of
an actual infinite, meaning with the idea of
infinitely small quantities of
vanishing terms.
And, in effect, if you
take Spinoza‚s letter on blood, of
which I have made great use, and the two
components of blood, chyle and lymph,
this now tells us what? It tells us that there
are corpuscles of chyle, or
better chyle is an infinite set of very simple
bodies. Lymph is another
infinite set of the very simple bodies. What
distinguishes the two infinite
sets? It is the differential relation! You have
this time a dy/dx which is: the
infinitely small parts of chyle over the
infinitely small parts of lymph, and
this differential relation tends towards a
limit: the blood, that is to say:
chyle and lymph compose blood...If this is
right, we could say why infinite
ensembles are distinguished. It is because the
infinite sets of very simple
bodies don‚t exist independently of the
differential relations which they put
into effect... the infinitely small don‚t exist
independently of the
differential relation.
Why is it that I can say:
this infinite set and not that
one?...I can say it, it is quite simple: because
infinite sets are defined as
infinite under such and such a differential
relation. Between other terms the
differential relations can be considered as the
power [puissance] of an
infinite set. Because of this an infinite set
will be able to be of a higher
power [puissance] than another infinite set.
[So] what is this relation
of movement and rest that is for
Spinoza characteristic of the individual, that
is as the second layer of the
individual, I would say that, no, it is not
exactly a way of vibrating, perhaps
we could bring together the two points of view,
I don‚t know, but it is
differential relation, and it is the
differential relation that defines power
[puissance].
Suppose that an infinite
collection of the infinitely small
is determined from the outside to take another
relation than the one under
which it belongs to me. What does this mean? It
means that: I die! I die! In
effect, the infinite set which belongs to me
under such a relation which
characterises me, under my characteristic
relation, this infinite set will take
another relation under the influence of external
causes.
this relation, it comes
from where, this relation?... Last
layer of the individual, Spinoza‚s answer: it is
that the characteristic
relations which constitute me, that is to say
which determine that the infinite
sets which verify these relations, which put
into effect these relations which
belong to me, the characteristic relations
express something. They express
something which is my singular essence... You
can now see what formula I can
give to the individual: each individual is a
singular essence, each singular
essence expresses itself in the characteristic
relations of the differential
relation type, and under these differential
relations, the infinite collections
of the infinitely small belong to the
individual...Hence a last question: what
is it, this singular essence?
to exist is to have an
infinity of extensive parts, of
extrinsic parts, to have an infinity of
infinitely small extrinsic parts, which
belong to me under a certain relation. Insofar
as I have, in effect, extensive
parts which belong to me under a certain
relation, infinitely small parts which
belong to me, I can say: I exist... I die when
these parts which belong to me
or which belonged to me are determined to enter
under another relation which
characterises another body... when I die, there
are no longer parts which
effect. Why? Because the parts have been set up
to put into effect other
relations. Good. But firstly there is an eternal
truth of the relation, in
other words there is a consistency of the
relation even when it is not put into
effect by actual parts, there is an actuality of
the relation, even when it
ceases to be put into effect. That which
disappears with death is the
effectuation of the relation, it is not the
relation itself.... both the
relation and the essence are said to be
eternal... what is transitory, and what
defines my existence, is uniquely the time
during which the infinitely small
extensive parts belong to me, that is to say put
the relation into effect... Essences
are not possibilities. There is nothing
possible, everything that is is real.
In other words essences don‚t define
possibililties of existence, essences are
themselves existences.
the essence of Paul, once
Paul is dead, remains a physical
reality. It is a real being. Therefore it would
be necessary to distinguish
them as two real beings: the being of the
existence and the being of the
essence of Paul. What‚s more, it would be
necessary to distinguish as two
existences: the existence of Paul and the
existence of the essence of Paul. The
existence of the essence of Paul is eternal,
while the existence of Paul is
transitory, mortal, etc.
So long [when] nothing is
traced on [a] white wall, does
something exist which would be distinct from the
white wall? Spinoza‚s response
very curiously is: ŒNo, strictly speaking
nothing exists!‚ On the white wall,
nothing exists so long as the figures haven‚t
been traced.... The white wall is
something equivalent to what Spinoza calls the
attribute. The attribute,
extension... What is the existence of bodies in
extension? The existence of
bodies in extension is effectively when these
bodies are traced.... when an
infinity of infinitely small parts are
determined to belong to a body. The body
is traced. It has a shape. What Spinoza will
call mode of the attribute is such
a shape.... ultimately it is impossible to
distinguish something outside of
existing modes, outside of shapes. If you
haven‚t traced the shape, you cannot
distinguish something on the white wall. The
white wall is uniformly
white...[But, he say somewhere else that
essences of people are singular] Now,
if essences are singular, it is necessary to
distinguish something on the white
wall without the shapes necessarily having been
traced.
[So] modes exist in the
attribute in two ways; on the one
hand they exist insofar as they are comprised
and contained in the attribute;
and, on the other, insofar as it is said that
they have duration. Two
existences: durational existence, immanent
existence.... my question is this:
can I distinguish on the white wall things
independently of the shapes drawn,
can I make distinctions which are not
distinctions between shapes?... There are
degrees, and the degrees are not confused with
the shapes. You say: such a
degree of white, in the sense of such a degree
of light. A degree of light, a
degree of whiteness, is not a shape. And even
though two degrees are
distinguished, two degrees aren‚t distinguished
like shapes in space. I would
say that shapes are distinguished externally,
taking account of their common
parts. I would say of degrees that it is a
completely different type of
distinction, that there is an intrinsic
distinction
There are degrees which
are what, which we call in general:
intensive quantities, and which are in fact just
as different from quality as
from extensive quantity.... Duns Scotus...
appeals to the white wall... he
says: the white has an infinity of intrinsic
modes, these are the intensities
of white. Understand: white equals light in the
example. An infinity of
luminous intensities... he is saying: a form has
intrinsic modes.... that in
which the form puts itself into effect are
extrinsic modes. Therefore it is
necessary to distinguish form from extrinsic
modes, but there is something
else. A form has also a kind [espèce] ˜
as they say in the Middle Ages ˜ a kind
of latitude, a latitude of form, which has
degrees, the intrinsic degrees of
form. Good. These are intensities, therefore
intensive quantities.... the
theory of intensive quantities is like the
conception of differential calculus
[and the relation between the 3 modes of the
Trinity also makes this a crucial
theological question]
how can Spinoza say, at
least in one text, that every
affection, that any affection is an affection of
essence... in definition one
at the end of book three we read this: "Desire
is man‚s very essence,
insofar as it is conceived to be determined,
from any given affection of it, to
do something."... one asks oneself how Spinoza
can say that all the
affections and all the affects are affections of
essence. That means that even
a passion is an affection of essence.... At the
close of all our analyses, we
tended to conclude that what truly belongs to
essence are the adequate ideas
and the active affects, that is, the ideas of
the second kind and the ideas of
the third kind. It‚s these that truly belong to
essence. But Spinoza seems to
say entirely the opposite: not only are all the
passions affections of essence,
but even among the passions, sadnesses, the
worst passions, every affect
affects essence! [Zizek problem again] ... Thus
the passions belong to essence
no less than the actions; the inadequate ideas
[belong] to essence no less than
the adequate ideas. And nevertheless there was
necessarily a difference.
I have an inadequate idea,
I have a confused proposition out
of which comes a passion-affect. In what sense
does this belong to my essence?
It seems to me that the answer is this: in my
natural condition I am condemned
to inadequate perceptions. This means that I am
composed of an infinity of
extensive parts [which are] external to one
another. These extensive parts
belong to me under a certain relation. But these
extensive parts are
perpetually submitted to the influence of other
parts which act upon them and
which don‚t belong to me... the perception that
I have of heat is a confused
perception, and from it come affects which are
themselves passions: "I‚m
hot!" At the level of the proposition "I‚m
hot!," if I try to
distribute the Spinozist categories, I would
say: an external body acts on
mine. It‚s the sun. That is to say that the
parts of the sun act on the parts
of my body. All of that is pure external
determinism, it‚s like the shocks of
particles.
I call perception when I perceive the heat that
I experience, the idea of the
effect of the sun on my body. It‚s an inadequate
perception since it‚s an idea
of an effect, I do not know the cause and from
it follows a passive affect
In what sense is this an
affection of essence?
It‚s inevitably an affection of essence. At
first sight it‚s an affection of
the existing body. But finally there is only
essence. The existing body is
still a figure of essence. The existing body is
essence itself, insofar as an
infinity of extensive parts, under a certain
relation, belongs to it. [But
Spinoza] considers the following two concepts as
equivalents: relation of
movement and rest, and power [pouvoir] of being
affected or aptitude to be
affected. One must ask oneself why he treats
this kinetic proposition and this
dynamic proposition as equivalents. Why is a
relation of movement and rest that
characterizes me at the same time a power of
being affected that belongs to me?
There will be two definitions of the body. The
kinetic definition will be this:
every body is defined by a relation of movement
and rest. The dynamic
definition is: every body is defined by a
certain power of being affected. You
must be sensitive to the double kinetic and
dynamic register.
What does one call
affection? One calls affection the idea
of an effect. These extensive parts that belong
to me, you can‚t conceive them
as having no effect upon one another. They are
inseparable from the effect that
they have on one another.... An affection is
nothing other than the idea of the
effect. The necessarily confused idea since I
have no idea of the cause. It‚s
the reception of the effect: I say that I
perceive. It‚s thus that Spinoza can
pass from the kinetic definition to the dynamic
definition, that is, that the
relation under which an infinity of extensive
parts belongs to me is equally a
power of being affected....
Ultimately the affections
and the affects can only be
affections and affects of essence. Why? They
exist for you only as they fulfill
a power of being affected which is yours, and
this power of being affected is
the power of being affected of your essence. At
no moment do you have to miss
it. When it rains and you are so unhappy, you
literally lack nothing [general
and morally indifferent version again] ... Every
affection, every perception
and every feeling, every passion is affection,
perception and passion of
essence... Here the power of being affected
belongs to essence... When one
succeeds in rising to the second and third kinds
of knowledge, what happens?
Here I have adequate perceptions and active
affects. What does that mean? It‚s
the affections of essence. I would even say all
the more reason. What
difference from the preceding case? This time
they do not come from outside,
they come from inside.... the extensive parts
and the action of the extensive
parts are cast off since I am raised to the
comprehension of relations that are
causes, thus I am raised to another aspect of
essence. It‚s no longer essence
insofar as it actually possesses an infinity of
extensive parts, it‚s essence
insofar as it expresses itself in a relation...
if I am raised to ideas of the
third kind, these ideas and the active affects
that follow from them belong to
essence and are affections of essence, this time
insofar as essence is in
itself [en soi], is in itself [en
elle-même], in itself and for itself, is
in
itself [en soi] and for itself [pour soi] a
degree of power [puissance]... All
the affections are affections of essence, but be
careful, affection of essence
does not have one and only one sense [Maslow
really here – self-actualisation
is at the top of the pyramid at least ion the
move from 1 to 2.Level 3 is
circualr]
Why does all this
constitute an ontology? I have a
feeling-idea. There has never been but a single
ontology. There is only Spinoza
who has managed to pull off an ontology. If one
takes ontology in an extremely
rigorous sense, I see only one case where a
philosophy has realized itself as
ontology, and that‚s Spinoza.... The passions
are affects that fulfill the
power of being affected and that come from
outside... when can I begin
authentically to say "I"? With the second kind
of knowledge, I leave
behind the zone of the effect of parts on one
another... What would the third
kind be? Here Lawrence abounds. In abstract
terms it would be a mystical
union... It‚s here that there is something
irreducibly mystical in Spinoza‚s
third kind of knowledge: at the same time the
essences are distinct, only they
distinguish themselves on the inside from one
another. So much so that the rays
by which the sun affects me are the rays by
which I affect myself, and the rays
by which I affect myself are the rays of the sun
that affect me. It‚s solar
auto-affection
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