Deleuze
for the Desperate #5: the movement-image
Dave & Maggie Harris
The first thing you need to consider when you read
Deleuze on the cinema is that Deleuze is a
philosopher. He seems to display a great
deal of knowledge about film, and he probably was
a considerable film buff, but his main interest is
in seeing film as a kind of philosophy. He
sees a number of other art forms, like novels,
painting and theater, in the same way, as attempts
to think about the world and to depict
reality. With the cinema, he is particularly
interested in the way it is able to show us
movement and the operation of time: that's why the
two books are called the movement-image and the
time-image. This makes Deleuze's account of
cinema rather selective from the beginning,
because he's choosing films that particularly
illustrate these two sorts of image, although he
thinks they are very common. Largely, his
chosen films are going to be what might be called
art house or experimental film. There are
some films discussed which are more popular, but
even here, these films illustrate the work of
thinkers and philosophers, who also happen to be
directors or screenwriters, auteurs as they are
normally called. These auteurs have written
about film as well as making some classic
breakthrough films. They include figures you
will have heard of, such as Griffiths, Hitchcock,
Hawks or Welles, Pasolini, Rossellini and
Visconti, Eisenstein and Vertov, but also
Mizoguchi, whose work I did not know but who is
acclaimed.
M. Harris
What you don't find in Deleuze is much discussion
of the things that have interested recent media
theorists: nothing on the audience; nothing on the
production side of film; often very little
commentary at all once the film has been fitted in
to his overall scheme of work. Indeed, you
can call on knowledge of these more modern topics
to criticize Deleuze's work for its obvious
selectivity. Deleuze tells us that he knows
this is a selective treatment, but that he is not
interested in the history of the film. He
also has a pretty low opinion of a lot of popular
film.
End M. Harris
I repeat, he is a philosopher, and he is
interested in film as philosophy, not as
entertainment, not as an aesthetic form, and not
as ideology. The very book starts with a
commentary on a particular philosopher that
Deleuze admires and has borrowed from— Henri
Bergson. I feel sorry for poor film studies
students who open the book and encounter that
first chapter! Ideally, you need to read
what Deleuze thinks of Bergson more
generally. If you don't have too much time
at present, you might just have to rely on my
gloss on Bergson's concepts for now. There
are also some notes on Deleuze's view of Bergson
on my website here.
In one of his books, Matter and Memory
(vii--viii) , Bergson defines what he means by an
image:
'a certain existence which is more than that which
the idealist calls a representation, but less than
that which the realist calls a thing – an
existence placed half way between the "thing" and
the "representation". This conception of
matter is simply that of common-sense'. So
the image is not a picture or representation of
something, which is what we might normally think
of as an image. For Deleuze, these
representations would be better understood as
signs. Instead, an image is rather an idea
of something, a conception of something that
exists. So, to jump ahead, a movement -
image is a conception of the way in which
things move. As we will see, this conception
does not involve a single representation but a
whole series of signs, a whole sequence of shots.
Deleuze also thinks that the study of signs in the
work of CS Peirce is going to be a good way to
begin to understand the signs found in
cinema. I'm not going to discuss this here
at all, however. Bogue (2003) is the best
text to read to trace this argument out.
There's a lot of references to films you may or
may not know. Again we see Deleuze's rather
narrow interest in movement, and also his
unconscious elitism again—no doubt all his friends
in Paris had seen these films, and he is assuming
that we readers will have seen them too.
There is often rather limited comment as a
result. You might be more used to discussing
film in more detail, and this will be a
critical resource. However, one of the
delights in reading the books for me was the
discovery of directors and films I'd never heard
of before, and I was able to go off and have a
look at them. I learned a lot. Another
delight was seeing what Deleuze made of films that
I had watched, and using his work to develop new
ways of looking at them. If you had the time
to read more widely, and watch the films like I
did, you would probably enjoy the books a lot
more. But you are pressed for time, I have
been assuming throughout this series, so let me
see if I can put you straight on the money.
It is not quite so simple as with the earlier
topics, where we plucked key concepts out of the
wild and woolly theorizing, because whole books
are devoted to these concepts. So this video
can only offer a kind of initial orientation to
the argument, a first grasp, which will obviously
be limited and will need fleshing out. But
the assumption is we have to start somewhere, that
we cannot just plunge straight into full blooded
Deleuze, especially if these books on the cinema
are the only ones of his you have read.
Let's concentrate here on the philosophy of the
cinema. I have more extensive notes on the
actual books on the cinema on my website which you
can go to if you want: here
and here.
Why should images or conceptions of movement and
time be so important? Deleuze has a very
good argument here. First, these are
important philosophical concepts to understand how
the universe works, and Bergson has made a major
contribution. Second, these are precisely
the images or conceptions that the cinema in
particular can depict. The cinema offers us
images which are quite unlike those of any of the
other arts.
Strangely, though, a lot of conventional film
studies can be seen to largely ignore movement and
the specifics of moving signs. For example,
in my day it was common to use analyses of
photographs to try to understand film, or at least
stills from film. One example would be
Barthes' (1973) famous analysis of the photograph
of the black soldier standing underneath a French
flag. We would examine signifiers in this
photograph, those usually understood as
denotations and connotations. Other analyses
tended to take film as a form of written
literature, and would use the same analytic
techniques to grasp filmic narrative as they would
to grasp narrative structures in a novel. I
think of analyses
which I used to do of the Bond movie, which
would begin with a discussion of Eco's
structuralist analysis of the Bond novels.
Analysts would try to find all sorts of parallels
with literature, and use terms such as signifier,
syntagm and paradigm. Sometimes they would
identify particular narrative structures, such as
realist ones, in the novel, and then try to find
them in film, to cite a debate that raged in the
1980s, associated with the name of Colin MacCabe
(see Bennett et al 1981).
M. Harris
The first shock that Deleuze offers is his
argument that none of these approaches are going
to be able to properly grasp movement in
film. If we look at film stills we are not
looking at film movement, and if we are looking
for literary forms, we will miss the particular
ways in which film links elements, including those
not found in literature, like visual or sonic
ones. These are linked together to form a
narrative.
End M. Harris
Let's start with some very simple observations
about movement. The cinema is very good at
illustrating movement, we can all agree, but it
does this in a number of ways. Very early
cinema, for example, was rather like the theater
in that a fixed camera on a tripod recorded the
action that was taking place in front of it on a
set. We saw movements, by the actors, and
sometimes by non humans like horses, but it was
within the confines of theatrical notions of the
set and a scene, even when shooting
outdoors. The scenes would then join
together with other scenes, with straightforward
cuts, where the screen just went dark, just like
scenes at the theater.
However, cinema soon developed different ways of
illustrating movement. One way is by editing
scenes together so that they represent a larger
sequence—montage. There are clearly
different ways to do this, and you might have
learned about some of the conventions of realist
or continuity editing. For example, the
camera obeys the 180° rule, or the need to match
shots on eyeline across cuts, or pursue shot -
reverse shot techniques. If skillfully done,
the join between the shots is practically
invisible to the audience, at least once they had
learned how to view cinema, and the movement in
the film flows across the cuts. One great
example here is Hitchcock's film Rope,
which is cleverly edited it so it looks as if it
is just one continuous take, or at least a couple
of continuous takes (Deleuze does not mention this
example himself).
The real breakthrough, however, came when cameras
were able to move themselves, tracking in various
ways for example. The invention of different
sorts of lenses, including the zoom lens, also
enabled them to move in and out of the scene, so
to speak. The cinema developed the classic
variety of shots—long shot to establish context,
mid-shot to focus on action, closeup to display
emotions. Again a movement flows between the
shots as montage or zoom. Of course, with
the advent of talkies, film could also include
sounds and make them act as signs as well.
The cine camera also developed unusual pictures of
reality, which are not just those of natural human
perception. The camera can give us a
nonhuman or objective view. To take some
easy examples, it hovers above the landscape or it
zooms in and out. In more experimental cases
it can show slow motion or time lapse, reverse
sequences, or very unusual non natural angles (try
Downside Up). Modern cameras can
stand in places where humans cannot—in front of a
stampede, in a clearing in the forest in front of
a dangerous animal, lowered into the sea, put on
the outside of a space vehicle. We can see
the world as it is without human perceptions
(Deleuze calls this whole set of points of view,
including human and nonhuman ones,
'percepts'). The ability to depict the
nonhuman or the objective is important, because it
is going to show us how human subjects are
affected by things moving in a life of their own,
relating to each other without human intervention,
or even human knowledge.
Now, the camera can depict some very interesting
kinds of movement, interesting for philosophers,
that is. We are finally beginning to see
illustrations of what movement really is for
people like Bergson. It is not a mysterious
force that operates somehow in addition to or
between still moments, which is the classic Greek
conception. Instead, movement is a force in
itself. Everything is in motion, and still
objects are seen as temporarily halted
movement. We now see movement not just in
terms of fixed poses or instants, but as operating
constantly, affecting all the stages in between
significant moments, 'any-instants-whatever', as
Deleuze puts it.
This conception of movement as the major process
in depicting reality began to deliver results in
maths and science too in the early 20th century,
and Deleuze briefly mentions a couple of
them. One view of physics, often shown in
popular documentaries (like B Cox's recent Forces
of Nature episode 2),
has the independent movements of forces
occasionally stabilizing around attractors and
slowing down or cooling down to produce matter,
first gaseous then solid or liquid matter.
Deleuze cites Bergson's understanding of this as a
matter of light being obstructed by matter, and we
should see light as standing for all the
electromagnetic forces.
Incidentally, in the second commentary on Bergson,
Deleuze gives the clearest definition yet of the
term that keeps cropping up in his work—the plane
of immanence. Immanence (with an 'a') is a
state where some inner potential is being
realized. The plane of immanence is that
theoretical but real level of the universe in
which energy is just starting to turn into matter,
where light is just beginning to be obstructed, a
plane where matter and energy coexist, both
virtuals and actuals exist, in Deleuze's
terms. It is a bit like the level at which
both ice and water coexist at 0°centigrade.
Cinema also shows this new kind of creative,
active movement on the plane of immanence, or
rather the image or conception of it. This
is the important development in the movement
image. One such movement that Deleuze
actually talks about quite a lot in the first
volume is between background and foreground,
context and location, the big picture and the
local picture, the objective and the subjective,
what is in the frame and what is left outside
it. Parts are shown in relation to wholes by
these camera movements.
You probably know that some people think there is
a formula for the narratives of popular films: an
initial state of equilibrium is shown, then it is
disturbed by some intruding force to produce
disequilibrium, then the problem is resolved
leading to a new equilibrium. Think of High
Noon, my favorite western, although again
not mentioned by Deleuze. A town in the
American west is just settling down at last to a
normal life with law and order, then the bad guys
turn up, from the past and from prison in another
state, destroying equilibrium and threatening to
turn back the clock, metaphorically
speaking. We hear of them off-frame long
before we actually see them. The hero has to
take action, reluctantly, to restore equilibrium,
partly by invoking his own violent past. He
wins, but it is a new equilibrium that results,
with lessons for us all—ideological ones, you
might think, suggesting that violence is sometimes
necessary, even for Quaker women, that
civilization is constantly under threat from
dangerous outsiders, but that luckily real men are
available to rise to the challenge.
Deleuze is not interested in ideology and offers a
different terminology. For him, there's a
closed set of elements, which could be humans and
objects, interacting in a predictable and ordered
way. We mean a mathematical set here not a
film set. Then something disturbs the set,
something from the outside. This is able to
disturb the set because the set is always only a
part of a larger whole, never fully closed off
from the outside, even though no-one in the set
realized this. The disturbance produces a qualitative
change in the operation of the set.
Again, this is not just a narrative for film, but
a description of how change happens in the real
world too: stable sets of solid things interact
predictably, but they are always subject to the
Whole, something more open, something more chaotic
if we can use popular terms. This is what
produces qualitative change. Think of a
homely example: the dinosaurs were developing
nicely into different species and types, fairly
regularly and predictably over millions of years,
and then... The asteroid strikes and we get
qualitative change, not change inside existing
patterns of dinosaur development, but changes of
species themselves, the extinction of one and the
rise of others. The asteroid moving through
space was always part of the Whole, a cosmic
system that earth was related to, although of
course the poor old dinosaurs did not know that,
plodding along in their seemingly closed set on
Earth.
M. Harris
That is a spectacular example, but it does not too
far from what Bergson thinks normal evolution
involves: some element from a complex multiplicity
outside the apparently closed world of species of
plants and animals intrudes and sets off a
qualitative change. Bergson describes this
process in terms of a life force, an élan vital,
and the concept is connected to his major term,
duration, which we will come to in the video on
the time-image.
End M. Harris
So, back to film. Elements of the Whole, a
set of multiple possibilities, intrude and spark
off qualitative change and the film shows this
happening. This can be done in many
different ways, and Deleuze explores some.
There are different conceptions of the Whole, for
example, in French and German film and in
different genres. However, the thing about
classical film is that it still feels it should
place human beings at the centre of this
process. It is all tied to humans, and the
ways in which they respond to the world and then
react, in the 'sensori-motor schema' as Deleuze
calls it. One characteristic of modern
experimental or art cinema is that it abandons
this organizing schema, as we shall see in
discussing the time-image. You might be able
to see some possibilities already by thinking of
how we discussed the nonhuman perceptions of
cameras just now.
How does this work in normal films? First
someone, or the camera itself, perceives that
something is happening out there, outside the
normal set of stable life, from somewhere that is
normally kept at a safe distance, on the
horizon. It has the capacity to change
everything. We see the smoke from the Indian
fires, the gathering snowstorm, a new threat to
world order in the rise of dangerous politicians
or gangsters, the initial signs of an alien
invasion, or whatever. This has to be shown
on screen in a manageable way, in a
perception-image. We might have subjective
perceptions by the character, or initially
objective ones. Some objective ones can
rapidly becomes subjective, or sometimes the
reverse, as in interesting cases where the camera
does not adopt the standpoint of any one
character, but moves among them and can come to
tell their story in a particularly important
development—the 'free indirect discourse'.
These interplays between subjective and objective
are possible because of Bergson's initial insight
that we started with: an image has an existence
placed half way between the thing and the
representation, and is thus capable of acting as
either. Deleuze modifies Bergson in fact,
but let's leave that for later.
After perception, everyone takes appropriate
action, requiring an action-image. Again,
there are different possibilities here including
different sorts of links between action, situation
and subsequent action, in what Deleuze calls
'large' and 'small' forms, and this is a
particularly interesting section of the
book. There are different types of action
too, like impulsive or reflective types, and this
is where Bogue (2003) says Deleuze draws on Peirce
to help him identify the classic signs for these
different types.
We also see what motivates this action. We
see the impact of external events upon the people,
usually in the form of some facial responses shown
in close up—a frown, a doubt, a tear or
whatever. Deleuze particularly admires
actors who can let micromovements play
across their features, and takes as an example the
amazing classic 1928 silent film La Passion de
Jeanne d'Arc. Incidentally you can now
watch this free, online, on the superb
website Open Culture here,
together with many other classics. This film
tells the whole story, more or less, in a series
of large closeups of the actors' faces—the slyness
of the prosecutors, the surprise, hurt, but
saintly innocence of Joan, the sadistic voyeurism
of the torturers. This is the
affection-image, and 'affection' here has a
special philosophical meaning: it means the human
responses to external events, often, but not
always, emotional responses. In Bergson
(19), this is clear: affections refer to all the
human impulses for initiating action, not just
emotional responses.
Deleuze also sees 'affect' not in modern terms, as
just emotion, but as any influence acting on
humans. The term is much discussed in his
other work, but there is a particularly neat
argument here in the second commentary on
Bergson. Human perception is selective, and
we perceive what we want and need at the
time. But the things left out by the
selectivity can still affect us, without us
knowing at the time. We still receive
affects from events, and we can be strangely
affected by things like the weather, in a
favorite example in Deleuze and Guattari (2004),
even if we do not notice it or perceive it at the
time. Anyone trying to teach young kids, or
students, during a snowstorm will know that.
Although affects are often registered by movements
of the face, or even parts of the face, or a
montage of faces, Deleuze says that nonhuman
things or processes can affect us as well.
Here, he notes that spaces or sections of spaces
can also offer affects—the bits of wall or stairs
almost out of shot, caught in the closeup of
Joan's face. In another film on Joan, The Trial
of Joan of Arc, directed by R. Bresson, we
see the mundane spaces of Joan's cell with a
glimpse of a busy corridor crammed with English
guards just outside, or we see shots of Joan's
manacled ankles as she sits on a nondescript
prison bed. All these refer to the
depressing and alarming indifference and
impersonality of these mundane ordinary bits of
space, an awareness that they have witnessed
imprisonment and executions before as a
routine. Deleuze says such shots indicate
any-space-whatever in a clear link to the
any-instant-whatever discussed earlier.
Together, the perception image, action image and
affection image are components or 'avatars' of the
overall movement image, the overall conception of
a force from outside, from the whole range of
possible forces, affecting the actors and objects
in the limited set.
I will let you go off to examine the very
interesting ways in which Deleuze develops these
points and illustrates them with films, very often
with just a simple couple of comments. The
books are not at all easy to follow at first, and
are spattered with references to films you may not
know. I coped by running through the books
doggedly waiting for something or someone I did
know, while going off to learn more and watch more
films. Quite a few of these films are now
online, doubtless because fans of Deleuze have
uploaded them to YouTube or Ubuweb. As I
said before, Bogue's excellent commentary is very
clear and helpful.
Finally, you can also turn to the Glossary at the
end of volume one. It is in alphabetical
order, but I have picked out the main terms, and I
think it makes more sense organized slightly
differently. I have also added some
comments.
So the movement image is defined in the
glossary as 'the acentered set [ensemble] of
variable elements which act and react on each
other'. An acentered set means that movement
is not immediately centered on human perceptions
or actions but is objective. As we saw, the
most interesting movements are those that come
from the outside and cause qualitative
changes. In classical cinema, centered on
human beings, the objective reality has to be
given human significance, provided with an
image center: 'a gap between a received
movement and an executed movement, an action and
reaction (interval)'.
This center is provided by connecting variable
elements to human action, mimicking ordinary
consciousness by organizing everything around the
individual's body. First this is done
through the perception image, 'a set
[ensemble] of elements [either subjective or
objective] which act on a center, and which
vary in relation to it'. The effects of
these perceptions are shown in the affection
image , filling the gap between an action
and reaction, 'that which absorbs an external
action and reacts on the inside'. The
overall result is an action image, an image
of 'the reaction of the [human] centre to the set.
I must say I don't find these definitions terribly
useful.
Finally, Deleuze argues that this whole way of
making movement image films changed, as the result
of a number of factors. There were social
crises like world war two, which disrupted normal
perceptions and actions and their settings.
The whole process of depicting movement images
became rather artificial predictable and
clichéd. There's also a new philosophical
thinking about movement, with particular emphasis
on time. The result was a series of time-
image films, which we're going to cover in the
next video.
STOP PRESS. I forgot to mention the useful if
condensed discussion of cinema in Deleuze,
G. (1995) Negotiations. Trans Martin
Joughin. New York: Columbia University
Press. I'll maybe mention it in the next
video. I have some notes on the whole
book here
References
Barthes, R., (1973) Mythologiques.
London: Fontana.
Bennett, T, Boyd-Bowman, S., Mercer, C.
and Wollacott, J. (eds) (1981) Popular
Television and Film, London: BFI
Publications.
Bergson , H.
(2004) [1912] Matter and Memory. New
York: Dover Publications Inc
Bogue, R. (2003) Deleuze
on Cinema. London: Routledge. My notes
on http://www.arasite.org/Boguefilm.html
Deleuze,
G (1989) Cinema 2
-- the time-image, London: The
Athlone Press. My notes on http://www.arasite.org/cinema2.html
Deleuze,
G. (1991) Bergsonism, New
York: Zone Books My notes on:
http://www.arasite.org/bergsonism.html
Deleuze, G. ( 1992) Cinema 1: The Movement Image,
London: The Athlone Press. My notes on
http://www.arasite.org/cinema1.html
Deleuze G and Guattari F
(2004) [1987] A Thousand Plateaus,
London: Continuum. My notes on: http://www.arasite.org/dandgthouplat.html
Films
Downside Up,
1984,Dir. UK Tony Hill. Available from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WhPWatlJyuY
High Noon. 1952. USA
Dir. Fred Zinneman. United Artists.
The Trial of Joan of Arc.
1962. Dir. Robert Bresson Agnes
Delahaie Productions
La Passion de Jeanne d'Arc.
France. Dir Carl Th Dreyer. Société
générale des films.
Rope.
1948.USA. Dir. Alfred Hitchcock. Warner Bros.
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