Mental ecology involves a pre-objectal and pre-personal logic, as in the Freudian primary process. Here, there are no logically developed binaries. The ecology of each phantasm necessarily involves a singular expressive framework. This will exceed the psychology of the individual. However, concepts like context, as in Bateson, have to be rethought: praxis is required to take on a context or aspects of it, and this in turn requires a break with systematic pretexts. Enunciation does not split into hierarchical components [as in foreground, and background context?] but are always heterogeneous. Praxis provides consistency which will 'cross the thresholds that constitute one world at the expense of another' (37). Fragments of chains crystallize as a result, becoming a-signifying ones like a particular work of art that must be detached from the surrounding world.

The issues can arise at any time as fragments, tending to catalyse bifurcations. This has been dealt with in the classic Freudian processes of free association or dream interpretation, but modern family therapy creates different scenes. However the issue of the production of primary subjectivity is not addressed, and they risk missing 'creative proliferation'(37). The real test is whether the point can be detected at which discursive chains break with conventional meaning, and the extent to which a new auto construction can be encouraged. Freudian approaches are okay for the first one but not the second, while family therapy is good for the second but underestimates the first. Both tend to ignore the general issue of mental ecology.

Psychiatric models have to be seen as similar to religious, neurotic or psychotic ones. They should be evaluated in terms of their effectiveness rather than their scientific validity. In particular we need to grasp the 'a-signifying points of rupture' (38), where conventional denotation, connotation and significations and the semiotic chains they lead to are broken. This will produce repetitive symptoms, prayers, ritualised psychoanalytic sessions, emblems, refrains and even the 'facialitary crystallisation of the celebrity'. These can be seen as partial subjectivities or proto-subjectivity, eluding the full mastery of the self. Freud noticed that this can happen when meaning clusters around objects, but this was seen as 'essentially adjacent' to instincts and to corporeal images, whereas they could be seen as the generators of a dissident subjectivity. All institutional objects can be seen like this.

The issue is whether we are generating a break and how it is represented — as phantastic origins, perhaps. Pure acts of 'creative auto reference' are not possible in ordinary existence, and so it is difficult to grasp except through masks, myths and other kinds of metamodels. At the same time, we can understand creative subjectification ourselves only in terms of 'a phantasmatic economy'[involving machines, production and all those other metaphors?].

We should understand mental ecology not in terms of borrowed concepts and practices from psychiatry, but focus on 'the logic of desiring ambivalence' wherever it occurs [examples include sport]. This logic will not be that of profit. It will not just focus on individuals. It will examine various phantasms, including those of aggression or racism affecting both children and adults, and we need to understand these phantasms in terms of ecology, how they transfer and translate into matters of expression. This implies that such phantasms need to acquire modes of expression in the first place in order that they can be reattached to existential territories. We understand violence transversally. This does not mean that we allow people to act out their phantasms nor that we ignore the constant dangers of the death drive that threatens to emerge whenever territories of the self are undermined. Overall, violence is also produced by complex subjective assemblages, not essential to humans, and maintained by various assemblages of enunciation. Sade and Celine offer examples of how to manage negative fantasies, turning them into literature. Anything that prevents this sort of process in the imagination threatens to produce violence in the real.

Thus for example comic books aimed at children are alarming, but much worse is the presence of the despot [rendered as the one eyed man, already described in ATP, 424. The translators also detect a reference to Le Pen]. Successful fascists also manage to harness a widespread 'montage of drives' (39).

There is of course no obvious reliable methodology that will be able to deal with all the fantasies that lead to the objectification of minorities and thus in the need for institutions. However a more general account of experiences of analysing people in these institutions [including schools] might help to change these conditions. It will still be an enormous task to reconstruct the damage caused by IWC. No central reform will succeed. We need the 'promotion of innovatory practices'(40), and the increase of experiences which do produce a respect for singularity and autonomous subjectivity. Violent fantasies and brutal deterritorialization will only bring about redeployed assemblages that will further limit bodies and individuals, but ordinary approaches [to education and socialisation] will not defeat punitive superegos and deadly guilt complexes. Religions have lost their hold, while totemism and animism seem to be on the increase. Human communities have become introspective and trade unions left behind by ever present crisis.

Social ecology involves affective and pragmatic activity by human groups of different sizes, in order to qualitatively reorganise primary subjectivity. The seem to be two options: (1) 'personological triangulation' [some sort of family triangle or relation between self and other]. This might begin with the usual identifications and imitations to produce primary groups, but these tend to produce hierarchical arrangements and passivity unless they are extended more broadly, even to the cosmos. (2) 'diagrammatic efficiency' to replace the usual systems of identification,a turn to processual semiotics [what would normally be called symbols except that is structuralist]. Diagrams tend to deterritorialization, to create new discursive chains attached to referents. It is the difference between a music student imitating his teacher and developing his own style that will tend towards singularity. We must also separate imaginary crowd aggregates and collective assemblages of enunciation which are better able to connect with social systems or machinic components as autopoiesis rather than repetition [note 74, page 113, gives an account of Varela's biology as a system of production of its own components. Guattari apparently identifies this sort of self positing in jazz music as well {in Chaosmosis apparently} and suggest that a number of different machines can also feature autopoiesis. Maturana's definition is also cited — apparently poiesis originally meant cultural production and when 'auto' was added the neologism  was used to refer to 'the dynamics of the autonomy proper to living systems"].However, the modalities might be difficult to separate when examining actual political systems. Further, capitalist societies produce 'serial subjectivity' (41) to the salaried classes, another kind [not specified, presumably the worst kind of passive conformity] to the huge mass, and an elitist subjectivity to the executive sectors [note the bourgeois categories]. Mass media increases these divergences. [Now a bit that sounds like Bourdieu...] The elite possess material wealth and cultural capital, but the subjugated masses have to remain within the status quo and have a 'hopeless and meaningless life'. We need to move to a post-media age where the media reflect a multitude of subject groups [hints of free radio?] so they can be re-singularised.

The alienation produced by the media is not necessary. Any fatalism here depends on certain misunderstandings: 'sudden mass consciousness-raising' (42) is always possible; the collapse of Stalinism has encouraged 'other transformative assemblages of social struggle'; the technological evolution of the media means it is now cheaper than ever and might be used for non-capitalist goals; labour now requires more '"creationist subjectivity"' and upskilling.

The subjectivity of the working classes was eroded and serialized [as in family, school, work etc] first, and this has now been exported to the Third World. However there is an acceleration [a straw here to clutch] of technology and information, providing for new forms of subjectification. It is contradictory, trying to subordinated intelligence and initiative to capitalist control, and even to domestic life. The key policy is to reterritorialize the family on a large scale.

Effects will be different depending on whether a collective subjectivity arises and whether this can resist archaic features — Japan and Italy seem to have managed to do so. In France by contrast, whole regions were able to withdraw from economic life [in an archaic way presumably, not as Autonomism]. In other Third World countries, we see a post industrial subjectivity imposed on a mediaeval one, and this may be extended to Africa. If technological progress results, Europe might be put under severe tension.

Archaism is always a danger. Some uprisings, say in Algeria, have managed to achieve a symbiosis between fundamentalism and Western ways of living. A spontaneous social ecology can arise to constitute new existential territories, but it needs  politically coherence to avoid being recaptured. Obviously we should move away from profit-based markets as regulators and consider 'a range of other value systems'(44). These might include notions of aesthetic profitability, and 'the values of desire'. At the moment, these are still regulated by the state for example in the notions of national heritage. New social associations might constitute a whole new  Third Sector, neither private nor public [New Labour did that as a phony Third Way], and this might be encouraged by increasing mechanization [Guattari thinks it 'will be forced to expand continuously' (44) — accelerationism again]. A universal basic income will need to be seen as a right.

There will be a problem in encouraging the organization of different ventures to produce re-singularisation. New territories will be necessary, but not like nationalist movements which tend to dominate over molecular reform. Deterritorialized nationalities might be possible through music and poetry. The general equivalences of capitalism must be resisted by producing existential territories which cannot be grasped in terms of labour time or profit. New information technology might help to create new 'stock exchanges of value' and collective debate [I think this has happened to some extent with the Web], and this can provide an opportunity for the most singular and dissensual activity. Companies that lead not to profit but to enrichment of the whole of humanity need to be encouraged in the collective interest. Challenges to fundamental research and artistic production must be resisted.

This can never take place globally, but will emerge from particular shifts in value systems and the emergence of new 'poles of valorization'. We can see the possibilities in various spectacular social changes, on a political level say in the Philippines or Chile, on a nationalist level in the USSR [oh dear]. In these cases 'value system revolutions'(45) are rising up from the base.

Environmental ecology suggests that anything is possible, that so-called natural equilibrium will be increasingly dependent upon humans, and that 'vast programmes' will be required to regulate things like atmospheric conditions. We can think of this better as 'machinic ecology', because both 'cosmic and human practice has only ever been a question of machines, even, dare I say it, of war machines'. Nature itself has always 'been at war with life'[in the same sense as in a war machine?]. We need to master the mechanosphere if we are to deal with 'the acceleration [sic] of techno-scientific progress' and population increase. We will need to not only preserve but repair nature, and deal with matters such as the creation of new living species by technology.