Baudrillard, J. (1987) Forget
Foucault, New York: Semiotext(e) Foreign
Agents.
My preliminary
In what senses has the real
disappeared? There seem to be two ideas:
(A) Hyperreality. In Eco, this
is a state where representations of the real fuse
with the real itself, adding to it, making it more
real in some way. As an example in Tourism – the
Egyptian pyramids are real, but when you see them
you are also aware of all the TV documentaries
about them, the explanations of their possible
origins and significance, the diagrams and
animated walk- throughs and so on. By comparison,
the actual objects can look disappointing. You
might even get a better sense of their reality by
staying at home and watching more documentaries.
In Baudrillard’s Simulations,
this arises in the case where the two pilots about
to crash at the Paris Air Show saw themselves
crashing on TV, or in the notorious case of the
Gulf War (I), where training footage of smart
bombs was interwoven with actual footage the
better to show how they really worked, so that
training mock-ups became more real than the War
itself.
(B) Simulation. In Baudrillard
this is a process that replaces or displaces the
real altogether. What happens is that:
1.Signs (buildings, clothes, paintings,
texts) become separated out from their original
associations as symbols of particular people or
activities (only the rich wore sumptuous clothes,
only religious paintings used purple, only the
nobility spoke French and so on).
2.Capitalism and the Enlightenment took these
signs away from such restricted use and let them
be used more widely, as counterfeits and as
commodities (false appendages like stiff shirt
fronts or fake castles, classical fronts on modern
buildings). Then industrial capitalism in
particular strips signs of particular meanings and
abstracts them – labour, with very definite
meanings according to what sort of areaof the
country you lived in, becomes abstract work. Goods
are reproduced because there are models or
templates of them – models replace the real as the
main referent. Relations
between signs themselves become more important
than relations between signs and the real
[Baudrillard’s examples, in Symbolic Exchange and
Death, are the relations between signs themselves
in Saussure, and the emergence of exchange value
to replace use value in Marx: eventually, sign
value replaces use value altogether].
3.Capitalism then starts producing signs
fully in the abstract. In the arts, cultural goods
are mass produced (not even reproduced). Finally,
signs join up with each other as it were in new
professionalised types of communication – such as
advertisements, or TV programmes, popular novels
etc. These are localised forms of strategic
communication not whole ideologies though. In the
sciences, underlying, often digital binary codes,
are discovered/formulated explaining how things
are joined together in biology or computing and
leading to phenomena like the digital copy of
information or the (ideal) clone, that is
indistinguishable from the real. The whole point
of capitalism – and the arts and science – is to
develop and explore abstract connections in codes
like this, without even bothering any more about
the real. Hence ‘abstract’ non-realist painting,
and the investigation of codes for their own sake
rather than real phenomena in biology (the
exploration of the genome would be a good example,
especially if the original ‘real’ purpose to
discover the genetic origins of illness now seems
to have abandoned) or in physics (the Hadron
Collider searches for particles to test
mathematical theorems as much as to discover new
bits of ‘reality’).
Simulation
is thus a final stage of hyperreality, where the
real and the representation of it have completely
combined –
‘collapsed’ or ‘fallen into each other’ (think of
a vertically collapsing building where all the
floors merge into one), ‘fused’ (think ofalloys
where different metals fuse in the right
conditions of heat and pressure), or ‘imploded’,
as internal differences disappear (think of the
two sections of enriched uranium forced together
by conventional charges to form a critical mass
when a nuclear weapon detonates) to use
Baudrillard’s terms. Some aspects of reality might
resist and remain detached from representations of
them, but vanishingly few. All the major aspects
have become simulated including politics, mass
communication, class struggle.
In Forget
Foucault, Baudrillard argues that real
power, which was once intended to manage these
real conflicts and divisions, has also disappeared
(or possibly just mostly disappeared) as in
Foucault, and so has real desire as in Deleuze
and Guattari. No one does it any more.
Capitalism seduces instead [roughly, makes people
want what is provided, although Baudrillard also
uses the term to suggest an alternative sexualised
relationship, opposed to modern forms of
sexuality, focused on the quick orgasm] . Even
politicians just simulate it, in a sad attempt to
pretend what they are doing is real and thus can
justify themselves and their activities. Power and
desire have, like most other things, ‘fallen into
hyperreality’. So we can forget all the elaborate
analyses of power (Foucault) and desire (Deleuze)
– they are mirrors of each other anyway (it is the
old banality of spontaneous creativity on the one
hand being managed and repressed on the other) and
so we can forget them both.
Cases where real power has
indeed disappeared are easy enough to experience.
Any teacher walking out in front of a class
realizes that the game is up and there is no
longer any way to exercise effective power. It is
all smoke and mirrors and the trick is to pretend
(simulate) a powerful performance, so that your
bluff is never called. If you are lucky you might
be able to seduce a few kids – get them to realize
there is some other kind of meaning available in
what they take to be obvious -- but you can’t
compel them any more in the name of Authority,
Society, their parents, the job market or
whatever.
If all fails you might need to
fall back on physical force – but is that power?
It is a contradictory policy to use force since
that risks busting authority altogether because
you have shown it relies ultimately on force and
not reasonable calculation (work hard and you will
get a good job) or symbolic authority (you have
let down the whole school). Anyway, regulating
kids by the use of force requires constant
policing and exhausting constant battle with them.
The last whole society to try that sort of
regulation was Nazi Germany says Baudrillard.
However, I would say that
Baudrillard and the others have overemphasized the
entanglement of power with authority and almost
neglected force entirely – a typical omission for
philosophers who are not sociologists (although
plenty of sociologists have made the same
mistake). This may be because authority-based
power is far more central and important for most
of us, and especially for famous professors, but
there is also Hebdige’s strange remark to bear in
mind (Hiding
in the Light) that he lost interest in the
politics of youth culture when youth began rioting
– no subtlety and nothing to analyze if it is all
a matter of chucking a brick through a window.
Nevertheless, you can rescue Foucault a bit by
saying not all power has fallen into hyperreality
(unless you define it exclusively as the same as
authority). Mind you, Foucault ignored force too.
Where
the analysis hits home especially though is with
Deleuze and desire. What is the equivalent of
real support for remaining real aspects of power
in the use of force when we discuss desire?
Deleuze argues it is a real force on the basis
of his virtual/realist ontology but we get into
difficulties with that, according to Zizek,
Badiou and others. If the virtual endlessly
actualises things, the role of desire remains a
bit ambiguous – is it just something that
explains human actualizations, or itself an
actualization? Maybe Baudrillard is also arguing
that ontology, as the study of the real, is also
forgettable anyway? Actual social life has
escaped from the real, if not merged with it?
Philosophical ontology is at the second stage of
simulation if not the third one, still producing
what it takes to be some sort of copy of the
real, yet already engaged in producing it
through professional philosophy itself? DeLanda’s commentary
on Deleuze’s work on the ‘abstract machine’
already shows a dangerous flirtation with
mathematical projects aimed at some abstract
unity of the code? Much might depend on what
Baudrillard actually means by saying Foucault
and the others are engaged in some project to
maintain the real anyway –deliberately so as to
preserve their philosophies and careers ,to stop
them being forgotten? (bits of Foucault suggest
this – he wanted to branch out to avoid being
absorbed into the 'warm freemasonry' of
scholasticism -- in Power/Knowledge).
Or at a deeper level, unable to grasp somehow
that the game is up? What would follow
Baudrillard anyway –we would have to forget all
philosophy and politics. Far more likely, as he
or Lotringer predict anyway, is that he will be
forgotten instead?
Sample from the Interview
With Lotringer
It is true that logic only
leads to disenchantment.We can’t
avoid going a long way with negativity, with
nihilism and all.But then don’t you think a more exciting
world opens up?Not a more reassuring world, but certainly
more thrilling, a world where the name of the game
remains secret.A world ruled by reversibility and
indetermination (74).
Earlier on you mentioned
disenchantment.The other, enchanting aspect, for me, is no
longer desire, that is clear.It is
seduction.Things
make events all by themselves, without any
mediation, by a sort of instant commutation.There is
no longer any metaphor, rather metamorphosis.Metamorphosis
abolishes metaphor, which is the mode of language,
the possibility of communicating meaning.Metamorphosis
is that the radical point of the system, the point
where there is no longer any law or symbolic
order.It
is a process without any subject, without death,
beyond any desire, in which only the rules of the
game of forms are involved.Among
other things, what psychoanalysis has to say about
mythology is an abuse of metaphorical language.
And what
would correspond to that mythology in the order
of metamorphosis? (Lotringer)
The
possibility of transmutation: becoming–animal,
becoming–woman.What Gilles Deleuze said about it seemed
to me to fit perfectly.Love
is no longer considered as a dependence of
desire upon a lack, but in the unconscious form
of the transformation into the other.In
that metamorphic unconscious nothing is
repressed.The metaphor is bypassed.(77 –
78). [Nice one!
If I have nderstood this correctly, the
argument is that Deleuze's own much-lauded
process of becoming has been recuperated. It
is no longer based on desire but just reflects
possibilities like digital
transformations.Nothing matters! Become what
the fuck you like!]
1.
Deleuze and Foucault need each other,
because without Foucault’s analysis of the micro
physics of power, there would be no need to posit
universal desire as an opposing force.Without
ever-present and dangerous desire as a threat,
presumably there would be no need for a
surveillance society saturated in power either.
2.Opposition
and resistance are always attractive to thinkers,
but the masses have long given up caring, and are
content to devolve issues of power to politicians
and intellectuals.It is in this sense that the social
dimension to political philosophy has disappeared,
and politics makes sense only in its own terms [so
Cameron vetoed the European Treaty to please his
own backbenchers rather than from any interests in
the reality of the policy or the crisis. Obama
asked people to vote for him to induce change --
and then announced that change had happened
because he had been elected]
By extension, power no longer exists as a reality.It has
already undergone transformation from symbolic to
political power [so disbelief in the symbolic was
the first damaging step], and now political power
is practically unusable, and everywhere subject to
challenge.Even
a powerless lecturer can challenge the system to
sack him, and calling the bluff of power shows its
inherent status as simulacrum. {my bosses couldn't
even sack me -- so what does that make of all
their silly meetings to develop policies etc?]
4.Sometimes,
political power attempts to escalate back to the
symbolic level, but can’t sustain it.Sometimes
there is nostalgia.Oddly enough, academic analyses like
Foucault’s can help to talk up the reality of
political power. [There might also be occasional
forays back to the real -- I think probably
inevitably, as when economic confidence collapses
when people look at the 'real' economy --all
bubbles have burst so far anyway. Baudrillard says
this helps talk up the reality of the rest of the
activity, which may be true -- but does this
EXPLAIN it?]
5.Calling
the bluff of power is rendered rather romantically
as gambling on death, going all out, refusing to
compromise [more on this in Symbolic
Exchange...] .This is what Lotringer says Baudrillard
claims he has done in this book challenging
Foucault to a duel to the death—one of them has
got to be wrong!There is none of the usual attempt to weave
together the discourses, do symbolic exchange,
compromise, evaluate, rank order or negotiate and
all that academic stuff. More generally, any
theoretical or political opposition will be
recuperated -- Symbolic
Exchange argues that even Marxism helped
legitimate capitalism by insisting it was about
production not reproduction]
6.When
Foucault announced that power was no longer top
down ‘juridical’, but dispersed through social
life, it became inexplicable and untraceable for
Baudrillard, another sense in which it
disappeared. The problem is like the one which
afflicts ‘conflict sociology’, where conflict is
too common, so to speak, explaining disputes over
garden fences as well as major systems of
exploitation. Like that tradition (and
gramscianism when it took the same path),
‘politics’ became similarly trivial and
indistinguishable from everyday life– the politics
of the personal, racism as a matter of using the
proper words etc. This keep academics in business,and
revitalises their favourite concepts, of course.
7.What
is really at stake is talking up the real,
desperately trying to insist that power is a real
everyday and ubiquitous reality, Foucault shows
how this is done with his analysis of how (modern)
sexuality needs to be talked up, created though
discourses like Freudian ones. This is exactly how
power itself is talked up.
8.Challenging accounts like Foucault’s
involves demanding to know the relation of his
theory to the real [and maybe exposing the dubious
strategies whereby the real is smuggled in – but
this is done better by De Certeau?] [Later on, in
the discussions with Lotringer, Baudrillard is
sympathetic to theorists who somehow have to keep
going, denying that it is all just a game, trying
to make it real etc. Even he doesn’t want theory
to disappear altogether, although he doesn’t know
how to stop it happening!]