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Dr W Large Kant's
Theory of Taste 30 January
2007 16:25
85 The
quality of
judgement is that it is disinterested. The big
problem here is
the connection between interest and existence - surely an object has to
exist
even if I am disinterested in it. Questions
87 The notion
of interest
comes from the moral theory - human agency Inclination
is linked
to need - a relation to desire which is not determined by reason,
whereas
interest in always linked to 'principles of reason' - these must be
subjective,
since they do have objective moral worth. Inclination for something is
not a
yet an interest - to be interested in something we must have a reason
to be so.
Thus it is clear that non-rational beings have inclinations, but they
do not
have interests. This not being capable of having interests is not the
same as
being disinterested which is the basis of aesthetic judgements - human
beings
are both sensuous (animals) and rational beings and this is the ground
of their
relation to beauty. 88 For this
reason in the What is
different here
from the moral writings, however, is that there is no discussion of
existence. 89 How we
might understand
the meaning of interest in Kant in morality is that it is always
directed to a
realisation of a state of affairs where the origin is pleasure which
determines
the will, or the will, as in the moral law, which determines pleasure. Having an
interest in something necessarily involves desiring its existence, and
this
holds true regardless of the nature of this interest. It is not
interest in
the existence of the object a such, but as the attainment of some end. Kant's
method is
negative - both agreeable and morality are the only expression of
interest, and
beauty is not like them, so therefore it must be disinterested - but
this is
not sufficient -- why because beauty might be just another kind of
interest -
what Kant has to do is show that the agreeable and the moral really
exhaust
every possibility of interest, which unfortunately he does not do. In the
agreeable
pleasure is the source of desire - I like the object because it gives
me
pleasure. It is not merely a inclination because I have a rational
representation of the object that gives me such pleasure - I can think
about
what it is that gives me pleasure The liking
for the
good, on the other hand, is based upon a determinate idea or concept of
the
object, which serves a definite purpose. The beautiful, on the
contrary,
concerns only the representation of the object, without any relation to
purpose. The
agreeable and the
good, on the contrary, have to do with liking of x which concerns the
existence
of x and thus interest in it, where it
is willed or merely wished for 93 But where
is this
exhaustive for interest? This has to do with the faculty of Desire -
that is
there are two possible relations. Either pleasure as the interest in
the
existence of something is the ground in
relation to desire or it is the product But does
this really
explain why those who take pleasure in the beauty of things are not all
interested whether they exist or not.
94 But it is
only the determination
of the Aesthetic value that must be seen in terms interest, not the
existence
of the object - of course I must interest that the object exists, but
when it
comes to make my aesthetic judgement I do not need to take account of
this (it
might be a political judgement for example) - but these interests
cannot be
part of the determinate ground of the judgement, because it pure
disinterested
pleasure which gives rise to their existence in the first place. Subjective
universality The issue
here is how
we can have a universality that is not conceptual and then what is the
subjective ground of this universality. - the ground is the harmony of the imagination
and the understanding in free play. 99 Universality
seems
first to derive from the independence of interest that we gained from
the first
moment - but we have to ask ourselves whether this is enough, as in
Guyer's
critique. 100 But maybe
this first
part of the argument is only preliminary for Kant - that the person who
believes that his judgements are disinterested takes them to be
universal but
that is not sufficient for the philosophy. He needs a transcendental
proof,
since the very idea of a subjective universality is very problematic. 101 But we
have to ask
ourselves the question about why an a claim to taste can be
disinterested and
only private - why must it have a universal validity? But surely
something
private like not liking paintings with the colour red cannot be
disinterested.
In other words can we private disinterested judgements?
Every time that we go for examples of
idiosyncratic likings then we always discover interests and nothing
disinterested. 102 The
analysis in section
6 is analytic - in the same way that to claim that to be free also
involves the
existence of the moral law - this does
not prove that either freedom or the moral law exist, just that one
must follow
the other. The argument here is if a judgement is taken to be free
(disinterested) then it must have some claims to universality - at this
moment
Kant has not proved than any such kind of universality exists. 103 So do
aesthetic claims
make a claim to universality? Kant wants to show that they do by
distinguishing
between the agreeable and the beautiful. The first part of the analysis
is
normative and linguistic - thus that everyone takes it to be the case
that no
one thinks that statements about agreeableness have nothing at all to
with
universality - they are just about my own private tastes, whereas when
I say
that something is beautiful, I don't just mean that it is beautiful for
me but
that you should take it to be beautiful as well, and if you don't then
you lack
taste. 105 Since this
universality
is has nothing to say about the object, then it cannot be logical. But
is this
a question of quantity or validity? It cannot be the former since all
aesthetic
judgements are singular because they are not conceptual - 'this rose is
beautiful'. A
subjective
universality has to do with feelings rather than logical universality
which has
to do with the concept of an object.
Kant seems to want some kind of parallelism between
logical and
aesthetic judgements as though we could use the same tables, but this
is not
possible. Rather we have to think of a universality which is quite
different
from any kind of logical universality. This
universal voice is
the origin of the claim to universality in aesthetic judgements.
This is
what I am
saying when I claim that something is beautiful - of course I cannot be
sure
that I am speaking with a universal voice, just as with moral judgement
I
cannot be sure that I am not acting out of self interests, though I can
make
the distinction between the moral law and interests. The universal
voice is
only an idea, and not an empirical reality. 109 So we can
be certain
that we have made a judgement of taste, but that we can never be
certain
whether we have be successful. 110 Universally
communicable means universally shareable. This means that when I make a
judgement of taste I speak with a 'universal voice', that is my
experience must
subjectively accessible by everyone. What
section 9 is
concerned with is to show that it is not pleasure in the object in
which this
universability is to be found but in the 'judging of the object' 113 The
universality of
taste comes for the universal communicability of a mental state and
that has
its basis in 'universally communicable act of judging or reflection'. 114 This
aesthetic
reflection is related to cognition even though the judgement itself in
non
cognitive in the free play of the relation of faculties - imagination
and the
understanding. - it isn't cognition but relates to it - this is the
subjective
condition of any aesthetic judgement.
This subjective condition is necessary but it does not
determine any
object. It applies to the subjects universally and not to any object as
in the
conditions of knowledge (space and time and the other categories). It is
these free play
of the faculties which leads to the possibility of disinterested
liking. If the
free play is harmonious then it leads to pleasure and if it is
disharmonious
then it leads to displeasure. So what
the mind feels
is not the object as such, which would be mere sensation, but this
harmony or
interplay of the faculties. This is not determinate since it is not
lead by a
concept of the object, but it is still rational or intellectual,
because it
relates to the cognitive faculties of imagination or the understanding
and in
this way it is universally communicable to all human beings. Beauty,
Purposiveness
and Form 119 The
relation in
question here is between the judging subject and the representation of
the
object. For the
first time it
appears that Kant is turning towards the object of aesthetic judgement
rather
than just the subject, but it is not about finding a restrictive list
of
properties that would determine in advance what an art object would or
world
not be. Rather it is a matter of the representation
of the object, without reference to any practical or theoretical
concern. The
aim of this section is the characterisation of this relation such that
it makes
possible the universal communicability of the harmony of the faculties.
What is
central to this
endeavour is the idea of 'purposiveness without purpose' and form. It is
beauty which is
the purpose of the object, without this appearing as the end of the
object. 120 The aim of
section 10
is to give a 'generic account' of purposiveness.
121 He
understands this
intentionally - a concept of the object - what is it meant to be - in
this case
the effect (what it does) proceeds the cause (what it is) in our
representation. 'Purposiveness'
is
derived from this idea of purpose, and can be explained as the
causality a
concept has in relation to is object in terms of purposive form. 122 A pleasure
for Kant,
which is an awareness of increased activity of thinking through the
harmony of
the faculties, is not merely a feeling but includes judgement,
otherwise we
would not speaking of aesthetic judgement at all. Because it is a
judgement it
involves a 'certain kind of intentionality' and here we might see the
link to
purpose. 123 Our liking
for a
representation of an object stems from our consciousness (not just
feeling) of
its power to keep our attention, but it only does so because it is
inherently
pleasurable In terms
of action we
conceive of a purpose in terms of an end - I will such a such in order
to do
this or that (I buy a bus ticket in order to get to college). We can
also
describe object, state of mind or action as purposive - the hammer is
for hammering,
fear is for fleeing lions, reading secondary texts is for understanding
the
primary one. This is the case even if something does not have such an
intrinsic
purpose - the rock does not have the purpose for smashing some one's
brains in.
124 But the
problem here is
that Kant's first definition is that purpose is the causality of the
concept
(know what something is), whereas here it is an attribute of 'certain
products'
which are not conceptual purposive. It is the
only the
latter which seems to make sense of purposiveness without purpose -
that is we
take the object has having an aesthetic purpose without positing a will
behind
it. 125 The
problem with this
definition is that it covers the whole of reflective judgement - it
takes the
object as purposive (nature) without postulating an original will, and
not just
aesthetic judgements. Kant's
argument is
eliminative is § 11 - first of all because judgements of taste
(JT) are
disinterested we cannot be speaking of a 'subjective purpose', i.e.
that I like
something, nor can it be based on an objective purpose, which would be
conceptual. Rather the purpose of the JT must be to do with the free
play of
the faculties - the 'subjective purposiveness of the representation'. 126 But we
might ask why
does the JT have to do with purposiveness at all? Because it can't be
agreeable
or moral, Kant ends up with the strange phrase purposiveness without
purpose,
and then he links this to the idea of 'form of purposiveness', but all
these
seems to beg the question that it has to be purposive at all. For Kant
subjective
purposiveness and purposiveness without purpose are the same, since it
make no
sense to speak of a objective purposiveness without purpose. No for
Kant an object
can be given a purposive even if it does not have one through the
subject's
will - that it is it intended as if it were designed (form) in this way
- the
rock bashing some one's head in. Thus if
JT is based on subjective purposiveness then it must be related to form
or
design But why
must be take
the art work to be purposive at all. This is linked to the previous
moment and
§ 10 and the universally communicable of the mental states of JT.
The mental
state of the
free play of the faculties is subjective purposive since it determines
the
actual ground of JT. What is purposive here is not the will, but the
attunement
of the faculties, which is without purpose (it is in free play - we
could say
that it is without reason) 128 Although
we might say
that the mental state is without purpose, since it is not cognitive or
volitional, it does seem strange to say that the aesthetic object is
not
purposive, since it's purpose seems to be to cause the free play of the
faculties in the first place. But if we
start talking
about the object, then we are flying in the face of Kant's view,
because he is
precisely he knew this position (Baumgarten), but he precisely rejected
it. His
argument is that aesthetics is both subject, and yet universal, and
this is the
problem of the 130 In §
11, the analogy
with the moral law is that the feeling that is produced is not caused
by any
determination of the will (I do not decide to feel respect or pleasure)
but is
'an ingredient in the consciousness of such a determination'. It is the
consciousness of the formal play of the faculty which is the pleasure
of the JT
- it is not the cause of it. It is this what I communicate in the
universal
claim. 'it is not purposive because it produces pleasure, but rather it
is
pleasurable because it is purposive. 131 There is
no external
purpose in this - it is the just the subjective relation between the
faculties
and the desire to maintain this relation. In §
13 and 14, Kant
give a formalist account of JT - what I attend to in the object is
merely its
formal qualities and nothing empirical (which would be charm and
emotion for
Kant). We need to
distinguish
between form of purposiveness and purposiveness of form
- in the first case we are merely speaking
about mere form - it appears to have a form, but has no determinate
conceptual
end. JT are purposive because they 'occasion' the free play of the
faculties,
but this in itself has no determinate end, either conceptually or
practically
although it is the source of the universally communicable JT. 132 The second
phrase,
purposiveness of form, on the contrary, seems to indicate that the form
of the
object has some purpose. This seems genuinely objective even if it only
refers
to the representation of the object and not its matter. Kant gives us
no
argument to move from the former to the latter, and moreover appears to
end up
with a very restrictive formalism which appears to contradict the idea
of
beauty he himself has set up. The answer
must be that
the formalism has its origin in the harmony of the faculties which is
the
purposiveness of JT. The problem is that Kant restricts his account of
form to
space and time of the first critique which ends up with a very
restrictive
formalism. Again
Kant's method is
eliminative - beauty can have nothing to do with charm and emotion
because this
is linked to interest 133 Nonetheless
he goes
further than this in § 13 by arguing that charm has to with
matter, whereas JT
has to do with form. It is here that he introduces the idea of
'purposiveness
of form'. Only in
§ 14 is matter
equated with sensation and form with space and time.
Kant's
argument here is
against those who would think that tone or colour are JT since they
refer to
sensations. They can only be so if they are considered as forms as
Euler's
theory of colours and sounds as temporal. But this seems to allow a
scientific
theory, one that is conceptual, to determine JT. 135 In JT it
is matter of
pure configurations of time and space, design and composition,
abstracted from
any kind of sensation. But this
seems to limit
JT of taste to the form of the object in perception as it is described
in the
first critique. But this would take away what most would consider to
the be
intrinsic to the experience of art - colour in painting, and tone in
music for
example. 136 Kant's
conception of
the harmony of faculties does require some connection to form, but
perhaps not
to the restrictive account of form that is given in the transcendental
aesthetic. What he
have to
remember is that JT are reflections for Kant - they are representations
of the
object within the subject, in the free relation between the
imagination
and the understanding (in other words they are not determined by a
specific
concept). No some kind of ordering (form) must be the origin of this
relation
rather than just an isolated sensation. Thus it is not the sensation of
colour
that occasions the JT, but a reflection upon the sensation of
this
colour. Where we might differ from Kant is restricting this notion of
form to
merely space and time, but including all formal arrangements of the
imagination. 137 It is
Kant's search for
the universality of JT that leads him to conflate perceptual and
aesthetic
judgements. But we don't need these objective properties
(transcendental
objective forms) to account for the universality of JT - what is
universal here
is the universal communicability of a mental state, and is only the
form of the
object as it is taken up in the imagination that can provide the basis
for such
reflection. 138 In other
words the
object is the occasion of the free play of the faculties, form of
purposiveness, but it is only so because it is taken up formally,
purposiveness
of form. The next
sections are
to show that any conceptual content that is added to a JT (what I know
about
the author, the paint, production of the art work and so) destroys the
purity
of the JT. However, the different is that this conceptual content is to
some
extent positive for Kant, whereas sensible content (charm and emotion)
is not. 139 Kant
demonstrates the
non-conceptual content of JT, by showing that beauty has nothing at all
to do
with perfection - again is argument is against objective definitions of
art a
la Baumgarten. But he does seem to retreat slightly from the pure
judgement of
beauty by accepting the notion of dependent beauty, which allows
conceptual
content. Free beauty does not require a concept of what a thing is (the
examples are natural) whereas dependent beauty does. 140 What is
particular of
importance for Kant is the relation between aesthetic and moral
considerations.
But by admitting dependent beauty doesn't all of Kant's distinctions
fall
apart? How
Allison answers
this question is by saying that JT can enter in relation to other
judgement,
even a subservient one, without losing its own purity as aesthetic
judgements. 141 Thus we
might say that
the beauty of a church is constrained by its function, but this
function
does determine
the judgement of the beauty -just because the building is a church does not
make it beautiful per se. 142 The issue
for Kant is
that for some objects it is hard to separate form from function,
whereas others
it is not, but this does not undermine the difference between
form and
function, and nor does it imply that the JT is linked to the function
as such.
The distinction is between ways in which the beauty of the object is
considered
- either in its own terms, or in relation to a greater whole which is
the
function of the object. The
Modality of Taste
and the Sensus
Communis 144 The modality of JT have
nothing at
all to do with the content but the relaton to others - its 'evaluative
force'. The demand for
agreement
pressuposses common sense, which is in fact a combination of all the
other 3
moments. 146 Logical judgements
concern the
conceptul content of representation - that is the relation between the
representation and the object. But JT have to do with the relation
between
representations and feelings, and here it does not seem possible to
claim that
there is a universality. First of all we have to
say that
this judgement is subjective, as opposed to the objectivity of
knowledge and
the objectivity of morality. The universality comes in because when I
make a
JT, I claiming that I am judging an object that ought to be judged in
the same
way by others. I do this because I treat my judgement as making a
universal
rule. - however because it is aesthetic rather than cognitive, I cannot
state
what this rule is - it has the form of a rule, but not the content. The second moment is
quantitative
- the different between the private and the universal, the 4th moment
is
evaluative, you ought to judge the same way that I judge. 148 The mysterious
unstatable rule is
linked to common sense. If I am claiming the agreement of all, the exemplarity
of
JT, then it must be based on some principle (by what right can I make
this
claim), and this principle is common
sense,
which is the free play of the
faculties occasioned by the object, and which is attributable to all
other
subjects 149 What this principle is
trying to
answer is the paradox that one can have a feeling that is universally
shareable, when feelings appear to be what is most private about us. Common sense is feeling
for what
is universally shareable. 151 Kant's argument
concerns first of
all cognition in general - so we must convince ourselves that he is
right to
suggest that one cannot have knowledge with the common sense, but also
why this
is relevant to JT. 153 The problem with this
argument is
that it seems to imply that we can speak about aesthetics in cognitive
terms,
which is precisely what Kant has argued against in the rest of the
analytic of
the beautiful. Also its seems to imply that cognition is dependent on
aesthetics which would be very strange for Kant to argue for. 155 Common sense can be
defined as a
immediate seeing (a feeling) of how a given manifold falls under a
concept. |