What are The Consequences of
Increasingly Using the Territorial Army, US Army Reserve and National
Guard to Support British and American Operations? Can Any Comparisons
be Drawn? Andy Harris Introduction
Since
the
end of the Cold War, reserves have been increasingly used to support
the
regular British and American armed forces in times of overstretch or
national
crisis. Today they provide support for the full range of military
operations,
serving alongside their regular counterparts on war fighting and
peacekeeping
missions, rather than being limited to their Cold War role of providing
a
general reserve for a general war in Europe.
The recent
rise in overseas commitments, most notably those in Iraq, has only
served to
highlight an expanded role for reservists[1].
Increased
operational tempo has significantly increased the potential for
overstretch,
thereby posing a substantial impediment to operational effectiveness.
As a
result, the numbers of British and American reservists deployed on
operations
has risen exponentially since the occupation of Iraq in 2003.
No where are
these observations more apparent than in the cases of the British and
United
States Army, both of which contain a notably larger reserve component
than
their respective sister services. The Territorial Army (TA) currently
comprises
twenty five per cent of the entire British Army[2],
with over
nine thousand of its personnel being compulsory mobilised for
operations in 2003
and 2004[3].
The US Army
has an even higher dependency on reserves, with over fifty per cent of
its
overall compliment consisting of United States Army Reserve (USAR), and
National Guard (NG) soldiers. In 2004 over forty per cent of US Army
troops in
Iraq were reservists[4],
a
number which has reportedly risen in 2005.
With both
armies having such a sizable reliance on reserves, they provide an
interesting
focal point for a discussion on the ensuing consequences. Additionally,
because
they are two of the most heavily engaged armed forces in the world,
they prove
particularly useful in debating specific contemporary issues, such as
the
relationship between increased operational tempo, reserve use, and
operational
effectiveness. Furthermore, due to the fact that joint British and
American
Army operations are commonplace, a unique opportunity is provided to
make a
comparison between the consequences resulting from the increasing use
of
reserves, in two similarly orientated armies. It is for these reasons
that the
British and US Army have been chosen as the subjects for this
dissertation.
It is clear
that such an increased use of reservists to support British and
American
operations has resulted in a number of consequences, but what exactly
are these
consequences, and what are their effects? In order to address these
questions a
thorough academic analysis is required, a task that has had
surprisingly little
attention devoted to it, considering its relevance and importance. A
number of
studies and reports deal with specific aspects of these questions, but
an
analysis dealing with the issues in their entirety appears to be left
wanting.
Accordingly, the aim of this dissertation is to offer such an analysis,
by
discussing and expanding upon the existing debates. In doing so it also
aims to
present a fresh perspective, through a more subjective vantage point
from
within the military establishment. Such an approach is arguably crucial
to
fully appreciating the entire range of consequences, and yet is absent
from the
majority of existing literature. Overall it is hoped that the findings
presented in the analysis will stand as a basis for further inquiry.
Methodology
The
government reports came from Ministry of Defence publications, and a
study from
the US Government Accounting Office. The academic pieces were largely
American
in origin, and included articles from publications such as “Armed
Forces and
Society”, and a number of MA theses presented by serving US Army
officers,
submitted as part of their staff officer training. The media articles
were more
evenly spread, comprising of British newspaper articles, such as those
from the
“Daily Telegraph”, and American articles, such as those from the
“Washington
Post”.
The
government reports and academic pieces formed the focal point of the
analysis,
with the media articles predominately being used for illustrative
purposes, as
they provided a number of good examples on specific issues. These
reports were
used to introduce some of the key debates, and provide an “official”
account of
the consequences affecting British and US Army operational
effectiveness from
increasingly using reserves. They also provided a means to measure
these
consequences, as they discussed the desirable capabilities of reserves,
against
which assessments of the actual capabilities, taken from other sources,
could
be compared.
Due to the
nature of this dissertation as an academic inquiry, previous academic
discourse
on the subject was a vital component of the methodology. It was used to
expand
upon specific aspects of the key debates raised in the government
reports, and
counter some of the shortfalls in these reports, by providing a
theoretical
setting.
A number of
journals, and the MA theses, were deliberately chosen for their unique
perspectives, as they combined academic methods with a military
insight. Both
attributes were lacking from the majority of the government reports,
which
often appeared rather uncritical in reaching their conclusions. They
also often
appeared to lack a substantive military input, resulting in the issues
largely
being interpreted from a civilian perspective.
There were,
however, two key weaknesses inherent in these academic pieces. The
first was
that almost all of them concentrated entirely on the case of US Army
reserves,
with very little specific inquiry into the TA, an apparent result of a
substantial gap in military academia as a whole. As a result, the
problem of
over representing the USAR and NG in the findings became an issue.
The second
weakness was that a number of the pieces needed updating, with specific
reference to three pieces. The first was an article by W. Walker,
published in
1992, and the second was an article published in 1998 by D. Segal, B.
Reed and
D. Rohall. The third was one of the MA theses written by J. S.
Pritchett, also
published in 1998.
Due to the
considerable changes in the way reserves have been used in the British
and US
Army since the publication of these pieces, the accuracy and validity
of their
findings was called into question. Arguably therefore, their use in
analysing
the scale and nature of the current consequences faced by increasingly
using
reservist, would be inappropriate.
With regards
to the second problem, that of a number of the pieces needing updating,
it
appeared unwise to dismiss their findings purely on the basis of the
date of
their publication. Admittedly they could not provide as contemporary an
analysis as more recent publications, but they were nevertheless still
relevant
to a debate on the consequences of using reservists in the post Cold
War era.
Indeed not only were they relevant, but upon conducting further
research it
became evident that their findings were in fact fundamental to
understanding
some of the key issues, with many of their central tenets being
supported by later
publications. As a result it seemed reasonable to assume that a number
of
inferences could be made from these pieces, upon which further, and
more
recent, research could be used to form a more contemporary analysis.
In addition
to the research gained from existing publications, the decision was
taken to
include some primary research, using the social science methods of
surveying
and ethnography, to conduct an analysis of the TA. An elaboration of
the
specific way in which these methods were used, along with a discussion
of their
merits and difficulties, is included at a later stage.
It was
decided during the initial stages of researching this dissertation,
that a
component of the research was needed to focus specifically on the case
of the
British Army. This decision was taken in light of the lack of
contemporary
British specific analysis in the existing publications, and therefore
with the
aim of further limiting the weaknesses inherent in these pieces. With
regards
to the weakness of a potential overrepresentation of US reservists in
the
findings, a series of British specific examples would provide a means
to cross
reference the findings from American sources. Likewise, the inclusion
of some
contemporary research would further negate the weakness posed by the
outdated
sources, by providing some updated findings to either support, or
disprove
their original findings.
Predominately
though, this specific type of qualitative research was chosen for its
ability
to provide a unique insight into the questions being addressed, as it
allowed
for a subjective viewpoint through the eyes of serving reservists. Such
an
insight seemed particularly important as a number of the surrounding
issues
dealt specifically with subjective matters, such as the reasons for a
reservist
being less likely to volunteer for another operational tour. In much of
the
existing material, particularly from government sources, these matters
had been
addressed with little or no in depth consultation of serving
reservists, favoring
quantitative data as a means of compiling findings. Whilst quantitative
data
certainly had its place in an analysis of reserve use, the shortage of
qualitative data stood in need of correcting.
The
questionnaire was eleven questions long, and asked for reservists who
had been
operational to reflect on their experiences during mobilisation, whilst
in
theatre and upon being demobilised. Subjects covered included their
impressions
of the training they received, and whether they experienced any
employer and
family tensions. The questions were deliberately kept open ended in
order to
give respondents the opportunity to express their own views, in their
own
words, and therefore maximise the validity of the data. In all, eleven
questionnaires were returned.
The issue of
validity relates to a significant merit of this method[5],
reflected
in the answers given to the questionnaires, which provided a detailed
and
extremely useful subjective insight into the experiences of “going on
tour”.
Another merit was the ability to readily access a large population,
with
relative ease and minimal inconvenience to the respondents, through the
use of
email. In addition it allowed for a reachable comparison between the
experiences of reservists from two different units, with very different
roles.
However
despite these merits, a number of difficulties also emerged. The first
relates
to a common criticism of open ended surveys, that of the lack of
standardised
answers making any kind of statistical analysis difficult[6].
Nevertheless, due to the requirement for qualitative, rather than
quantitative,
data, this criticism did not appear to be a significant concern.
The second
relates to the fact that only eleven questionnaires were returned, even
though
the number of recipients potentially numbered at company strength
(ninety
soldiers). Although the exact number of recipients is unknown, due to
the
nature of a circular email, it was anticipated that there would be a
larger
number of respondents. As a result, the problem of not having enough
answers to
provide a typical analysis became an issue.
Nevertheless,
it was felt that this issue could be overcome by using the eleven
completed
questionnaires as a sample to infer additional findings. Although
relatively
small in number, the completed questionnaires fortunately came from a
variety
of reservists, from different civilian backgrounds, different ranks,
and who
undertook a range of roles. This advantage, combined with the fact that
they
all provided extremely thorough answers, suggested they could still
provide a
reasonable sample to highlight some emerging general trends.
The small
number of completed questionnaires also signified another difficulty,
that of
an unwillingness by some reservists to be overtly questioned about
their
experiences. Indeed a small proportion appeared openly hostile to being
sent a questionnaire
and academia in general, with one particular reservist stating that he
found it
offensive and intrusive. Although such cases were very much in the
minority,
and every step was taken to ensure the questionnaire remained
respectful of
delicate issues, it still evidently caused a problem for some.
The effectiveness of the
questionnaire was
also compromised by a number of military restrictions, in particular a
concern
originating from senior ranks in the military police unit, that
restricted
information might inadvertently be exposed. Even with the reassurance
of being
a serving member of the unit myself, and therefore being subject to the
constraints of the Official Secrets Act, these concerns appeared to
remain a
source of contention, and undoubtedly reduced the units’ willingness to
embrace
the research.
The merits
of conducting such a study were evident. It allowed me to penetrate the
close
knit military sub-culture prevalent in the unit, and gain a first hand
subjective insight into the reservists’ experiences, thereby filling in
the
gaps left by the survey to produce a richer understanding of the
prevalent
issues. Gaining such an understanding proved particularly valuable to
the
research, as although I personally had military experience, and could
gain an
insight into the personal issues surrounding a mobilisation, I could
not fully
appreciate them, as I have yet to be deployed.
Although the majority of those
individuals
spoken to knew that I was a student, and knew the title of my
dissertation,
they nevertheless appeared far more willing to discuss their
experiences in an
informal and more personal setting. Indeed even the reservist who had
stated
his disdain at being sent a questionnaire, remarked that he did not
object to
being approached face to face. Using participant observation also
afforded far
more flexibility than a questionnaire, as it allowed me to tailor
questions and
immediately follow up any leads[7]. There
were, however, a number of
inherent difficulties in using this approach. Aside from the ethical
implications,
which it was felt were addressed by ensuring anonymity was preserved,
the most
significant difficulty arose from a potential for me to loose an
objective
standpoint, and become an “insider”[8].
The
mere fact that I was a serving soldier in the unit made this problem a
particularly pressing issue, and called into question my ability to be
able to
compile an unbiased, and therefore valid, analysis.
In response,
I would suggest that a suitable objective standpoint was achieved
through the
application of stringent academic standards, in order to distance
myself
slightly from the group, and maintain a disciplined approach. The fact
that I
was new to the unit, having just transferred from another TA unit,
aided this
process. Consequently, although there remains the potential for the
analysis to
be biased, I would argue that it has been limited to an acceptable
level.
Another
significant difficulty was that although the use of participant
observation
yielded a higher number, and arguable more valid set, of responses than
the
questionnaires, it still sampled a reasonably small and specialist
group of
reservists. As a result it could be questioned whether the responses
gained
from these reservists can be used as part of a general analysis of the
TA. Military
policeman/policewomen belong to a small corps, and by the nature of
their role
often act independently whilst maintaining a distance from other units.
The
experiences of the soldiers in the military police unit are therefore
likely to
reflect these particular conditions. To counter this problem,
the
technique of “triangulation”[9]
was
adopted, whereby the results gained from the participant observation
study were
checked against the results from the questionnaires and existing
publications,
in order to see if any correlations were evident. In completing the
task of
triangulation, it emerged that a number of similarities were prevalent
amongst
all the sources. Findings and Analysis In
doing so it will concentrate on the
consequences affecting operational effectiveness, in light of the
controversial
debate currently raging over whether a reliance on reservists, to
counter the
negative effects resulting from increasing operational tempo, actually
aids, or
instead merely impedes, the abilities of the two armies. It will also explore the
social
consequences, which although perhaps appear less immediate than the
operational
consequences, nevertheless still deserve attention. Indeed a
consideration of
these social consequences proves important, as they can underlie, and
act in
conjunction with, a number of the operational consequences. Their
evident
impact upon certain important social institutions and functions also
highlights
their significance. Before beginning the
analysis, it
should be reiterated that these findings focus exclusively on the
consequences
of increasingly using reservists to support
operations, rather than discussing the general pros and cons of the TA,
USAR
and NG. Some of the more general debates concerning the use of reserves
are
therefore deliberately omitted, or merely touched upon, in order to
narrow the
specifics of the analysis and keep it as contemporary as possible. For
instance, the debate surrounding the relationships between reserve and
regular
soldiers is not discussed in depth, because the exact effects of
increasingly
integrating reserve soldiers are unclear at this stage. To do the topic
justice, a separate detailed enquiry would have to be conducted, which
is
beyond the scope of this dissertation.
From the
outset, it is clear that the increased use of reservists results in
both
positive and negative operational consequences for the British and US
Army. In
order to analyse these consequences in greater detail, their affects
should be
assessed in relation to the tasks expected of the TA, USAR and NG. With
regards
to the TA these task are as follows. Firstly, to provide support to the
regular
army in order to fulfill operational demands; to act as insurance in
case of a reemerging
threat against NATO; to provide a homeland contingency measure, in case
of a
natural or terrorist incident and finally, to provide a link between
the army
and civilian population[10].
The expectations of the
USAR and NG
follow suit, but with an extra emphasise on the need to provide a
homeland
contingency measure, in response to the US’ greater susceptibility to
natural
disasters, and heightened requirement to support her domestic
authorities in
the face of terrorist action. The
Negative Operational Consequences With these tasks in mind,
let us
first address the negative operational consequences. These relate to
the
heightened exposure of prevalent shortfalls in the TA, USAR and NG,
which
although have always existed, become more of a problem in light of the
increasing demands placed upon reserve soldiers. The result is a
significant
barrier to the readiness of reserves, and therefore their ability to
adequately
support the full range of operations
The most
immediate of these shortfalls regards the training standards of British
and
American reserve soldiers, an issue which has consistently plagued the
TA, USAR
and NG. However, previously, in their largely inactive role, reservists
had
advanced warning of an impending mobilisation, and time to bring their
training
up to speed before deploying. Today deployments are quick, which
significantly
reduces preparation time.
By their part time nature,
reserve soldiers
receive considerably less training than their regular counterparts, and
the
quality of the training that they do receive often appears of a
questionable
standard. The normal annual training commitments of a TA soldier are
one drill
night a week, one to two weekends a month and a two week camp or
course.
Similar commitment levels are expected of USAR and NG soldiers serving
in the
higher readiness “Selected Reserve”, standing at an annual requirement
of forty
eight drill periods and a two week camp[11].
However,
those serving in the “Individual Ready Reserve” (IRR) have no such
training
obligations[12].
Unsurprisingly
therefore, there exists a substantial gap between the military skills
of
reserve and regular soldiers in both armies, compounded by the fact
that
reserve training packages often fall significantly short of regular
standards,
by having to be condensed in line with civilian schedules. For example,
the
recruit training for a TA Infantry soldier culminates in a two week TA
Combat
Infantryman’s Course (CIC), whereas the regular course lasts twenty
five weeks.
Numerous
examples of this skills gap can be found throughout the TA, USAR and
NG,
despite the existence of pre-deployment training packages and efforts
to bring
reserve training in line with regular programs. Although these efforts
have
gone a long way to decrease the gap, the fact that they are often
implemented
in an ad hoc fashion, means the quality of a reservist is very much hit
and
miss, and down the individual.
The findings
of the Hansard Debates highlight this gap, with the assessment that
only fifty
per cent of the TA is readily deployable at any one time[13],
pointing
to training discrepancies as the key contributing factor. A 2004
Government Accounting
Office report highlights a similar gap in the ability of the NG to
readily
deploy, and also points to training shortfalls as a central cause. It
uses a
recent deployment to Iraq to illustrate the problem, stating that only
sixty
eight per cent of personnel from the six brigades activated during 2004
were
qualified in their specialist role. The remaining personnel were
employed in
new roles and without the proper training to conduct them effectively[14]. Findings from the primary
research
further reflect this skills gap, highlighting a number of prevalent
concerns
amongst TA soldiers over training standards. In particular, a
consistent theme
emerging from the questionnaires is the inadequate nature of
pre-deployment
training received by soldiers before deploying to Iraq. Although the
severity
of the criticisms varied, all the questionnaires discussed a number of
common
shortfalls.
Two of the
soldiers questioned were deployed on Operation Telic One, the initial
war
fighting phase of operations in Iraq. One was an Infantry Corporal
whilst the
other was a Military Policeman, and both expected to be deployed in
their
respective roles. However, they were subsequently re-rolled upon
arriving in
theatre, to perform totally different tasks in a logistical brigade.
These
tasks required specific training, but both soldiers state that their
pre-deployment package covered none of the necessary skills. In
addition the
soldiers state that it neglected to adequately bring their other skills
up to
speed, most notably Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) procedures,
which was
of particular concern in light of the expected high risk from such
weapons.
The rest of
the survey group, serving on peacekeeping duties during Operation Telic
Three
and Four, also stated that they received very little specific training
for
their role. They were deployed in a “Force Protection” role, a major
feature of
which was convoy escorting. Despite this, the soldiers state that they
received
very little vehicle training, such as anti ambush drills, with just one
day
devoted to the specifics of convoy escorts. As a result they had to
learn these
skills “on the job” in theatre.
Another
common criticism was a focus on physical training while other, arguably
more
important, skills were overlooked. Whilst they all accepted the need
for
physical training, they were quick to point out that it was the wrong
kind,
with long forced marches proving of little benefit in preparing for the
urban
environment of Basra. More importantly the soldiers state that
practical weapons
training was subsequently overlooked, which they feel would have
prepared them
far more for the rigors of an operational deployment. By practical
weapons
training the soldiers were referring to learning how to use their
weapons in
real life situations, rather than merely going through the drills in a
classroom.
It should be
mentioned that these soldiers overcame these shortfalls to perform
their roles
extremely well, but the clear gaps in the training suggest that that
was
largely down to their unusually high caliber, allowing them to quickly
adapt
their training in theatre. Thus it remains questionable whether a less
able TA
unit, of which there are many, would have been able to perform as
effectively,
highlighted by a number of examples in the UK press of TA soldiers
performing
badly.
An article
in The Daily Telegraph for instance, pointed to the case of a TA
soldier being
court marshaled over the shooting of a colleague whilst on a tour in
Iraq.
During the investigation, it emerged that he was deployed despite
demonstrating
poor weapons skills, suggesting the training he received was
inadequate.
Furthermore, the article suggests that this was by no means an isolated
case,
with an official British Army estimate alleging that approximately two
thousand
three hundred TA personnel should not have been deployed for the same
reason[15]. A particular problem
arising from
this skills gap, regards the quality of reserve officers in the TA,
USAR and
NG. With regards to the TA, officer training is significantly less
extensive
than in the regular British Army, culminating in a mere two week course
at the
Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, compared with the usual eleven
months for
regular officers. Although superseded by several months of training in
the officer’s
respective unit, there is a massive discrepancy in the way it is
implemented,
resulting in a significant number of potential TA officers reaching
Sandhurst
under trained and under prepared[16].
Likewise,
Walker’s study points to a disparity in the abilities of USAR and NG
officers[17],
compared
with their regular counterparts. He studied a sample group of both
reserve and
regular officers, and recorded a greater tendency for the reserve
officers to
appear uncertain and indecisive, and be overly concerned with “local
issues”, such
as promotion opportunities. He also noted that they were intensely
mistrusted
by their regular colleagues, indicating a lack of confidence in their
abilities. Ultimately, it would seem reasonable to attribute the
majority of this
disparity to the existence of shortfalls in USAR and NG officer
training,
similar to those found in TA officer training. Findings from the primary
research
also support the existence of a problem with reserve officer training,
with a
number of soldiers revealing a concern over the abilities of their
officers. A
commonly cited problem was the inability of TA officers to adequately
prepare
for training exercises, leaving soldiers unnecessarily under prepared
and under
equipped. On one specific occasion, whilst conducting public order
training,
soldiers were left without the necessary protective equipment,
resulting in
three sustaining serious facial injuries and having to be medically
discharged. The doubts over these
officers’
abilities were reinforced upon arriving in theatre, with soldiers
describing
how an operations cell had to be closed down by regular staff, because
it
failed to perform effectively. Interestingly, even the officer in the
survey
group indicated the presence of these problems, stating that if he were
to
deploy again he would prefer to serve with, and under the command of,
regular
officers.
A
significant barrier to reserve soldiers achieving the required training
standards,
relates to an apparent disparity between their average fitness levels,
and
those of regular soldiers. This disparity appears to be a particular
problem
amongst US reservists, with the Pentagon confirming that a troubling
percentage
was medically unfit for deployment to Iraq[18].
Furthermore, a disproportionate percentage of reservists were recorded
as sick
or injured during their service in Iraq, and although fatalities and
wounded in
action rates were similar to those of regular soldiers, the instances
of
reserve “Disease and Non Battle Injuries” (DNBI) were nearly double.
The Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Health Affairs, also reported
that
reservists had a fifty per cent higher incidence of “health concerns”,
and a
sixty five per cent higher incidence of “medical/dental problems”. They
also
displayed a thirty three per cent higher incidence of “mental health
concerns”
than regular soldiers[19]. These divergences are
attributed to
Reservists’ being on average older than their regular counterparts,
which in
turn suggests they are less able to cope with the rigors of operational
service, particularly those presented by combat roles. Although no
figures were
available to compare these findings against those from the TA, the fact
that
the average age of a TA soldier is also higher, suggests a similar
problem may
be prevalent. Training shortfalls in the
TA are
made worse by the fact that it is often the most experienced NCO’s that
are
mobilised first.
With
increasing numbers of deployments, units have been left without their
best
instructors, resulting in a substantial lull in the training standards
of those
soldiers left behind[20].
This lull is a particular source of concern with regards to recruit
training,
which has had to be virtually suspended in some units, due to the high
numbers
of training staff deployed on operations. For example, the observations
of the
military police unit indicated significant shortfalls in the training
of
recruits, and the company as a whole, due to a substantial number of
personnel
remaining in Iraq. As a result there were neither enough instructors,
nor
enough numbers of personnel, to make the training as effective as it
should
have been.
In
comparison, none of the existing material on the USAR and NG discussed
the
problem of loosing experienced instructors, perhaps due to the fact
that US reserves
tend to deploy in large formed units more often than the TA, meaning
very few
soldiers are left behind to experience a training lull. Instead, the
material
suggests other factors are responsible for the training problems
inherent in
the USAR and NG, such as those relating to geographical constraints.
For
instance, due to the highly dispersed nature of the NG, with training
locations
spread out over vast distances, it proves extremely difficult to conduct
centralised
training on
a regular basis[21].
Equipment procurement
problems also
serve to exacerbate the training shortfalls; a common difficulty faced
by both
British and US reserve units. As the Hansard Debates highlight, the TA
is
significantly under equipped compared to the regular British Army[22],
in terms of weapons, radios, vehicles and other personal items such as
clothing. Not only are there insufficient quantities of equipment, but
it is
also often outdated and therefore different to that issued to regular
soldiers. USAR and NG soldiers face
a similar problem,
with one US Army estimate stating that reserve equipment is on average
ten to
fifteen years behind that of their regular counterparts, making it
largely
ineffective and incompatible[23].
Furthermore, the Government Accounting Office report stated that the NG
units
deployed to Iraq in 2004 were only allocated sixty five per cent of the
equipment they needed, whilst the remaining inactive units faced a
thirty three
per cent equipment deficit. The ensuing effects are a
widening
skills gap amongst reserve soldiers, and a reduced capacity for
integrated
training with regulars. Operational effectiveness is further
compromised by the
fact that reserve units are often forced to deploy with deficient
equipment,
meaning they are under prepared to serve alongside regular units,
especially at
short notice.
From
examining the extent of these training shortfalls, and the further
problems
caused by equipment procurement difficulties, it is clear that the
readiness of
reserve units to deploy on certain operations is questionable. In
particular,
their ability to deploy quickly is limited, with reservists unable to
immediately step into regular roles, as they require substantial time
to
prepare for an impending mobilisation.
The majority
of reserve units are therefore largely unsuitable for operations
requiring a
quick reaction capability, which includes the majority of war fighting
missions
and “spearhead” deployments. Consequently, it is doubtful whether these
units can
adequately perform their first task, that of providing support in order
to
fulfill operational demands, as a large proportion of these operational
demands
concern war fighting missions. Accordingly, they are also limited in
their
ability to provide an insurance measure against a potential reemerging
threat
to NATO, referring to their second task.
Furthermore,
the increased demand for reservists to support operations overseas has
resulted
in the training being focused almost exclusively on operational roles,
which
detracts away from training for the task of providing a homeland
contingency
measure. For instance TA units currently
allocate just two weekends a year to training for their Civilian
Contingency
Reaction Force (CCRF) role, presenting a concern over the ability to
effectively co-ordinate with the emergency services should an incident
occur[24].
Neglecting this role is a particular source of concern for the US, due
to their
greater reliance on reservists to support domestic authorities in the
face of a
natural disaster or terrorist attack. A shortage of useable
manpower in the
TA, USAR and NG is the second most obvious shortfall, another prevalent
problem
which has progressively worsened with the increasing demands placed
upon
British and American reserve soldiers. According to 2002 figures, the
TA had a
personnel deficit of one thousand three hundred[25],
a figure which is likely to have risen following the recent numbers of
deployments[26].
A similarly damaging deficit is facing the USAR and NG, although is far
more
serious with the US Army’s heavier reliance on reserve support. The NG
currently falls some ten thousand personnel short of its required
number, and
the USAR only has an estimated thirty seven thousand five hundred and
fifteen
available personnel, from its usual two hundred thousand three hundred
and
sixty six compliment[27]. Mounting difficulties with
recruitment and retention are the main reasons behind these
deficiencies, a
direct result of the personal costs faced by reservists from being
increasingly
deployed. The question of whether the TA, USAR and NG can provide
enough
numbers to fulfill their heightened operational requirements is
subsequently
raised, presenting more doubts over their readiness to conduct the
tasks
expected of them. With an increasing
disparity between
military and civilian attitudes[28]
resulting in individuals choosing to pursue alternative paths to a
military
career, recruitment in the British and US Army has been a problem for
some time.
But with mounting social unrest over recent operations in Iraq, reserve
units
have found it progressively more difficult to recruit sufficient
numbers. The
major factor behind this recruitment problem, is that individuals are
dissuaded
from joining as they become increasingly aware of the personal costs
they could
face as a result of being deployed[29],
a subject which has received a lot of attention in the British and
American
media. An underlying social consequence is therefore reflected, one
which is
further discussed later in the findings.
It is the
issue of retaining serving reservists that proves the greatest source
of concern
though, with a reported mass exodus following large deployments of
British and
US reserve units in 2003 and 2004[30].
Tensions between reservists and employers are seen as the most
influential
reason behind these retention problems, closely followed by family
pressures,
as reservists become concerned over the implications further
deployments could
have on their careers and families.
These
concerns are reflected in the British Government’s assessment of the
retention
issue for the TA, referring to employer tensions and pay anomalies as
the most
common source of unrest amongst deployed personnel[31].
In particular they are seen as being concerned over the security of
their jobs
upon demobilising, questioning the effectiveness of the provisions in
the 1985
Reserve Forces Act, in which employers are legally bound to keep a
“similar”
position open to returning employees[32].
The potential financial consequences are also highlighted as a key
concern,
with a large number of complaints emerging over the difficulties faced
in
gaining compensation for loss of earnings, due to the discrepancy
between
civilian and military rates of pay[33].
Whilst deployed TA
soldiers are paid
the same rates of pay as their regular counterparts, and with a
compensation
ceiling of just twenty thousand pounds, dependent on rank and
specialist
civilian skills, many soldiers have experienced serious financial loss.
Further
compensation is available upon proof of hardship, but, according to the
government assessment, this process proves unwieldy and increases the
likelihood for affected individuals not to volunteer for further
deployments,
or to leave the TA completely[34].
A recent
survey of TA personnel sent to the Gulf further reflects these
concerns. Of the
personnel questioned, eighty per cent stated that they did not expect
their
employer to be supportive of a future deployment, and thirty nine per
cent
stated that they believed their job security had been directly
threatened by
being deployed. Because of these factors, sixty three per cent stated
that they
were considering resigning from the TA, and sixty one per cent
indicated they
would not recommend joining the TA to work colleagues[35].
Employer
related problems appear to particularly affect TA officers, resulting
in the
issue of officer retention receiving special attention in the
assessment. The
Hansard debates attributes the rise in the numbers of officers leaving
the TA
to the fact that they often possess high powered civilian jobs, which
are
especially threatened by being mobilised. They are therefore forced to
make a
choice between their civilian and reserve careers, and invariably their
civilian career comes first[36].
American sources
also reflect the view that concerns over employment and pay are the
main
reasons behind reservists making themselves unavailable for further
deployments.
But they also introduce the notion of family pressures having an equal
impact,
a tension which specifically affects reservists due to being, on
average, older
than their regular counterparts[37].
Kirby’s study for instance, found
that
family stresses were placed alongside employer tensions as the most
common
reasons for US reservists terminating their term of service following a
deployment[38].
Female
reservists were found to be especially influenced by these stresses[39]. In addition, Kirby
discusses the
impact of other factors on US reserve retention, such as the importance
of
feeling satisfied with being a member of the USAR and NG. She found
that those
who were satisfied with their service were twice more likely to extend
their
contracts than those who were not, which becomes a source of concern in
light
of rising levels of disillusionment amongst reservists over operations
in Iraq.
This could present a particularly acute problem for the USAR and NG,
with
levels of disillusionment amongst US reserve soldiers at their highest
since
the Vietnam War[40],
almost certainly due to the extensive demands placed upon them.
Increasing
these demands would only heighten the unrest, and make retention even
more of a
problem than it already is.
The primary
research further supports the notion of employer tensions and family
pressures
having a considerable impact on the retention of reserves. Just two of
the
soldiers from the survey indicated that they would unconditionally
volunteer
for another deployment, with the rest stating that they would not due
to
potential career implications, and, or, pressures from their partners.
Four of
the soldiers indicated that they would leave the TA completely at the
end of
their service engagement, because they felt they had now “done their
bit” and
were keen to pursue more personal agendas. Out of the soldiers who
indicated
they would not volunteer again, five described experiencing financial
loss as a
result of being deployed, supporting the assessment that financial
considerations also have a serious impact on retention figures. One
soldier
stated that there was a twenty thousand pounds difference between his
civilian
and military salary, which left him struggling to keep up his mortgage
repayments. Another soldier stated that due to the short notice of his
deployment, he was unable to exit his tenancy agreement, and was
consequently
liable to pay rent for his central London flat throughout the six month
tour. These findings were also
reflected in
the study of the military police unit, which, as previously mentioned,
is
currently suffering from a severe shortage of personnel following
deployments
to Iraq in 2004. The majority of regular attendees were soldiers who
had not
yet been deployed, a notable observation in itself, but upon
questioning the
soldiers who had been deployed as to why they thought the turn out was
so low,
the most common answer given was that employer tensions and family
pressures
had caused many to reconsider their
position in the TA. A number of these soldiers also stated that
although they
had enjoyed their tour, and were happy to remain in the TA, they
themselves
would think twice about volunteering for another deployment for similar
reasons. Those soldiers who were self employed were particularly
concerned
about the effects another deployment could have on their business.
Increasingly
using reserves to fulfill operational commitments has thus undoubtedly
resulted
in mounting recruitment and retention problems, thereby further
reducing the
readiness of British and US reserve units to fulfill the tasks required
of them.
Consequently, it is likely to become increasingly difficult to deploy
reserves
on a mass scale, and on a continuous basis, with a marked depletion in
the
numbers of willing and able personnel. The TA is currently only
effective at
providing company level support[41],
and even this is likely to become more difficult in the face of
continuing recruitment
and retention problems. For USAR and NG units, the problems are more
acute,
with the head of the USAR, Lieutenant General J. R. Helmly, stating
that they
are in danger of becoming a “broken force”[42].
The notion
of reserves being ineffective at providing support for sustained
military
operations, such as war fighting missions, is therefore further
supported,
making the completion of the first two tasks expected of them even more
problematic. In addition their ability to provide an effective homeland
contingency
measure is also reduced, with missions of a higher priority, which are
generally overseas, soaking up the available manpower.
Despite these negative operational
consequences, it is important not to be overcritical of reserves,
especially
when considering the abnormal demands placed upon them. Although
variable in
quality, some reserve units, certainly the TA units studied in this
dissertation, have shown that they can perform extremely well,
demonstrating
the same standards of professionalism as their regular colleagues. An
appraisal
of the USAR and NG in one of the MA theses reflects a similar view[43]. Indeed in some instances
they even
appear to perform to a higher standard than regular soldiers, as
highlighted by
a number of examples from the primary research. Soldiers from both
units stated
that regular soldiers often appeared lackadaisical in their approach,
with one
particularly poignant example being when a TA corporal had to lead a
dangerous
patrol, because a regular corporal was reluctant to go. A change in the attitudes
of regular
soldiers towards their reserve colleagues is another example of some
units’
achievements. Whereas reserves were previously viewed with some disdain
by
regular soldiers, they now appear to be increasingly viewed on equal
terms, a
trend that is reflected in the primary research. When asked to describe
their
relationships with regular soldiers, the soldiers from both units
commented
that generally speaking it was good, although there were some
exceptions,
particularly with regards to the attitudes of regular officers. Consequently, whilst
increasingly
using reservists has resulted in significant problems, it has
nevertheless
given them the chance to prove themselves and show that effective
integration
with their regular counterparts is possible. In addition, whilst they
are
certainly impeded by a significant skills gap, reservists can often
make up for
it in enthusiasm and the possession of certain civilian skills. Indeed these skills prove extremely valuable
to the British and US Army, because they include much needed specialist
expertise. It is clear that these
skills
manifest themselves in more general, as well as specialist abilities.
For
instance, reserve soldiers bring life experience and maturity, due to
them
being on average older than their regular counterparts. The TA is also
renowned
for having, on average, better educated soldiers than the regular
British Army,
with a high percentage having at least a good standard of secondary
education, and
a considerable number with further and higher education. This is
reflected in
the primary research, with the vast majority of soldiers from both
units
possessing GCSE’s and A Levels, and an estimated fifty per cent holding
diplomas
or degrees. The fact that the TA is a largely urban force could be one
reason
behind these better standards, making for high caliber recruits. These observations are not
reflected
in the USAR and NG though, with their soldiers, on average, possessing
similarly
low education standards to regular US Army soldiers[44].
Perhaps this reflects the fact that the majority of recruiting is done
from
lower income families in the more provincial areas of America. However, the TA, USAR and
NG all share
the advantage of having reservists with specialist civilian skills
amongst
their ranks. These skills are often directly transferable to a military
context, which enhanced operational effectiveness in a variety of ways. Civilian managerial
expertise become
particularly valuable as both the British and US Army adopt more a more
civilian outlook. For instance, logistical operations now resemble
those found
in industry, with concepts such as “just in time stocks”. It is clear
that the
military struggles with such concepts, as demonstrated by the equipment
shortfalls during Operation Telic One, and require a civilian input to
facilitate their smooth implementation. The experience brought by
reservists
who work for large companies is therefore invaluable. Human resource management
skills are
another advantage in an increasingly civilianised military, often
providing a
fresh and more productive outlook on leadership than traditional
military
approaches. The primary research highlights this point, with a number
of
soldiers from both units commenting how they felt their management
backgrounds
allowed them to lead the soldiers under their command more effectively
than
regular counterparts. One example was a soldier from the infantry unit,
who
stated that whereas regular NCO’s tended to shout at their men and
enforce
discipline, he applied his management experience to discuss the issues
with his
team, and make sure any grievances were addressed. He continued by
stating that
in doing so, he believed he achieved better results on the ground.
The primary
research also highlighted a number of occasions where reservists use
other
transferable skills in their military roles. Most obvious were the
civilian
policeman in the military police unit, who stated that although
policing in
Iraq was a unique challenge, they were nevertheless able to step into
the role
with relative ease. Another soldier in the unit was an immigration
officer, and
remarked that his skills came in useful on a number of occasions while
patrolling Iraq’s waterways. Perhaps the biggest asset
of
increasingly using reservists is that they can be used to sustain a
niche in
expensive, short supply skills. With the effects of downsizing and cost
cutting,
the British and US Army find it increasingly difficult to sustain
adequate
numbers of medical personnel, technical tradesman and soldiers in more
specialist areas such as psychological operations and civil affairs. As
a
result the TA, USAR and NG prove extremely valuable in covering these
shortfalls.
Although the
British Army relies extensively on the TA to provide these
capabilities,
particularly with regards to medical services[45],
the US Army is even more dependent on USAR and NG soldiers to overcome
shortages. In 2002 reservists accounted for ninety seven per cent of
its civil
affairs forces and eighty two per cent of its public affairs forces.
The
reserves also contained eighty one per cent of its psychological
operations
forces, eighty five per cent of its medical personnel and sixty six per
cent of
its military police[46].
Heightened operational demands are likely to have caused these figures
to rise
over the last three years.
These forces
prove particularly useful in supporting peace support operations. Thus,
whilst
reservists remain unable to deploy at short notice, and are therefore
largely
unsuitable for war fighting missions, it is clear that without their
specialist
skills, a large number of British and US Army operational commitments
could not
be fulfilled. There is also the notion
that reserve
soldiers are generally more receptive to peacekeeping duties than their
regular
counterparts, who see war fighting missions as their primary role.
Segal et al
attributed this receptiveness to the “constabulary attitudes” of
reserve
soldiers, which tend to be more compatible with peacekeeping operations
than
the martial attitudes of regular soldiers[47]. As a result, it would
appear that
increasingly using the TA, USAR and NG could actually enhance
operational
effectiveness in certain circumstances. If used correctly, reservists
can not
only provide important skills to the regular British and US Army, but
also free
up regular soldiers to concentrate on what they do best; fighting wars. Increasingly deploying
reservists
also gives them more experience, further enhancing the usability of the
TA,
USAR and NG, as it allows for the honing of specialist and military
skills. In
addition, although smaller, due to the ensuing recruitment and
retention
problems, the remaining pool of reservists unaffected by these issues
is
nevertheless more committed, demonstrated by their willingness to
remain in
service and be mobilised again. These reservists are what the British
Army
calls “serial mobilisers”[48],
and are arguably far more useful than having large numbers of personnel
who are
unwilling to deploy, allowing for a dependable, yet flexible, niche of
personnel. There is also evidence to suggest that some reservists are
actually attracted
by the prospect of using their skills in real life situations[49],
suggesting that the numbers of serial mobilisers could rise with
increasing
opportunities to deploy. The
Social
Consequences
With regards
to the negative effects on society, the most apparent problem emerging
from
increasingly mobilising reservists is a more frequent removal of key
workers
from their posts in important social institutions. As discussed in the
previous
section, many reservists possess valuable specialist skills, which
although
prove a great asset to the British and US Army, are also in great
demand in
civilian life. Thus, although the total numbers of mobilised reservists
may not
appear high enough to make a large impact on social functions, the fact
that
certain specialist areas are disproportionately affected means that
these
functions can be significantly compromised. Increasingly relying on
reservists
to provide skill niches will only compromise these functions further
still. The overrepresentation of
public
sector workers in the reserves is a particular problem for both British
and
American society, although is undoubtedly more acute in America due to
the US
Army’s higher reliance on their skills. For instance, in Britain the
National
Health Service was severely affected by the extensive deployment of
TAMS personnel
during recent operations in Iraq. Many health trusts had substantial
numbers of
crucial workers mobilised, with some senior staff being called up twice
in one
year, and others having their tours unexpectedly lengthened[50].
Consequently, the
efficiency of the
service provided by these trusts was reduced, with one consultant
orthopedic
surgeon referring to waiting list failures as a prime example[51].
A survey of reservists deployed with 202(V) Field Hospital, one of the
TAMS
units used in Iraq, also found that seventy three per cent believed the
NHS had
lost vital skills as a result of the deployments[52].
British and
American industry also faces serious problems from loosing skilled
personnel,
especially when they are deployed at short notice. These problems are
made
worse by a failure to properly compensate employers for any ensuing
financial
loss, a particular source of contention between British business and
the MOD[53].
Again, although affecting both British and American industry, the
impact of
loosing workers is felt hardest amongst American business owners. One
assessment even goes so far as to suggest that the US economy has
suffered from
so many reservists being mobilised, attributing it as a factor in
causing the
total pay roll employment figures to fall by some three hundred and
eight
thousand in February 2003[54].
Reservists
also gain more general transferable skills, such as increased
confidence, a
greater sense of responsibility and improved interpersonal skills. Some
employers openly support their employees to be mobilised for this very
reason,
noting that, in military terms, they go as a private soldier and return
a lance
corporal as a result of their experiences[55]/span>.
British Telecom is one such employer, which has almost ten times as
many TA
soldiers on its pay roll than any other company[56].
The primary
research also supports the notion of these benefits, with a number of
soldiers
commenting on the skills they felt they gained from being deployed. In
particular, the civilian policeman in the military police unit
described how
they felt more confident in their abilities, with most situations
encountered
in their civilian roles now {palling} into insignificance compared to
those
they faced in Iraq. Other soldiers commented how they felt more able to
complete tasks which were once deemed difficult, or stressful, due to
the
confidence they had gained from successfully dealing with “life and
death”
incidents.
From
examining this notion further, it is clear that if it holds true, the
resulting
social consequence has a number of further consequences for the British
and US
Army. More specifically, it reduces the ability of the TA, USAR and NG
to
fulfill the final task expected of them, that of providing a link
between the
respective armies and civilian populations. This is because the gap
between
military and civilian attitudes has arguably become so great, that it
can no
longer be breached by reservists. The problem gets worse as other
social
organisations, such as Youth Service Programs, gradually fill the void[58].
Increasingly using reservists, especially to support unpopular
operations, is
likely to only exacerbate the difficulties, as it further polarises
public
opinion and attitudes.
The findings and analysis
found that
a number of positive and negative operational and social consequences
emerge
from increasingly using the TA, USAR and NG to support operations. It
is also
found that substantial comparisons can indeed be drawn between British
and US
experiences, although some differences do emerge. The most apparent of
these
differences is that the effects of the consequences generally prove
more acute
for the US Army, and American society, due to a higher reliance on US
reserve
soldiers.
The
amplification of existing prevalent shortfalls in the reserves, most
notably a
training gap and recruitment and retention issues, encompass the
negative
operational consequences. As a result, the ability for reservists to
deploy
quickly is severely limited, making them unsuitable for certain
operations,
such as war fighting and spearhead missions. The ability to provide an
adequate
homeland contingency measure is also limited, with training and
available
manpower concentrating on supporting overseas operations.
However,
it has been shown that reservists can, in some instances, perform
extremely
well, and that some positive operational consequences emerge from their
increased use. These relate to reservists possessing valuable civilian
skills,
particularly in specialist areas, which compensate for deficits in the
British
and US Army. Increasingly using reservists therefore allows for a niche
in expensive,
short supply skills to be maintained, an advantage which is bolstered
by the
experience gained from being deployed more extensively. These skills
are
particularly useful in supporting peace support missions, meaning that
although
reservists may well prove unsuitable for some war fighting missions,
they
nevertheless still have a clear role to play. With regards to the
negative social
consequences, the most apparent is an increased likelihood of removing
key
workers from their positions. British and American public sector
services have
suffered as a result, as has the industry of both countries, with small
companies especially affected by the loss of skilled workers at short
notice.
Despite
these negative social consequences, their impact is limited by
reservists
bringing transferable skills back to civilian life after serving on
operations.
These skills often prove extremely beneficial to services and
employers,
suggesting that increasingly deploying reservists could actually
produce some
benefits to society.
Another social
consequence is a widening disparity between military and civilian
attitudes,
heightened by mounting social unrest over operations in Iraq. A further
negative consequence for the British and US Army subsequently emerges,
with the
TA, USAR and NG finding it extremely difficult to breach the gap, and
therefore
fulfill their task of providing a link between the army and civilian
population.
If the
British and US government want the reserves to be more than just a
quick fix to
an overstretched British and US Army, they need to invest in their
development,
make them more integrated with their regular counterparts and do more
to smooth
tensions with employers and families. This process is underway, but
further
legislative improvements must follow, in order to provide a
sustainable, well
trained and readily deployable TA, USAR and NG, capable of facing the
challenges of the twenty first century.
Bibliography Books A. Giddens, Sociology,
(Polity Press: 2001). Journal Articles S. N. Kirby, “The Impact of Deployment on the
Retention
of Military
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Reconstruction of
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References
[1] House of
Commons Hansard Debates, P2 - 18. [24]
Memorandum from the RFCA to the
Defence Select Committee, P1-42. [25]
House of
Commons Hansard Debates, P2 - 18. [26]Memorandum from the RFCA to the
Defence Select Committee, P1 - 42. [27] B. Graham, Washington Post.
[28]
M. Morgan, P373 – 391. [29]
J. S.
Pritchett, no page numbers on electronic copy.
[30]
M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 29/05/03,
and B. Graham, Washington Post. [31] Memorandum from the RFCA to the
Defence Select Committee, P1 - 42. [32]
Supporting Essay Three, MOD White
Paper, no page numbers on electronic copy. [33]
Supporting Essay Three, MOD White
Paper, no page numbers on electronic copy. [34]
Supporting Essay Three, MOD White
Paper, no page numbers on electronic version. [35]
M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 07/05/03. [36] House of
Commons Hansard Debates, P2 - 18 [37]
J. S.
Pritchett, no page numbers on electronic copy. [38]
S. N. Kirby, P3 - 9 [39]
Kocher and Thomas in S.N. Kirby, P3. [40]
Author Unknown, Economist, [41] House of
Commons Hansard Debates, P2 - 18. [42]
B. Graham, Washington Post. [43] S. M. Herron, no page numbers on
electronic copy. [44]
A. Russell, Guardian. [45]
M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 07/05/03. [46]
M. K. O’Hanion, no page numbers on
electronic copy. [47]
D. Segal et al, no page
numbers on electronic copy. [48]
House of
Commons Hansard Debates, P2 – 18. [49]
S. N. Kirby, P 3 - 9. [50]
M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 07/05/03. [51]
M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 07/05/03. [52]
M. Smith, Daily Telegraph, 07/05/03. [53]
Supporting Essay Three, MOD White
Paper, no page numbers on electronic copy. [54]
Author unknown, Economist, [55]
General Sir Mike Jackson, Defence
Select Committee debate, P3. [56]
Memorandum from the RFCA to the
Defence Select Committee, P1 - 42. [57]
M. Morgan, P373 – 391. [58]
M. Morgan, P373 – 391. |