Notes on:
Barbalet, J. (1982) 'Social Closure in
Class Analysis: A Critique of Parkin'.
Sociology 16 (4)
Dave Harris
There has been a resurgence of neo-Weberian
approaches to social class, seen best in Parkin
and Giddens. These two draw different bits
from Weber however—Giddens [The Class Structure
of the Advanced Societies] sees class as
determined by market situation, while Parkin sees
class relations as power relations. Parkin
[in Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois
Critique] agrees that classes are not
social differentiations like any other, but nor
are they merely the consequences of an 'interior
logic' [of capitalism]. Class boundaries
result from the interests and actions of members
themselves. There is an emphasis on
closure. We need to compare class closure
with other forms. We need a set of
parsimonious concepts to do this. For
Parkin, definite types of closure can be seen as
different directions in the exercise of power:
downward power is exclusionary, and 'can be
regarded by definition as exploitative'. Any
basis of exclusion might be used, however
producing new groupings, including ethnic ones and
intra class ones.
For Barbalet, it is right to see social strata as
outcomes rather than as caused, as in classic
conceptions of class relations. Giddens is
also right to stress structuration, especially
through social mobility. However, the issue
is to see class relations in terms of relations
with other classes, and here there are differences
in terms of the processes involved, group action,
for example rather than individual mobility.
Class reproduction rather than class renewal is
the issue. Social mobility can affect the
crystallization of class and its solidarity, but
power relations between the classes is the real
issue.
Parkin's formulations are based on Weber's notion
of power, and this is less coherent than Giddens's
approach. Closure and power are connected
for Parkin: closure equals the mobilisation of
power, while power is an attribute of
closure. But this is vague and
circular. For example exclusionary
closure, by the possession of property or
credentials, assumes that power is an attribute of
property and credentials directly. Actually,
property and credentials involve merely a set of
arrangements to restrict access, and this depends
on a legal support—so closure can be seen as 'a
conduit for the power of the State' rather than a
strategy on behalf of an active class.
Habermas and Offe argue for the State as a
necessary part of the framework of class
relations, rather than just legitimating class
inequality, but even so, we need to add something
to Parkin's notion of closure as collective
action.
Turning to the other example of a closure
strategy, what Parkin calls usurpation [a
strategy used by those relatively powerless people
to maintain borders and exclude rivals from jobs
or housing], Parkin is more consistent here in
that it is the power of members of a class which
is mobilized, and closure is the realization of
this power. But again what is the basis of
this power? It can only be a threat of
disruption, which can only be opportunistic rather
than structured. Again it is impossible to
define the basis of this sort of power without
circularity or without introducing some exogenous
base. The base is what's missing, and
without it, Parkin can only offer a mere
description of the current balance of power.
Class formation is not the same as class power,
and different factors are responsible, even if
class relations are indeed power relations.
Exploitation is not the same as closure.
Closure is a sufficient condition for exploitation
for Parkin, who operates with a Weberian notion of
exploitation, a matter of restriction of access to
rewards and opportunities and life chances.
This can arise from competition though, and
indeed, Weber's definition of competition is very
similar. But this sort of competition is not
the same as exploitation, which is not competition
for some independent resource: the members of the
dominated class are the resource themselves, and
exploitation creates conditions imposed on them
rather than operating within them like competition
does. Exploitation involves the creation of
productive relationships which produce surplus
value, for example. It is not like the zero
sum game of competition over a fixed level of
resources. Parkin means competition not
exploitation, because capital is only a 'right to
deny access', to do with rights of ownership, not
about productive capacities and advantages, not
about appropriation, simply a matter of
access. The whole thing is limited to the
provision of 'life chances', not about the
relations of production which only feature
exploitative relations. Giddens has a
similar approach, describing the production of
life chances, but these still arise only from
differential distributions: there is no account of
production.
Let us consider intra-class divisions. For
Parkin, these are emphasized, and the same
concepts used to explain them. So there is
exclusion within the working class, exploitation
too, and it is the same kind that affects
relations between middle and working
classes. It is true there is a lot of
competition inside the working class, but this is
explicable only once we have understood the basic
relation of exploitation which explains the middle
class/working class relation first.
Exclusions, like those by skilled workers or white
workers, enhance the competitive powers of a group
to bargain with capital, and therefore to limit
their exploitation. Parkin refers to
'exploitation by proxy' to explain divisions among
working class groups, like those between migrant
labour and the indigenous, and again these are
often supported by the law or housing
policies. However, these are still best seen
as a 'residue' of inter-class exploitation for
Barbalet. Exploitation by proxy represents a
failure to mobilize power to prevent
discrimination, and this is not the same as the
positive mobilization of power to produce
exclusion [seems a bit apologetic].
Intra-class divisions really vary according to the
intensity of exploitation, the differential
capacity to resist and the uneven way in which
this capacity is distributed.
What about ascriptive factors in social
relations—'racial', religious, sexual and ethnic
identities? All of these are examples of
social class for Parkin in his special sense, but
he actually offers two treatments of this
problem. In Class Inequality and
Political Order, he sees status differences
as autonomous from class ones, connected maybe
contingently, as in Weber himself. However,
in Marxism and Class Theory... class
can arise out of any form of closure. Again,
for Barbalet, ethnic and the other dimensions are
important, but they are not the same as
class. For Parkin, class relations are
always about power, but not all power relations
are class relations! All depends on tricks of
definition.
more social theory
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