This is necessarily an incomplete story of a complex process, for example survey data is incomplete and depends on the immediate issues as academics and pollsters perceive them. It seems that ethnocentrism is and will be an important political factor, but they do not see it as the same as authoritarianism [less consistent and less deep-rooted?]. Overall they do not offer a pessimistic analysis, and do not see the collapse of the old order, or some irreconcilable division. There are concerns about identity and social change, but there is still a notion of Britain as a responsive democracy, and the capacity to adapt. Identity politics are here to stay and will be an important factor in voting, even though it will not be as extreme as culture wars in America, or at least not yet.

Chapter 2

The Referendum exposed divides that have been building for years, especially educational expansion and ethnic diversification, which together have transformed the electorate: the younger generation are 'dramatically more highly qualified and ethnically diverse' (22).

Ethnocentrism is defined as ""the view of things in which one's own group is the centre of everything"' [quoting Sumner 1906], and it is held to varying extents. The identity conservatives most frequently hold ethnocentric worldviews with strong attachments to national identity and feelings of threat by out groups. The other identity liberal groups reject ethnocentrism but for different reasons. The activation of this conflict is a major source of the political upheavals of the past decade and has become a central structuring feature, producing polarised politics. At the moment there is also instability because none of the groups are strong enough to prevail consistently.

Different identity groups are clustered in different age groups and areas. Generation is important, and so is social background. Geography also polarises, since university graduates tend to migrate to prosperous towns and big cities, and so do ethnic minorities. The less economically successful rural and small town areas are more ethnically homogeneous, have a growing age gap, and the loss of graduates. This helps produce growing social segregation. Local factors support identity beliefs, for example ethnically diverse neighbourhoods reinforce beliefs in a dynamic and diverse Britain, while white voters with low education levels tend to live in 'ageing and declining places… [With a]… Sense of marginalisation and stagnation' (24). Nevertheless, 'demography is not political destiny'.

Education first. Britain is transforming to a society of university graduates as with many other developed democracies. It is associated with prosperity and the idea that higher education is an investment. The changes were not rapid in Britain until the reform in the 1990s upgrading educational institutions to degree awarding University status which doubled the rates of attendance at university. Attendance rates at 18 are 40% [2010] this means a substantial generational divide. There is still privileged access towards the wealthy and the middle-class although this might be reducing [quoting Boliver] there is also more staying on beyond the leaving age. When Margaret Thatcher won her third election victory in 1987  70% of voters had left formal education at 16, 8% were graduates and those with no formal qualifications at all were 42%: in 2017, nearly 1/4 of voters had a university degree and graduates 'substantially outnumbered the unqualified'. And did so in every election since 2010 [can this be right? 27].

Immigration has been on a different scale since the 1950s, within a single lifetime. For pensioners aged 75 in 2019, Britain was a society where 'less than 1% of people was born outside Europe', but for 18-year-olds one person in five belongs to an ethnic group other than White British. In the early days, first-generation migrants tended to dominate, so 'race and migration were conflated' and concentrated in British cities, but now the second generation has emerged born and raised in Britain and settled more widely, bringing a more embedded form of racial diversity. Such people were less willing to accept discrimination and disadvantage. New debates arose about the meaning of British identity and multiculturalism. Mass repatriation might have been popular, but it is clearly absurd given the numbers. Debates will evolve in the future given population changes — mixed racial heritage are the fastest growing ethnic group, again especially for children under 10, where it is also the largest single minority ethnic group. There are also new waves of migration, enough to constitute a second wave between 2005 and 2017, especially from South Asia and the rest of the world, and quite a few from the EU [example migrants from Poland Romania and Lithuania]  'exploded from less than 200,000 in 2005 to nearly 2,000,000 by 2017' (31). These new migrants are less likely to have voting rights. The first wave 'rapidly became an important electoral constituency for politicians', and this helped counterbalance 'the influence of ethnocentric white voters' (32). New migrants unless they obtain British citizenship are more marginal in electoral politics.

Both these changes have an important effect on voters' values and political choices, especially when we consider ethnocentrism. Apparently there is a lot of work here by Inglehart, who connects it with a general change away from materialist values towards post-materialist ones focused on 'individual rights, self-actualisation and liberty' (33). This is again generational and also affects religious attitudes, gender norms and the emergence of democratic values as well as more general political values and identities. There are also different levels of allegiance to concerns with problems prevalent in youth and also loyalty to political parties. They have a slow generational change in political allegiances and priorities and take some time to be mobilised. The debate about ethnocentrism focuses this.

Ethnocentrism in America particularly is influenced by the colour line and race and racial attitudes, which still Remain 'among the strongest predictors of political choice' (34) although conflicts over immigration have also added to identity conflict. In Europe, it's more a matter of mass immigration and the growth of Muslim minorities, as well as more general views about immigration and diversity, and these are having an increasing influence on voter choices. Generally divides in white majority populations based on identity attachments are deep and growing and can shift white vote choices and disrupt alignments, especially if migrant groups are seen as threatening. Ethnic minorities political choices controversially are influenced by their experience of white hostility and discrimination and this gives them an attachment to parties which fight for their rights. Ethnocentrism also explains more specific political upheavals. For example how immigration became top of the political agenda in the 2000s and how this led to unpopularity for both new Labour and then the coalition government and the growth of UKIP. We can also see how identity liberals became more central to the Labour Party coalition deposing centre-left electoral coalition away from poorer left wing but ethnocentric white school Leavers and towards university graduates and ethnic minorities and how this became important in debates about the Referendum. In particular ethnocentrism in the form of taking back control became important. Identity conflicts with the different inflection played a major role in Scottish politics.

Sumner saw ethnocentrism as universal and this has been confirmed by 'a large body of research across several disciplines… People everywhere are indeed remarkably prone to identifying with social groups and turning even arbitrary and explicitly meaningless group contests into emotive battles of "us vs them"' (36). Ethnocentrism is a stable personality orientation and it has overlapping characteristics expressing strong attachments to in – groups [but not necessarily identical] hostility to out-groups. There are variations across populations, and some people have defined it in terms of a readiness to reduce society to us vs them. Different researchers have discussed the mix of psychological and sociological forces involved. Some work has taken place on the authoritarian personality, others refer to a more general closed personality. Group competition can also stimulate it. You can feel a response to inequality and hierarchy or a feeling of threat. It can be a 'stable personality orientation, one that varies between individuals, and can be activated among those who hold it when they perceive threats to in-groups they care about' (38) as a result, it becomes a predictor of political preferences and choices, and a stable link with demographic features of the electorate. It can also produce large and rapid shifts in priorities and behaviour. It tends to last over time. [However] it varies by educational level and ethnic identity [are these the same sorts of factors?]. Education predicts levels of in- group attachment and out-group hostility in the white majority. For ethnic minorities, there is also hostility to out- groups, for example external marriage, but also a strong rejection of ethnocentric white groups such as nations, from which they are usually excluded. For some reason it seems easier to ally with white conviction liberals [I still think this needs to be explained]. The activity of ethnocentrism depends very much on whether a threat is perceived [the researchers studied stresses an underlying authoritarian personality as being particularly important here, producing surges and intolerance and demands for strong leadership]. Immigration is a classic candidate for providing threats, as our national security terrorism and war. Stacey's study of migration into Banbury in the 1930s also found ethnocentric responses, hostile mobilisation against newcomers, worries about existing provision, the appearance of new and alien shops, even though immigrants were English. From a few counties away.

[More detailed research on the different characteristics of the groups identified follows. It is quite detailed and includes work by Heath on racial discrimination which I should really have read — for example Heath et al 2019 Racial Discrimination in Britain 1969 – 2017 British Journal of Sociology 70 (five) 1774 – 98, and lots of Heath on voting behaviour]. I will take the material on ethnic diversity and necessity liberals for particular discussion: they do apparently have a widespread sense of injustice, but also a notion of '"linked fate"' (45) which links them to conviction liberals — the notion that 'what happens to other members of their racial groups affects what happens to them individually'. Their views on many other social issues fundamentally differ with other conviction liberals making for a 'very volatile and potentially thin coalition', threatened when say, when conservatives declined as a voting force, or hostility shifts to other out groups. [The 'left behind' thesis is discussed with identity conservatives, and this is 'not without reason' (46). They have themselves become more liberal but not to the extent that other groups have. They feel they are dominated by identity liberals in the media and within political elites and therefore are unable to express their opinions freely, part of a general politics of racism turning on expression.]

However, democracy is not destiny since political actors can respond and adapt. We can see this in the various predictions that certain Labour Party policies will lead to their extinction. Identity politics are too dynamic. Demographic shifts are better seen as 'electoral resources' involving different potentials.

[Chapter 3 — brief notes only] social differences do not necessarily lead to polarisation or strong emotions, and they do simultaneously involve broad agreements. For example there is 'a general social consensus that racism is a personal failing and a social evil, so that those judged racists, or even accused of racism, face a substantial social stigma' (72 – three). However there is a disagreement as to what constitutes racism and this heightens the heat and emotion. The authors designed an experiment to see how important racist behaviour was, asking respondents in a survey to imagine that they were a shop manager and they needed to decide what sort of disciplinary action to take against an employee who was rude to customers in different ways. They randomly varied the sort of rude behaviour — criticising mothers not controlling their children, suggesting customers were too poor to buy the goods, criticising customers using poor English, and making racist comments. This was to see if there was a distinctive stigma attached to racism. Respondents were also asked to react in various grades of severity — dismissal, a warning, doing nothing. Their results confirm that racist behaviour was taken more seriously. Surprisingly, ridiculing a customers poverty was not seen as a particular offence, but racism was [by more than a factor of 8] — 97% of the sample saw racism as a transgression they should punish although they varied in terms of the sanction. This shows that to be called a racist is to invite a powerful stigma, and identity conservatives are particularly aware of this, hence they are seeking common ground or attempting to neutralise hostile responses. The difficulty is drawing boundaries between beliefs that should be stigmatised as racist from 'more benign expressions of the group attachment and judgements about others' (76) and there is a constant war about the definitions and legitimacy of the expressions, among the political parties among others [examples follow]. Emotions indicate high-stakes. Broader definitions may also weaken the political effects and weaken the social consensus, for example with the argument that all white people are racist. Identity conservatives have been liberalised, for example more tolerant of racial diversity, and therefore more sensitive about criticism. Political correctness is the usual counterargument, and this is also influential, as they found in another test of their sample [they qualified their questions by saying some of them might indicate political correctness — those more strongly favoured to follow anti-prejudice norms are strangely most affected by the suggestion that this might be political correctness — indicating that they are mostly responsive 'to the standards set by wider society and will shift their response' (82).

[Chapter 4 – brief notes again]. Ethnocentrism does not only apply to immigrants, but any influx of outsiders. The first wave of nonwhite migration from the 50s to 70s showed how conflicts became political and how identity politics became a function in the electorate. Familiar dimensions appeared — policymakers developed liberal policies which unwittingly triggered more migrants, and then faced pressure to restrict  flow following ethnocentric hostility among white majorities, and then a need to protect migrant communities from this hostility. Originally, identity conservative voters were aligned with the Conservative party and identity liberal voters with the Labour Party in terms of emphasis on controlling the threats or protecting rights. There was 'a large and persistent elite – mass gap' (86 ), with elites introducing reforms to increase migration  rights and underestimating public hostility. A mythical community, the Commonwealth, was at the heart of this, and later, the EU. A surge in migration was produced by both sets of policies. Secondly, ethnocentrism was mobilised by political actors given that control of migration was slow and there was no mainstream political outlet for concern until a credible electoral threat emerged — UKIP. The referendum on Brexit became an option to exit open border arrangements. Enoch Powell was also temporarily popular and led to concessions ending migration rights for most Commonwealth citizens. In both cases identity liberals counter-mobilised, first within the Labour Party in the form of race relations legislation, antiracism norms in British law, and a 'longer run project' to develop a multicultural society. This aspect of the politics of identity persists since 2016 with struggles over hostile environments and race relations.

The British Nationality Act of 1948 was 'one of the most liberal pieces of citizenship and migration legislation passed by a western democracy' (88), with a very expansive definition of citizenship, which included all residents of Britain and all residents of territories of the British Empire, so that 800 million people acquired full British citizenship rights. However mass migration was not expected, and the aim was to create an integrated Commonwealth and to retain links with white colonial settler societies. Mass migration was not really considered. The first inflow from the West Indies began in the 50s and then increased.

Ethnocentric sentiments were soon apparent, despite much polling. Restrictive legislation in 1962 seem to be popular with 70% of respondents, and this was 'from the outset racially discriminatory' (92), opposed to 'coloured' migrants: in 1967, migrants from Ireland were as numerous and were not restricted, yet attracted less public opposition (20% as opposed to 60%) (93). Identity conservatives were clearly dominant. White school Leavers were a large majority of the population and these formed 'the core identity conservative demographic group'. University graduates were then a tiny minority.

There was already a broad clash of outlooks — 'cosmopolitan political elites concerned to maintain Britain's status in the international community and a more ethnocentric electorate' (95), an ideological 'us' which included the former in imperial territories, a global network, and a more narrow sense defined racially and territorially, 'white British people born and resident in Britain'. Opposition was not affected by post-war labour shortages or arguments about the contribution Commonwealth citizens actually made to the war effort. Debates exposed deep divides, including whether migration was an important political priority, and whether racial and ethnic differences were important.

Both parties were divided internally between elites and electorates. Expressions of racism in everyday life were common, for example in discriminatory rental policies and in popular culture, and they eventually came to political prominence in the 1964 general election campaign with the notorious Smethwick election, and finally Enoch Powell's speeches. These were greeted with banishment, but some electoral support — one [NOP] poll showed 75% agreement with his views(100). This consolidated a lasting divide between the parties. Powell led to the Conservatives being seen as favouring control, while Labour reaction led to stronger support for minority rights. This was supported by British Election Study surveys, when in 1970 there was a clear division between voters who saw the different parties as different in terms of controlling immigration, although further data shows perceptions were actually 'more restrictive than reality' (102), which turned out to be electorally valuable for the Conservatives — 'the party was able to have its cake and eat it on immigration' (103) and Conservatives did respond with more restrictions, for example the Immigration Act of 1971 which created two classes of Commonwealth citizens according to their patriality, which in effect ensures continued access to white Commonwealth citizens. The intentions of this legislation were undone however by the expulsion of Asians from Uganda, when the Conservative leader (Heath) honoured the rights of Ugandan Asians to settle and nearly 30,000 refugees were admitted to Britain. There was a  reaction, led by Powell, which turned ethnocentric voters against the Conservatives and public sentiment  no longer believed that the Conservatives had the strictest migration control. Curiously, the share believing  Labour was more liberal  fell [the electorate were desperate since that was the only alternative — the beginning of voting while holding your nose?]

Space opened for new parties to exploit ethnocentric sentiments, such as the National Front which became the fourth largest party in the mid-70s and led to support for the BNP and UKIP. The Conservatives replied with new stronger promises of control, to limit numbers or impose regular lines, this time including EU free movement [not discussed so far]. Thatcher was fully aware of ethnocentrism and the disruptive power of immigration, although she had no sympathy for rabble-rousers. She attacked elites as hypocritical and defended ethnocentric sentiments, both in power and as leader of the opposition [in the latter, she used the famous term 'swamped']. This immediately regained electoral support, including support among Labour identifiers. Somehow she managed to avoid 'violating elite antiracism norms' [a footnote claims this was down to Whitelaw and members of the Cabinet. Compare this with S. Hall and M Jacques on the necessary contradictions of Thatcherism— simple nationalism combined with support for EU membership]. She did stress the importance of heritage in the 1981 Nationality Act, severing links with former colonies and also withdrawing the automatic right to British citizenship for those born in British territory, although this was not realised by many migrant families [hence the Windrush controversies where lots of early migrants did not realise they were not British citizens and not entitled to benefits]. There was also a sustained drop in migration to Britain, partly due to the recession of the 1980s and the growth of mass unemployment.

Allegiance by ethnocentrics to the Conservative party persisted through the 1980s and 90s, and  ethnocentrics increasingly left Labour. However ethnic minority electorates began to show alignment to Labour, partly as a reaction to campaigns against them. This had an effect in England's largest cities. General unhappiness with both parties was apparent with identity liberal elites and this produced a counter mobilisation. Some pressed Labour into acts which provided laws against racism which expanded to include more areas of life. There was also protection for customs, religious practices and cultures, multiculturalism. There was a category of indirect discrimination in the 1976 Race Relations Act and discrimination worked through the civil justice processes meaning that 'the burden of proof… has been lighter and made it easier to raise a complaint' (114), which was apparently 'directly modelled on the US system of legislation'. A coalition of identity liberals emerged, for example around flashpoints like the murder of Stephen Lawrence and the Macpherson enquiry in the 1990s which produced legal protections against ' what Macpherson called "institutional racism"' [the 2000 Race Relations Act obliged public bodies to promote good race relations]. The Lawrence murder was responsible for 'the spread of antiracism norms through society and politics' (115), at least to the extent that they were no longer located in the elite.

The real puzzle is why liberal rules were maintained so long. Vestiges Remain today, for example that citizens of Commonwealth countries and Ireland still have the right to vote and stand in British general elections from the day they arrive in Britain. There is a kind of inertia here. To abandon citizenship rights would require writing discrimination into law. There was also the need to align Britain with a large international structure — first the Commonwealth and then the EU — which led to an unforeseen influx of migrants, but an apparent inability to respond to the concern of electorates. Foreign policy was also important, especially the need to cooperate in some sort of '"Anglosphere"', at first, and then a European alignment. Finally, there was a close connection with social norms among the elite which condemned racial prejudice [pretty recent? Not extended to Jews? Not extended to other outsiders, especially arriviste's?]. War veterans saw racism associated with Nazis, including Heath. These norms did act to restrain even Margaret Thatcher, and immediate responses to hostile public sentiment, and produced, say,  a balance of anti-immigration legislation with equalities legislation, in the case of Labour. University expansion would also increase the sentiment [why? They were hardly members of the new elite, and did not share many of their other values — why would the petty bourgeois develop antiracism especially?].

Issues in the past have a legacy for the parties different reputations — conservatives was seen as inheritors of Powell and Thatcher, but the Labour Party despite inconsistency emerged as the party of identity liberals [not any more], 'simply by being the main opposition to the party of Powell and Thatcher and thus the only viable alternative' (118).

Chapter 5. There is a process by which latent social conflicts become mobilised into major political issues — the '"mobilisation of bias"' [apparently attributed to Schattschneider] (121). Conflict over immigration and the EU were marginal issues in 1990s, but these were mobilised. Firstly the main political parties converged ideologically with new Labour [adopting the third way]. Secondly a new professional political class emerged dominated by liberal graduates and they displaced traditional working class and identity Conservative people. Thirdly, campaigning became more professional and coordinated, focused on campaigns, swing seats and marginals. This brought a weakening of tribal attachments and partisan bonds, and identification of the parties. Instead there was 'a growing pool of disaffected voters'[pragmatists] (123). This affected identity conservatives above all and they were the most volatile group. Nevertheless these feelings Remain latent until an issue emerged to galvanise them — the new wave of emigration under new Labour, again an unintended effect of policy intended strength and commitment to the EU and its economic policy.

The two-party system was occasionally messy but did seem to offer voters meaningful political choice, but this changed to competition based on a narrow range of swing seats and marginal voters. Politicians became more similar, ideological competition was replaced by managerial and performance-based criteria and ideological moderation. Blair intended to appeal to the growing middle-class electorate by abandoning long-standing commitments such as nationalisation and links with trade unions. Tory response to his success was initially to appeal to activists, but then to more moderate centrists like Cameron. A common economic agenda emerged, low regulation investment in public services, moderate redistribution. Meaningful choice disappeared and voters realise this — opinion polls showed increased numbers of voters saying there was no difference between the parties.

Professionalisation of campaigning increased, replacing traditional local mobilisations and canvassing. Mass membership also decreased. Focus on the swing votes and seats became crucial, with polling and survey data playing an increasing part in 'micro-targeting'. The decline of activists left parties with little choice. The greatest impact was felt in safe Labour seats lacking resources for politics anyway and large turnout slumps became apparent after 1997. Face-to-face contact differed between the parties increasingly. Elitism also changed the Labour Party, as working class representation declined in favour of managerial culture, itself part of professionalisation and internationalisation. Graduates middle-class professionals 'have become a majority of party elites of all parties', and 'a distinctive professional "political class" emerged whose views came to define the mainstream political conversation' (130). This group was dominated by graduates: nearly 2/3 of all candidates were graduates even in 1992. By 2001, school Leavers even among Labour candidates had slumped to 14% (132), and graduates now comprise over 80% of all candidates in 2015. Since 'education levels strongly predict identity politics stances… The political elites as a whole will have views at odds with much of the electorate it seeks to represent' (132). This can be seen by a pole comparing voters and candidates who felt that equal opportunities for ethnic minorities had gone too far both in 1992 and in 2005: the candidates were significantly more liberal than their own voters and this Group, especially with Labour. Same pattern emerges with views of the EU, so that 'Euro scepticism in the electorate was persistently underrepresented in the political class as a whole' especially for the Labour Party (133).

This made it easy for new political movements to win voters. New Labour could attract new voters to compensate for the loss of traditional partisans, but the increasing alienation of traditional supporters produced more problems — poll returns showed an increasing decline in belief that Labour represented the interests of the working class. Genuine attempts to improve the representation of women and ethnic minorities did not improve voters perceptions, and 'a large majority of the electorate'already thought that Labour represented ethnic minorities effectively in 1987, while Cameron's conversion was too 'transitory' to change perceptions (135). This sort of diversity matters far more to the political class but is not 'a high priority for most voters'.

New Labour always gambled that they could broaden their appeal and retain the loyalty of traditional supporters because there was nowhere else to go, and this did work at first, although at the expense of dissatisfaction and abstention, especially among identity conservatives. The traditional attachments to political parties declined in new Labour, from 51% to 29% (136), even more so when generations are considered — 'partisans ship has collapsed among the [younger] generations' (137) [British social attitudes surveys here] even among identity conservatives. Partisan attachments have been more enduring in the ethnic minority electorate. A new swing electorate emerged — younger identity conservative voters, more pragmatic rather than tied to traditional parties. This opened a gap between identity liberals and identity conservatives — the latter were more detached from the traditional party system and were becoming increasingly hostile to it, with lower trust in government and MPs, more unhappiness with how democracy operates, more discontent with the system itself. Abstention seemed to be the possible alternative and 1/5 of the entire electorate dropped out between 1992 and 2001, a bigger swing than that from Tory to Labour in Blair's first landslide. Many never returned and lower turnout has been an increasing trend, especially among white school Leavers. The result is 'a large and lasting turnout gap between identity conservatives and identity liberals', even more marked if we consider generations — 'the largest turnout declines of all [are] found among younger identity conservatives' (141). Older voters were still unhappy but still retains some links to the mainstream political system.

Abstention has a limited political impact, however especially in safe seats, but it provides a potential. Immigration mobilised this potential. Labour figured it as a byproduct of their foreign policy goal to build a position within the EU. New Labour also saw immigration in positive terms as a resource, as a boost to economic growth. Family and student migration changes as an impact, so migrant arrivals rose above 500,000 per annum by 2002 and have Remained high ever since. Public concerns rose in tandem, and produced discontent. This was focused in 2004 when Blair decided not to control migration from the new EU member states which triggered a further wave of migration from them. This decision was reached with very little consultation and was seen as a way of strengthening relations with the new EU states. Labour politicians had no idea of the numbers, nor did they expect that most of the other EU members would impose controls. The new migrants settled throughout the whole of Britain bringing the Banbury experience so many areas. In 2007, nearly 40% of voters 'named immigration is one of the most important issues facing the nation' (146) and immigration Remained among the top three issues even through the recession. Labour's points based system was supposed to attract skilled migrants, but it did not apply to unskilled migrants from the EU and so did not affect public opinion [just as ethnocentric about white Europeans, or xeno racist].

This was not a surge in xenophobic sentiments (146) there was an argument that ethnocentric feeling was paired with numbers arriving increasing competition for jobs and resources, with migrants given an unfair advantage, accompanied with rapid and visible change in local and national identity. The authors think that 'the truth is more complicated' and that high migration does not increase hostile sentiments 'among those not already prone to see migrants in a negative light'(147) [another way of saying those unaffected?] Studies of views of migrants themselves [as human beings, as opposed to migration as a problem] have not been consistent over the long term in various opinion polls, and the authors caution us about aggregating the data, but they argue that there was certainly a 'modest but consistent negative shift in overall public sentiment about migration during the new Labour era'.

They combine four measures on social and economic impacts to build two indices, and argue that views of the social impacts of migration 'provide the closest proxy for the ethnocentric sentiment that migrants are an alien and threatening outgroup'. The four measures are: 'support for the idea that migrants increase crime, and rejection of the idea that migrants opened Britain to new ideas and culture… Support for the idea that migrants take jobs from British workers and rejection of the idea that migration is economically beneficial of Britain' (148). Their figures show that there was a negative shift in attitudes between 1995 and 2003 focused on social impacts but not a changing economic impacts. There is no further shift after 2003, with stable attitudes despite record immigration levels [the scale is rather difficult to penetrate, so we don't know if it means percentages are not. If it is on a scale of 0 to 1 we are talking about ranges from 40 to 50% at the extreme and an average of 50%]. These are average figures and there were divides within the electorate. Most concerned were ethnocentric identity conservative voters. They were also concerned with other aspects of identity politics — assertive English national identity and Euroscepticism, and these 'would become mobilised in the next decade' (149). Overall, rising migration levels activated already existing sentiments especially among identity conservative voters who already had negative views of migrants well before the second wave. Identity liberals were happy, but did not see the need to particularly mobilise to defend migration levels [they did not name it as the most important problem, for example — those who did were overwhelmingly negative]. This was 'asymmetric activation' (150) [we saw this with the Remainers as well – no positive case]. Hostility became more politically significant and influential. There was no surge in xenophobia , but the mobilisation of it. New Labour were too focused on managerial performance and neglected the management of  immigration — their identity liberal supporters saw no problem, but identity conservatives were intensely unhappy and made a more general assessment of the party and its leaders. Even so, those most unhappy tended to abstain which blunted the impact [and allowed politicians to ignore opposition]. From 2004 onwards there seemed to be no alternative between accepting uncontrolled immigration as the price of EU membership, or rethinking EU membership as the only way to control immigration. Identity liberal elites resisted immigration control and this also split the Labour Party and intensified Conservative voters anxiety. The Conservative still had a reputation for immigration control and so were seen as a viable alternative for the moment.


Chapter 6. BNP and UKIP had begun to grow in the 2000s, but in 2010 the Lib Dems did well enough to form a coalition with conservatives. The worst economic crisis this generation played a part, pushing immigration off the list of crucial issues and delaying identity conflicts. However, identity conservatives soon shifted to UKIP, and Labour Party became a coalition itself, losing white school Leavers but gaining white graduates, especially those alienated by Lib Dems, and Muslim voters. In Scotland, there was a different outcome. The 2015 Conservative victory followed stabilisation of economic performance, but UKIP was revealing its power, especially since it was able to combine opposition to immigration and the EU. Anti-immigrant feeling led to recruitment for the Tories during Blair, and large parts of the electorate considered immigration to be an important priority [British Election Studies]. Both parties responded with promises to limit numbers and clamp down on illegals. New Labour 'strangely' did not appeal to established migrants by offering them citizenship — the authors think they would have then supported EU free movement. Even Cameron promised a reduction of numbers, although they were soon seen to be unrealistic while Britain stayed in the EU, eventually by the electorate as well. Initially, the issue led to  defections from Labour to the Tories, but total control could not be achieved.

Both the BNP and UKIP mobilised ethnocentric sentiments and.record shares of the vote 2005 and 2010. The BNP grew to be the most successful far right party in British history, gaining 564,000 votes in 2010, but then disintegrated after the 2010 election [they say because of a decision to return to street protest politics despite Griffin]. BNP voters were 'often openly racist' especially towards British Muslims, but this also put a limit on its appeal, including rejection by UKIP. This shows the importance of antiracism norms even for those who would support BNP otherwise, and lent it a toxic reputation. UKIP grew rapidly in support at first in the European Parliament elections, especially after proportional representation. It faced rivalry first with the Referendum Party, but was able to use the European Parliament to mobilise Euroscepticism, including being able to mobilise 'considerable EU resources and media attention' (167). Support in general elections doubled between 2001 and 2010 although the vote was spread thinly. In the end, it triumphed over the BNP because of the 'critical importance of antiracism norms and party reputations' (167) — it was seen as more legitimate, especially by focusing on Europe, and this focus made it more difficult to stigmatise it as simply racist, even in the media. This seems to be actually a classic finding with successful radical right parties who began with other ethnocentric issues to acquire a '"reputational shield"' against being stigmatised as racists (168) reflecting the ambiguity that identity Conservative voters feel, and the need for 'veneer of legitimacy'. UKIP was resisted as long as the Tories Remained as a party that would control immigration.

They could do this while Labour Remained in office, but not when they took power as a coalition. They try to introduce caps and quotas for skilled immigrants and other restrictions — the '"hostile environment"' (169) — but this failed to reduce numbers sufficiently. Substantial EU migration continue and this could not be controlled. EU unemployment had increased. Universities were becoming increasingly dependent on foreign students, although voters tended to see them as not really migrants at all. Employer lobby is also important. Harsh restrictions were necessary but the government could not bring itself to introduce them, hence it constantly made pledges that would fail visibly — a regular farcical publication of target figures which would then be shown to be not achieved — a 'rinse and repeat ritual of failure' (172) that rapidly destroyed the reputation of the Tories migration control and lost them massive support among the electorate. Labour did not gain support: UKIP did. The collapse of voter faith is evident in the monthly surveys conducted by the British Election Study of approval of various policies, and the swing against the Tories was large among the core identity Conservative electorate of white school Leavers. Labour did not benefit, however and 1/3 of voters said that no party could be trusted to deal with it — rising from 20% in 2009 to 40% in 2013. There was a general distrust of politicians and mainstream parties and immigration Remained at the top of the public's political agenda all the way through to the referendum — but it became increasingly connected with membership of the EU.

Collapsing faith in Conservative abilities benefited UKIP, especially in the English regions among marginal seats and local elections. In 2014 in the European Parliament elections, the party came in first place with nearly 27% of the vote, and two Tory MPs defected. The largest group of recruits were 2010 Conservative voters but all mainstream parties suffered defection of voters, including those with back labouring 2005 and even those who had backed LibDem in 2010. However demographic background attitudes and priorities were still similar — 'ethnocentric white school Leavers with very negative views about immigration and the EU' (176). Nigel Farage was 'adept' at packing the two issues together. UKIP quintupled its support among white school Leavers between 2010 and 2014 European elections, but was much weaker among core identity liberals. Education and ethnicity were the strongest predictors of UKIP support and these measures 'do a much better job of explaining UKIP support than any other economic or social factors' especially in domestic elections (177) [numbers of references there, based apparently on regression models]. As we move identity liberals to identity conservatives, the rates of switching to UKIP rise sharply, particularly with those who voted Labour and LibDem in 2010. The Tories already had some fairly reluctant supporters for the coalition, but the impact of immigration seems to have had important shifts in the support base for the others.

There was austerity at the time and public anger at welfare cuts in public services, and this might explain some of UKIP's rise, but identity politics are more powerful predictors, especially among key groups such as older voters working class voters and lower income voters: 'once differences in education are statistically controlled for there are no Remaining class or income differences in UKIP support… A white working class school Leaver is no more likely to support UKIP than a white middle class school Leaver. A poor ethnocentric nationalist is no more likely to back UKIP than a rich ethnocentric nationalist' (180). There is some evidence that anger at austerity might have increased UKIP support at the margins, but identity conservative attitude were much better predictors, and this is a close fit with the '"authoritarian dynamic"' [Karen Stenner] — an urgent threat to identity or values, combined with the belief that political elites have failed or cannot deal with that threat needs to 'rapid and disruptive mobilisation of authoritarian voters' (181). No main party could resist because none could offer the Draconian measures required to deal with immigration.

Chapter 7. This continues the story of volatility, the attempts by the two traditional parties to form stable governments, alternating between themselves, and in one case, forming a coalition, between Conservatives and Lib Dems. The specific requirements and voting interests of the different factions are analysed here in some detail, including the role of ethnic minorities. I think the notes on the conclusion will suffice. Labour consolidated support from identity liberals who had lost enthusiasm for the Coalition, especially because the LibDem faction reneged on their promise not to increase university fees. Labour also got support from groups whose electoral power was growing, identity liberals [and essential liberals?] but at the cost of losing their traditional partisan loyalists. The problem with identity liberals is that they are not particularly partisan — for example 40% of those who switched to Labour in 2015 'reported having little or no attachment to their new party' (209) [so we are seeing the rise of the pragmatists to use the old terms -- except for UKIP voters?], and would be open to new offers. The Lib Dems were inherently appealing once they had got over the negative impacts of their coalition. The Green party also appealed, especially to younger university graduates who had liberal social views with left-wing views on economic issues and did environment, and in Scotland and Wales nationalist parties offered a range of identity liberal policy stances. These parties also tended to attract those who had stayed at home in previous elections. Overall, there was 'intense competition for identity liberal voters' (211). So Labour in 2015 were appealing to different sorts of voters. They collapsed in Scotland, lost white school Leavers to new graduates and ethnic minorities also left the Lib Dems to go to the Conservatives. Identity liberals were prominent for the first time in Labour and this caused major frictions with MPs defending traditional post-industrial states. This led to a geographically patterned support, and often 'wasted… majorities' (213). Concentration also produced threats to city centre constituencies from graduates and ethnic minorities. The old reliance on abstention was also weakening since attractive alternatives were available. Any stability for labour was 'largely achieved by default', especially the unpopularity of the Lib Dems. We also see the beginnings of the tension in labour between identity liberals and traditional supporters and activists. Things came to a head in 2016.

Chapter 8 There had long been deep distrust of the political class, a feeling of lacking meaningful choice and disruptive electoral potential of immigration. One less visible struggle has been between antiracism and political correctness, and connections between immigration and attitudes towards the EU. The Referendum focused the issues and produced two tribes. Identity liberals rallied around the threat of Brexit in response to unity among identity conservatives. That group now saw themselves as 'holders of a powerful democratic mandate' as well (218), the emergence of 'referendum identities' mutual hostility and stereotyping.

Subsequent analysis produced lots of puzzles including 'why surprisingly large numbers of ethnic minorities voted Leave' (219) [references]. Other analysts pointed to authoritarian values, austerity, demographic divides, inequalities and the role of campaigns and leaders. The coalitions were almost equally successful, but they want to focus on the mobilisation of identity conflicts. The 2015 election had produced two groups — identity conservatives and identity liberals, but they were less conscious of themselves as distinct opposing groups, and there were crosscutting geographical class and economic issues. The referendum cancelled geographical distribution and stimulated mass mobilisation, and even class income and economic ideology 'played virtually no role' (220) compared to identity politics. The identity of Leave and Remain took on meaning and attachment more powerful than those associated with traditional parties and they may still be active.

In 2015, UKIP attracted and mobilised identity conservatives especially affecting the Conservative party but the Tories still got a majority. Geography works in favour of the Tories, since UKIP had a broad national appeal. Lib Dem collapse also helped the Tories, since it took place in Tory areas. The only UKIP MP had a particularly favourable set of circumstances. Tories had gained a late swing from UKIP in important marginal seats. Geography penalised Lib Dems by comparison since they were often in areas relatively easy to capture by Tories. However political normality 'proved to be fleeting' and the Tories were now committed to a referendum, which unleashed full identity conflict.

Euro scepticism is not unique to Britain but common all over Western Europe, growing as EU integration has developed. It has a history of decades [with data from 2003 on page 225]. Euro scepticism was long associated with identity divides especially as the link with immigration developed. In Europe, however there is strong proEU support among identity liberals but this is 'much less true in Britain' (226). The Leave side realised this and focused on identity politics from the beginning, especially deploying ethnocentric themes as in take back control. There were misleading claims for example about Turkey being admitted, and scares about increasing refugees including undesirables, 'reminiscent of the anti-immigration rhetoric of Enoch Powell' (228). These are not the only arguments but were prominent. Remainers did not make a positive case, however but stuck to pragmatic and transactional grounds, economic interests, the risks of disruption, non-emotional and value laden — for example a pundit confessed he was risk averse and seeking safety. Jeremy Corbyn was lukewarm, Cameron had earlier been a Eurosceptic. Remainers were not able to 'mobilise tolerance and inclusiveness as core values' or not at first.

The split produced by the referendum was different to the earlier divides, as a British Election Study reveals, comparing voters to those who had earlier chosen Tories or Labour, and the various issues they stressed — briefly, there were diverse motivations of choice, largely economic ones in the election, but immigration attitudes much more strongly in the referendum. Those dissatisfied with British democracy were likely to back Labour in the election, but Leave in the referendum. The earlier stress on economic arguments encouraged Remain to focus on them which was a mistake — 'those who thought Britain's economy was booming voted the same way as other similar voters who saw an economy in crisis… ideologically left wing voters who wanted a larger stronger state, stronger unions and a more regulated market voted just the same as otherwise similar voters in favour of a low tax low regulation free market' (231). Immigration was the issue, together with national identity and equal opportunities. In demographic terms, social class, income, education level, ethnicity and generation, the referendum split the electorate in new ways, oddly enough enabling the Tories to make links for the first time post Brexit, with groups who had traditionally avoided them. If we just look at class and income, those at the top favoured Tories over the Labour in the election, but in the referendum, the relationships are much weaker and even in the opposite direction [well, weaker anyway]. There were new important divisions 'education and generation', with education the most dramatic. In the election in 2015 graduates tended to be slightly more conservative than school Leavers, but the two groups were poles apart in the referendum 'graduates voting 26 points more Remain than school leavers' (236), a surfacing of a difference that had been lurking there for years. Ethnic differences were less marked. In the election and ethnic gap was 20 points between white Tories and ethnic labour, but this had narrowed with the referendum to 13 points in favour of Leave. 'There were many more ethnic minority Leave voters in 2016 than ethnic minority Conservative voters in 2015' (236) ethnic minority suspicions of the Tory party did not transfer fully to Leave despite ethnocentrism. This could have been because Labour did not emphasise ethnic issues. It could have been because more resentment was focus towards EU citizens and perhaps ethnic minorities felt they would get better treatment if those were restricted. This was an opportunity for the Tories [!] post Brexit, but May was 'uniquely ill suited to capitalise on this opportunity' (237). There was a generational pattern both with the election and the referendum — Tories and Leave did better with older generations, but this was larger in 2016, with younger voters backing Remain 'by an overwhelming margin'. This turned into an opportunity for the Labour Party after the referendum.

The new identity conflict did not fade away. It might have done if Remain had won, but the subsequent political engagement to Leave left Brexit as a prominent issue. Identities became central to personal identity, much more so than attachments to traditional political parties, and they became focuses for new changes of attitudes, including negative attitudes towards the other group and influences on their own political preferences. They surveyed respondents with a list of attributes, some of which were associated with the referendum vote choices and asked respondents if they could use them to describe Leave and Remain voters — they did so clearly and accurately. Referendum voters did see votes as 'much broader expressions of who people are and what they value' (239) and these played a role as add similar emotional attachments to parties — for example 88% of respondents reported feeling close to either Remain or Leave' [45% and 43% respectively] (241). There were symmetrical stereotypes, widely shared and quite intense [again there were exercises asking people to rate different tribes in various ways]. The researchers investigated social contacts between the groups 'such as marrying, befriending or working with each other' (243 and compared this to the social distance produced by immigration, ethnicity, social class and political partisan ship: they asked for responses to hypothetical neighbours and found the referendum preferences had a powerful impact, a bigger one than cultural indicators [leisure] and identity indicators such as migration status and country of birth. However unemployment was bigger. A past vote for UKIP triggered negative views by Remainers. There were divergences on 'a remarkably wide range of issues', including support for the parties [a brief support for the Tories as pro-Brexit], and economic perceptions, optimism Leavers, pessimism for Remain. Voters increasingly saw politics in terms of their tribal loyalties. Perceptions also broadened so that Remainers saw 'trouble everywhere' (247).