Notes on: Sehgal, M (2014)
Diffracted Propositions: Reading Alfred North
Whitehead with Donna Haraway and Karen Barad.
Parallax, 20 (3), 188 – 201. DOI:
10.1080/13534645.2014.927625 Online:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264090238
Haraway contrasts diffraction with reflection 'as
a metaphor and a method for knowledge production'.
This is a redemptive reading of optical metaphors
and challenges the usual optical imagery. However,
diffraction is 'more than "merely a metaphor"'
(188) since it also focuses on historicity and
difference. It should be seen as 'essentially
pragmatic', performative, making consequential
meanings [still Haraway] mapping the effects of
difference.
Barad elaborates more ontological implications
from quantum physics. Here, diffraction patterns
show how something became, how being is becoming.
The consequences extend beyond physics because
they make us think differently 'about the world on
an everyday basis after Newtonian physics has lost
its evidence' [exaggeration surely — every day
thinking is pretty well Newtonian or sub-
Newtonian]. Classical metaphysics is problem of
time and is now untenable, especially relating to
'individualism and presence' (189). Diffraction
phenomena are now the fundamental constituents of
the world [if we accept quantum theory as a
foundation?]. Haraway and Barad do not entirely
disagree, however because epistemology and
ontology is also to be related, together with the
whole issue of subject and object, words and
things. In particular, we can no longer see
knowledge as a matter of 'distant gaze'. We need
to engage and get entangled.
On to Whitehead and the relation between
epistemology and ontology. Whitehead was also
involved in debates within physics in the early
20th century and wanted to explore the
philosophical consequences — he says Newtonian
physics ceased to be a foundation and persisted
only as a useful description of reality. Later
work grappled with these consequences. He saw that
trying to account for reality as such was an
abstraction, related only to a certain realm of
reality at a certain level of generalisation — it
contained a particular central assumption, that
matter or material was self-sufficient as a
starting point, just located, with no particular
relations of its own, no becomings, passive and
mechanical. But this was both metaphysical and
anthropocentric, and led to unnecessary
bifurcations between matter and humans. Because
the Newtonian conception of matter was seen as
self-evident, it led to a further problem of
trying to see everything that did not fit with
science as needing particular justification, often
as something illusory or subjective. Such habits
persist in modernity. He wanted to construct a
metaphysics with no bifurcations, no metaphysics
of individualism or human exceptionalism. [Much
turns on Stengers' reading].
We should read Whitehead diffractively with Barad
and Haraway to look at the relations between
ontology and epistemology. This reading will be
diffractive. [just additive, I think, or
reinterpretative ]. It does not show that
Whitehead already knew what Barad and Haraway
would also look for. Instead we 'read Whitehead
today' referring to 20th century physics and
post-modern concerns [this used to be seen as a
methodological error once — imposing our meanings
on material from the past. What we are really
doing is 'completing' Whitehead with Barad?]
Whitehead has still been seen as offering
metaphysics in the classic sense, but it is not a
return to pre-modern modes of thought. Instead it
is 'situated metaphysics' responding to the
bifurcations of nature as a problem particularly
relevant to his own epoch, and as a way of
situating all theoretical practice:
representationalism is undermined, metaphysics is
pragmatic, and justified by their generation of
consequential meanings rather than a capacity to
mirror reality.
This is a 'surprising convergence', but there is
friction [easily apologised for, it seems]. There
are divergent styles, for example, with Whitehead
insisting on classic 'coherence and systematicity'
(191), while the feminists refer to stories
produced by writing technologies, with full
situatedness. Whitehead uses opaque technical
vocabulary in an attempt to be systematic, but
this whole attempt has been problematised in the
20th century as implying 'a "view from nowhere"'
[but didn't she say earlier it was situated in a
particular intellectual context — he just hasn't
told us about his personal life and struggle?]. We
should read this is an interference pattern
between the three writers [and I think we're going
to explain his insistence on coherence and
systematicity as a product of relevant notions of
science and theory at the time — situated after
all]
Whitehead can be seen as offering a diffractive
metaphysics. He even talks about dropping stones
into water when discussing the development of
theory. Seeing thought as an excitement disturbing
being, leads him to discuss propositions. These
are not just theories, referring to 'explicit
knowledge production', confined to 'the human
activity of conscious thinking' (192) they are
metaphysical, 'they belong to the realm of
existents', they are 'required to describe actual
entities' and it is entities that are disturbed
[buggered if I can see how, unless 'entities'
contains some human elements as in phenomena, or
unless propositions are acts -- because actuality
emerges from virtuality in a definite way --
Whitehead's 'attraction'or 'lure'?].
Whitehead talks of an '"actual entity"' which he
uses to critique individualism, introduced first
in the context of quantum theory and the
'discontinuous orbit of electrons'(193). It is
only a paradox if we think that matter endures
through time and space, and is not instead a
'vibration'. Actual entities are all that exists,
they are concrete, there is nothing more real
behind them, they are '"final facts"'. Other kinds
of entities also exist including 'eternal objects
and societies, or propositions' among a whole
collection — but these are derived from actual
entities and studying them is what makes his
position empiricist. They are not to be imagined
as things, enduring like Newtonian matter, but as
waves or vibrations. They are constituted by
'"prehensions"' which can be understood as 'mutual
interactions', and are constituted by a Baradian
cut, a 'decision' for Whitehead which both
incorporates and eliminates what matters.
Actual entities are not vibrations in a
microscopic realm — like all concepts, they are
speculative, and are justified by relations to
specialist forms of knowledge such as quantum
physics. He is not arguing that physics is a
foundation for all other kinds of knowing and
being [bloody looks like it] . It does require us
to stick to conventional metaphysics as 'mirroring
the fundamental constituents of the world'
however. In his metaphysics, epistemology,
ontology and ethics 'cannot be separated'. Instead
of a foundation we have to develop 'a hypothetical
starting point' for heterogeneous fields of
experience and knowledge as well as quantum
physics, one that incorporates all forms of
intra-action in the world, not just those of
physics [so we can now see the links with Deleuze]
Speculative concepts are pragmatic (194) — what
they mean is what they generate in the form of
consequential meanings. Specialised forms of
experience do not grasp actual entities as such
but 'prehend' it [a general term menaing to grasp
inknowledge, with specifics like apprehend?]
or according to their own modes of selection
and emphasis. So experience does not produce
actual entities, not even an experimental
apparatus. At most we can experience a pattern —
the same as Barad's phenomena or entanglements.
Actual entities produce experience, or rather
presuppose it and are never experienced as such,
so can never be represented by detached observers.
This leaves them speculative.
So terms like prehension or feeling are not
limited to human subjectivity. Actual entities are
processes of feeling, 'feeling the manifold data
[that] comprise all that there is'. This is
connected to the unity of individual
'satisfaction' [that is they have to be adequate?]
There is only one adequate feeling, no
bifurcations but monism, and it is not a human
originated one, so we can counter human
exceptionalism — all actual entities feel, none
are just inert. There is no Cartesian dualism of
mind and body but rather a 'monist and pluralist
starting point' from a non-bifurcated nature. This
is a 'radically non-modern beginning' implying
quantum entanglements and also relating ontology
and epistemology.
We get there through a new metaphysics, which
involves necessarily 'diffracting' habits of
thought (195). Theories or propositions are actual
entities, they matter, by becoming,
acquiring definition and singularity. This
involves a relation with 'all other actual
identities, eternal objects, societies and
propositions'. Nevertheless, propositions are
distinguished from these others, especially from
eternal objects. What prehension does is to
'confirm each new actual identity with aspects of
the ones it inherits', producing a continuous
universe. This produces in us '"conceptual
feeling" — the prehension of eternal objects'.
These are in 'the realm of pure potentiality'. An
actual entity apparently decide how to actualise,
'how it inherits its past'. Potential does not
realise itself and has no preferences about how it
might appear in experience. Any actualised entity
selects from eternal forms, related to all of
them, but ordered according to 'terms of
relevance': this still leaves discarded
possibilities, or 'negative prehension'.
Propositions are '"matters of fact in potential
determination, or impure potentials for the
specific determination of matters of fact, or
theories"'. Unlike eternal objects that are
prehended by any actual entity, propositions are
limited to specific actual entities, and thus get
incorporated in experience because they offer '"a
lure for feeling"' [shades of Deleuze's dark
precursor?]. We are not interested in truth or
falsehood with propositions — 'the primary
function of a proposition is not judgement but
entertainment'. Propositions have to be manifested
in experience, to be embodied, and as a result it
'"collects up the people"', the audience that
share meanings in stories [this is what being
entertained means — 'being admitted into feeling'
(196)]. Particular feelings that are important are
'horror, relief, purpose'. It is much more
important that propositions are interesting rather
than true [Deleuze again] but truth 'adds to
interest'.
Philosophers often exaggerate, extending things
like logical judgement because it is what matters
to them. Non-logical, false propositions can be
equally important, in having a social effect, for
example. Propositions '"pull"' us, but can never
determine or decide what gets taken up — there is
no inherent quality. Truthfulness is not immanent
but related to actual entities from which
propositions abstract. Propositions preexist
subjects, and are only felt because they are
relevant to the actual world, '"awaiting a subject
to feel it"'. They must be relevant to the actual
world, propositions must have efficacy in
attracting interest and prioritising, but only as
a suggestion. This accounts for difference and
novelty in intra-action. Different subjects
[remembering that these are the actual entities in
this case] feel propositions differently and
respond differently. The social environment
'decides on the relevance of a proposition' and
this is a particular relation to the world. As
propositions also relate to the past, they help us
both make '"sense of the situation and at the same
time…lure it into a new becoming"' This is the
'diffractive character' propositions, 'specially
non-conformal ones'. Propositions can only be
evaluated by the consequences, though.
Actual entities are not the same as societies —
the former are located in time, can both become
and perish, but societies 'assure the continuity
of the universe' in this sense, continuity of a
society 'such as a body or social group' is an
achievement, something not given but made. In this
sense 'intra-actions matter'. So although
continuity becomes, becoming is not continuous
[really witty!]. Propositions relating to actual
entities can 'introduce a break into the
continuity of a becoming' take a different route,
generate a different pattern.
In Whitehead's vocabulary, this applies to
theories. The point is not to describe what
factually exists, but to 'disrupt the given, as a
lure to what could be but not yet is'. This is why
thought generates excitement and disturbance. Yet
for Whitehead, the stone thrown into a pond is an
inadequate metaphor, and he 'corrects — or rather
diffracts' this metaphor (197). [A weird bit where
ripples are an effect of the plunge of the stone
into the water, that release thought which then
'"augments and distorts the ripples"']
Propositions are pre-conscious and metaphysical.
This is like Barad saying that the world is an
experimental agent. Propositions are not just
human language or thoughts but rather 'what is
presupposed by language and conscious thinking'
some prior metaphysical excitement or prompt,
producing explicit thoughts, propositions first
have to operate to lure a feeling. This is a
necessary speculative aspect of thought, an
imaginative jump. Metaphors can produce them but
never fully embody them. Theories themselves as
propositions introduced difference into the
becoming of the world — 'they matter because they
are diffractive' [I still don't see why this makes
them diffractive except that that retains the
notion of generating an interference pattern]
What are the consequences for metaphysics? It
offers a critique, but how do we construct a new
metaphysics or ontology? If we read Whitehead
diffractively [of course] through Haraway and
Barad, we see that he must be heading towards an
entanglement of epistemology and ontology,
eventually an' "ethico-onto-epistemology"' [we are
just completing Whitehead with Haraway and Barad
here?]. Situated knowledges and situated
metaphysics will result.
We have to first read 'Whiteheads metaphysics as a
situated one' and this involves looking at his
efforts to deal systematically with earlier works.
His metaphysics looks abstract and technical, but
it can be seen as a response to a reading of
modernity, nourished by a hope that the modern
epoch and 'its fatal incoherences' would finally
end. Modern habits of thought need to be more
systematic and coherent. He begins by asking what
if we had a non-bifurcating metaphysics, actual
entities 'not self identical essences but rather
as phenomena of diffraction' [so we've just
associated Whitehead and Barad again].
Rationality is not an abstraction, deduction or
induction, but something speculative and
pragmatic, the only possible response to the end
of Newtonian physics where certainty is gone.
Pragmatism is necessarily speculative and we are
forced to use 'a leap of faith' (198) by positing
a conclusion 'that can only be verified after the
fact': in fact this faith 'is necessary to bring
about the conclusion'. In this way, 'knowing is
part of the intra-action'. Logical justifiability
is not the issue. Instead we should take
adventures and risks, requiring leaps of thought.
His own work is therefore 'situated', not aiming
at final adequacy about what is, but 'itself lured
by a proposition'. It offers one possible
rendering of the world, but it hopes to be
relevant, attract feeling in a specific context,
to lure readers into 'other-than–modern modes of
thought'
So Whitehead's metaphysics is nonconformal to its
social environment and also 'in this sense, a
diffractive one' [still don't see why]. It is to
develop critical consciousness. Like Haraway, it's
committed to making a difference rather than just
replicating the same. In this way, his 'situated
metaphysics in bodies a diffractive proposition'
[still not convinced]
[Pretty unconvincing project. Whitehead has to be
made relevant -- why? This is to be achieved by
reading Whitehead from a currently fashionable
position -- Barad. You could do this foranyone --
Marx? The reading is achieved by first establising
similaraities in the critique of Newton,
then asserting that Whitehead is really
doing diffraction, as a kind of early Barad. No
non-specialist can effectively challenge this
reading of Whitehead. There is to be only
affirmation, of course The only cancelling bit is
the style -- and that is easily forgiven as
a matter of context and history. No other
conribution by Whitehead to Barad is identified]
back to social theory
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