Notes on: Atkinson, P and Hammersley, M. Ethnography and Participant Observation. In N.  Denzin, and Y Lincoln, (eds) (1994). Handbook of Qualitative Research [1st edition]. PP 248 – 61. Sage Publications: London Dave Harris We can pick out certain complementary themes to distinguish the various approaches. Some people see ethnography as a philosophical paradigm, others as a method. Usually, it involves exploring social phenomena rather than testing hypotheses about them; a preference for unstructured data rather than closed categories; a small number of cases, sometimes only one; analysis that involves 'explicit interpretation of the meanings and functions of human actions', mostly verbal rather than statistical or quantified. Participant observation also means different things, participant observation might involve a researcher playing 'an established participant role' (248), but nonparticipating observers can play roles as well. Options can range from complete observer through to complete participant, but even there it depends whether the researcher is known to be a researcher, how much people know about the research, what sort of activities are engaged in, whether the orientation of the researcher is that of an insider or outsider, consciously or not. To some extent, all social researcher is participant observation, so it is not a distinct method. The usual claim is to offer 'a uniquely humanistic, interpretive approach', often in opposition to scientific or positivist approaches, although some ethnographers espouse scientific stances. Political commitments also vary. Strands connect to form particular schools of ethnography, and there are connections with various different theoretical movements. We have 'a constant process of oppositions, of successive heterodoxies and heresies' (249), and different positions adopted towards a supposed mainstream. The particular focus of the disputes can change, however, from methodological ones to more epistemological. The 'posts-' have provided new interest. The founding fathers included Malinowski and his fieldwork, although there may be older roots in German philosophy. It has been shaped by an interest in non-Western societies. It has been effected by historicism, and 19th-century hermeneutics. People of the past were different, and should be understood and not prematurely judged. This was then applied to societies contemporaneous with the West, and, in the 20th century, to the study of 'one's own social surroundings too' (250), both the discovery of pockets of traditional culture, and the discovery of diverse cultures in metropolitan centres. Institutionalisation of the social sciences in universities is also important, with its history of regular crises and long-standing disputes, for example between empiricist natural science and hermeneutics. This is often seen as a tradition of conflict between paradigms, but this is 'misleading' — there is more a diversity of ideas, as we see by looking at actual founders. For example, Boas, Malinowski and Radcliffe Brown saw anthropology as a science with a central part played by ethnography. Information must be collected first-hand, and speculation rejected. All admired the natural sciences, but believed that social phenomena were different: the tension between science and humanities was 'present from the start'. We see that too with Chicago sociology — disputes about methods, case study or statistical, were seen as disputes within interpretations of science. Kant and idiography was 'blended with  a nomothetic interest in the discovery of sociocultural laws' (251). Pragmatist philosophy tried to combine scientific orientations with German idealism and historicism, especially in Hegel. The tensions with notions of natural sciences persist, and there is now even more diversification and varieties of practice. The question of scientific status 'cannot usefully be answered simply'(251) — different sorts of social science might be taken as paradigmatic; there can be interpretations about the methods used by science; they can be disagreements about which bits of scientific method might be applied. Much of the debate has been taken up by a rejection of positivism, [usually as scientism], involving rigorous testing of hypotheses by quantitative data. The criticism is that the 'true nature of human social behaviour' has been missed, because artificial settings or experiments affect the outcome, or people can say one thing and might do another, because meanings are reduced to what is observable, static, and because mechanical causality is deployed. Nevertheless, quantitative data can still be used in ethnography, although not exclusively. However, there is now a more radical rejection of both science and quantification [and Lincoln is one of those so mentioned], reflecting a general disillusionment with natural science, seeing it as an oppressive force, as in the writings of various critical theorists and feminists. The objectivity of social researchers been questioned, for example as reflecting masculinist assumptions which affect the whole enterprise, as in early Marxist formulations of ideology. Similar criticisms are found 'among advocates of black sociology'[Hammersley cites his own contributions]. A more fundamental question has emerged, whether social scientific knowledge of human activity is even possible. Accounts are constructions reflecting particular circumstances, and there is no universally valid knowledge. Ethnography describes this social reality best, especially after discovering various posts [and Denzin is singled out — the article on post-modernism — and so is Lather]. Denzin and Richardson have criticised Whyte's classic . The accuracy of Whyte's account has been questioned, after more interviews although his original account has been defended by an actual participant. Denzin and Richardson argue that 'all accounts are constructions' so the whole debate about which one is the more accurate in depicting reality 'is meaningless' (252). Ethnography itself can be subject to the same sort of criticisms directed at quantitative research — it also reified social phenomena, and claims 'illegitimate expertise over the people studied, as being based on relationships of hierarchy control'. It might even be a more subtle form of control, apparently related more closely to people. This epistemological challenge 'is undoubtedly fruitful in many respects', especially in demonstrating common problems between ethnography and quantification. In ethnography, theories are particularly ill-defined. However, scepticism and relativism has also emerged and 'it is not always clear how thoroughgoing' it is: it is often applied selectively, but without clear principles. Embracing scepticism fully is likely to lead to 'debilitating nihilism'. We need to reject some binaries, especially between 'a single oppressive conception of science and some uniquely liberating alternative'. In the past, ethnography claim to be directed mostly towards developing disciplinary knowledge rather than solving practical problems, contributing knowledge of general relevance and value, with a diffuse impact. Usually this involved 'marked deviation from the sort of research, or even the sort of written presentation, appropriate to academic work', following the general 'enlightenment model' (253). However, there has been an applied anthropology movement, especially in the USA, trying to do research aimed at the solution of practical problems, and criticising the disciplinary model. Sometimes anthropologists and others have engaged in advocacy, but whether this should be integrated into the research process is less clear: of course any attempt to represent others involves 'ethical and political responsibilities'. But there are complications because the context of advocacy is complex if a number of individuals and groups are involved, or if the group to be supported is not internally homogenous — they are also 'rarely democratically organised', so it is not certain what is in the interests of the group. There is the danger of adopting 'ethnographic myths, such as that Indian groups represent "islands of culture"… or that informants speak "cultural truths"'. There has been an application of ethnography in applied fields, as confidence in quantitative data declines. Ironically, this has developed more in commercial market research than government funded work, but in the US even federally funded evaluations have involved ethnographic component. This might not be properly ethnographic, and controversy focuses on things like condensed fieldwork [citing the criticism of casework by Atkinson and Delmont]. There has been more collaborative research, sometimes involving practitioners as partners, designed to make research more relevant and practitioners more reflexive. Again Marxist critical theory and feminism have encouraged these trends as an extension of democracy, the exemplification of commitment, an attack on traditional hierarchies. However, there is no reason to think that 'a single conception'(254) of the relationship between researcher and practitioners should dominate, especially if we still want to produce knowledge as well as pursue practical goals — these are 'no more worthy in general terms of our time and effort than the pursuit of knowledge'. We should not pursue unachievable goals. Academic research might have valuable long-term effects. 'Utopian attempts to do politics by means of research are of no service to anyone' [no wonder Denzin is upset by this]. The rhetoric of ethnographic accounts has been receiving more attention, especially the connections with rhetoric representation and logic. This is more general in the human disciplines, and enhanced by the emergence of the posts. Ethnography  has been examined as a textual genre with characteristic argumentation. There is no natural or neutral way to present the natural world, and impersonal forms are conventional. Authenticity and credibility 'is dependent on readers' adopting shared strategies of reading and interpretation'. There are various conventional devices to guide portrayals of social scenes or people, and early work has been influential in establishing formats. As a result, current formats still display, for example, 'direct, if implicit embodiment of the domain assumptions of functionalist anthropology'. Clifford and Marcus marked the major form of departure by focusing on textual impositions and the production of ethnographies. Geertz also argued that anthropology could be seen as fiction because they are crafted by their authors and shaped by literary conventions, and he went on to demonstrate the characteristic styles on show. Others have identified parallels between ethnography and travel writing (255). Atkinson has used literary criticism to show how realism and authenticity is a matter of drawing upon particular conventions. The same can be said of earlier sociological traditions in the USA and the UK ['Booth and Rowntree have major affinities with several literary models'], and there are community studies. The aim is to remove 'the false distinction between "science" and "rhetoric"' to return to the dichotomy between humanism and science. Whole schools of thoughts can be understood as combining various textual devices to construct their scholarly accounts, and there might be subtypes according to different regions and preoccupations. Van Maanen has contrasted realist and confessional accounts, part of a more general problem of managing the personal and the impersonal. These conventions were not always apparent in earlier work, because authors and readers used devices that seemed familiar and natural, partly explaining the success of classics such as Whyte's. [No Clough on familiar narrative devices?]. Atkinson has shown how 'narrative forms are used to convey accounts of social action and causation' or how characters or actors are solidified from various fragments. He also looks at various figures of speech 'such as metaphor, irony, and synecdoche' (256). This does not invalidate ethnography, but it should make us aware that we cannot use techniques innocently: there is no necessary reason to find alternative literary forms, although some anthropologists have done so [looks like a useful set of references page 256]. For some, these discoveries raise ethical and political implications, since it is both the author and the other who is being textually represented. More general cultural criticism such as Said or Spivak can be deployed. A paradox results — the ethnographer is committed to their hosts, and a shared social world, ostensibly based on surrendering to the other and establishing reciprocity of perspectives. This egalitarian rhetoric based on a shared humanity goes along with 'a radical distinction between Author and Other', and a realist technique that endows the narrator with a privileged gaze and privileged voice organising the actors. Moves towards more dialogic or multiple voiced forms have ensued. Feminists have echoed these concerns by describing privileged Western masculine observers. They have experimented with styles to subvert these formats — Kristeva using a '"stream of consciousness" style. There is a general feminist interest in treating textual forms as problematic, and a feminist standpoint that links together 'epistemological and ethical, personal and professional' concerns. There is also a post-modern tendency to explore 'discontinuities, paradoxes and inconsistencies', a more fragmentary representation of social life, not brought under a single point of view. Participant observation gives way to dialogue. There are also radical textual alternatives, based on evoking rather than representing the social world [lots of lovely references, including one to Dorst who apparently shows how a particular suburb creates itself 'through various forms of representation and acts of identification (not least identification with and through the paintings of Andrew Wyeth)' (257). Rose has an even more extreme version, juxtaposing different collections of materials and styles of writing. Realist ethnography remains, but there will be more experiments with textual styles and formats. At least this will focus attention on the conventional character of most ethnographic work. Different forms will be self-consciously recognised and explored as 'part of the craft knowledge of ethnographic authors' (257). The recent emphasis on the poetics of ethnography raises the 'danger of undue attention to these literary and aesthetic issues. Problems of logic and inference have been obscured'. The rhetorical has been privileged over the scientific or rational. We should really be paying attention to strategies of reading and writing 'primarily in order to evaluate the quality of arguments and the use of evidence', even if much of it is implicit. Textual elements should be critically addressed in order to 'evaluate the quality of the arguments'. So, there is no simple rationale or definition, no consensus. It's doubtful even if we can identify 'different types of "qualitative research."' There are different positions based on theory and epistemology, some common threads, but a lot of attempts to 'define their activities in terms of what they are not — in opposition to less preferred perspectives — rather than in a positive way'. There are generalisations and assumptions — that Chicago's sociology was dominated by ethnographic fieldwork, similar to recent approaches, and predicated on symbolic interactionism, itself 'largely a subsequent codification of presuppositions'. The same goes with debates about ethnomethodology, whether it is uniquely fundamental, or another perspective, again, there are restricted views of what counts as the field, too much reliance on spoken interaction, which limits the material. The same can be said about discourse analysis: neither substitutes for ethnographic enquiry. The textual metaphor is important, for example in Geertz's thick description, and here it does help reduce reductionism. However, there is still a paradox between relativism and claims that ethnographers can interpret cultures, despite increased attention to the poetics, metaphors and tropes of cultures themselves. There is no 'one-to-one relationship' between ethnography and any theoretical perspective, no single epistemological orthodoxies, rather a set of different appeals to different disciplines and tendencies. [The notes and references are excellent]. back to Hammersley page