Notes on chapters in Hammersley, (ed) (1986). Controversies in Classroom Research [1st edition]. Open University Press: Milton Keynes. Dave Harris Hammersley, M Revisiting Hamilton and Delamont: a cautionary note on the relationship between 'systematic observation' and ethnography. 44 – 48 Hamilton and Delamont compare the merits of the two approaches, but were particularly critical of systematic observation, especially interaction analysis in Flanders. Ethnographic research was recommended instead, partly on the grounds that ethnographic research was a more open ended activity, while some researchers saw themselves as much more self-contained and thus narrow. However, they then identify in their own work in tension between positivism and interactionism, and trace that to differences in classroom research, before going on to argue that different forms of research did indeed 'exemplify self-contained epistemological paradigms'. (45). This is reflected in their substantive criticisms that SO discusses only average or typical classrooms, ignores contexts, concerns itself only with overt behaviour neglecting possible meaning, concerns itself with what can be categorised or measured, focuses on small bits of action rather than global concepts, pre-specifies its categories, puts arbitrary boundaries on continuous phenomena. Much of this is valid, but are these necessary features of SO? Are these features incorrigible? Delmont and Hamilton might be engaged in paradigms wars after all, because they do not criticise ethnography in this particular piece. Much ethnographic research displays the same sort of problems as SO — it classifies classroom events as interaction sets or negotiation, and this can also ignore qualitative features; it also snapshots continuous phenomena, and categories might be self-fulfilling. Any kind classification has these dangers. A close attention to content validity is required. Generating ideas and making discoveries are important, but so is 'the testing of factual and theoretical claims' (47). Justification of ethnographic claims 'cannot avoid the measurement issues', especially typically see of cases, frequencies of different types of action. Ethnography at the moment does not test claims effectively, often ignoring the issues of linking concepts and data and considering rival explanations. This might be accepted in exploratory research, but findings are sometimes announced 'with full conviction'. At least SO has addressed the problems. So we should take up the initial suggestion not label everything in terms of self-contained in mutually exclusive paradigms. There are more than two approaches, for example, not a fork in the road but 'a maze'. The same dilemmas arise — typicality, the difference between 'sensitising and definitive concepts. We should learn from each other rather than just bolstering our own preferred strategy and 'castigating those who have made different choices' (47). Hammersley, M. Some Reflections Upon the Macro – Micro problem in the Sociology of Education pages 176 – 183 The issue has become one that now includes the 'validity of different theoretical perspectives in toto'[Marxism on the one hand and interpretive sociology on the other]. As a consequence, 'there has not been much real debate at all, the macro – micro distinction has simply been used to dismiss work in other traditions' (177). However, 'a number of different issues have been run together in the debate' — determinism or free will, generalised explanations or detailed and complex processes, whether theories can be tested against empirical data or only by their internal coherence 'since all data are theory laden', whether sociologist theories are more scientific than participants views, whether national or international events are more important than smaller scale ones. These are 'logically distinct' (178) so problems might be solved with one but not all. Taking the last issue as key, we see not a binary but a dimension. Philosophical analysis alone will not resolve this issue. 'Whether there are valid macro and/or micro theories is a matter for empirical investigation'. Progress has been limited both by the 'political arithmetic tradition' of early soc of ed, and 'the anti-positivist backlash which fragmented the subdisciplines in the 1970s'. Few testable theories have arisen, for example, with classroom interaction, which is often contented itself with describing perspectives. There are exceptions, for example in the work on streaming by Hargreaves and others — if pupils are publicly ranked, their attitudes to underlying values will be polarised. Even here, more work might be needed. It has been attacked both from the micro and macro sides, e.g. Hammersley and Turner saying that the data actually shows variations from the theoretical predictions, or Rachel Sharp demanding that an adequate explanation involves the structure of the wider society, especially the reproduction of labour power. However, none of these criticisms are really relevant, if we allow theory to be both abstracted from reality, necessarily selective, and right to focus on limited interactions. Sharp's criticisms amount to saying that there is another important research issue to address. We need to organise our efforts 'around research problems', without waiting for some all embracing future theory. 'No theory is likely to encompass all the factors that influence the behaviour of teachers and pupils' (181). We should not be 'wasting time in fruitless polemic between theoretical perspectives'. This only 'turn to methodological problem into a political dispute. It also discourages the systematic development of testing of theories on which the solution of the macro – micro problem depends. Hammersley, M. (1989). Controversies in Classroom Research, second edition. Open University Press: Buckingham. Hammersley, M Practitioner Ethnography, Pages 246 – 64 Classically, ethnography is not applied research, but contributes to knowledge. There is a tradition of applied Anthropology, however, and we find it being used in fields such as educational evaluation. There have also been calls for stronger relations to policy issues. There is now an argument that practitioners must participate in the research process and take it over. One aspect of this is found in the teacher as researcher movement, associated with Stenhouse. The claim is that research becomes more relevant and can change teaching. His preferred technique is case study. People like Kerr and Kemmis have more revolutionary goals in mind with their critical theory. Collaboration has been stressed by a number of trends in social psychology, anthropology, and feminism. Freire's 'conscientisation' aims at liberation. Qualitative methods seem to be preferred. The underlying assumptions are that: conventional research is irrelevant to practice, that it is invalid because it does not have an insider perspective, and that it is exploitative. The first criticism assumes that value is defined only by serving the needs of practitioners. This is justifiable, especially for publicly funded research, but it is not clear that practitioners are the only audience or that research should provide information 'of immediate and acknowledged use' (248). There can be indirect relevance, say through influence on other research. Research might be directly relevant in serving a specific and acknowledged need for information, or a more general value, such as 'the investigation of assumptions that are routinely made, but about which there is some reason for doubt'. The latter might not always be acknowledged by practitioners. Practitioners do not have privileged insight into the value of research, although their views are valuable. However, they often have more pressing problems, and the context of their work will affect their judgement and perspectives. Is research by specialists irrelevant? Findings are often indirect and general, an inevitable consequence of specialised activity. The research community should play a role in checking validity of findings of particular studies, to provide knowledge. Such scrutiny, based on 'a higher level of routine scepticism than is common outside the research community' (249) is the 'major rationale for the intellectual authority of research'. Questions formulated by researchers may require a whole program of coordinated studies. Research report should be directed towards fellow researchers. Relevance 'will usually be indirect'. Specialisation will provide benefits. The demands of practitioners might limit research. Research with general relevance is more likely to be read and assessed by the research community. It's not to argue that knowledge is of value for its own sake. Nor are we reverting to 'a naive and discredited positivism' (250). It is that a specialist division of labour produces special knowledge of general relevance: it is more reliable than information from other sources. Practitioners might indeed acquire the skills of specialist researchers, and vice versa. 'What is crucial is the nature of the research'. Claims of practitioner researchers often draw on and narrow concept of relevance, but they would need to show that the narrow concept is more valuable than the general one. Allowing only practitioners to value research accords them 'privileged insight into the contribution that research makes to practice'. There are of course other legitimate forms of enquiry, 'more everyday sorts of investigation', out of which research might have developed. For example there is pragmatic research designed to remove obstacles to action, tailored to a political context, and with immediate conceptions of relevant information and success. It might be confusing to call this research. Sometimes advocates of practitioner ethnography are really encouraging their own preferred methodological canons of research, 'and this will often be inappropriate' [some interesting notes support this view: note 13, P261, notes that '"research" is a status loaded word, and that to deny problem-solving enquiry that designation may be interpreted as denying it value… For my part there is no such implication'. Unfortunately the note supporting the quote about inappropriateness just refers to people who make such claims and does not give examples. I think the argument is that we should not judge practitioner enquiries by the methodological canons of research]. Each form of enquiry is differently oriented, to relevance, for example. When assessing validity, practitioners use their experience to judge whether something should be accepted: often that is personal, and even if collective, is often still relatively local. Other considerations also affect this judgement — how important the decision is, risk, legal implications and so. Researchers orient only towards what 'the members of the research community'might think. This is an 'open-ended and cosmopolitan community'with diverse skills, by contrast. It's not surprising that researchers and practitioners 'work may well come to different but equally justifiable judgements about what assumptions are and are not beyond reasonable doubt' (251). What about the issue of changing practice rather than developing research? The argument is that practitioner ethnography encourages reflexivity, raising their eyes above immediate problem solving. However there are still differences with specialist kinds of reflexivity. Practitioner reflection can draw on experience knowledge and relevant literature, which may or may not include research. Practitioner reflection is 'likely to be less explicit and focused' (252). Strictly methodological considerations might be inappropriate. People like Stenhouse have a 'loaded'notion of reflexivity, often informed by assumptions about what is good teaching. In his case, it is compatible with the concept of teacher as researcher, since teaching is regarded as a form of discovery learning. Critical theory too has influenced the notion of reflective thinking, especially about enlightenment and emancipation [Carr and Kemmis are the sources here]. The risk is that values have been smuggled in. Not all outcomes of reflection 'are necessarily good'. The result of reflection might be knowledge that is both direct and general, but even that does not replace the specialist general knowledge of research. Turning to validity, it is sometimes argued that practitioners have a better understanding of the situation since 'only those actually involved can truly understand' (253), only direct experience gives valid knowledge. We can find a version of this claim in conventional ethnography, although even here, ethnographic distance reduces the validity of participant knowledge. The underlying 'epistemological assumption' needs to be challenged: 'all knowledge is a construction; we have no direct knowledge of the world'. The best arguments for practitioner claims suggest that because they have access to their own intentions and motives, and this gives them a deeper understanding: that they possess long-term experience and knowledge of the history of the situation, that they already have relationships in settings which are helpful in getting them accepted; they can test theories as key actors, much better than observers can. However, there are equal and opposite disadvantages. People can be wrong even about their own intentions and motives, they can deceive themselves, perhaps sometimes following their interests, instead of being able to judge between different accounts, they may be unable to grasp the wider context. Their experience derives from a particular role that closes off axis to some information, and can even provide distortion. They will process their information 'on the basis of practitioner concerns'. Researchers can tap wider sources and use more explicit processing. Existing social relationships can exclude as well as include, and might also constrain the enquiry. Testing theoretical ideas is not the same as deciding what's needed for good practice. Quasi-experimentation also has disadvantages '(notably potentially high reactivity)' (254). There may be no privileged knowledge of practitioners that outside researchers cannot access. The best approach is 'a judicious combination of involvement and estrangement' (255, although there are never guarantees, but both advantages and disadvantages in each position. Again the research community is crucial in assessing validity. Other activities can be equally systematic rigorous and explicit. The real difference is that there are different considerations — that researchers need to satisfy themselves and their colleagues and how they do this is different from the way practitioners satisfy themselves and their colleagues. Institutionalised routine scepticism is important with research, even if it does mean that relevance is sacrificed. These findings 'may or may not be'superior to practitioner knowledge, depending on circumstances. Is conventional research exploitative? It involves the exercise of power by researchers over practitioners and serves the former's interests, but not exclusively. Researchers are not just careerists producing unread work. Good intentions do not always produce valuable outcomes. There is a difference between individuals and 'research as an institution' (256). Value is not to be judged simply on whether library copies are read. Political action is also more complex than just gathering relevant information, and change brought about 'will not always be of the kind intended or desired'. Does research involve power over people? If so, this is often minimal. Throughout for example ethnographers have to gain the consent of participants for access. It may be the more powerful who can block most successfully. Overall, though 'it is rare, I suspect, for participants to be forced into cooperation', and most ethnographers would respect these wishes. Generally, 'ethnographers are in a relatively weak position vis-a-vis most of the people they study' (257). They may be more able to publish and disseminate their ideas, although not always. Does democracy require that everyone has an equal voice in the public realm? That there are 'no sources of intellectual authority that would give the researcher more justification for publication than others'? Hall and others have claimed that intellectual authority like this denies '"the knowledge generating abilities innate to every human being in the world"'. However, every day opinions are not judged as of equal value, and we routinely question their validity. We already accord intellectual authority on some topics, but this is not a relation of dependence, 'simply a reasonable adaptation to circumstances' (258). The authority of research depends on the existence of a sceptical research community, and their deliberations require publication. There are other forms of enquiry, there are thus forms of intellectual authority — even practical experience and first-hand observation by practitioners [I liked Jacotot's rebuke to his students that they were smug and authoritarian when citing their own experience]. Research is not intrinsically exploitative. Does it aid exploitation? Some does, but this is not necessary. The argument seems to depend on a view that 'implicit in the very character of such research is a technical interest in social control' [and the idiotic Fay is cited here]. Quantitative research usually demonstrates the tendency best, and serves the function of legitimation, 'for example, suggesting that all conflict is the result of miscommunication'. But the notion of transcendental interests is questionable. It gives research too much power. Much research, including ethnography is indeed funded by powerful groups, and it is predominantly focused on those lower down. But there is still no 'sponsorship constraint to any significant degree. At least, the critics have not shown this to be the case' [pretty weak and ignores ideology?]. Deciding on whose interests are being served 'is not always straightforward'. The complementary argument is that research could and should be emancipatory, and that practitioner ethnography is the best way to do this. With Hall and others [note that this is Hall B not Hall S], human creativity is being stifled, but this involves 'the notion of humanity independent of society', and sometimes a teleological view of history. It overestimates the role of researching emancipation. It mis-conceives the relevant political framework. Emancipation can never exceed all constraint. Expectations are excessive. There is no evidence that 'practitioner ethnography is necessarily in the interests of those engaging in it', even less so that the interests of others are also being served. Overall, conventional ethnography need not be exploitative. Cases linking it to oppression need to be demonstrated, and vice versa for practitioner ethnography. Overall, the most useful form of enquiry 'should conform to the model of specialist research that I outlined, and which researchers the activity of a research community oriented to discovering errors and producing knowledge of general, rather than specific, relevance to practice' (260). back to Hammersley page