Notes on: Hammersley, M and Traianou A (2014) An Alternative Ethics? Justic and Care as Guiding Principles for Qualitative Research. Sociological Research Online 19(3)  DOI: 10.5153/sro.3466 [Electronic text -- no page numbers but para numbers] Dave Harris Social research used to be dominated by an ethics based on 'deontological and consequentialist principles', but now there is an approach based on an ethics of participation, equal relations between researcher and researched, based on notions of 'justice and care' Lincoln is among those who has proposed research that '"enables and promotes social justice, community, diversity, civic discourse and caring"', while others like Mertens say that research should contribute to social justice and human rights. There is a strong contrast made to the '"deception-based, utilitarian IRB {Institutional Review Board} system"' (1.1) We can turn to the account by Denzin and Giardina [the 2007 book Ethical Futures in Qualitative Research…] as definitive [hereinafter D and G] . They stress the methodology of the heart, performance, an '"indigenous feminist communitarian ethic that embraces an ethics of truth grounded in love, care, hope, and forgiveness"', a feminist communitarian model which gives participants an equal say over what should be studied with which methods, how findings are to be validated and implemented (2.1) Indigenous scholars are particularly valued with the challenge to conventional research. Kaupapa Maori approaches for example insist researchers listen and participate, and for the people themselves to be agentic and authoritative (2.2). Research should also be evaluated in terms of concrete experience and in a way that '"privileges storytelling, listening, advice, and personal performance narratives"' (2.3) aimed at enhancing moral agency, moral discernment, a commitment to praxis and justice, and ethic of resistance — that is not just the production of new knowledge. This will replace the conventional ethical problems since subjects and researchers now collaborate. There is no need for confidentiality, participation is voluntary, research is performative, and '"acting together, researchers and subjects work to produce change in the world"' (2.4). D and G referred to an underlying '"sacred, existential epistemology"' which is naturally non-competitive nonhierarchical and stresses solidarity love and community. We need to recover these values against the '"rational Enlightenment science project"' (2.5). This is not only a universal human ethic but it is also based on 'locally experienced and culturally prescribed proto-norms', something primal representing a notion of good based on '"universal human solidarity"' (2.6). There are clearly social and political consequences, based on decolonisation and reclamation of indigenous practices, '"healing"' and '"transformation"', politics of possibility, of hope (2.7). So the goal is to change the world rather than produce knowledge as such, but any knowledge normally produced reflects Western Enlightenment thinking and must be replaced by respect for local knowledges, especially that of indigenous groups. Knowledge is to be performative rather than propositional. Researchers and researched should form relationships based on love, solidarity and resistance, and particularly on participation in central decisions governing the research — 'research must itself exemplify the form of social relations that it should be aiming [at]' (3.2). However, the principles are not clear and terms are rarely explicated. Feminism, for example, has many versions, and terms like life enhancing are particularly unclear [they cite Nietzsche's conceptions here!]. Care and justice are just as difficult. The discussion often uses evaluative terms, assumed to be self validating, while others are taken to be obvioulsy negative. This discourages questioning and suggests there are just two opposed positions. However there is much variation in complexity. Ironically, there is 'little commitment to dialogue displayed in how this alternative account of research ethics is often presented' (3.5)[I have myself noticed a slide from is to ought and back again]. The principles might contradict — for example love and forgiveness on the one hand and resistance on the other, which might obviously involve violence. Feminist perspectives might clash with 'most indigenous cultural perspectives', and indigenous communities often display sex and age discrimination (3.6). The strong utopian strain distracts from practical feasibility. It is not clear that establishing a vague solidarity will offer the same sort of protections that the mainstream approaches establish — informed consent, anonymity. A fully open community devoted to the common good simply ignores potential divisions, and might involve repression. This community seems attainable immediately rather than after a revolution as in Marxism,  and we can get there through research itself (3.7). It is not sure if ethics of care and justice should be extended to unpleasant political or social groups — bankers or terrorists. Why should only sympathetic groups be studied? Participation does not always work anyway — for example there is often reluctance to participate, or researchers can curb or modify participation if discussions go into say 'sexist or racist messages' (3.8). An emphasis on justice focuses the issues. The notion of justice was already important in conventional research ethics, especially that based on medical research, but commentators have noticed that it is still difficult. Qualitative researchers have long been interested in reciprocity, so that both sides gain from the research, instead of just researchers who get data and information and can generate research projects which provide benefits. Perhaps the relationship is 'intrinsically' exploitative (4.2). Against this view, it's often argued that the people studied do get benefits, even if only finding someone who will listen, a kind of therapy. Sometimes minor services like reading and writing letters are also offered by ethnographers, sometimes even payment. Justice has now become a stronger principle, perhaps, and research is indeed seen as part of a general issue of the distribution of power. It is another thing to argue however that researchers should compensate for this inequality, although D and G are close to this. Despite all the discussion, the notion of justice is still '"an essentially contested concept"' (4.5). D and G adopt a very broad conception, but there are serious problems relating justice and other principles, which may conflict and produce serious dilemmas — eliminating them might result in 'totalitarianism' [citing Popper] (4.6). There are narrower definitions, perhaps turning on equitable distribution of goods or costs, or the notion of just deserts — 'the "economic" and "legal" interpretations' (4.8). This connects with Bentham or Marx, for example, while meritocrats stress social contribution. As this shows, there are still disagreements. Judgements are underpinned by assumptions [and attempts to calculate things like benefits and costs]. Actual cases often produce discrepant views. Applying it to research might involve either goals or means. Taking goals first, arguing that research should aim at justice assumes that researchers are privileged in these debates. There is a risk that researchers might not be able to 'warrant' their conception of justice in practice, but mostly, they simply do not have the power to promote justice. Just carrying out research 'is unlikely to be the most effective strategy' (4. 10) [CF Foucault and Deleuze on the relation between theory and revolutionary practice, or Habermas]. It is one thing for researchers to be motivated by the hope for a more just society, but this is not the same as making that the very goal of the research — that would assume considerable [political] knowledge and it also 'increases the danger of bias, since researchers will often be torn between doing what they judge to be most likely to promote justice and acting in the most effective ways so as to produce sound knowledge' (4. 11). False findings can promote justice. There is an old Enlightenment view that truth and justice are closely connected — and that 'does need to be rejected'. There are even other ethical principles to consider [which are usually justified in the name of achieving sound knowledge]. The new criteria might actually reduce the importance of justice, especially if it does not 'distribute [even consider] benefits and costs… In the way that medical trials do'. [Luckily] there are only minor costs and benefits involved usually (4.12). It is not always unjust to not involve participants in research. They are not necessarily oppressed. Not 'all role differentiation… Is unjust'. All societies generate power differences. Why should the power of researchers be particularly illegitimate? Pursuing sound knowledge as the major goal still involves responsibility and ethical acceptability. Sharing responsibilities can sometimes muddy the issue. Whether participation in research helps challenge wider injustices is also doubtful, and D and G provide no evidence for this. Where does it stand in terms of other struggles for justice, including political or even military ones? What if it does not even produce sound knowledge? The whole thing seems to resemble Freire on conscientisation, but this is not the same as research. Care is another apparently general principle, linked to the general argument that research should produce more beneficial than harmful results, classically in the field of health. Caring professions can sometimes affect research. The issue is why it should be given a major priority. D and G possibly draw upon feminist work here, where it is argued that women have distinctive 'experiencing of nurturing and mothering' (5.2), or relations are seen as somehow '"ontologically basic"'. These will be particularistic not universalistic concerns [see below] . Care seems to be a general attitude or sensibility affecting all behaviour [nevertheless]. Human beings are seen as interdependent, researchers require emotional sensitivity and empathy. Research should be a process permitting growth. Consequences for the people involved should be to the fore. This can be particularistic [related to those with particular needs] — children are more vulnerable, for example. This approach is criticised 'even by many feminists'(5.4). It reproduces the sexual division of labour, and here, the notion of care 'is at odds with the principle of justice'. A form of essentialism might be involved if caring is seen to be innate to women — and those who do not demonstrate caring are seen as 'not proper women' (5.5). Broader practices involving care might be considered instead. Attempting to apply the ethics of care to research has led to proposals such as the need for '"fluid research goals''' (5.7), where researchers fully grasp the experience of others and engage in mutual critique and understanding. This is in contrast to the usual 'brief, highly formalised interchanges designed to elicit data from people' (5.8). However, more diffuse relationships have also been criticised as involving 'a form of deception', where friendly relations are cultivated for the purposes of research, just as salesmen might simulate friendship. This seems to be a single idealised model of the caring relationship, whereas in practice it might vary considerably and be connected with, sometimes conflict with, other ethical concepts such as reciprocity, trust or respect. We see this with professions like nursing. Do researchers have the same burden of care anyway? There is not even a good argument that caring relationships 'confer epistemological privilege' and lead inevitably to sounder knowledge, and there is the problem of whether we need to care for those who belong to oppressor groups. We can see some conflicts in cases where, for example we are researching young people — does this compromise autonomy? Is this a form of disguised adult control? [All these points are referenced to other commentators]. Relationships are not egalitarian anyway, say between parents and children, and sometimes authority has to be used. Neither Heidegger nor Foucault would support this notion of care. Research subjects should not be seen as clients, so caring need not be central. Overall, care is 'a contested concept' (5.13). It might conflict with a commitment to justice. Overall, there is a 'wide range of ethical concepts' (6.1.) involved here, some of which have serious problems. There is a lack of clarity, and little supporting argument. Conflicting implications are not explored. We saw this with just two of the principles — justice and care. These are not the main goals of research, as indeed is also the case with practice in some caring professions. The main emphasis on participatory forms actually 'reflects a broad sociopolitical philosophy which is at odds with that underpinning most social science' (6.2). That latter view accepts divisions of tasks and responsibilities and distrusts utopianism. It looks at realist constraints on action. Participatory enquiry does not follow automatically from the principles anyway, and it can contradict 'what ought to be the central concern of all social researchers: to produce sound knowledge' (6.2) [There are some useful notes which extend the arguments into secondary literature] back to Hammersley page