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NOTES
ON: Althusser L (2011) [1964] Student
problems. Radical Philosophy
170: 8--15
by Dave Harris
Montag W Introduction
This essay has come as a surprise to readers of
Althusser, even though he wrote it at his most
productive period. It is specific to the
French student movement after the Algerian
conflict, aimed in particular at the communist
student group UEC, which was 'divided and
factionalised' (8).
Critics including Rancière [and Bensaid] saw it as
decisive, however, revealing political and
theoretical positions particularly clearly.
For them the piece is theoreticist in prioritizing
theory over practice, and in its attacks against
'petty bourgeois anarcho-syndicalist student
critics (many of whom were members of the
party)'. It demands a defence of the order
of the university. The whole thing
represents the authoritarianism of the Party and
its opposition to revolt.
Most readers tended to agree, and many saw it as
resembling Stalinism. The insistence on the
autonomy of theory just seems like a way to
prevent criticism from those lacking in the
necessary knowledge. They just had a duty to
receive the correct line.
The hierarchies in French universities was under
serious challenge by communist and noncommunist
activists, who had been radicalized and unified as
a response to the Algerian War. However, the
Party itself had been ambiguous about the War, and
in particular had opposed 'as "adventurism"', (9)
tactics of refusing conscription, and aiding the
FLN, opposing French imperialism and the fascist
OAS.
After the War, the national French student
organization, UNEF, which united a number of
factions including the communists, focused on the
university itself. UNEF repositioned itself as a
trade union for students, seen as intellectual
workers, demanding better conditions and even a
student wage, as well as student participation in
administration. It opposed the hierarchy in
university pedagogy, especially the relation
'between student and professor understood as a
relation between one who does not (yet) know and
one who does'[so this is where Rancière got it
from?]. Knowledge was to be collectivised
through working groups. The conventional
exams were to be opposed in the name of
pedagogical effectiveness. Some radicals,
including many communists saw these demands as
'"apolitical" and "economistic"'and thought in
terms of '"global contestation"'. However students
were no longer a privileged elite. Many had
experienced violence in the struggle.
Althusser seemed to have abandoned the concrete
analysis of concrete situations, still seeing
students in terms of their classic abstract class
position. Despite the [better-known] ISAs essay he seemed to be
defending French universities with their
discipline and individualizing mechanisms, and
focusing on the content of instruction [the ISAs
essay actually came later though, we are told
below]. In particular, he seemed to be
restoring theory to a privileged place, almost
suggesting that the correct practice was only
possible after theory. This seem to oppose
his earlier position in The Piccolo Teatro (in For
Marx) which argued for the materiality of
critique and the priority of practical problems,
which might occur before theory could grasp them.
Rancière saw this essay as a pure expression, the
'real Althusser, beneath the rhetoric of struggle
and resistance'. Others argued that the
essay was not central at all, either a tactical
maneuver, or representing 'the brief phase in
which Althusser saw himself as the enunciator of
the Theory of theoretical practices'[admitted to
be an error in the self
criticism].
However, both simplify. Althusser's work is
contradictory, 'a philosophy at war with itself',
perhaps 'a wish… that the correct theory
could act as a guarantee of correct practice'.
The notes are interesting:
Note 4 says it was the 'Italian wing' of the UEC
[who included Rancière], who wanted pedagogical
reforms, based on 'a Marxist humanism according to
which the concept of alienation replaced class
struggle is the motor of history'. The ISAs
essay was written six years later and shows the
influence of this critique. The critique
also appeared in later [PCF not LA?] denunciations
of the university 'inspired by the Chinese
cultural revolution', but minus the humanism.
Note 5 says the PCF did finally engage in the
struggle, and was ferociously repressed, losing
eight of its members at a single demonstration in
1962.
Note 7 points to other work by Althusser on the
student movement. In 1969, he admitted its
significance and denied it was simply the revolt
of privileged youth. He saw it as rooted in
the struggle against French imperialism. In
1972, he criticizes a small group attempting to
boycott annual exams, but on tactical rather than
principled grounds.
Althusser
We should use Marxist concepts of the technical
and social division of labour to analyze the
modern university. These concepts are
universally valid, since they depend on a mode of
production and positions reflect the labour
process itself. The division of labour has
two forms, for Marx, which can be confused in
actual jobs—the technical and the social division
of labour.
The technical division relates to jobs which are
'exclusively justified by the technical
necessities' of a particular mode of
production. These can be defined objectively
and scientifically (11). Thus consumer goods
require technical jobs in factories,
administrative jobs to run the organization or to
control complex processes—engineers, technical
management and so on. Universities are
basically part of the technical division of
labour, undertaking the training of future
technical and scientific groups, doing creative
scientific work. Pedagogical training of
this kind 'is of vital necessity for every
society' ['society'?] and is therefore itself
based on the technical division of labour.
The social division of labour is different.
It involves the forms of class structure and
domination. It is technical only in this
sense of reflecting the mode of domination.
It includes the instruments of the state, the army
the police and law courts, with all the associated
personal and jobs. Managers can be seen as
being produced by both the technical division of
labour and the social division, since management
involves controlling and repressing workers.
Foremen are included here: they also have a dual
function, both technical and social, and workers
in charge of their comrades can display
this. Thus sometimes people in charge have
to lean towards the boss, and sometimes towards
the workers. [This is pretty determinist --
compare the later work by Poulantzas on political
and ideological determinants of class position, or
Giddens on 'structuration factors' etc].
These trends can be seen in universities, but in
'very special conditions'. Universities have
special privileges, for example to appoint their
own professors. This is the result of a long
struggle, and universities do offer some shelter
from class politics. University autonomy and
independence is based on its role in distributing
knowledge and producing it, which demands a
certain critical spirit and freedom of
thought. The early development of science
and philosophy were rooted in the first medieval
free universities. Thus, '"liberal" values:
critical spirit, freedom of scientific research
and discussion and so on… do not, as some
people dangerously say, spring from bourgeois
individualism, but from genuine scientific
values' (12). Liberty is necessary to
science and is not the same as ideological
liberalism: scientific forms 'are sometimes
necessarily individual' but this should not be
confused with 'bourgeois individualist
ideology'—Marx himself 'made his discovery alone',
and Lenin worked alone at certain times.
It is quite wrong to join scientific individuality
and bourgeois individualism. It is wrong to
insist on collective forms: 'these are very
dangerous points of view, as much from the
pedagogic as from the political and ideological
standpoint'. The real issue for Marxists is not
the form in which knowledge is transmitted, but
'the quality of the knowledge itself'.
University liberalism is of considerable value to
resist the transformations introduced by 'the
monopolistic bourgeoisie'. It would be 'a
political mistake' to 'alienate academics'.
It would be wrong to reject all forms of
individualism, especially where individual work is
carried on in collective forms anyway. We have to
understand how social and technical divisions of
labour work out in the university in order to
undertake any political or trade union work.
Although universities clearly exhibit social
divisions of labour and class domination, the main
site is not where students theorists look for
it. It is found in the objects of
intellectual work, 'in the knowledge the
university is commissioned to distribute to the
students' (13) [more below] . We can see
class domination at work in government measures
attempting to control the appointment of teachers,
maneuvering to nominate vice chancellors,
reforming teaching 'along technocratic anti
democratic lines etc.' These reforms of teaching
'are the most dangerous' since they are based on
error and theoretical confusion [apparently, even
the most technocratic enthusiasts did not always
oppose student wages].
It's not just the student struggle that should
dominate critique of universities. There
should be a much wider battle involving 'the union
of all abilities and of all university and popular
forces'. The social division of labour does
not only act through 'government political and
administrative measures' and ideology. The
'true fortress of class interest in the
university' would be untouched by such
struggles. The real influence lies in
[positivist] knowledge that reproduces the
division between technical and social divisions of
labour.
True scientific knowledge, which 'really
corresponds to technical necessity' might well be
taught in old fashioned ways, whereas 'pure
ideology' might be taught in more modern forms.
The issue is to clarify the scientific status of
knowledge, the interplay of ideology and science,
the effects of 'technique shot through with
ideology'. Pedagogy itself is both technical
and social ['politico ideological'] whether or not
it uses modern forms.
'Most of the literary disciplines… [and]
sometimes history… are often a place for the
reigning aesthetic, ethical, judicial or political
ideology, and almost all the so-called "human"
sciences, which are the chosen ground for the
contemporary positivist technocratic ideology'.
Positivist ideology even appears in the pedagogic
presentations of the natural sciences, but is
often not contested. Practical work in
science can 'inspire in the students nothing but
passivity', although this passivity can be a form
of resistance. Science can be taught in a
way which chops it up and make students swallow
the segments: if these thing-like objects are
unpopular with students and teachers, 'then they
are right'.
Positivism brings 'thingification'[sic]
(14). Positivism prevails for example in the
insistence on teaching [deeply bourgeois]
epistemology in the philosophy of science and in
all disciplines. We need a 'new conception
of the subject matter' as 'the essential thing'
rather than demanding new pedagogic forms.
The main issue is the nature of knowledge taught,
and the distinction between science and ideology,
arising from 'knowledge which a class division
cuts into two'.
We need an objective analysis of the pedagogic
function of the university. Pedagogy
transmits knowledge to subjects who do not have
it, and rests on 'the absolute condition of any
inequality between knowledge and a lack of
knowledge'. The 'society' decides what
should be transmitted and assimilated, and
therefore also defines inferior knowledge.
The classic pupil teacher relationship is the
technical expression of this pedagogy. It is
not just an age relation. Usually, teachers are
older than pupils, but not always— not in some
cases of social and political transformation, such
as mass literacy campaigns in the USSR and China,
or when political leaders have arisen without
formal education.
Claiming that universities belong to students 'is
pedagogically a mistake and politically an insult
to the convictions of the majority of the
teachers', and this can only assist governments
who want to send in the police. It is the
same for protests based on the difference in age
or generation. In addition, we should not
fall into 'the traps of governmental "novelty"'
[such as announcing new gee-whizz technology for
online education?].
There is no way of settling the problem of
pedagogy by demanding 'pedagogic equality between
teachers and students'. It is legitimate for
students to claim that they be represented on
various management committees, but they should not
have equal powers of decision in teaching 'for
this does not correspond with the reality of the
pedagogical function' [or the right of teachers to
assess students and not the other way
around]. Demands for the management of
student activities outside of teaching is valid
'for it corresponds to a social and political
reality and not to a pedagogical reality'.
Demands for equal representation should not be
transferred from one sector to another: objective
justification exists for one, but not the other.
If students demand equality in work with the
teachers, they are confusing the two cases.
There is no real equality in pedagogy. There
may be some when in academic life, say when
researchers collaborate in a team, but here,
equality in knowledge is indispensable. Not
so in 'its simulacrum' (15). Students need
long training before they do research, unless it
is 'piecemeal investigations, dubbed research by a
capitalist society, which abound in both the
natural sciences and the humanities, and where the
researcher is more a blind operative for
fragmented tasks arranged by others'.
Participants here are 'victims of the consequences
of the positivist ideology'. Nor should 'the
mere personal or collective rediscovery of an
already existing knowledge' be called research.
They can be collective labour to assimilate
existing knowledge, and this can save time and
effort. However 'good "participational"
intentions' can be technically bad if it lacks
meaning and direction. Teaching works 'if it
is led by teachers' who have the knowledge already
that students need, and are able to develop
'scientific technique for transmitting that
knowledge. This scientific technique is
called "pedagogy"'. Self instruction might
have good intenions, but if it distrusts all
directional forms, if it only operates in a
democratic or authentic groups not led by
teachers, then it 'rests on the incorrect
conception of the reality not only of research but
even of simple pedagogic work'. It will lead
only to disappointment. Enthusiasm will
rapidly wane. It is absurd and inefficient
to rediscover knowledge which is already
accessible by a direct and rational path.
Such discoveries will only postpone acquiring
enough knowledge to become researchers.
There is also a risk of students 'alienating
the good will of their professors', whose
pedagogic expertise is suspected, 'and whose
knowledge is held to be superfluous'. They
might even become alienated politically, and turn
into enemies of students and their causes.
Students committed to participation and 'the
"democratic" illusion of knowledge 'will remain
'for a long time in a half-knowledge—that is, in a
state that does not give them the weapons of
scientific learning'.
Reactionary bourgeois and technocratic governments
often prefer this half-knowledge.
Revolutionaries seek 'knowledge, in other words
science'. Half-formed intellectuals are
easier to manipulate. The government is
obliged to train intellectuals to provide itself
with 'cadres and teachers', but it fears proper
training for intellectuals.
Note 1 admits that forms of teaching can actually
be complex, with both dominant and subordinate
tendencies. Content is primary or
dominant. We can demand that the forms of
teaching should be transformed, but only by
considering the content first.
[I must say I actually quite like this! Have
I become a Stalinist? It is also worth
pointing out that Gramsci had very similar views
about the liking of the fascist government for
progressive methods, much to the chagrin of his
British admirers. However, they just chose
to ignore those bits, rather than launch a great
campaign against Stalinism as they did with
Althusser. Increasingly, I think the old guy
was right, that he attracted so much opprobrium,
scorn and hostility because he wouldn't let
leftists operate with the dubious category of
humanism, so they responded by choosing the usual
bourgeois straw man opposites of
humanism—economism, positivism, Stalinism, elitism
-- and slagging him off. They NEVER consider his
arguments calmly or interrogate them with demands
for evidence etc. It is full on hate from the word
go!]
more notes on Althusser and on other social
theorists here
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