O Father! You
and Dr.
Freud stopped me from becoming a post
structuralist!
Lots of people who should
know better insist that children
are natural philosophers. It is
a kind
of version of Rousseau—kids are
born
philosophising, but everywhere they are
enchained in rigid conceptual
schemes. All
sorts of people seem to
support this view, including Deleuze. The
argument is based on the ability of
children to ask interesting questions.
That is, questions that are interesting,
and
look philosophical, to adults, that is, to adult
philosophers.
Deleuze & Guattari
have the example of the legendary
Little Hans, the person at the centre of Freud’s
analysis of childhood
sexuality.
Deleuze quotes examples of
the sorts of comments and statements that little
Hans makes about horses. It
should be stated immediately that Deleuze
is quoting Freud here, and Freud is quoting
Hans’s father, who, like all
parents, love to record the interesting
statements and questions of their
children, and who promptly forget all the banal
and uninteresting ones. Here
is what I noted of what Deleuze and
Guattari say ( in Thousand
Plateaus):
The
language of children represents a fair
expression [but not an understanding
surely] of the relations in assemblages before
they have been disciplined – and
Little Hans’s inquiries are cited – do
machines pee/why do some machines like
train engines pee; what exactly are the
differences between boys and girls and
how they pee, the use of indefinite articles ‘a
body’ etc. Things like
horses are a ‘list of affects’[for him] rather
than a clearly defined member of
a species – its eyes are blinkered, it has a
dark band round its mouth, it
drums with its feet etc. So becoming horse
means not playing at horse, not
developing an analogy with a horse, not
empathising with a horse but
whether Little Hans
can endow his own elements with
the relations of movement and rest, the
affects, that would make it become
horse, forms and subjects aside. Is there an
as yet unknown assemblage that
would be neither Hans’ nor the horse’s but
that of the becoming–horse for Hans?
An assemblage, for example, in which the horse
would bare its teeth and Hans
might show something else, his feet, his legs,
his peepee maker, whatever? And
in what way would that ameliorate Hans’
problem, to what extent would it open a
way out that had been previously
blocked?...[and when Hoffmanstahl contemplates
a dying rat and ‘becomes a rat’ ]... This is
not an analogy, or a product of
the imagination, but a composition of speeds
and affects on the plane of
consistency; a plan(e), a program, or rather a
diagram [I later learned this
meant some representation of a mathematical
relationship], a problem, a
question-machine’ (284-5)
As is
well
known, Deleuze and Guattari go on (in Anti-Oedipus
mostly) to
chide Freud for making sense
of Hans’s statements, including those of his
fears and anxieties, which in turn
are given as reasons for his sudden anxiety
about going outdoors and
encountering horses. Freud
squashes
these interesting questions and statements
into the emerging orthodoxy of the
oedipal triangle. The
horse really
stands for Hans’ father, and, later, for his
mother (since horses pull box
wagons which in turn stand for wombs, and
energise Hans’ anxiety about his
mother getting pregnant again and producing a
rival: the connection with horses
is particularly strengthened by recollections
of an early visit in a horse
drawn carriage to see a family with a new
baby). Freud
also suspects that the particular
anxiety about horses drumming with their
hooves represents a witnessed primal
scene of sex between his father and his
mother.
Little Hans is ‘cured’ by his father
explaining and discussing these
aspects of infantile sexuality.
For
Deleuze
and Guattari, however, this is a form of
repression, preventing Hans from
developing his own interesting ideas about
horses and how they relate to his
own desires, which Deleuze and Guattari
suggest are more to do with wanting to
play outside, including in the depot where the
horses are, just like the street
kids. These
have to be repressed to
maintain social distance as well as the normal
sexual relations between men and
women and children. At
its most creative
and imaginative, Deleuze and Guattari suggest,
Hans is exploring becoming, the
process of deterritorializing conventional
understandings by opening up
conventional categories. This
is
described as his wish to ‘become-horse’, which
is further explained, at least
in AntiOedipus, as a less pathological form of
what schizophrenics do.
As the
paragraph above indicates, Hans uses affects
of various kinds to drive his own
enquiries.
Let us give him the benefit
of the doubt and see his questions as
embryonic percepts. We know that affects and
percepts are important in the process of
philosophical inquiry. However,
equally important are concepts. These
are required to extend questioning into
philosophical challenges, and to stop
deterritorialization by conceiving of new
concepts, in a subsequent phase of
reterritorialization. Hans
is only a small child. He has
a long way to go before he is able to
develop a taste for concepts, and, above all,
before he attains enough
educational and cultural capital to construct
new ones.
Deleuze and Guattari are clearly
extremely
well read themselves, for example, and a draw
upon this extensive knowledge to
construct their concepts. They
do not
just rely on affects. However,
what is
really being argued is that infantile affects
are enough to make children into
philosophers.
This is as a foolish a
mistake as the one made by naive rationalists,
who think you can just rely on
concepts, or the one made by empiricists who
rely on experience, to generate
new thoughts.
You need all three,
Deleuze tells us.
This
leads
to what might be seen as the teachers’
dilemma.
To get there, let us imagine that
Little Hans had encountered not horses
but black people, and that for strangely
subjective reasons, these had been
attached to his anxieties. Perhaps
he
saw a black man fall in the street and drum
his feet in an epileptic fit. Perhaps
he saw a collection of pregnant black
women. He
might then be induced by
various affects to begin to think about black
people as ‘a list of affects’. We
would then be faced with a dilemma as
educators.
Would we want him to reterritorialize
using our concepts—common humanity,
explanations of perceived differences in
terms of social and economic differences not
‘racial’ ones?
Or would we be content to let him
explore,
and maybe encounter quite different sorts of
reterritorializations based on
racist conceptions? Are
some affects and
concepts better than others?
[Incidentally, I did manage to find
Deleuze expressing a value judgment
in Cinema
2 where he compares the
irrational cuts and sequences in experimental,
critical and political film
approvingly with the commercially driven film
pretending to be art, which might
use irrational cuts and sequences itself and
thus look rather similar, but
which is not motivated by philosophy or
politics.]
Or
perhaps
we would let Hans pursue endless
deterritorializations only, so he could become
one of those cultural heroes the
schizophrenics?
Deleuze and Guattari clearly admire
some
schizophrenics, artists and philosophers
especially.
But they also admit that they have
never met
‘normal’ schizophrenic, and we can only wonder
what on earth they would have
made of people who hear voices telling them to
kill other people, and are
driven to criminality or serious insanity,
sometimes to suicide, rather than to
experimental art.
As usual, we need some way
of deciding what is a ‘good’ form
of affect, becoming, and deterritorialization.
I think that in the case of Deleuze
especially, his own elite values
deal with that important issue, and like all
elite values, they are not made
explicit, and probably that is because they
reside in an unconscious
habitus. If
we were to make them more
explicit, we would have to leave behind abstract
philosophy of course, and leap
back into actual practice. Philosophy
will
not solve the teachers dilemma on its own.
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