Notes on: Bonilla-Silva, E. and
Zuberi, T. (2008). Toward a Definition of White
Logic and White Methods. T Zuberi and E
Bonilla-Silva (Eds). White Logic, White
Methods: Racism and Methodology. London:
Rowman and LIttlefields publishers Incorporated
Dave Harris
Introduction.
Are research methods not objective?
The book grows out of their own life concerns and
is to some extent personal, as 'sociologists of
colour' (4) they want to examine race and to
criticise the notion of objectivity, analysis and
analysts. They do this via vignettes.
Zuberi first. He published a book about racial
statistics on the history of racism, and met
people who were afraid he was calling them racist.
He was instead analysing the history and logic of
statistical analysis in a spirit of self-criticism
and critical evaluation. Statistical analysis was
developed 'alongside a logic of racial reasoning'
(5), and the founder of it also developed a theory
of white supremacy [?]. He uses stats himself,
knowing that it was connected with colonialism and
eugenics, especially via Galton who was 'obsessed
with explaining the racial hierarchy'. Colonialism
and enslavement were crucial and racial statistics
gave credibility to racial inequality.
Of course statistics are now used to refute racist
arguments, but the methodologies still 'perpetuate
the problem' (6), for example in discussing '"the
effect of race"', which assumes that race is some
unalterable characteristic of an individual.
Instead we need to understand racial dynamics and
how they have changed and have definitions have
altered over time. The interpretation of race is
crucial when discussing it as some apparently
independent variable, connected with mortality
rates, for example. The 'larger social world' is
in danger of being ignored by stressing race
instead of the way people respond to race, some
effect of 'self-imposed choice within an
externally imposed context' (7). Forgetting the
context means that social science justifies racial
stratification.
Race is a social construct and belief in race
makes race real. The issue is why we should
believe it to be real, and how to demystify it,
including its use in racial statistics and the
factors that have influenced these statistics
including social interests. 'Data do not tell us a
story' (7) and if we begin with a biosphere of the
world, we end with one.
We have to distinguish between numbers and their
use in statistics and in mathematics. Numbers in
the latter follow from logical calculations, but
in statistics we are talking about estimations
based on uncertainties, applied axioms, which do
not usually specify how they should be applied —
the users decide. There is 'no set logic in the
methods themselves' (8), and they are used
according to a consensus among the practitioners.
For example current methods were developed 'as
part of the eugenics movement and continue to
reflect the racist ideologies that gave rise to
them', an early interest in human difference,
found in statistical logic and even regression
models.
We can see this best in the studies between race
and intelligence. They assume that both
intelligence and individual racial identity can be
measured, say by a questionnaire and this already
assumes that we understand the relationship as a
connection between 'individual attributes'. This
ignores how this relationship has been designed
and come to be accepted — the data has been
'generated by our own biases', and only then does
become objective and consistent. All this was
generated within the 'intellectual movement of
eugenics'.
The revelation that much of statistics is in fact
socially constructed, can be met with the defence
that he still a good way to inform public policy.
This might be true, but interpretation and
analysis still depends on some underlying theory,
a causal one, that social scientists may not even
be aware of. It is usually a claim to have a
strong theory that explains the strength of belief
in the statistics. This debate often does not go
any further, however.
A more specific issue arose when discussing race
in population resources, and a particular
discussion of an article that claimed that
eugenics thinking was still present, in an attempt
to integrate biological and social factors. The
argument was that it was important to examine the
relationship, but the particular approach was
weak, 'an anachronistic theory of racial
difference' accompanied by a misuse of statistical
methods' (10). However, this misuse 'in the
analysis of race is routinely allowed in social
science journals' [!].
The argument was that reproductive isolation had
led to differences in gene frequency among racial
groups. The mother's self-reported racial
identification was used in definition here, an
indirect and socially constructed matter, but
standard practice because there is no other
'scientific way', especially to measure 'the
genetic aspect of race'. The mothers were of
course using a socially constructed idea using
skin colour, a rather arbitrary decision,
allegedly based on a 'melancortin 1 receptor', but
it is unknown as a factor affecting other matters
like health outcomes. Biological variation is real
yet 'race is a distorted way of organising this
variation' and 'biology is not its root cause'.
The authors misunderstood this. Further biology
relates to individuals, but demography refers to
populations not individual attributes. There were
also problems with statistical methods which did
not use a genetic understanding adequately — they
used a statistical model instead of a genetic one
[no aetiology?]. There was no way to conduct
empirical testing. They did not realise that
numbers in statistics are estimates, and cannot be
used in mathematical proof, to indicate that
something is real.
The debate had little impact on research practice
and further articles were published on racial
differences, for example in birth weight, although
they did not cite the debate. it shows how
powerful racial statistics still are, and that
they are still critical 'in guiding and justifying
both private belief and public policy' [on both
sides] (12). Government statistics, for example
look scientific, are used by reputable scholars,
but are still 'misleading, inappropriate, or
false' although few are able to detect this.
As a result we are seeing a 'revival of the
biological idea of race', in medicine and science,
and a hidden influence of eugenics, a silence
about the misuse of racial statistics, a
disservice done by disciplinary journals. We need
more analysis and discussion, the dedication to
justice.
[Bonilla Silva discusses reactions to his own book
Racism without racists 2006]. He
presented at the University of Michigan and found
whiteness seeping through the cracks in the
questions.
He was asked about coding and intercoder
reliability, suspecting that this was asked only
about investigations of race. He was also
challenged for the lack of longitudinal data, and
replied by saying that he also used interview data
as a kind of triangulation. Apparently it revealed
that many of the white respondents who show
tolerance to multichoice survey questions looked
different when they gave responses to in depth
questions [and there is a reference to the piece with Forman].
Longitudinal data also presuppose that racism have
not changed or developed, but he believes that it
has. He was challenged for lacking scientific
rigour — 'Ah, whiteness grants the gift of eternal
objectivity to its grantees!' (14).
He was questioned about whether he saw concern
about interracial marriage as rationalisations
rather than real concern about the effects on
children. His reply was that he didn't recognise
'the ambivalence and angst' in these matters, but
the usual way of interpreting that was to suggest
that whites were ambivalent, for example in
agreeing with integration but disagreeing with
most of the policies designed to accomplish it.
This sort of ambivalence seemed to him to be a
naïve interpretation, equivalent to saying whites
were ignorant of racial matters. Instead it's a
matter of maintaining 'systemic privilege by
failing to do anything about racial
inequality'(14). He believes that whites are
concerned that mixed race couples might produce
children who experienced discrimination, that he
asks them why if we are a colourblind society, and
points out that this is a problem with
colourblindness, suggesting that again this is a
rationalisation.
Another challenge arose in connection with
diversity and whether it should be replaced with
universalism. He pointed to the exclusion of
sociologists of colour from the curriculum, and
got accused of racism, fanning racial flames,
making arguments for which he did not have data.
The consequence was 'the beginning of the end for
me as a professor at Michigan' (15).
The final section starts with a quote from
Poulantzas that concepts and notions are never
innocent, and though it is dangerous
sometimes to reply to adversaries on equal terms.
They offer four problems inherent in white logic
and white methods:
(1) whites in the USA are the dominant group and
they have an interest in keeping a racial order
and racial stratification, and unequal
distribution of rights and privileges, including a
view of reality and a dominant perspective in
sociology privileges whites. Their study of race
was designed to support racial stratification and
colonial efforts although it appeared to be
'carefully thought out result of experience and
reason' (16)
(2) both physical and social sciences have helped
define racial stratification are scientifically
legitimate and socially acceptable. They were
often monopolised by white people and reflected
the dominant racial views, justifying racial
stratification. Unable to develop objectivity.
(3) even after a few scholars of colour were
integrated, white males still dominated them and
integration did not transform ways of thinking.
Most scholars hoped that 'integration would
produce white scholars with black faces'. Most
scholarship proceeded as ethnographic excerpts or
statistical analysis which did not challenge white
supremacy even though it posed a subjective study,
leading to an early challenge of the scientific
claims of sociology [subsequent heroes include
Hill Collins and Tuhiwai Smith]. Dubois and even
Weber were early challenges, although they have
little impact compared to the mainstream, who have
still not acknowledged their work [including
Wacquant].
(4) sociology is still white led and white
dominated, although some readers will strongly
disagree that there is white logic or white
methods, and will instead blame bias. Many
sociologists of colour continue to doubt research
findings about race by white people, and there is
a lengthy tradition of criticising the whiteness
of sociology [some are listed, including Hill
Collins, Winant and Omi, and others] (17) as a
result, a certain Murray is right that there is no
particular reason why Negroes still regard social
science with anything other than suspicion, and
surveys as frauds.
White logic defies 'reasoning about social facts…
Grants eternal objectivity to the views of elite
whites and condemns the views of nonwhites to
perpetual subjectivity'. It is anchored in the
Western imagination, where white men are central
and others have no knowledge history or science,
and are incapable of meaning making.
Some will want to claim that the logic of social
science operates without bias, but they argue that
all scientific endeavours 'transpire in a world
where race, gender and class are important not
only as subject to investigation, but as
structural factors that partly shaped researchers
and their scientific gaze' (18). The normative
order of science is 'white male bourgeois and
heterosexual'.
They are not arguing that racial subalterns are
necessarily able to better understand the social
world, partly because they have often employed
white logic and white methods themselves, although
they have also led the critique, drawing on their
own knowledge and experience.
White methods are the practical tools to
manufacture empirical data and analysis, and they
produce '"racial knowledge"' and have done since
white supremacy emerged in the 15th and 16th
centuries (18). They are linked to white logic,
entangled. They were originally mostly
argumentative, and found in early sociology and
their need to scientifically build on data,
including data produced by all kinds of
phrenologists and eugenicists in the early days
[and they include Chicago school people are
reproduced 'racial common sense' (19)]. Some were
openly biological racists, others were more
accommodationist. Some were openly in opposition.
New practices have developed, but they still
generate racial knowledge — 'surveys, ethnography,
various demographic indices, genetics, scholastic
aptitude tests, and comparative history'. However,
there is always resistance. An early sign was
Dubois, and there has been others. This resistance
is needed, together with social movements of
protest.
[The chapters in the volume are summarised — they
look good, focusing on specific criticisms of
census data, black racial classifications,
definitions of race, especially as causal
variables, quantitative methods generally and how
they neglect interactive processes, how a range of
contemporary sociological studies claim that race
is declining in significance, which 'both reflects
and reproduces whites racial common sense' (21),
how colourblind racism seems to have emerged in
social psychology, and how ethnography can
maintain pathological views of people of colour]
One section argues that we need 'new methods and
optics' both the scientific and political reasons,
to increase resistance to white domination, to
raise the self-esteem of new thinkers, to
encourage them to trust their own cognitive powers
too proceed to liberate themselves from white
logic and white methods.
Note 3 refers to Dalton and his work on the
hereditary Genius, which he says arose from
'considering the mental peculiarities of different
races''
|
|