Notes on: Cabrera, N. (2018).
Where is the Racial Theory in Critical Race
Theory?: A constructive criticism of the Crits.
The Review of Higher Education 42 (1):
209 – 33.
Dave Harris
CRT was not intended to be a full theoretical
framework but it is generally applied as one.
However it needs more work on hegemonic Whiteness.
CRT developed within critical legal studies, was
adapted to educational research and is
increasingly applied to HE. It is not a dominant
paradigm but it is appearing as a frequent method
to frame scholarship. People who use it are
sometimes referred to as Crits. They see no line
between activism and scholarship and think that
social science should aim at challenging and
transforming systemic racism.
CRT also has several detractors who are writers,
logically opposed [and Horowitz 2006, and
McWhorter 2000 are cited], but these have myopic
viewpoints. There is also public controversy,
connected to Obama's support for Derrick Bell. Kennedy's
critique has also been controversial: there was a
'colloquy rebuttal' in 1990, where Brewer asked if
Kennedy's critique was too risky in the current
atmosphere — Brewer thought it was. These show the
dangers of even constructive criticism of CRT,
although the intention here is to highlight the
limits and then 'to fill that void' (211), via
'deconstruction and reconstruction' focusing on
the racial theory in CRT.
The conceptual tenets are not adequate as social
theory so CRT actually needs a theory of racism.
It is sometimes treated as a 'stand-alone
theoretical framework'. It needs supplementary
work on hegemonic Whiteness so overcome its limits
and tensions.
Delgado and Stefancic offer the critical tenets,
rooted in 'either law or education': racism is
normal, structured, there is interest convergence,
race is socially constructive rather than
essential, there is 'differential racialization'
(212) and intersectionality. Differential
racialization refers to unique patterns
experienced by racial groups. The final tenet
suggests that unique voices of colour emerge with
a different perspective and different notions of
truth. Other versions argue that racism is endemic
and permanent, or that Whiteness is a form of
property.
In education particularly, there is a stress on
'intercentricity', the endemic nature of racism in
society that takes multiple forms, and a challenge
to dominant ideology in the form of conventional
social science. There is the same commitment to
social justice aimed at liberal policies of racial
equality. There is the same centrality of
experiential knowledge and an interdisciplinary
perspective. There is still no 'overarching
framework for how racism operates' (213), and even
CRT scholars claim it is a 'theorising counter
space' not a theory in itself. Should it
incorporate racial theory?
There have been several criticisms that it does
not offer testable hypotheses while treating
narrative as data, although these are typical
claims of dominant social science. However, the
need for theory remains to 'clarify the
epistemological and ontological assumptions of the
research' (213). The tenets only achieve this to
some extent. Theory is also needed to
contextualise human behaviour and social
structures.
In particular, Crits 'frequently refer to systemic
racism/White supremacy as the cause of race based
educational inequality, but offer little in terms
of the nature of this oppressive social force…
There is not a "mental model of racism"' (214).
The tenets only produce problems 'if logically
pushed far enough'. We can compare Solorzano and
Yosso with the work of Connerly, an opponent of
affirmative action. S and Y condemned the
colourblindness in a particular Michigan
affirmative action case, but Connerly argued that
there are been great strides made, that racial
discrimination was a relic of past and that there
was no need for affirmative action.
Both were written by POC. Both rely on narrative
and 'unique voices'. Both draw upon the discourse
of civil rights. S and Y appeal to social justice,
while Connerly claims that affirmative action is
reverse discrimination — 'i.e. racism against
White people'. Both opposed dominant ideology, but
do not agree on what it is — colourblindness or
'rampant political correctness and reverse
discrimination'. What is required is 'a critical
theory of racism' to sort these views out, to
firmly locate one in a dominant paradigm, and the
other as a challenge to it: at the moment, the
difficulty of apparent equality between the two
approaches highlights 'an internal logical
tension'.
Do Crits use CRT as a stand-alone theory, or draw
upon other approaches such as 'racial formation'
in Omi and Winant? He
pursued some content analysis of CRT scholarship
within HE, based on Krippendorf, to identify which
data being analysed, how they are defined, what
the population is from which they are drawn, what
the context is, what the boundaries of the
analysis are and what is the target of the
inferences (216). In practice he searched peer
reviewed education journals using the terms
critical race theory and CRT, and additionally
whether CRT was applied explicitly rather than
opposed. Then he asked whether the study focused
on HE specifically. The journals chosen for
'primary impact' were: International Journal
of Qualitative Studies in Education, Equity
and Excellence in Education, and Race
Ethnicity and Education. There are also CRT
articles in some of the more high impact education
journals such as the Harvard Educational Review
[full list of journals in the sample 217.
Each article was read through and then coded in
terms of whether CRT and its tenets was applied
and then whether there was a racial theory to
supplement it [another example is Bonilla Silva].
Cabrera did some limited intercoder reliability.
Overall there were two important trends: 'the
strong majority of the time, CRT was used as a
stand-alone theoretical framework in higher
education scholarship... There was a general lack
of racial theory either explicitly or implicitly
applied within CRT analysis' (218). He relied on
the authors being 'upfront about how they used
CRT' which most of them were), although sometimes
it was referred to as a conceptual framework, a
lens, an analytical framework and so on. Other
kinds of racial theories were incorporated 'in the
extreme minority' of these pieces (219).
Some offered 'a working definition of racism' that
did go beyond individual prejudice and talk of
structures of oppression, but these were still
'limited in understanding [the] contemporary
nature [of racism]' (219), and tapped pre-Civil
Rights attitudes, for example.
'Explicitly articulated racial theory' is missing
in CRT for several reasons. Bell saw racism as
permanent, not challenged by either liberal reform
or Civil Rights utopianism, but a 'permanent
oppressive social force', which informed his
activism. Technically, this could be seen as 'an
un-interrogated tension with CRT's social
construction tenet'., And it certainly distracts
from the evolution of White supremacy. Crenshaw
saw critique as crucial, with theory as
aspirational, although 'higher education scholars
are applying CRT as if it has [a coherent account
of race]' (220). Ladson
– Billings and Tate extended the analysis
into education as a critique of multiculturalism,
and in the process incorporated property rights,
but still left racism undefined, except for a
brief remark about '"culturally sanctioned beliefs
which regardless of the intentions involved,
defend the advantages Whites have because of the
subordinated position of racial minorities"'.
Although this addresses systemic racism, it does
not engage racial ideologies specifically,
structure or unconscious racial bias [unlike, say
Hall, Bonilla Silva and Omi and Winant]. O and W
were criticised for an insufficient attention to
education, and Dubois was preferred instead.
Dubois does not 'articulate a racial theory',
however (221), exploring further systemic racism
and how it produces double consciousness, or how
it is structured. Again this means that
substantial changes in White supremacy have been
overlooked — in Dubois, biological inferiority was
crucial, not least in providing privileges to even
poor White people. The civil rights movement
substantially weakened this argument. Property
rights still remain, but no other structuring
principles of racism are addressed.
There needs to be a supplementary racial theory.
There might be an implicit one, for example based
on the notion of hegemony. Mills apparently argued
that racial domination was 'embedded within the
juridical – political, economic, cultural,
cognitive – evaluative, somatic and metaphysical
spheres of contemporary life' (222). This reflects
an important change in White supremacy from Jim
Crow and explicit ideology based on superiority, a
shift towards Whiteness as normal, unmarked.
Hegemony is attributed to Gramsci [!] who stresses
caution and consent and the use of cultural
ideological and discursive means of naturalising
inequality. 'Common sense' masks 'the realities of
oppression', for example common accounts of
poverty. However, Gramsci did not study race, and
even Hall says that 'in relation specifically to
racism, [Gramsci's] original contribution cannot
be simply transferred wholesale' (223), although
some bits were clearly relevant, especially the
notion of plural selves or identities rather than
'"pregiven unified ideological subjects — for
example the proletariat"'. One implication is that
suffering will not guarantee 'antiracist critical
awareness'.
Hall also stresses specific moments rather than
overall metanarratives, concrete levels, constant
challenges and recreations of systemic racism. O
and W get close. Hegemonic Whiteness is sustained
by White privilege, racial inequality and
'anti-minority affect'.
Race might need to become central to arguments
about social change, but within this approach,
race does not produce inequalities but is 'a
marker of difference', 'mediated through a system
of racial domination'. He thinks you must add a
consideration of this idea to the tenets of CRT
[the actual list doesn't seem to be very
different, and still stresses 'the centrality of
experiential knowledge' for example, although it
does add 'hegemony of Whiteness'(224)].
One thing we can now do is distinguish 'instances
of racism vs of POC's negative experience', to add
rigour to CRT: even Ladson – Billings was critical
of 'counter narratives that are recently moved
from an analysis of systemic racism to being
venues to "vent or rant"' (225), and she invites
us to reconsider the plight of a female WOC who
did not submit to the normal colleaguely
procedures 'and then blamed her cumulative
failures on racism' [looks good — this is a
chapter in the Handbook of Critical Race theory in
Education 2013].
We can now see racism 'as probabilistic as opposed
to deterministic'. There is a high likelihood that
POC will have high levels of racial awareness but
we must not assume this, and this moves us away
from 'the pitfall of racial essentialism' with
which CRT flirts dangerously in its stress on the
unique voice of colour [apparently argued by
Delgado and Stefancic 2001]. An obvious problem
arises with the right-wing commentators who are
POC [and some are listed 225] — Cabrera insists
that these people are racists, that they deny
contemporary racism. This undermines the view that
'due to power differentials, POC cannot be racist'
(226): they can be and they can also 'serves as
hegemonic examples of society's openness'. There
is apparently a rare study of internalised racism
of POC (Perez-Huber 2010).
Freire incorporated a notion of hegemonic
structuring and advocated conscientisation to
gather material to inform collective action. The
oppressed themselves were in the best position to
understand this, but they did not uniquely possess
truth because they could be blind to the realities
of their own oppression. POC are not a 'uniform
oppressed group with a collective critical
consciousness'. They might be more likely to
penetrate racism, but White people can also become
aware of their complicity. As a result, Crits
cannot rely upon just the marginalised communities
and this involves a more 'balanced approach to
research', weighing the 'relative truth in
participant narratives in relation to the
realities of systemic racism', even considering
narratives which challenge existing paradigms of
racial stratification (227).
There is still insufficient analysis of racism in
HE, except for CRT, and their spokesman are often
inadequate. Hegemonic Whiteness is a better
orientation, focusing on 'issues of race and
racism in practitioner/student interactions while
critically interrogating how racism is embedded in
the fabric of higher education institutions (Gusa
2010)'. Activist should be prepared to encounter
students of colour with different stances, 'both
the targets of racism and the source of the
problem'.
There is a need for greater complexity and focus,
for example on interests convergence, and the
debates about affirmative action. In the USA,
there is a common argument based on '"the
diversity rationale"', where all students are held
to benefit from affirmative action and diversity,
which seems to confirm interest convergence.
However, interest convergence is seen as a form of
structural determinism here and there may be
suppressed possibilities.
There has been a shift towards post racialism,
race not mattering, even a belief in reverse
racialism. Analysis is even more important to deal
with this 'imagined problem' clarifications of
racism and closer work on hegemonic Whiteness is
even more important. The existing critiques of HE
should extend to self reflection to avoid
dogmatism.
References
Brewer, S (1990). Introduction: choosing sides in
the "racial critiques" debate. Harford law review,
103(8): 1844 – 54
Ladson – Billings (2013). Critical Race Theory –
what it is not! In M Lynn and a Dixson (heads)
Handbook of Critical Race Theory in education, 34
– 47. New York: Routledge
Delgado, R and Stefancic, J (2012). Critical Race
Theory: an introduction. New York: NYU press
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