Notes on: Moore
R and Maton, K. (2001) 'Founding the Sociology of
Knowledge: Basil Bernstein, intellectual fields
and the epistemic device. In Morais, A., Neves, I., Davies, B.
& Daniels, H. (eds) Towards a Sociology
of Pedagogy: The contribution of Basil Bernstein
to research. New York, Peter Lang, 153-182.
Dave Harris
The intrinsic relations of knowledge have not been
well understood, especially not by the new
sociology of education. It is not just that
this neglected to study, more that it was a blind
spot for the sociology of knowledge that could not
be penetrated. That is why we need new
tools, Bernstein on knowledge structures and
grammars which can describe differences between
intellectual fields 'in terms of the organising
principles of their knowledge formations'
(154). This will lead us to focus on the
production of knowledge, which in turn depends on
knowledge claims. This can be seen as
completing Bernstein [with a familiar picture of
his progress through pedagogy to knowledge
structures (155)]. The rereading enables us
to see even the early pedagogic work as implying
different notions of knowledge, and with
'empirical research' making new objects visible
[the actual process seems to be to develop a
classification and then to investigate the cells -
empirical research is not problematized as we
shall see, and it seems to be covered equally by
illustrative fictions and unproblematic
histories]. We need to look at an epistemic
device which, like the pedagogic device, explains
why certain kind of knowledge comes to be seen as
legitimate, or as 'altering relations between the
arbitrary and non arbitrary in knowledge', where
the former relates to power relations, and the
latter to 'principles intrinsic to knowledge
itself', 'relations within'(156).
Bernstein has accused the sociology of education
of ignoring the analysis of 'pedagogic discourse
itself and its intrinsic features', treating
pedagogy as a mere relay for external power
relations. If we look at the organisation of
knowledge we can detect some underlying principle
to regulate the production of new knowledge and
its form. As this principle varies, so do
modes of production, so that certain things become
visible and potential objects for knowledge.
It is a difference of principle, 'not just a focus
or perspective'. [Which raises the question
immediately of what these principles are - Maton
goes on to claim that they seem to be some
universal forms, rather like Durkheim's
classifications?]. This explains blind
spots, which arise from the very constitution of
the intellectual field.
Bernstein explains what this principle amounts
to. There are different structures of
knowledge, like hierarchical vs. horizontal ones,
and differences in grammar between weak and
strong. Thus the natural sciences have an
integrated hierarchy of knowledge, while
humanities have a horizontal and segmented
collection of specialised languages each with
their own modes of interrogation and
criteria. The latter include the
perspectives in sociology [here, integration does
relate to the vertical and collection to the
horizontal, which is the commonsense way to see it
- I am sure it is used the other way around
in some other Maton pieces]. Development for
hierarchical forms involves greater generality and
integration, while in the horizontal ones, new
languages or segments are added.
Grammar refers to the conceptual syntax which
provides empirical descriptions and/or formal
models of empirical relations. Strong
grammars can be found even in horizontal knowledge
structures which include 'mathematics, logic, and
economics'. Weak ones are found in social
anthropology, cultural studies and
sociology. Used together , we can
systematically describe differences between
intellectual fields in terms of their organising
principles. Now we have to explain the
practices which generate the differences, again in
terms of 'underlying generative principles'.
Knowledge is both produced and then
recontextualized or reproduced. The former
cannot be reduced to the latter, since the two
fields of practice are specific, and what might be
tacit in one becomes evident in the other.
The pedagogic device plays a major part in
reproduction, by transforming knowledge into
pedagogic discourse. Knowledge production
highlights new issues, however, by focusing on
knowledge claims and relations between arbitrary
and non arbitrary elements [the arbitrary now has
a broader definition as something which is related
to social relations, especially power, and the non
arbitrary is justified as something which cannot
be so related]. These issues are not so
important with pedagogy. Different knowledge
claims can deny that anything is non arbitrary, or
impose a particular definition of the non
arbitrary as in positivism. [The issue
becomes one of examining how Bernstein defines the
non arbitrary]. The basis of knowledge
claims is crucial to the existence of intellectual
fields, however [really? Not just an
occupational ideology?].
The epistemic device is an analogue of the
pedagogic device, looking at how generating
principles operate. This leads to Maton on
the principles of legitimation, which combine to
produce different modes of legitimation. The
principle regulates the combination of the
arbitrary and non arbitrary. The epistemic
device shows ways in which 'actors, groups of
actors, or institutions may alter these
relations', competing over legitimation claims and
the status of the field as a result. This is
seen as a 'precondition of knowledge
production'(161), having a positive function of
establishing knowledge claims [merely as an effect
of power?]. The epistemic device is the
object and stake of struggle, 'the key to symbolic
domination'.
We need to illustrate here, to avoid confusion,
like that which is affected Bernstein's work on
the difference between knowledge codes, and the
actual rules employed by the pedagogic
device. This confusion arises from 'an
empiricist tendency to substantialism' [described
confusingly as 'asking where the device may be
seen rather than when'. A way to dismiss
criticisms of this sort of 'empirical' approach?]
We can illustrate different strengths of
grammar in the sociology of education [which we
have already agreed is a horizontal
structure]. Changes in the 1970s have been
seen as a paradigm shift, using Kuhn. We can
now 'imagine the following scenario'(162)
[basically where a horizontal knowledge structure
shifts from describing itself as a series of
perspectives to one of incommensurable
paradigms. The former still has some
elements in common and sees the differences as
perspectives. It's the grammar that is
common. With incommensurable paradigms,
there is no agreement about what counts as a
question or solution, and no common ground.
The field has been divided into not specialisms
but 'exclusively specialised knowers... each with
their own distinctive and incommensurable
language'. The shift helps Maton bring in his
stuff about knowers, but I am not sure that this
was the decisive issue between the new and the old
sociology of education - there were
epistemological differences as well, even if they
were not very well clarified. At the same
time, the differences between knowers was also
apparent in the old specialist approach, with
differences between elite and upstart departments,
or with status differences attached to
quantifiers]. Overall, grammar has been
weakened, [since there are no shared
classifications], and this produces 'a
comparatively low level of integrative power'(163)
There were still some conflicts between the two
ways of characterising the field, since the old
guard did not always accept the new epistemology
['or, more precisely, anti epistemology', (164),
which enables him to preserve the term for his
preferred kind of internal relations].
Claiming to have developed a new paradigm is an
attempt to restructure the nature of the field and
split its grammar, so it is about 'languages of
legitimation', about what counts as
knowledge. Actors are struggling to define
the field, to control the epistemic device.
We see in this struggle different principles of
legitimation, and the effects include judging how
achievement within the field should be
measured. A new relation between the
arbitrary and non arbitrary is being proposed,
[disguised as] debates about whether or knowledge
is to be understood as entirely sociological and
historical or as 'ontologically necessary',
struggles between epistemic and social relations
of knowledge. [Maton is attributing the split
tothe struggles between actors, a social relation!
He is not even prepared to see internal
contradictions and problems with the old
approaches, not even as does Kuhn? ]
These are analytically distinct, 'but empirically
interrelated'(165). Languages of
legitimation offer different classifications and
frames around these two relations, producing the
usual configurations of strong or weak
classification and framing. The claim is
then that seeing a field as composed of
perspectives and specialisms produces strong
classification and framing of the epistemic
relation, but weak classification and framing of
the social relation since 'knowers are not the
issue'. In the paradigms approach, the
strengths are reversed, and who makes the claim
becomes crucial, 'regardless of the procedures
used and the object studied' [surely a substantial
exaggeration]. What we end with is a knower
mode. The struggle establishes status
hierarchies [undoubtedly present, as in the
production of colonies of ethnomethodologists who
went around promoting their mates - but ever
present?].
Such switches of paradigm have been identified
before. We're not talking about dichotomies,
nor preferring one rather than the other - each
approach has relative strengths and weaknesses,
compared to each other and compared to other
fields. We're talking about changes rather
than total switches. These are not ideal
types 'which remain at the level of the empirical
[??]; rather, they represent real principles whose
empirical realisations are dependent on the
enabling context' (166). There is a tendency
to conceive of grammars as absolute states, but
this arises from the false dichotomies constructed
within the fields themselves.
We can examine two contrasting examples, literary
criticism and mathematics, and explain their
differences in terms of these modes of
legitimation. We acknowledge that the
strength of grammar also depends upon 'the
condition of the field in terms of its location
within the broader structural dynamic of the
education system', which turns out to refer to
factors such as educational expansion, state
policies, the extent of external regulation.
We're not going to examine those issues here, at
the expense of producing 'necessarily partial'
accounts (167). Conventional sociologies of
knowledge are required here.
The switch is sometimes seen in terms of a
generational conflict, but this would not account
for the schismatic radical break being
suggested. The 1960s was a time for
announcing radical breaks. There have been
considerable segmental breaks, for example the
move towards '"standpoint" theory and "voice"
discourse'(168). Such breaks are so common
that sociology looks like it's permanently
revolutionary.
The same characteristics affected literary
criticism, with the proclamation of a new form in
the early 1960s, associated with Kermode. It
featured the familiar 'apocalyptic cosmology',
which made all the old approaches redundant.
It was an attempt to close the field. It
implied that the location in time can be the basis
for a knowledge claim, just as with
postmodernism. It also implied that only a
few knowers could see this new world, located at
points in space, time and society. The
knower became more central, and this provided a
problem for communication between different groups
of knowers [the struggle at one stage involved
exclusion of knowers]. Here, social
relations are strongly classified and framed,
producing little epistemic communities or
segments, but there is an inherent instability and
a tendency to even greater proliferation and
fragmentation.
There was also the notion of a creative fiction,
apparently claiming that the world had changed,
even though it was the conditions of some members
of the intellectual field that had changed
[exactly what Bourdieu
says about people like Barthes]. The same
might be said about those experiencing the
postmodern condition. Such statements are
creative fictions, heuristic devices, part of
Bourdieu's scholastic fallacy [maybe]. The
proposed change is just announced and becomes an
article of faith. Relations with actual
objects of enquiry show weak classification and
framing, since it is the gaze of the knower which
is crucial, the ability to see the new
world. This clearly excludes everyone else
and makes everything in the past redundant.
In mathematics, radical breaks or ruptures are
relatively rare [requires substantial empirical
support here surely?]. Mathematics has
perspectives. It is still horizontal, but
with a particularly strong grammar. The
lengthy discussion about Fermat's Last Theorem
shows continuing work over a great deal of time,
and effective communication with quite different
people inside an epistemic community. There
is no particular focus on the knower [although the
person solving the Theorem gained a great deal of
status]. It is the object itself that is
supposed to produce the specialist language and in
turn specialist knowers.
There are still mathematical fictions, invented
problems and mathematical structures and worlds,
but mathematicians 'cannot explore these worlds
just as they like'(173), and must follow an agreed
strong grammar and criteria solutions to
problems. These are constant, and do not
depend on the status of the author. This
helps mathematical work 'transcend specific worlds
and endure over time'(174). The findings are
open for use by anybody, and previous work can be
developed regardless of context. The
official motivation is only intellectual or
mathematical considerations, regulated by the
object itself. The social relation of
knowledge is weak in terms of classification and
framing. History itself is at least
partially negated, avoiding the impact of
historical contexts. The personal
characteristics of Fermat are irrelevant.
Thus development can proceed over time
cumulatively, and without its building
impenetrable barriers between specialisms.
So both literary criticism and mathematics have
horizontal knowledge structures, although they
differ in their relative strengths of
grammar. Using these concepts from Bernstein
helps us describe these fields 'beyond their
empirical and substantive characteristics'
(175). That's why we need to look at the
principles, and the 'actual settings for the
epistemic device'. We can also understand
struggles as attempts to seize control of the
epistemic device, even though they may masquerade
as generational ones. Once knower modes are
established, they are difficult to change, 'though
the empirical realisations of the principle may be
subject to ceaseless change'. For knowledge
modes, there is an emphasis on the 'non arbitrary
relation of procedures to their objects of study',
which produces an agreed strong grammar and an
extended community. Struggles over the
epistemic field are not relevant, since 'it is, so
to speak, the social property of the field
itself'. This produces paradoxes such as
excessive individualism of sociology. The
affects of particular settings of the epistemic
device appear in, for example the relation to the
past and whether it is a continuing reservoir or
something to be abandoned.
Social and institutional factors are still
important 'in the enacted practices of
intellectual fields' (176), but there is a
separate force and effect of the 'self
representations of a field's operations', for
example the way in which members of the field
define it for themselves [with a reference to
Popper here on the importance of the structures of
fields in themselves]. Languages of legitimation
are important perspectives toward the field and
they affect the relation of the community to the
field. Existing approaches to knowledge need
to discuss these factors as well, since 'the
epistemic shape of an intellectual field has
ramifications for its social form'. The
social [actually 'sociological'] nature of
knowledge itself has been neglected so far by the
sociology of knowledge.
The epistemic device is analogous to the pedagogic
device. The former regulates who can produce
legitimate knowledge and how knowledge is selected
and transformed to produce acceptable new
knowledge. Together with the pedagogic
device, it explains knowledge production,
recontextualization and reproduction, although it
is less important in the last two. However
all new knowledge has to be recontextualized, and
'all educational knowledge is subject to the
epistemic device' (177) [that is, legitimation
claims are common in classrooms].
It is not just social relations in classrooms,
since the 'epistemological nature of social
relations is similarly universal and ubiquitous -
if it were not we would not be able to function on
a day to day basis'. This means there is no
simple division between social principles' and
logically formal epistemological principles, 'as
realist philosophy of science has long been
recognized': the logic of discovery is social but
in a special way. Truth is also important to
every day effective action. The epistemic
device is social, and is most systematically
developed in university disciplines, but it is
'necessarily ubiquitous and universal. It is
the precondition of knowledge'. [Seems to be
a commonsense refutation of the new soc of ed?]
Epistemic matters are often seen as tacit , and
they may not be highlighted even in
university disciplines such as mathematics.
In other fields, they can produce open
conflict. The issue then becomes one of
trying to decide why conflicts like this
occur. The new sociology of education has
been largely silent on this, because of its knower
mode - only in knowledge modes can claims become
detached from their authors and thus subject to
debate. A return to an knower mode threatens
this autonomy, and focuses on voice rather than
the epistemic device itself. The arbitrary
is everywhere. Thus the intrinsic features
of knowledge cannot be analysed by the new
sociology of education - 'weak grammars cannot see
the epistemic device'(178). However, it does
have an important role, and it should be the
fundamental issue for the discipline. Only
Bernstein has seen this
The next stage will be to see both epistemic and
pedagogic devices as part of 'an overarching
knowledge device'
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