Brief notes
on: CCCS (1978) On Ideology.
London: Hutchinson.
Dave Harris
The introduction says that studying ideology
requires the 'deeper knowledge than is at present
available from the general perspective of cultural
studies'. In principle at least, such a
study can deliver a more coherent account of
either pole in the culture/society couplet, and,
in so doing, avoid reducing either turn to the
'"expressive" manifestation of the other' (6) [an
obvious dig at Lukacs].
Hall, S. The Hinterland of Science: Ideology
and the "Sociology of Knowledge."
Merton introduced the term ideology through the
sociology of knowledge. The history of the
concept leads to dilemmas, since ideology is seen
as representing both ideas and false ideas.
There is a promise of a criticism of idealism, but
the sociology of knowledge soon drifts into
idealism [gramscianism does as well]. Roots
of the concept line Kant and his categories of
mind, but Hegel remedied the lack of history in
Kant and develops the notion of the super session
of categories. Feuerbach's project to unmask
the root of religious ideas followed, and this led
to Marx is objections that the material base of
ideas had to be investigated. Althusser
further develoedp this notion to talk about breaks
with rather than inversions of this philosophical
tradition. However, some of the dilemmas
from Kant and Hegel still persist, for example in
the development of neo-Kantianism in some German
traditions that led to seeing ideology as some
kind of Objective Mind: the example is Dilthey on
the stages of human thoughts, the development of
world views. This legacy appears in Lukacs
who tried to restore the dimension of social class
(13) then Mannheim. Methodological legacies
including is an emphasis on verstehen and
on hermeneutics, and eventually on Weber and the
notion of the ideal time as a compromise between
idealism and positivism.
Weber failed to show an articulation between ideas
and the economy, and we can criticise the famous
Protestant Ethic study as developing only the
notion of elective affinities or homologies as
inadequate explanations of how ruling ideas come
to rule (17). However, ideologies are seen
as a motivating force and as having specific
histories, suggesting that Weber did have some
proto Marxist inputs.
Marxism retained its emphasis on the social
formation, its complexity and various levels, to
replace the idea of an expressive totality.
Ideologies are also seen as real, but not self
sufficient. This contrasts with the work of
Lukacs, who was influenced by early German
'irrationalism', especially via Nietzsche (18),
and reason was to play a major role in the power
struggle with systematic illusions. The
fascist appropriation of this notion is criticized
in Frankfurt work on culture as illusions, and on
lingering irrationality, as in Dialectic of Enlightenment:
this is pessimistic. [There is often a weak
sociology of knowledge in this criticism, where
Frankfurt pessimism is explained as a result of
the awful circumstances they endured in Nazi
Germany, and which somehow got incorporated,
unreflected, into the general philosophy].
Weber's influence is also clear in Schutz and the
development of social phenomenology, with a
lingering notion of Objective Mind appearing in
objectivated structures of meaning and the
assumption of reciprocity. Sartre develops
the notion of alienation as both objectivation and
loss, rooted in the dialectic between subject and
object, which 'always testifies to the under
exorcised ghost of Hegel' [which might be a
reference to Althusser again] (20). Berger and Luckmann
develop the notion of social structure as a series
of typifications, supporting symbolic
interactionism and ethnomethodology, but in this
tradition, ideology is no longer historical or
political, or produced by conjunctural
relations. Ideas become more important than
studying reality, the opposite emphasis to the one
developed in German Ideology.
Berger and Luckman link with Durkheim. We
should not see Durkheim as a simple positivist
since he sees social facts as governed by rules or
ideas, as collective representations, categories
with social origins. This work is developed
with Mauss in Primitive Classifications,
and in the Années. Levi Strauss's
work must also be considered, and his influences
include Russian formalism, especially Jackobsen
(23). Levi Strauss operated with the notion
of a deep structure connecting to actual
structures not through reflection or analogy, a
distinction akin to Marx on the real and
phenomenal, and this led to work on the 'human
spirit' and its formations, including arrangements
between elements of language permitting
communication [I have noted some work on the honey
myth, for example, where honey stands in for other
magical fluids that are both natural and cultural,
such as sperm and blood]. We see structural
resemblance at the level of difference, a
reduction to a basic structure then a specific
analysis of myths and so on. The synchronic
structure is the closed field, and this has led to
the development of 'structuralist causality' as a
'Copernican revolution' (26), obviously appealing
to Althusser, although he was forced to deny that
his work was a mere combinatory of abstract
possibilities.
We can also fit in Lacan and Kristeva, and
Barthes. Barthes was influenced by Saussure,
and came to see ideologies as particular uses of
signifying systems used by dominant groups [at
least in Mythologies]. Eventually,
Lacan's influence led to the notion that the
subject was the key to ideology, rather than
specific ideologies (27) [well at least in
Althusser].
Levi Strauss is work can still be seen as Kantian,
concerned with abstract rules for knowledge,
leading to another collapse into idealism.
Why should this be so? Is there some
affinity between idealism and the
bourgeoisie? Is there some inadequacy in
materialism? We can see Bourdieu on the notion
of symbolic power or some kind of third way,
combining idealism and avoiding materialist
reductionism. Symbolic relations are not
just class relations, and nor are the mere
signifiers, but they transfigure, establish
correspondences between structures rather than
elements. As with Althusser, we need to hold
on to both ends of the chain, both relative
autonomy and economic determinism.
[What should we make of this hectic tour through
95 positions before lunch? The whole thing
takes up about 26 pages. A harsh critic,
like me, would see this as a typical setting out
of the ground, or 'theoretical mapping', where a
set of oppositions is set up, such as those
between idealism and materialism, there is a
general 'balanced' discussion, but obviously a
selective one, rival approaches are seen as giving
too much to one side rather than the other, and
ending with the need to somehow maintain both
while transcending it with—Gramsci. A steady
progress is made towards the preferred position.In
this case, sociology of knowledge is a mere
'hinterland',and goes in sneer quotes --
sometimes,it is clearly nearly getting towards but
never quite close enough to gramscian marxism.].
Chapter three. Hall, S., Lumley, B., and
McLennan, G. Politics and Ideology in
Gramsci
There is no systematic account of ideology in
Gramsci's work and it should be read as focused on
politics rather than epistemology. It offers
a concrete specific study of Italy at the
time. Ideology is considered to be a
superstructure. Gramsci has been accused of
historicism because of his interest in
history. However the work is non
psychological and complex rather than
reductionist.
Ideology becomes something much broader than a
philosophical world view, since it also appears as
a substrate in common sense. Ideology is a
force in its own right rather than just something
that reflects other forces. Yet it is linked
to the class structure. The economic
structure is the mainspring of history, but only
in the last instance. We can derive
authority for this from 18th Brumaire
rather than Capital.
The notion of a 'historical bloc' indicates the
economic construction of classes, which are seen
as both fundamental and as fractions, but also
show the impact of political combinations.
This makes the notion of a bloc neither economic
determinist nor idealist. Blocs are some
other formations not located in a base or a
superstructure. For example the notion of
civil society refers to both base and
superstructure and neither, when it is an
intermediary sphere, between the economy and the
state, something private, but still serving the
interests of the state [Althusserian terminology
here?]. It is the immediate source of the
subordination of classes, which operates not just
in the economic field nor in law, but in morals
and customs [Althusser is a bit of purist
here and says Marx only ever included law in the
superstructure]
The political level itself is relatively
independent, and it is here that we find
ideologies, ideas which unify social blocs.
Ideology appears both in philosophy and in common
sense, and is 'organic' in terms of its relation
to the fundamental classes. However,
bourgeois ideology simply has to represent itself
as universal. Nevertheless, it is not simply
produced by a unified ruling class, but draws on
relations with other formations in the ruling
bloc, both intellectual and practical.
Ruling ideologies are expected in different forms
and to different extents by the subordinate
classes. This leads us to develop the notion
of hegemony, which is not just ideological or
political, but which operates at all levels, for
example from economic concessions and political
alliances to transformations of consciousness.
Common sense is inherently eclectic, disjointed
and confirmatory, always a composite. It
appears as something ahistorical, 'natural' just
like political economy: if anything, the latter is
more open to modifications. The levels of
common sense and the economy are linked.
Common sense does contain a critical potential,
because experience can always spontaneously
produce contradictions and challenge hegemony
[only if that experience is made critical, not
fatalistic etc?]. Common sense is organized
by intellectuals, who can be themselves 'organic',
that is linked to classes and their interests, and
'traditional', linking two groups that are
remnants from the previous historical social
formation. The latter become partially
affiliated, as in Church intellectuals.
There is an intellectual field, where
intellectuals battle for the spontaneous support
of one of the fundamental classes.
The ruling bloc mobilizes state and civil society,
and tries to use the state to subordinate civil
society. Resistance produces a battle for
hegemony prior to the seizure of political power,
and the development of working class organic
intellectuals play a major part here. There
is no role for the detached traditional
intellectual [given much emphasis by Mannheim and
others known to Gramsci --important for him to
deny he was one in the context too -- the Party
would have booted him out?]. The party
operates at the cultural level, unlike the ruling
bloc, leading to an activist penetration of common
sense in order to radicalize it and realize the
contradictory possibilities of common sense.
The struggle does not just operate with logic, but
acts literally to politicize common sense, since
politics is the crucial level. Common sense
consciousness itself is spontaneously defensive,
so there must be a radical theory to understand
the terrain and to radicalize the proletariat.
We can see that the approach is not economic
determinist or psychologistic. There can be
no pregiven historical mission. Ideologies
are grounded in material circumstances and they
have material effects. Consciousness
develops in a largely corporatist direction, but
this can be challenged. However, there will
be no necessary unity in a bloc, with struggle and
room for maneuver at different levels. The
aim is to combat spontaneism to develop organic
consciousness, and this will be an intellectual
struggle. The test will be whether or not
the party can gain 'mass adhesion', but there is
no relativism or spontaneity involved, and no
notion of an 'expressive unity'. The party
itself can be considered as a bloc.
Is there a necessary unity between the levels for
Gramsci? Is Marxism a science or an
ideology, a mere conception of life aimed at
unifying the group, or some conflation of the
theoretical and the real? There is ambiguity
here, even if we stress the practico-social
functions of ideology. However, the current
denial of uniformity of ideology and its relations
with the economic is itself produced by
intellectuals, and is historically specific.
Analysis of this specific situation is a
precondition of intervention [nice role for
radical intellectuals here, and shades of
Althusser's notion of theory as class struggle
after all?]
Gramsci's 'philosophy of praxis' has been taken as
indicating his historicism. Yet there are
similarities, even for Althusser [and the texts
here is his essay on
contradiction and over determination] social
formation is not an expressive unity, for example
and there is no principal contradiction in the
base. There can be revolutionary situations
in decisive political conjunctures, when
contradictions overlap and fuse. Differences
between Althusser and Gramsci are the most
apparent in Reading Capital, in the
section opposing historicism. The
similarities appear in the
isas essay, and in political discussions in
the various essays.
Much of the argument turns on the concept of civil
society. This can carry liberal undertones
of something private, individual, the home of
individual rights and humanism. But civil
society in Marx is different, and indicates the
relations of exchange and distribution. The
phenomenal level of these is the 'hidden abode' of
capitalism, a source of bourgeois ideologies,
especially the 'imaginary relation'[presumably as
in Althusser's discussion of the imaginary
relation to the real relations of
production?]. Civil society displays and
accumulation these effects, economic, political,
judicial, and ideological. For Gramsci, it
is not just the site of domination, but of
direction and leadership, with partial consent, by
the ruling bloc. This is more than a series
of state apparatuses as in Althusser. The
non state elements are also very important: they
include the press and television in Britain, state
and nonstate churches, trade unions [all these are
included, I think, as isas—Althusser's point is
that they all require backing from the state, at
least with the legal framework]. Direction and
leadership provide the source for the struggle to
hegemonize. These distinctions are blurred
in the isas essay. Nevertheless, the isas
essay can be seen as an attempt to systematize
Gramsci, through the notion of reproduction
[special pleading here -- see Rancière's account
of the French context]
Gramsci offers no structuralist analysis to
connect specific conjunctures as instances of a
structure, while Poulantzas
does. Nevertheless, Poulantzas's work is in
the same space. The major political
disagreement arises over whether or hegemonic
strategy is possible without state power.
Hegemony does too much work: for Poulantzas it
simply means state activity, whereas for Gramsci
it means struggle, not just coercion but coupled
with consent, posing as universalistic. It
is a matter of domination and direction. Any
attempt to systematize this process in theory runs
the risk of losing the concrete and ending in
functionalism. There are no concepts in
general referring to general, automatic entities.
[ The notion of hegemony is discussed in a
suitably complex way (48). Then there is
some work needed to use Gramsci to correct
Althusser. First, Althusserian terms are
used to describe Gramsci, and Gramsci is seen as a
hidden influence on Althusser and Poulantzas [with
no real discussion of Althusser's critique of
Gramsci in Reading Capital], although the
role of the party and of party intellectuals is
clear [and undesirable in the UK context]
(51). A more populist stance is developed,
with a central role to be played by politics in a
more diffuse sense, but there is still a need to
understand the social formation adequately by
deploying a theory [which might be a rebuke to the
sort of activism being suggested by black CCCS
students like Gilroy]. There is a need to
reject historicist notions of the destiny of the
working class [not completely rejected, according
to Coward], and historicism is rebuked through the
figure of the 'expressive unity', as above [there
is also no obvious clear class party in the UK].
However, if the only test of Marxism is mass
support for it, then it risks being seen as an
ideology, and Gramsci is read symptomatically,
here. Gramsci is preferred to Lukacs on the
grounds of the latter's historicism. Gramsci
is preferred to Althusser, by seeing his
[Gramsci's] analysis as a 'limit case'.
Humanism is seen as a valid approach in civil
society, and this is defended via a long detour
into Capital, where the spheres of distribution
and exchange are seen as equivalent to civil
society (62). By seeing these spheres as not
separate, but offering an accumulation of effects,
we can retain specificity as against the more
general notion of ideological state
apparatuses. Even so, ideological state
apparatuses are seen as a 'direct borrowing' from
Gramsci any way [Rancière says Althusser got the
idea from him!].
We can see the influence of Gramsci in
Poulantzas's work on political power and social
classes, although he denies it. This raises
a further issue about whether the class can be
hegemonic before it wins power, and again
Gramsci's enlarged notion of hegemony wins out
here: it centralises struggle rather than any
functionalist mechanisms, and it operates as a
long-term process, where some moments can be non
hegemonic, and where there can be crises.
All this points us towards the need for concrete
analysis (69) [so does Poulantzas, of course].
Is the state or the ruling class hegemonic?
The state functions to maintain hegemony.]
Maclennan, G. Molina, V., Peters,
R Chapter three. Althusser's Theory of
Ideology
Ideology appears in several ways, in contrast to
science, as a level in the social formation, and
as a lived relation. We can detect shifts
from the notion of overdetermination to one of
structural causality, with the economic, political
and ideological/political (epic) levels making up
a 'structure in dominance' (81). There are
clear signs of epistemological essentialism and
eternality in the later conception
In the 'Generalities' model ideology becomes both
an epistemological and a material structure, and
this develops in the context of arguing against
reductionism. Ideology is also seen as
essential to social life, having a practico -
social function, something based on experience
rather than theory [notoriously here]. Marx's
theory is seen as undergoing an epistemological
break in order to separate science from
ideology. Ideologies are seen as imaginary,
that is as produced by a structure rather than
emerging from consciousness, producing the famous
'imaginary lived relation to the real conditions
of production, in For Marx.
In Reading Capital, ideology is defined as
what Marxism is not. If Marxism is another
ideology, we're only left with the problem of
choosing irrationally between them. Instead,
Marxism is a science. Ideology here appears
as a closed or mirror structure, closed as in the
subject/object relationship at the heart of
classic epistemology. The real cannot be
grasped by logical concepts [in some sort of
correspondence], and this argument is developed
particularly in the Introduction to Grundrisse.
Successful practice is not a criterion of
theoretical validity. The subject is to be
removed from the discussion altogether, and
knowledge decentred, so that only the
systematicity of concepts characterizes a
science. Marxism is not an ideology, and,
for Althusser, the distinction between the real
and the phenomenal needs to be reworked is a
distinction between phenomena and scientific
knowledge. Production of knowledge- effects
is the issue, needed to counter ideology-effects.
Is there an ideology justifying Marxist
philosophy? What of the reference to
empirical events and specific concepts in
Marx? Can ideology really be both a level
and the practice? Does the notion of the
knowledge-effect really abolish
epistemology? Althusser goes on to develop
the isas essay [to bring
in material practices as well as ideas], and
further goes on to develop the notion of
philosophy as a kind of class struggle in itself,
an intervention in the struggle as much as an
attempt to develop scientific knowledge.
There are later apologies for theoreticism in
discussing the science/ideology split [for example
here], and a
redevelopment of the theory of superstructure and
a discussion of the conditions of production of
knowledge. There are still odd sections,
like those seeing reproduction and ideology in
general as independent matters. The
reproduction of the legal and political relations
is necessary for class exploitation, though, not
just a mere repetition of forms of
combination. The isas essay also shows how
the state is necessarily involved in hegemonic
struggles in order to realize the role of the
ruling class: the installation of the isas
involves class struggle, for example. Here,
ideology is no longer eternal, but something
separated from specific ideological state
apparatuses. Althusser does go on to develop
some notes on the nature of ideology in general,
and does suggest that even this is 'eternal'
only in class societies [I think he was saying
that ideology was needin State Socialist
societies, that the Soviet Union was not classless
etc].
The concept is only an abstraction from specific
ideologies rather than a proper theory [although
he draws a lot on Lacan to allude to a general
theory?]. Even here it is not clear if this
is an abstraction from all ideologies or from the
dominant ideology, however. Again instead of
investigating real conditions, Althusser discusses
the representation of the individual to reality:
this does not involve a distortion of reality but
an imaginary relation to it [hardly scientific for
McLennan et al]. The material present
appears in practice, leading to the idea that all
practices exist in and by ideology. The
human subject is a figure of subjection.
Overall, this is a departure from functionalism,
but it only describes one moment of the capitalist
mode of production.
Other problems include the notion of relative
autonomy but not of total autonomy for
science. This produces an elitist notion of
theory, an idealism. There is insufficient
specificity, 'encouragement' and strategy for a
revolutionary movement. The self criticism
is not a complete apology: science can still not
be reduced to the practico-social, but ideology
can. Philosophy is a class struggle which
raises the possibility for specific studies, and
there are still good criticisms of economism and
historicism. However, economism can still be
found in the theory of the state.
[now try Rancière's
blistering critique of Althusser]
Burniston S and Weedon C chapter eight.
Ideology Subjectivity and the Artistic Text.
Macherey sees literature as 'containing' ideology
because writers draw upon ideological repertoires,
including some which are dominant. There is
therefore a correspondence between a text and an
historical period, although this is not 1 to
1. Literature necessarily evokes
contradictions in that historical period, so it is
not possible to pursue a simple class reductive
reading.
Literary ideologies also resolve
contradictions. They deliver a closed
system, or try to. However, great literature
can break out and show contradictions that cannot
be contained [obviously circular here]. Most
literature however attempts 'an imaginary
reconciliation' between contradictions (204).
It is possible to sketch out the background of
class struggle in the development and use of
national language.
There is a resolution between linguistically
constructed subjects in the text [drawing upon
Althusser and Lacan on interpellation]. The
reader becomes an ideological subject, identified
with the position in the text, and rewarded by
having their subjectivity granted. There is
a possible misrecognition, however and sometimes
deliberately misrecognition, and this is the first
step in developing a critical practice of
decentring and interrogating the text. This
in turn can lead to the perception of the
ideological nature of lived experience.
However, we have to denaturalize the text and its
claim that it can offer a reconciliation.
Instead we need symptomatic reading—'reading for
absences' (206).
[Then just a few bits] Macherey is closer to
Adorno in the analysis of contradictions rather
than supporting an expressive totality [which
seems to be the boo word running throughout this
text]. However, Adorno tends to emphasize
form rather than content, and also tends to accept
the simple reflective link with the economic
level. By contrast, form is ignored
altogether by Macherey.
Various other positions are then summarized,
including Benjamin and Brecht, the Lacanians and
Kristeva (212 F), with a good discussion on the
mechanisms of desire reflecting a basic search for
identity with the Father, but being possible only
with submission to the linguistic order. I
summarized the stuff on Kristeva mostly.
Kristeva develops Marxism to be able to deal with
marginal discourses like poetry. This
challenges the norms of civil society, and leaves
a space, especially for the female. She also
attacks the centring notion of the subject—the
subject is really constituted in language, a
'thetic subject', located in the Symbolic as in
Lacan, but developed at the price of having to
repress drives. It follows that signifying
practices are not directly reducible to the
Symbolic, and Kristeva is interested in repressed
signification in the form of poetry, art,
religion, and magic [and the avant-garde?].
Literature represents more than knowledge, and is
a place where the social code can be 'destroyed
and renewed' (220).
The outside of the Symbolic is the semiotic
order. Semiotics together with the Symbolic
produce more than just signifying practices, but
'signifiance' [sic] (220). The semiotics
precedes the mirror phase, reflecting drives and
primary processes, and providing for a 'semiotic
chora'. Evidence for it is found in research
on the pre-mirror phase [in kids] and on
psychosis. It is the site of negativity and
challenge to the Symbolic with its excess of
meaning. It is decoded best in poetry where
it takes over from the Symbolic. We find it
expressed in infantile linguistic rhythms, before
the development of structure and grammar,
featuring 'syntactically elipses'. The
semiotics offers a preconstruction of the subject,
it is the site of 'subject in process', and the
fixed moments produce a more fixed notion of the
subject. Ideology is therefore not the same as
subjectivity, despite Lacan [and subjectivity also
exists before the entry into the Symbolic, which
must feature male dominance].
Family and social structures do organize the
drives in the semiotic chora, as in Freud, and
particular moments are reinforced by state
apparatuses. But the unsociable elements
remain, associated with sexual difference, incest,
the death drive, and the pleasure process.
Signifying practices also discipline the semiotic,
but only as a 'provisional
articulation'(222). Overall, the semiotic
makes the subject precarious and challenges its
unity. Different signifying practices will
inevitably align with political experiences and
social movements, especially feminism. The
pleasure process is the main drive challenging the
family and the state. Some 'normal'
signifying processes are dynamic and result in
challenging art and literature.
In criticism, much of this work can be seen as a
direct contradiction of Lacan and his particular
notion of the unity of the social formation.
This did not arise from a systematic attempt to
think the relations between the economic mode of
production, and the mode of production of
signifying practices. Lacan and Althusser
are simply brought together [by Althusser?]
[echoing Hall's criticism]. The group formed
around Tel Quel [disgruntled ex-Lacanians
keen on the arts, briefly Maoist] refused to claim
any scientific basis for their works, but offered
only reading strategies [and this won't do for the
writers here, who are after some serious Marxism
to analyze literature. Stuart Hall couldn't stand
the Tel Quel lot either, or
anything avant-garde]. The development of
science was seen to be based on need and on
successful action, as an 'extension of control
over the given'. Practice is taken to be
mostly a struggle over signifying practice.
Both Marxism and psychoanalysis claim to explain
the same phenomena. Both Lacan and Kristeva
raid both disciplines in order to develop an
attempt by one to engulf the other [with
psychoanalysis leading?]. The origin of this
attempt lay in 'failures, impasses and rivalries
by various forms of political struggles'
[including the notoriously fractious
psychoanalytic schools?] (227). Each
claims a privilege for their own position, and
each is forced to place the psychic and the
economic on a similar basis.
more social theory
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