1956: Week 3 –The
Myth of Content
D Cormier's input:
I’ve always been a
little confused by the word ‘content.’ There is
something lonely and unconnected about the word
somehow, when i hear it used with reference to
what happens in learning. I imagine a lone
student, huddled away in a dorm room, reading
sanitized facts in the hopes of passing a
multiple choice quiz. The content somehow
merging with the learning objective and the
assessment to create a world where learning is
about acquiring truth from the truth box.
We talked a little this week
about how Descartes, ‘thinking alone in his
room’ was really carrying on conversations with
hundreds of correspondents, and with many other
people (also mostly old white men) in the record
of their thoughts printed in the books in his
library. Even the citation in our research
methods is about pointing to the web of people’s
thoughts… about preserving the history of the
story we are telling.
So what happens when we peek
under the word ‘content’ to see what lives
there? What does it mean for a course to
‘contain’ information? What choices are being
made… what power is being used?
There might be a
paradox between choosing an indivdual
route and maintain a collective,
especially when choosing content. What counts?
What should be included? What restricts
heterogeneity?
These thoughts can be seen as informed by
'connectivist' pedagogy (discussed earlier). As we saw,
the argument takes on special force when
electronic communication is considered since it
facilitates the establishment of a 'learning
community' or 'personal learning network'. If
these are productive, learners do indeed know
where information is offered rather than knowing
how themselves: the community regulates and
filters the huge amounts of knowledge available.
However, as somebody said (I've forgotten who
--sorry) once the information has been identified,
the lone student huddled away in the dorm room
still has to struggle to understand and
personalize the information. The situation is not
very different from the old context when students
entered libraries, not e networks. That is, unless
team working is allowed, of course: the problem is
that in universities, excessive team work tends to
be regarded as plagiarism, and team work generally
is unpopular with those who want to be given
personal credit.
In some circumstances, the learning community can
also become a 'truth box' as we shall see.
Much of the rest of it could be supported by
D&G. If we are going to 'peek under the word
content', D&G are a crucial part of your
learning network. If you want to see how power is
expressed in language, or what is mixed in with
the explicit 'content', who finer? Descartes was
indeed carrying on conversations with others, even
when apparently alone in his room wondering if he
existed, as do we all. This is why D&G argue
for the ubiquity of 'indirect discourse' [which
has an important implication for ethnography --
see week 6]. However,
as the following series of quotes, direct and
indirect, indicate, some different implications
follow from this point for D&G. In ATP
Chapter 4 :
A single voice
contains a number of other voices, 'all
discourse is indirect'. (85)
There is
also the 'illocutionary' (86),
which can also be seen as 'non
discursive presuppositions' [where
you assume that someone will act as
a response to what you say].
Together, the performative and the
illocutionary 'has made it
impossible to conceive of language
as a code, since ['if' would make
more sense] a code is the
condition of possibility for all
explanation'. [This is meant to rebuke Chomsky
or Levi-Strauss, but any UK fans of Bernstein's
work on language codes and pedagogy
might find this a useful kind of critique]
Pedagogic
instruction, like all communication,
involves giving orders or commands, even if
these are not external. What 'the
compulsory education machine' (84) does is
to impose semiotic coordinates including
organizing binaries [reads bit like Bourdieu
here on the dominance of gendered binaries
in ordinary language ]. The point is that
the 'order word' is implicit even in
statements that do not take the imperative
case. [A promising critique of some of
the specific terms in educational discourse?
Helps us get all Foucaldian by looking for
implicit 'order words', maybe even in Cormier
posts? -- but see the last quote]
[Then we get on
to an attack on the usual forms of
subjectivism] 'There is no individual
enunciation. There is not even a
subject of enunciation', because language is
irreducibly social. What this means is
that 'enunciation itself implies collective
assemblages', which can produce individuated
statements.. Instead of
interlocking individual statements
together, we should start with a
collective assemblage which determine
relatively subjectified statements and
different subjects of enunciation.(87)
[Extending
the idea of assemblages] Collective
assemblages can be combined 'in a
regime of signs or a semiotic
machine'.(92)
[Then we proceed
to the main ontological implications].
Linguists have developed 'an abstract
machine of language', with apparent
linguistic constants acting over time.
However, this is not abstract enough,
because it remains linear, and ignores
nonlinguistic factors. If we abstract
still further [and this is the D&G
method of philosophizing], we can see that
the apparent constants of language are
better understood as variables of expression
'internal to enunciation itself', which
always intermingle with the supposed
linguistic constants (100).
[back to
anti-individual subjectivism] In this sense,
the abstract machine produces singularities,
sometimes 'designated by the proper name of
a group or individual', but still as the
result of collective assemblages: 'there is
no primacy of the individual; there is
instead an indissolubility of a singular
Abstract and a collective Concrete' (111)
[Abstract
machines like this also provide creative
possibilities, which we discuss later: in
this case it is experimental writers] We get
creative by subtracting or removing elements
and placing them in variation. This
involves sobriety again. If we do this
successfully we pursue 'a becoming-minor of
the major language'(116).
Free indirect discourse
permits this. We should base ourselves 'neither
in language A, nor in language B but in
"language X, which is none other than language A
in the actual process of becoming language B"'
[quoting Pasolini] (117)
The problem is
not to break with order words [which would
be impossible] but with their implications: 'the order word is a death
sentence...but the order word is also something
else, inseparably connected: it is like a
warning cry or a message to flee' (118).
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