Notes on:
Guattari, F. (2011) The
Machinic Unconscious. Essays in
Schizoanalysis, translated by Taylor
Adkins. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e) Foreign
Agents.
Dave Harris
NB Thanks to Chandler again
[Formidably difficult material, as usual. As
if the frequent references to offers and
discussions that I have not read are not difficult
enough, the style is also close to impenetrable,
with eternal sentences, and this quality of
'Schizo flow' that others have mentioned. I
should be lucky to pick even the most modest bones
out of this mushy soup. One thing of
interest is that quite a lot of this appears to
have been reproduced in Thousand
Plateaus,(TP) sometimes almost
word for word, like the bit that surrounds the
famous statement 'there is no language', page 7 in
TP. I suppose the kindest thing that
could be said is that this account is slightly
more accessible than the pretentious rubbish in
TP]
Introduction: Logos or abstract machine? [NB
see also the discission on machine vs structure
in Psychoanlaysis
and Transversality]
Is the unconscious still a useful concept?
Can it still be understood and translated?
Modern conceptions see it is a structural matter,
with very little left of Freud or Jung, structured
like a language, even a mathematical language as
in Lacan. For Guattari, the unconscious
affects all kinds of perceptions and actions,
affecting the possible itself and all forms of
communication, not just linguistic ones. He
uses the term machinic unconscious to stress that
it is full of 'machinisms that lead it to produce
and reproduce these images and words' (10).
There is a need to reject both classic notions of
causality, and structural abstractions.
Instead, we need to consider interactions with
objects, space and time, without worrying whether
they are material, semiotic, or
transcendental. We should be working with
'abstract deterritorialized interactions' produced
by abstract machines, especially as they traverse
different aspects of reality and 'demolish
stratifications' (11). These interactions
operate on a plane of consistency which crosses
place and time. They should be grasped as
the 'quanta of possibles'.
Assemblages fix and unfix 'coordinates of
existence', constantly deterritorializing and
singularizing, and establishing new replacement
territories—'machinic territorialities'.
These processes are universal, and are only slowed
down or thickened on the '"normal" human
scale'. The same goes for normal
understandings of causality and temporal
sequence. [Thom is cited on the apparent
smoothing or reversability of space and
time. Machines are not just understood in
terms of their current manifestations and they
produce a plane of consistency enabling all sorts
of other intersections. Thom is on to this, but
too likely to understand it in terms of
mathematics, thus remaining at the abstract level,
unable to talk about the process of
singularization, which Guattari here refers to as
'extracts' from the cosmos and history].
Referring to abstract machines reminds us that we
are not just talking about normal processes of
abstraction to get to universals, and the need to
think of mechanisms as well as assemblages.
There are no universal general
assemblages—universality is a function of power.
The search for some systematic formal order, over
expressions, for example, as studied in the social
sciences is impossible, because it really depends
on 'political and micro political power struggles'
to attempt to stabilize an essentially drifting
language. Attempts to reduce behaviour and
language to binaries or digits could be extended
to all social phenomena, but we will not have
grasped the essence of the phenomena, unless we
make some assumptions that everything aims towards
stabilized equilibrium. Structuralism
attempts to deal with contingency and singularity
by probabalizing them along synchronic and
diachronic axes, but this is only a tidying up,
and it misses altogether those assemblages that
produce 'rupture and innovation'(13).
The tendency to aim at general axioms in science,
and at pure concepts in philosophy, has meant the
dominance of epistemology. The efforts to
connect certain privileged denunciations with a
transcendent order should be understood instead as
a form of power, justifying 'the social status and
the imaginary security of its pundits and scribes
in the fields of ideology and science' (14).
It's possible to develop a formalism operating
with 'transcendent universal forms cut off from
from history', or to see 'social formations and
material assemblages' as embodying them so that
they can be inferred. Some encodings will
come to appear to be natural, and accidental
connections with 'sign machines' will appear as
general laws. These were sometimes
misunderstood as comprising a metalanguage—but
language, enunciation, states of affairs and
subjective states are really all on the same level
['flat ontology'] . There are no independent
subjects or objects— their seeming independence is
really an effect of deterritorialization.
Abstract machines connect with
deterritorialization and this is what produces
apparent universal causess, laws, and
pre-established orders.
It is common to argue that we can never possible
to develop abstract conceptions free from
'invasions' from social assemblages or mass
media. However, it is 'assemblages of flows
and codes' that differentiate form, structure,
objects and subjects in general in the first
place so these invasions are just specific
observable cases (15). Abstract machines do
not code existing social stratifications from the
outside. What they do is to offer
transformations inside a general
deterritorialization, by constructing 'an
"optional subject"', a kind of focusing of
possibilities, 'crystals of the possible'
(16). They assemble components in order to
affect realizations, never logically or in a
law-like way, but contingently, never simply
passing, for example from the complex to the
simple, and never establishing a systemic
hierarchy. For example, the most elementary
elements can bring forth new potentialities and
invade more complex assemblages. We need to
lose terms like 'the elementary' when describing
what goes on and refer instead to a 'molecular
level', and this can never be simplified or
reduced. Molecules can provide keys or seeds
for more complex and differentiated
developments. The molecular is more
deterritorialized, and this is essential for more
complex assemblages to arise.
So abstract machines can not be understood in
terms of subject and object, nor in standard
logical terms [like the subject of a sentence and
its predicate?], And nor can they be understood in
terms of
denotation/representation/signification.
Instead, they offer something more general, 'the
order of subjectivity and representation, but not
in the traditional form of individual subjects and
statements detached from their context'
(17). One consequence is to move away from
anthropocentric conceptions, to move from, for
example, logical propositions to 'machinic
propositions' and to examine 'non - semiologically
formed matter' [eg birdsong]. This will make
[conventional, human] coding or signifying look
more contingent. There will also be an
emphasis on singularity as something that does not
just contain 'a limited number of universal
capacities'. Assemblages can be undone to
reveal other possibilities, overcoming the
alliance between universal thought and 'respect to
an established order'.
Linguistics and semiology claim a privileged place
by claiming to be able to solve problems in other
disciplines. But this is really a matter of
high status and an appearance of
scientificity. Saussure, for example, has
simply borrowed by lots of psychoanalysts,
following some sort of tacit agreement over
boundaries of domains. It is this 'shared
problematic' that will be investigated in
particular (18). Instead, it is important to
look at issues which will help us revive the
notion of the unconscious, and understand
pragmatics in a new way. We also want to
look at two particular issues: 'faciality traits
and refrains'. Then we want to develop 'a
schizoanalytical pragmatics' to address political
and micro political problems, and then to go on to
develop new semiotic entities based on pragmatics
in the form of 'a "machinic genealogy"'.
Then we will talk about faciality traits and
refrains in Proust [see my summary --sic-- here . See also
Deleuze's commentary
on Proust]
A glossary might help [ha!]
In order to replace formal analysis with
analytical pragmatics and schizoanalysis, we need
to replace a tree with a rhizome or lattice.
Instead of dichotomous choices, as in Chomsky,
rhizomes can connect any point to any other
point. Each semiotic chain can refer to a
number of 'encoding modes: biological, political,
economic chains, etc.' (19), meaning we can
discuss sign regimes and also forms of non
signs. We will look at the relations between
segments at different levels inside each semiotic
stratum, in order to demonstrate 'lines of flight
of deterritorialization'. We will emphasize
pragmatics rather than underlying structure,
machinic unconscious rather than the
psychoanalytic unconscious, something that
resembles a map rather than 'a representational
unconscious crystallized in codified complexes and
repartitioned on a genetic axis': this map will be
'detachable, connectable, reversible, and
modifiable'. Tree structures can appear within
rhizomes, and conversely the branches of the tree
can send out buds in a rhizomatic form [but we
need a 'pure' model?]
We can consider pragmatics as having different
components.
- Interpretative components
imply more importance for semiology and
signification. There are two general
types of transformations involved— analogical,
as in iconic signs, and signifying, requiring
more linguistic semiology. A type
becomes dominant only within particular modes
of subjectification of power—(re)
territorialized assemblages of enunciation for
analogical transformations, and individual
assemblages for signifying
transformations.
- Non interpretative
components are more general, with
interpretative ones as 'a particular or
borderline case'. They also have two
types of transformation: symbolic
transformation, operating at the level of
perception or gesture and also involving other
verbal and scriptural 'levels that escape from
analogical redundancies'(20); diagrammatic
transformation, which involves a non semiotic
deterritorialization produced by 'mutant
abstract machines… working
simultaneously within the register of material
and semiotic realities' [I assume this meant
transforming from one specific shape to
another governed by the overall diagram.Mutant
possibilities arise with deviant groups
--madmen or radicals].
At the semiotic level, there are also two
types of redundancy. One involves
'redundancies of resonance'[and this is something
to do with faciality and refrains] (21). A
second type is machinic redundancies' 'or
redundancies of interaction' [something to do with
diagrammatic components, presumably the ways in
which one gives place to another within the
overall diagram? As in evolution through the
machinic phylum? OR, the condensed versions of
language in 'restricted codes' or ideologies?].
At the existential level, there are three
levels of consistency. The first one is
molar consistency, relating to 'strata,
significations, and realities', and this seems to
have to do with phenomena as [collectively?]
perceived, including whether or not they are seen
as complete objects, subjects or
individuals. The second one is molecular
consistency, relating to assemblages and how
machines are embodied in them. The third one
is abstract consistency that apparently 'specifies
the "theoretical" degree of possibility of the two
preceding consistencies'. by combining
semiotic and existential types, we can get 'six
types of fields of resonance and fields of
interaction'[up to now I had blamed Deleuze for
this obsessive classification and tabulation].
The first note refers to differences in
terminology, especially with Chomsky, and the
second one distinguishes semiology from
semiotics. Semiology is 'the translinguistic
discipline that examines sign systems in
connection with the laws of language', with Barthes as the
example, while semiotics proposes to study sign
systems 'according to a [pragmatic?] method which
does not depend on linguistics', and the example
is Peirce.
Chapter two. Escaping from Language
[Lots of stuff here about different linguistic
theories. The main points seems to be to
argue that pragmatics is far more important than
any other aspect of language, and that general
theories, including structuralism, are really
describing particular clusters of pragmatic
utterances, some of which come to seem important
for political reasons]
Functionalist accounts of language operated with
phonological chains organized around
binaries. Language was seen in terms of
information theory, with messages and redundancy
and so on. Social and political context were
ignored, so that linguistics can appear to be
scientific and 'serious'. Generative
linguistics, as in Chomsky, saw functionalist
models as describing only the surface activity
produced by underlying syntactic structures.
Some followers wanted to describe the syntax in
terms of mathematics or types of logic.
Even a more recent emphasis on enunciation
[Foucault? Someone else I think] has failed to
grasp the social and political context, and it is
still common to study enunciation in general, or
something abstract, 'an alienated enunciation'
(24). In all these approaches, pragmatics
were seen as something to be dumped in a waste
basket, either ignored, or grasped in 'a
restrictive mode'. Syntax and phonology
dominated. Enunciations were supposed to be
located at particular 'structural junctions', but
were never seen as contingent or singular.
Language was just assumed to be able to represent
a social system. It was also assumed that
semantic and pragmatic fields could be
digitalized—relying on contents and context as
something that can be formalized and seen as the
result of a 'system of universals'(25).
Sometimes this means that semantic creativity
depends entirely on syntactic structures [Guattari
wants to suggest instead Hjelmslev's notions that,
apparently creativity finds an origin in 'the
concatenation of figures of expression and figures
of contents' -see below]. Generally,
creativity is seen as something marginal or
deviant, but this does not explain how originally
marginal words become mainstream.
Linguistics claims to be able to explain all
domains that use language, and this makes it
'imperialist'. There are claims to be able
to explain pragmatics in a neutral way, as
something secondary. Guattari wants to
explain pragmatic contents in terms of 'collective
assemblages of enunciation'(26). This means
that 'there is no language in itself', that what
we have is specific language of all kinds being
produced via 'an abstract machinic phylum'.
There is no direct connection with social
structures, and no general structure that produces
statements separately.
We can start with the classic distinction between
language and speech [and deny it in favour of a
pragmatics of enunciation]. The pragmatics
of the unconscious or schizoanalysis will be
particularly hostile to Saussurian structuralism,
since it shows that language does not have 'a
domain of its own'(27), that it is always an open
system connected to 'all the other modes of
semiotization'. It is only political or
micro political processes that close it up and
call it a national language or dialect, or
delirium. Language is suffused with
'borrowings, amalgamations agglutinations,
misunderstandings'. The same goes for
anthropological structures, such as the
prohibition on incest, which, when examined in
detail, consist of 'rules that can be bent in all
kinds of ways'. It is power formations and power
centres that unify languages and establish
boundaries [leading to the bit that reappears in Thousand
Plateaus. The whole discussion on language
is very similar in fact -- maybe a bit clearer].
Guattari the recycler:
Machinic Unconscious:
28
Language is stabilized around a parish,
fixed around a bishopric, and installed
around a political capital. It
involves by flowing along the river
valleys, along the railway lines; it moves
through oil spots (example of the
Castilian dialect). [it is just assumed we
all know about the Castilian dialect!]
|
Thousand
Plateaus: 7
Language stabilizes around a parish, a
bishopric, a capital. It forms a
bulb. It evolves by subterranean
stems and flows, along river valleys or
train tracks; it spreads like a patch of
oil
|
Note 4, p.333 says: 'Although I wrote them
alone, these essays are inseparable from the work
that Gilles Deleuze and I have carried out
together for many years. This is why, when I
am brought to speak in the first person, it will
be indifferently with that of the singular or
plural. Let one not see there especially the
business of paternity relating to the ideas which
are advanced here. There as well as here it
is all a question of "collective
assemblages". Cf. Our book in
collaboration: A Thousand Plateaus...'
Individuals are always moving from one language to
another, using suitable language for a father, for
a lover, for a dream and so on. These
utterances display a ' whole ensemble of semantic,
syntactic, phonological and prosodic
dimensions… [As well as]… poetic,
stylistic, rhetorical, and micro political
dimensions'. Linguistic mutations appear
from these languages, as a matter of frequency of
use [unstructured by social orders, that is,
unlike the examples above?].
The eternal distinction between synchrony and
diachrony is also suspect. As with other
formalizations, linguists claim an authority by
claiming to see abstract linguistic competence
behind actual performances. But there is no
general structural competence. Languages
reflect heterogeneous social and political
assemblages, as 'carriers of ... indecomposable
historical singularities' (29). The same can
be said about structural analysis in chemistry,
biology, economics or psychoanalysis. There
are no universals in transcendental form, but only
'abstract machines that differentiate themselves,
on the basis of the plane of consistency of all
possibles' at particular points of the machinic
phylum.
What are these abstract machinisms? We can
get some ideas from early Chomsky, as long as we
abandon the later idea of universal syntax, and
notions of depth and surface.
We might begin by analyzing minor languages,
including those associated with children or slum
dwellers. We begin to get an idea of the
'linguistics of desire', but this will not be
grasped by formalization [and Chomsky is singled
out in particular for developing a topology as a
tree structure, as his system developed and was
codified]. If we return to the earlier
model, we can reconsider grammaticality as 'one of
the modalities of the abstract power set into play
by the most decoded capitalistic flows'
(30). We also have to discuss what
grammaticality actually means: is it some
fundamental axiom producing a generative
structure, or is it a 'marker of power and [only]
secondarily a syntactic marker' (31)? There
is a normative element in it, in that the only
normal individuals form grammatically correct
sentences, and those who don't are seen as deviant
to be 'interpreted, translated, adapted' and
sometimes enclosed in institutions.
Linguistic competence is seen as neutral and
universal, outside of contingency, but it is
difficult to think of defining it separately from
performance, and thus the concept is always used
to judge performance, from a position of
power. Chomsky's model does point to the
excess of competence and linguistic capacity
compared with actual speech or performance, but it
is wrong to see this excess [the structure or
machine producing excess] as somehow producing
performance. It is the other way around, and
'the machine itself is produced by its
production'. There is no 'innate
faculty'. Competence and performance
interact. Thinking of competence as 'the
machinic virtuality of expression' can help us
deterritorialize rigid statements like
stereotypes, or syntaxes, seeing them as tied to a
specific social territory, a particular local kind
of competence. Alternative competences can
sometimes attempt to seize power, as when 'a
patois becomes aristocratic, a technical language
contaminates vernacular languages, a minor
literature takes on a universal importance'
(32). These transformations affect 'all the
resources of language'.
Linguistic competence is not universal, nor are
speech acts. They are all associated with
networks 'of various semiotic links (perceptive,
mimetic, gestural, imagistic thought etc.)'.
Statements are produced by 'a mute dance of
intensities', operating on social and individual
bodies. There might be some relatively
universal features [one is ' the
morpho-phonological organization known as double
articulation']. It is obvious that power
formations constitute particular fields of
representation, however, often in an overcoded
manner, displaying 'contingent relations between
heterogeneous layers' (33).
Speech acts, especially Habermas's version, have
been studied by modern linguistics in opposition
to Chomsky and systematic competence: the latter
is seen as arising contingently out of speech
acts, which are regulated by individual, social,
linguistic, and psychological factors [apparently
associated with somebody called Brekle].
This is a step towards analyzing real speech acts
concretely, which would mean an abandonment of
dichotomous or mathematical structures, but we
still have an assumption of universality—as in
Habermas and universal pragmatics . It would
be quite some project to identify these in every
speech act and in every possible one!
Habermas goes on to say that some are
institutionalized in cultures or societies, and
this has led some people to identify particular
characteristics as more likely to be universal [a
list on page 34]. This must be arbitrary,
however, and again focuses on normal adult
enunciation rather than idiosyncratic
performances. We should abandon any attempt
to find universals in favour of 'the full
acceptance of problematics pertaining to a micro
politics of desire and all sorts of macro
politics' (35).
What sort of power do we find in linguistic
fields? Power is not just found in
ideological superstructures, and nor is it
something that only regulates 'well defined social
ensembles'. Power engages 'the whole complex
of "extra human" semiotic machines', seen in the
power of the ego and superego which make us afraid
or neurotic. Combinations of these forms of
power can produce stable layers of competence in
various activities, including individual semiotic
activity, that relating to social machines,
machinic forms themselves, and systems connecting
domains including ' deterritorializing lines of
flight, components of passage, etc.'(36).
Making formal distinctions and pursuing abstract
foundations of language means we miss the effects
of 'collective assemblages of enunciation…
The true creative groups concerning languages',
and operate instead with either individuated or
universal subjectivity. These collective
assemblages can indeed display formal or
individual qualities, but it would be wrong to
turn these into abstract categories.
Instead, we need to examine 'the same types of
processes of universalization that every power
formation has utilized in order to be given the
appearance of a legitimacy of divine right', and
this particularly applies to expansionist
capitalism. We clearly can structuralize and
binarize, but it is a mistake to think that we are
describing eternal structures, things that have
actually produced specific social and cultural
forms. Instead it is 'processes of power and
machinic mutations' which have produced particular
regions of creative potential, and these are the
fundamental processes: we can make them more
complex, but we cannot decompose them any
further. These machines are either connected
to assemblages and transform them, or remain
virtual.
In order to become stable, particular fields have
to show themselves to be suitably collective in
managing diverse performances, even marginal
ones. They have to engage in coding a whole
range of 'overflowing' semiotic assemblages, based
on 'the dominant mode of semiotization that they
set to work' (37), particularly being able to
mobilize abstract machines in finance or science,
for example.
These processes involve 'semiological subjection
within fields of resonance' and 'semiotic
enslavement within interactive fields of machinic
redundancies', or some coordination of the
two. We can expect to find dominant
grammaticality being imposed, ideological
assemblages dealing with content, and
'diagrammatic assemblages of enslavement'
operating as referents [the examples are 'flows'
of abstract labour as the essence of exchange
values, flows of monetary signs as the substance
of the expression of capital… Linguistic
signs adapted to standardized interhuman
communications' (38)]. The intention is to
make each individual into a suitable speaker and
listener, adopting particular linguistic behaviour
that is compatible with capitalist modes of
competence. Capitalism has indeed produced a
pervasive and direct language that seems natural,
operating even at the unconscious level through
'presuppositions, its threats, its methods of
intimidation, seduction, and submission'.
This makes the search for a new conception of the
unconscious particularly urgent.
Again we have to deny that capitalist language
somehow expresses the apparently fundamental needs
or conditions of human beings, and see these
instead as 'semiological transformations dependent
upon a given context within a power system' (39),
with an increasing intolerance towards
alternatives. Such language overcodes the
signifying machines of the state and its
institutions. It replaces 'ancient
sedimentary structures' of societies and
communities with 'molecular chains of
expression'[no doubt in the Hjelmslev sense, to
include non linguistic expressions].
Contents appear as necessities, representing
dominant opinion and 'the persecuting refrains of
the ubiquitous Superego'. Classic forms of
desire are detached and transformed into the
'polarity of subject and object', so they can then
be attached to social needs. They become
inseparable from the significations of mass media,
and they become individualized in a fixed,
non-nomadic way.
We can detect these tendencies in societies before
capitalism, and anyway, such societies already
showed the existence of less dominant capitalistic
flows. However, modern societies, beginning
with the middle ages have led to a loss of control
over these decoded flows [ones that break with the
old symbolic codes]. One result has been
'generalized Baroquism'(40) 'leading to capitalist
societies strictly speaking' [so some sort of
linguistic determinism? Also detectable in Anti Oedipus].
Capitalism features the 'semiotics and machinic
enslavement of the flows of desire', as a response
to reterritorialized codes. This is
'correlative' to the emergence of new forms of
social division between sexes and ages, divisions
of labour, and other forms of 'social
segmentarity'. All forms of sense are
located in a social hierarchy. There is a
constant effort to rethink and modify codes to
incorporate 'in detail every significant
relation'. Children have to undergo an
apprenticeship in the use of such language,
including when they become sexualized and
socialised. They will encounter, for example
a 'regime of pronominality and genders that will
axiomatize the subjective positions of feminine
alienation'. Again there is no universal or
common language between these categories.
Any languages claiming to be national, such as
'those spoken in the French Academy or on
television' are really metalanguages, preserving
social distance with other languages', and
forcefully imposing over coding.
We need to return to Hjelmslev, but not the bit
where he wants to axiomatize language. [Here
is a good discussion of this, reducing, for
example, narrative form to a series of what looks
like Boolean logical connectors]. And try this
nice condensed summary in the irreplaceable site
on semiotics by Chandler:
- Plane of content: For Hjelmslev and
Barthes, the signifieds on the plane of content
were: substance of content (which
included 'human content', textual world,
subject matter and genre) and form of
content (which included semantic
structure and thematic structure - including
narrative). See also: Plane of expression
- Plane of expression: For Hjelmslev
and Barthes, the signifiers on the plane of expression
were: substance of expression (which
included physical materials of the medium -
e.g. images and sounds) and form of
expression (which included formal
syntactic structure, technique and style).
We can use these categories,
remembering Hjelmslev's own reservations about
these terms. He seems to suggest that
notions like planes of expression and planes of
content arise from everyday use and are
arbitrary. In practice they are
interdependent and understood only in opposition
to each other. It is unfortunate that this
looks like the same as Saussure on signifier and
signified respectively, which means that
linguistic structures seem to dominate the whole
practice of semiotics again.
However, we can rescue the general notion of
semiotics using these terms, and denying the
abstract universality of signifier and signified
[indeed, in Thousand
Plateaus, all sorts of inanimate
objects including rock strata are can be seen as
offering expressions — I think this is very
misleading in practice]. In particular, we
should see forms only as expressed by or in
substances, including non linguistic ones.
[I think the argument here is that nonlinguistic
expressions, involving rocks or whatever, are seen
as the original form from which linguistic forms
have emerged]. We need to consider the
nonlinguistic in order to grasp better 'the
abstract machinism of language'(42). [The
argument might be that we need this abstraction to
explain the appearance of semiotics substances of
all kinds]. Hjelmslev goes on to argue that
we should not see the syntagmatic dimension as a
mere product of the system—again, processes are
not based on universal codes, but arise from
assemblages which support those codes. We
also need some 'basic materials' which can be used
in the process of expression.
The issue is to decide what makes some semiotic
components creative, and what might
institutionalize them. Again it is pointless
to look at the qualities of language itself, since
it can produce proliferation, mutations and
standardization. Nonlinguistic components
are often crucial to break conformity or to
'catalyse mutations' (43). There is no
creative potential in the formal units of
content. The pragmatic level of enunciation,
especially assemblages of enunciation, and
molecular matters of expression are where we
should look: these bring into play abstract
machines. This helps us to break with
overcoded languages by going back to assemblages,
where standard significations are on offer,
supported by hidden power formations. We
need to preserve 'this systematic politics of
"good semiotic choice"', by going back to
assemblages and components that produce 'signs,
symbols, indexes, and icons'
Chapter three Assemblages of Enunciation,
Pragmatic Fields and Transformations
[This is very technical and I do not know enough
about linguistics to fully follow it. Allow
me to present a plain man's gloss. An initial
starting point might be the 'semiotic triangle',
which connects signs, thoughts and objects in
various formulations. Thank goodness for
Chandler who provides this:
Variants of Peirce's triad are often presented
as 'the semiotic triangle' (as if there
were only one version). Here is a version which
is quite often encountered and which changes
only the unfamiliar Peircean terms (Nöth 1990,
89):
- Sign vehicle: the form of the sign;
- Sense: the sense made of the sign;
- Referent: what the sign 'stands for'.
One fairly well-known semiotic triangle is
that of Ogden and Richards, in which the terms
used are (a) 'symbol', (b) 'thought or
reference' and (c) 'referent' (Ogden &
Richards 1923, 14). The broken line at the base
of the triangle is intended to indicate that
there is not necessarily any observable or
direct relationship between the sign vehicle and
the referent. Unlike Saussure's abstract signified
(which is analogous to term B rather
than to C) the referent is an
'object'. This need not exclude the reference of
signs to abstract concepts and fictional
entities as well as to physical things, but
Peirce's model allocates a place for an
objective reality which Saussure's model did not
directly feature (though Peirce was not a naive
realist, and argued that all experience is
mediated by signs). Note, however, that Peirce
emphasized that 'the dependence of the mode of
existence of the thing represented upon the mode
of this or that representation of it... is
contrary to the nature of reality' (Peirce
1931-58, 5.323). The inclusion of a referent in
Peirce's model does not automatically make it a
better model of the sign than that of Saussure.
Indeed, as John Lyons notes:
There is considerable disagreement about the
details of the triadic analysis even among those
who accept that all three components, A, B
and C, must be taken into account. Should
A be defined as a physical or a mental
entity? What is the psychological or ontological
status of B? Is C something that
is referred to on a particular occasion? Or is it
the totality of things that might be referred to
by uttering the sign...? Or, yet a third
possibility, is it some typical or ideal
representative of this class? (Lyons 1977, 99)
Typically, these components are connected in the
form of collective enunciations or assemblages
which not only specify the content of the links,
so to speak, but also privilege the legitimate
ones. Guattari is able to develop this model
and add dimensions to it, and then to offer a
table of the possible combinations. I'd take
this to be the 'diagram' of possible forms of
enunciation. The diagram offers machinic
variations, as various connections are established
between different options, including the
mysterious 'resonances'. However, there are
mundane variations as well, since each of the
points of the triangle can demonstrate
change—objects can change as in technological
progress, signs can change as languages develop,
including developing flexibly to exploring
metaphors and analogies and that, and thoughts can
change as culture is developed.
It is also possible to see how linguistic
assemblages are connected to cultural and social
assemblages, and this clearly develops on from all
the stuff about over coding in Anti Oedipus.
Here, Guattari sets up some ideal types societies,
including the one taken to be the most primitive
form, which looks pretty much like mechanical
solidarity in Durkheim. Signs and thoughts
are tightly confined by a collective agreement to
enunciate in a particular way and to rigorously
police any deviations. By contrast,
capitalist societies are heavily individuated,
with apparent autonomy given to signs and
thoughts, although in practice, these are
overcoded, that is subjected to dominant meanings
expressed over and over in a redundant way.
Now read on…]
[Not
yet...While I am here, the phrase 'redundancy'
occurs a lot ,in a linguistic sense, and it
normally means repetition so as to convey
meaning as in 'overcoding'. However, according
to a primer on grammar I found on the web, it
can also refer to material that is surplus to
identifications of a particular grammatical unit
and 'In generative
grammar, any language feature that can be
predicted on the basis of other language
features'.
There is also much reliance on 'resonance' as a
linking mechanism between components and
systems. Too much reliance in my view where it
helps Guattari duck out of being more precise
about what leads to what. I think of it in terms
of DeLanda's dicusssion about how signals, when
brought into close association, can line up
their wave lengths as they dampen the variations
in each other -- this is my take on the normal
notion of physical harmonic resonance as in
guitar strings etc. However, it must surely be
used as a scientific-looking metaphor here, just
to explain how all the forces converge in
semiology and social and psychological systems
to produce the reified capitalist subject. He
might as well have said 'pixie dust'. ]
Content and expression are attached together in
assemblages of enunciation. Originally,
before formed up human language, we have only
'components of semiotization, subjectification,
conscientialization [see below] , diagrammatism
and abstract mechanisms' (45). These are
joined by systems of correspondence and
translation between language and culture.
Some of these appear as common sense, but there
are many other possibilities. Assemblages
are partially autonomous from 'the plane of
content' and their 'angle of signifiance' depends
on the conditions of the semiological triangle, a
way of '"holding" a given subset of the world'.
Note that word 'signifiance' which I am
translating in my layperson's way as the capacity
to signify or to offer significations.
[Massumi's notes on translation and
acknowledgements suggests more technical
definitions. Signifiance refers to
the syntagmatic processes of language, and interpretance
to the paradigmatic ones in a '"signifying regime
of signs"' (xix). Beneviste, who was the
originator of the terms, has his work translated
into English thus: '"signifying capacity" and
"interpretative capacity"']
The subject itself is not just a result of the
play of the signifier, but the product of
heterogeneous components, some of which produce
meaningful dominant realities. Individuation
is itself the result of certain social
organizations and the operations of the
unconscious, the way it manages 'the libidinal
topics of the social field' (46). The notion
of subjects, approved contents, and the law are
determined by relations of power. There is
no universal content, universal world. For
example, there are no universal mechanisms of male
domination based around the operation of the
phallus either—the apparent ubiquity [redundancy]
of phallic forms simply shows the effects of
particular authoritative institutions and ways of
representing persons [which is what I think is
meant by 'faciality', but we will come to that].
There is no intention to separate out and isolate
assemblages of enunciation and desire. These
assemblages can deterritorialize. However,
deterritorialized desire can lead to capitalist
forms of subjectification, because of the effects
of 'semiological subjection and semiotic
enslavement'. It will not be easy to pursue
deterritorialization in the name of molecular
revolution [a note on page 336 explains why—each
side of the semiological triangle contains a
number of diverse apparatuses and possibilities,
and any molecular revolution would have to deal
with all of them—including scientific and economic
assemblages, ideological apparatuses, and various
established 'modes of perceptive encoding', mass
media and so on]. The more obviously
contingent nature of power relations conceals
other attachments to these assemblages.
Each assemblage has a 'machinic nucleus',
comprised of abstract machines, operating as
'crystallization of a possible between states of
affairs and states of signs' (47)—like those
mysterious virtual particles in contemporary
physics, it is useful just to presuppose their
existence. Abstract machines produce
'redundancies of resonance (signification) or
redundancies of interaction ("real" existence)',
depending on whether they are fully embodied 'in a
semiological substance' or exist only [virtually]
on a machinic phylum. Abstract machines like
this display three types of consistency:
- molar
consistencies, with strong crystallization and
stratification, operating through 'weak
resonance', as in formal translation, and
'weak interaction' between stratified
codes. The difference between molar and
molecular reflects alternative
consistencies. Thus molar forms include
'the world of stratified, identified, or
hierarchized objects and subjects', which
constrain the operation of abstract machines
to a reproductive function: schizoanalysis at
this level operates only with interruptions of
consistency, including challenging the
resonance between the levels by referring to
'weak diagrammatic interaction' (48)
[that is pointing out other possible
combinations on the basis of the overall
diagram?].
- molecular consistency,
with less stratification, with consequent
strong resonance, for example between the
subfields inside the overall semantic one and
relations between them, as in 'poetic or
mystical effects', and suitably strong
interaction, including particular kinds of
passage [and again faciality and refrains are
going to explain this]. Interactions at
the molecular level mean it is not really
worth separating out components assemblages or
fields. Abstract mechanisms are
actualized. At this level, constraint
has not set in, including that resulting from
power struggles, which gives schizoanalysis a
particular 'fundamental micro political stake'
in this level (49).
- abstract consistency,
where we can see machinic elements in a more
pure state, without redundancies imposed by
social constraint. Nevertheless, there
are capitalistic abstractions, where a whole
series of resonances and semantic fields are
coordinated. There are also [more
possible] consistent ways in which sign
particles behave. As a result, there is
always 'a "potential possible"' which is never
fully dissolved in existing fields and
components, and which is found in various
uncaptured 'matters of expression' [the
example turns on the ways in which computers
have been captured by instruments of social
control]. Schizoanalysis aims to
transform this situation by displacing
consistency by emphasizing potential passages
and new machines to challenge existing
semiotic fields. [an obscure diagram on
page 50 summarizes the argument, not very
helpfully]
Combining the molar and molecular and the abstract
types of consistency with the notions of
redundancies of resonance and interaction,
provides the six cell table (51) (see
below). These types of fields are
interrelated and dynamic. Some can 'swell'
until they are totally redundant or powerless
[cells in the second column?], asignifying
components can develop from signifying ones, and
pure abstraction is never possible [bottom right
cell,column 4], even with computers which always
retain 'some semiological terminals that are
human'.
We can see what happens in these interacting
assemblages by looking first at those that express
capitalistic power. Capitalism develops 'a
world of simulacra' from semiological
redundancies. It is the passage between
referents, expressions, and representations that
produce these simulacra. This process even
'simulates diagrammatic relations' (52), but
without any critical potential, since it claims to
represent the actual world with no room for
creative dissent, only its occasional version of
'Life, the Spirit, and Change'. Any
abstractions will look synthetic and arbitrary
[one example is '"extremist" religious
assemblages'], and any other abstractions are
likely to be reterritorialized. In
particular, subjectivity and objects of desire are
framed, by connecting them, through what looks
like reasonable resonances, to control mechanisms,
such as superegos, exchange values, or 'an
imaginary museum'. There is no attempt to
connect them to any absolute [as in mechanical
solidarity] , but rather to 'coordinated systems
of power', which manage lines of flight and lines
of dissidence as an example of 'oppression,
distancing, autonomization, and alienation from an
increasingly domesticated plane of the signifier'
(53). The process of homogenization also
involves splitting individuated subjects from
assemblages of enunciation, the reproduction of
conservative signifiers, sometimes drawing upon
limited versions of the diagram, and overcoding of
speech and writing through the control of syntagms
and paradigms. However, there is always a
possibility of new kinds of deterritorialization.
Capitalistic abstraction therefore operates to
neutralize and recuperate lines of flight and
machinic possibilities ['machinic indexes'], and
is linked to particular institutions.
Religion is one, but now there are more fragmented
and diversified mechanisms including 'public
infrastructures and facilities' and the mass
media. Together, these produce 'a gigantic
net, composed of points of potential
signification', and it is impossible to escape,
because all assemblages of enunciation are woven
in. There is a constant alteration and
recalculation so that the 'thresholds of
deterritorialization' are always trimmed for the
established order and made coherent. Lines
of flight will be confined within this horizon,
and machinic assemblages will have to deal with
contents that appear to be universal.
[Sounds like an elaborate way to describe
hegemony].
If we turn to Hjelmslev, we avoid the
simplifications of signifiers and signified, and
we can extend the notion of content and expression
'to all the various assemblages of enunciation'
(54). There is more to 'semantic reality'
than just signification. Semantic fields
refer to particular operations, particular
transformations—'analogical interpretations' these
involve redundancies of resonance and
interaction. Particular assemblages can be
derived from signifiation processes or
'diagrammatism', and all actual assemblages
affecting humans are mixed. Possibilities
are closed off by power and an emphasis on the
subject [the 'personological pole'], but there is
always a potential for new possibilities, since
abstract machines always exceed any apparently
'fixed and universal coordinates' (55).
We can build on the pragmatic component suggested
in the Introduction to produce 'four general types
of mixed assemblages of enunciation'[sigh].
Everything depends on how content is provided:
- In 'analogical generative
transformations', semantic contents envelop
referents, and are generated by 'fields of
interpretance'. They are territorialized
and collective assemblages [as in mechanical
solidarity or childhood assemblages before the
full development of language].
- 'Generative linguistics
semiological transformations' develop more
signifiance on the plane of content. The
referent is not seen as the same as the
signifier. The syntagmatic dimension is
better developed, and individuated assemblages
emerge from the collective ones.
- 'intensive symbolic and
asubjective transformations', where there is a
more reflexive grasp of the links between
enunciation and referents [entirely my own
words here], helping us seen more diagrammatic
or machinic dimensions. This can involve
a transformation of existing semiotic
components, as in 'mystical or aesthetic
desubjectification'. Assemblages of
enunciation are still collective even if they
appear to be unique to one individual, since
the individual still really operates as 'a non
- totalizable intensive multiplicity'
- 'asubjective diagrammatic
transformations', featuring 'asignifying
contents' these can deterritorialize the other
assemblages of enunciation and 'machines of
expression and semantic formalisms'.
They are connected to referents on the
'machinic plane of consistency' (56), and
appear as 'machinic assemblages of
enunciation'. [NB I think the 'asignifying'
bits mean two things -- non-linguistic things
like musical or scientific instruments that
still express themselves in the work of
Hjelmslev, and linguistic bits that have no
external meanings but make sense only as
internally consistent performances -- hence
D&G denying that their books signify
anything]
These different assemblages are not that
discrete. They can deterritorialized, as a
result of 'a signifying component (example: groups
of educated children)'[wha? Some sneaky way of
reintroducing the creative subject?]. They
can inject asignifying machinic elements into
symbolic components, as with drug induced
meditation or 'diagrammatic writing in repetitive
American music'. They can alternate, as when
they slide 'from subject groups toward subjugated
groups' [I think this is an example of what he
calls the 'individuated economy of
enunciation'—the impact of economic factors in
other words]. These alternations and
differences arise because they represent specific
states of the diagram, specified in an attempt to
maximize their efficiency, as a result of the
operation of a micropolitics [the example given is
poetic enunciation, which operates with particular
symbols and modes of subjectification, associated
with particular regimes of signs]. The table
that results also helps us fit in other linguists
and their categories [which I have skipped].
Transformations are possible from one type to
another, for example from (3,in the list above)
symbolic intensive into (1) analogical [the
example is when a fascist group colonizes and
monopolizes particular symbolic components].
Diagrammatic (4) can transform into semiological
(2) , which strengthens ordinary semiological
understandings, and the machine is 'subjectivized'
[the example is when a writing machine is
operationalized by an author -- I think].
Signifying discourses can become asignifying if
the semiological (2) transforms into the symbolic
(3), avoids existing formalisms and explores new
possibilities. Semiological (2) can
transform into diagrammatic (4) and this is where
common understandings join up with diagrams to
escape the limits of analogy and overcoding.
[This is a kind of creativity that explains
scientific or musical innovation -- and
revolutionary politics?].
Particular combinations of components and
assemblages have produced three 'particularly
important limiting fields' (59). We have to
diagnose more elementary components to consider
more complex possibilities. These
assemblages have certain lines of passages, which
have become typified [reified] by social
scientists. Another diagram summarizes the
three 'pragmatic' fields, page 60. [and this is
going to link to the attempts to understand social
forms as codes as in AO?]
We can understand territorialized symbolic
fields by considering elementary cases,
including those of childhood madness and 'archaic
societies'. These fields occupy stratified
territories and are unified by articulated codes,
and by endless elaborations 'of a substance of
universal expression'. So primitive
societies can develop myths which are not just the
result of articulated codes of gestures or
perception, but are related together by how the
group has been territorialized. The group
becomes the signifying substance and they act out
different semiotic combinations as 'a sort of
pragmatic rhizome'(61), but one which limits any
escape route [and the example is given of an
'index' which prescribes particular responses to
events, including what to do if the initial
responses fail. This is also described as 'a
"signifying synthesis"']. There is no
hierarchy established between these semiotic
activities. Mechanisms which
deterritorialize can be tolerated, but are treated
as the same as those which territorialize.
All possible disturbances are excluded, even
elements of diagrammatism. Symbolism is not
open to analogical or semiological processes of
translatability and transformation. Any
higher levels of signification are monopolised by
existing chiefs or 'mechanisms of semiotic
enslavement' such as the restriction of access to
technical or writing machines.
Deterritorializatiion is subject to the desires of
the group. Conventional ethnography has not
grasped how this can lead to a resistance to
external factors like new religions, and have
tried to explain such resistance in terms of
social grids, or notions like 'invariant
significations and stable relations of exchange'
(63). But the contents of the symbolic
fields are connected to each other
differently. Seeing this connection between
symbolic contents and social roles is an
'accomplishment of the hegemony of capitalism in
the 19th century', a clear example of a type of
'dictatorship of the signifier'. These days
we know that non western semiologies can reverse
colonial understandings, and the same goes where
'dream semiologies' assert themselves over more
conventional kinds of semiotics.
It is conventional in linguistics to assert that
iconic components depend on linguistic components,
that symbolism is always linguistic.
Instead, the subordination of images to linguistic
expressions is the result of particular
conditions: one such set of particular conditions
separates language from acts of speech, but
Saussure has universalized this. There is no
necessary type of transformation [as above]:
everything depends on the way in which enunciation
and intersubjective communication are individuated
[ at the level of individual groups here] .
Semantic fields are only moments of
transformational fields, and they rely on 'a
certain type of asignifying machine of
expression'.
Signifying, individuated, and abstractified
fields have been described already in terms
of capitalistic assemblages. The old
territorialities are transformed by signifying
systems. Indexes are abstracted and
connected to each other [systematized] .
Abstract codes produce particular potentials for
icons and indexes. All social life is open
to such abstraction. Analogies represent
only the first stage of translating semiotic links
into each other. Even signifiance is managed
as another modality of reterritorialization and
subjectification of contents: the latter organizes
systems of 'double articulation', in paradigmatic
and sytagmatic coordinates (64), and these are
more deliberately articulated with assemblages of
enunciation at this stage [more so than in
capitalism]. At least analogies preserve
some autonomy for strata of expression, and there
is no imposition of a final signified, embodied,
say, in a dictionary, or controlled by rigorous
rules of linguistic combination. Asignifying
sign machines remain arbitrary, to some extent, at
the level of expression.
As a result of this degree of looseness, also
found in analogies that are not particularly well
regulated, certain elements of diagrammatism
remain, in a mixed system. It is possible to
find 'empty signs without semantic content, for
example the phonic or graphic images of the word
"table" are seen as a table' (65).
Diagrammatic possibilities are limited because
they are seen as 'quasi objects'. However,
there is no symbolic authoritarianism.
Syntax and logic can operate on significations and
propositions, and every day reality can be
extended by pragmatic implications.
All this is soon to be captured by
capitalistic economy, however. The formal
subjectivity accompanies spectacular social
rituals, and an abstract matrix based on
differences emerges. After a state machine
develops, signifying power becomes more
autonomous, regulated by the equivalent of a
'stock market'(66). State machines operate
at the molar level, to stratify and restratify,
and at the molecular level where it 'articulates
and controls all the cogs of the economy and
society'. Molar operations are regulated by
'a collective semiological substance' that offers
differential relations and degrees and types of
power. Molecular ones are regulated by sign
particles that interact in order to recuperate
territorialities: for example different sorts of
time are converted into the quantifiable time of
work values.
Abstraction is the key to managing intensities and
releasing them in particular linear and flat 'old
territorialized rhizomes'. Linear models and
preferred sequences are imposed, so that, for
example older forms of communication in primitive
speech, combining song, gestures and mimicry, are
decomposed, broken into elements and then
rearranged in a syntactic order.
Deterritorializing potential is measured and
compared. Layers are organized in
hierarchies. Non linguistic components are
neutralized, and any that escape are controlled by
particular kinds of 'diagrammatic machines'.
Whole networks of semiotic operators [social and
cultural organizations] control any kinds of
escape, and only permit new machinisms or sign
particles if they are compatible with dominant
systems [including 'systems of abstraction and
formal syntax'(67)]
[The example is the way that new ways of writing
music introducing polyphony and harmony were
originally constrained by appealing to some vague
notion of 'suitable temperament', together with an
effort to fix orthodox forms of musical syntax
through lessons and academies. This
compromise eventually broke up with additional
processes of deterritorialization, in the form of
abstraction that we have already discussed, ways
of stripping components out of contexts and
reorganizing them 'according to a machinic
rhizome' (68). An alternative seems to be to
impose a tree structure 'of implication'.
Apparently, these are the twin dangers affecting
any attempts to get machinic in signifying
fields—an uncontrollable proliferation on the one
side, or a 'sclerotic syntaxization' on the other.
Diagrammatic, collective, machinic and
asignifying fields are when sign machines
operate without the 'significantive processes of
subjectification', and these examples become more
common with 'each passing day'. We now
realize that more normal semiotic machines and
material or social machines can both be traced
back to 'the same type of abstract machine', and
this is to inform 'political pragmatics'.
The old distinctions, like the ones between matter
and form become irrelevant. Polyvocalism
takes on a new form, no longer connected to
various territorialized assemblages, like the
personal or the technical. Instead, we know
operate with machinic populations and non human
machines. Despotic overcoding is no longer
possible. Everything develops on the plane
of consistency of abstract machines and their
potentials. Stratification increasingly has
to respond towards deterritorialized
elements. Fully machinic rhizomes develop,
showing vectors related to 'multipolar,
multisubstantial, multidietic coordinates'
(69). There is a machinic process of
destratification challenging hierarchies, since
machinic components cannot be connected to
stratification. They develop their own
phylum. We can study this by considering the
virtual, the theoretical and experimental
dimensions of analysis. Matters of
expression themselves become diagrammatic, as well
as semiotic contents, and it is no longer possible
to separate out apparently material intensities
from human and emotional ones: rhizomes connect
assemblages ['intensities' (70)] in all of
these areas, without privileging any of
them. We should not see material assemblages
as more territorialized than semiotic ones.
However, some assemblages are more intensive than
others, so that material assemblages can
constrain, but only temporarily, mathematical
machines. However, generally, 'abstract
machines fully exploit their capital of
possible'[sic]. Codings, and molar
stratifications no longer apply, and even
subjective feelings are affected, as when a
scientist falls in love and this affects his
research. [We also find for the first time
the mention of 'black holes' of subjectivity,
which I understand here as meaning dead ends,
where all signifiance ceases: erotic lines of
flight can overcome these]. Passions are no
longer separated from public life, and the special
category of intimacy ceases to be effective.
Psychoanalysis started to investigate these
interactions, but 'quickly stopped along the way'.
Pragmatics is not just about human
communication. Communication presupposes a
relation between 'things and signs' (71).
Semiological assemblages are special only because
'they produce fields of redundancies of resonance
on the basis of sign machines' [that is they can
name and discuss an awful lot of things].
General pragmatic fields have four principal
categories, which nevertheless interrelate [more
obsessive classifying]. There are two
generative fields, 'dominated by semiological
components', 'fields of interpretance' relating to
semantics, and 'fields of signifiance'[where
social and political organizations underpin
particular meanings?]. There are also two
transformational fields with no interpretative
components—'symbolic fields and diagrammatic
fields'. And another table, extending the
earlier one.
What happens is noninterpretive transformations
intrude into interpretive and generative ones,
especially analogical and signifying fields.
We cannot reduce these pragmatic fields of
enunciation by insisting on some universal subject
positions as in Lacan, however. We
distinguish these fields only as a result of a
'methodological necessity', and to insist there is
no priority. We want to produce 'a
"rhizomatic" analysis', and could have done this
from other resources including 'black holes,
faciality and refrains, power formations'
(72). [I think I will reproduce the table on
72]: (NB 'ex' means 'example')
Pragmatic fields interact with some of the earlier
fields we have discussed, to add a certain
flexibility. For example, territorialized
fields feature analogical transformation, it was
argued, but there is more than one type, and it's
possible to use elements from 'symbolic,
diagrammatic and signifying transformations' [the
example is not at all helpful, and considers the
speech of primitive societies and their ability to
refuse systematic significations, relying indeed
on symbolic techniques to resist reductionism, but
at the same time opening the possibility of 'a
signifying economy']. The second example
turns on individuation, which takes specific forms
according to the dominant type of transformations,
but still retains 'deterritorialized symbolic
transformations (similar to the Gestaltist
Figure/Ground)'. It is also possible for the
diagrammatic generation of additional symbolic
formalisms, which can restore some notion of
content to the 'black hole of
subjectification'[none of the transformations here
make any sense, but they include faciality and
refrain again, so perhaps clarity awaits.
Other transformations seem to refer to couples or
paranoia. There is also a reference again to
this work that I cannot find defined anywhere -
'consciential'. {I have seen it connected to
the term 'conscient', which means just
'conscious', sometimes in the sense of being self-
aware. Maybe 'consciential' just means referring
to the development of consciousness in this
sense?} Such subjective deterritorialization is
often stabilized by collective
appreciations]. The third example suggests
that diagrammatic pragmatic fields are still
'haunted by subjects of enunciation' even though
they have been already exhausted by
individuation—for example the continuing idea of a
'listener - speaker' (73), or the notion that
speech is a matter of the mouths of
individuals. Machines are the real source of
the enunciation. Nevertheless, even
diagrammatic fields feature 'artificial
reterritorializations', usually appearing as mixed
assemblages.
[After all that appalling stuff, I don't think
we've got much further than the schema in Anti Oedipus,
which combines social formations with linguistics
operations, probably by reducing social life to
linguistic operations, as long as we allow for the
fact that it's not just humans who
communicate. There seem to be three possible
combinations of social and political organization
with these ways of making sense: in mechanical
solidarity [what they insist on calling
"primitive" societies] there is a despotic system
of coding, where the collectivity polices systems
of enunciation, represented by the chief or
leader; then there is a colonial phase, where new
forms of coding intrude, and there is a
thoroughgoing attempt to understand everything in
terms of these new codes—this is over coding; then
finally there is a capitalistic phase, when codes
take on a certain autonomy of their own and are
not coordinated, except through markets.]
Chapter four Signifying Faciality, Diagrammatic
Faciality
[Delirium or schizo flow at full volume here, as
our hero attaches all sorts of weak significant
links to the notion of a human face. It
seems to go like this: first we can pick up on
existing critiques of the individual, maybe even
borrowing Althusser. Then we render
the core of individualism as the face, by
insisting that facial characteristics are really
important in establishing one's position in social
life. Here, Guattari is presumably speaking
on behalf of the French middle classes, acutely
aware of the appearance of their faces?
There is a brief flirtation with the notion of the
face as a landscape. Then we can conceive of
the face as a dual system of signification—a white
screen, with black holes for eyes. {Eyes are
centres of subjectivity as in 'black holes', the
screen refers to the cultural and social contexts
where subjectivity expresses itself?}. It works
well enough if we ignore ears, noses and mouths --
Guattari must have been impressed by those
over-exposed close- ups of women's faces where
most of the detail is washed out by the
light The notion of a screen helps us pick
up some paranoid stuff about the media. The
black hole is a glamorous way of referring to some
notion of personal semiotic collapse into
madness. Luckily, the signification involves
a binary system, so we can pile in against
binaries and how they confine rhizomes.
Right at the end we find faces are good at
delivering binaries because they operate with them
-- seems to be some sort of echo of the stuff in
sociology about how individuals build up dyads of
selves and others or it might be a borrowing from
Husserl (as Deleuze does) talking about how
perceptions develop from a reciprocity of
persepctives. It is all very much held together
with sticky tape -- Blue Peter
philosophy!
Finally, we can pick up on all sorts of
Foucauldian paranoia about controlling
gazes. Voila! A system is
complete. It all stays stuck together,
floating along, no doubt on a plane of consistency
{the subjective definition of, that is}
When things look ridiculously speculative, homely
examples are provided, like the ways in which
women have to use makeup in order to achieve a
presentable face, or how black skin on faces help
us identify -- black people. There are the
offhand references to anthropological study of
'primitives', and throwaways to various pictures
or novels. This is also Guattari at his most
conservative, with evil capitalism controlling and
dominating all attempts to break out from the
system of faciality. Of course, there are
always abstract possibilities of lines of flight,
and a face with a long hair 'shook the world' in
the 1960's but, by and large, capitalism seems to
have it covered. It even seems to survey
everything with an empty controlling eye:
capitalism as Mordor!]
Faces can be important socially, and we use them
to judge people as trustworthy. This is a
form of territorialization. There are other
connected signifying substances such as voice or
accent—and refrains. 'A voice is always
related to a real, imaginary, or composite face'
(75). In particular, a consciousness is
often based on the triangle that connects eyes,
noses and foreheads. This has apparently
been recognized by gestalt psychologists,
especially in working with infants. None of
this is natural or universal, of course.
'A certain module of faciality, with its tolerated
deviant types' (76) dominates all forms of
expression, and determines 'the strategies of the
subjection of desire'. This is the triangle
mentioned above. Specific forms of
expression are based on this more fundamental
form. We can consider it as a system based
on a circular white screen, on which resonate 'the
semiological triangle, the ego, and the
object'. Thus 'a facialized consciousness'
develops, circulating to pursue new notions of the
possible by connecting to singularity traits
around certain black holes. Thus the
capitalist notion of the individual, '"person"',
is constructed 'in a fundamentally Manichean way',
and there is no alternative except nonsense or the
end of social life. This 'abstract faciality
speaks at the heart of speech', and manages the
black holes of semiotic collapse while
constructing 'personological structures of
power'. This is a binary system and it
supports 'the universal translatability and
responsibility of statements', as a 'subjective
totalization', reducing everything to 'my
consciousness'. The system has the effect of
apparently naturalizing meaning and things, and
thus helping to reproduce 'the reigning socio -
semiotic order' (77). Bodies are shaped to
strategies of power and politics. Faciality
employs redundancies and resonances [rapidly
becoming the all purpose term for a relationship
which avoids any of the inconveniences of having
to say whether one causes or determines the
other], although it 'occupies the determining
[sic] place within pragmatic fields' to do with
sex and social bodies. As usual, it relates
both to these global binary and phallic systems on
the one hand, and more singular traits.
There might be particular 'faciality- types',
including the normal everyday one, which sometimes
gets interested in other lives, say in the past,
which seemed equally normal. Even here 'the
normality of yesterday supports that of today'
(78). This is because currently normalized
faciality always superimposes itself on landscapes
and territories. It does this as it 'wards
off the black hole of senselessness', and this is
why alternative significations have to be
domesticated. The threat of semiotic
collapse is ever present, with any individuated
enunciation. As a result, 'modern
intersubjectivity is now primarily founded on a
vacuous faciality, a blind face-to-face between
two absent gazes' (79). Facialization is
therefore political at the molar level, operating
to produce a consensus on signification, and at
the molecular level, trying to avoid 'signifying
traps'. Both forms are produced to control
deviant individuals with incompatible faciality
traits.
Capitalistic faciality unifies modes of
subjectification, places them in systems of
coordinates and hierarchies, developing 'an empty
semiotic screen', a screen of reflexivity, on
which can be displayed individual
consciousness. Any threatening components,
including asignifying ones are blocked. It
is this that homogenizes significations,
regulating the plane of consistency and the
machinic phylum of matters of expression.
The face is as important a regulating mechanism as
the phallus, but it operates differently.
Face, phallus and [capitalist] self consciousness
all reterritorialize abstract flows and produce an
illusion of power in the form of an imaginary
appropriation. However, they have different
origins, and only seem to be the same because they
have been standardized 'by the action of power
formations with a hegemonic inclination'
(80). In particular, facialities are
connected more generally to interactions in social
fields, and 'the face is always tied to a
landscape as its foundation': you can travel from
one faciality to another as different social
circumstances require different expressions.
All these are collective, however, shared even
with animals, and affected [ie showing affect?]
institutions, such as the '"a priori" faciality of
the doctor', or the robotic gaze of the policeman
(81). Phallic functions are grounded on the
asignifying system of the socially divided sexes,
and these can be personalized by faciality traits
like facial expressions, grimaces, winks and so
on. It is not a matter of thinking in terms
of theatrical masks: actual persons and
intersubjectivity are themselves semiotic
components 'assembled from machines of
capitalistic abstraction'.
Again, there is no universal subjectification,
only individuation at the intersection of modes of
production of the semiotic and social. There
are the redundancies of faciality, the binaries of
the phallic, refrains, and nothing else 'except a
hopelessly empty consciousness (the Sartrean
"being-for-itself")' (82). Consciousness
struggles against black holes, but does not
intervene in modes of production. It is
caught between resonance with these modes of
productions, producing 'pseudo -
territorialities', and permanent
deterritorialization, between tranquilised
faciality, and 'anxiety which aims at the reality
of nothingness'. The media play a major part
in producing the former. The whole system
tries to mask semiotic subjection, through
normalizing faciality, self consciousness, and
feelings of belonging 'to a "mother language"',
and controlling the range of assemblages and
components. A constant adjustment goes on there to
control turbulent desire, ranging from
domesticating the 'animalistic facialities' of
childhood, through binary options for adults, to
the actions of the mass media in producing
'substitute ritual and totemic facialities'
(83). These replace earlier territorialities
like clans or ethnicities. However, there is
no reification or alienation, because there are no
remaining 'instinctual representations'.
Instead, capitalist subjectification develops from
a diagram of its own, aiming at specific functions
for specific power formations. The
possibilities of the rhizome are neutralised,
including its 'animal, vegetal, and cosmic
eyes'. The media purify representations,
arrange them according to 'dominant coordinates',
and construct 'a vanishing point' for everything
else. These representations resonate with
'all local significations'[major paranoia well
installed by now].
[The bullshit is thick and deep in this next
section, smothering all the self supporting
assertions]. Faciality is not iconic, but
signifying. Speech and language is never just
about transmitting messages. Faciality and
facial substance links elements of discourse to
dominant significations, or dismisses them as
nonsense: in this way it stabilizes
signification. The way it does this is by
sorting out options for the possible, one relating
to the past and one to the future, a binary.
This regulates 'paradigmatic [in the linguistic
sense, a set of associated meanings] equivalences
and axioms' (84). To do this, faciality is
detached from other components, and then
neutralized so as not to interfere with those
components, the better to regulate them into
'standard deviations and passages' (85). In
other words, faciality is constrained itself,
except with schizophrenics or autistic children.
Before modern '"mechanization" [the bad type] and
informatization', various 'mnemotechnic montages
based upon the domestic environment' organized the
'mental space of reference', but these have been
deterritorialized, leaving a modern system of
'dichotic deduction'. We can see this,
apparently in some current university exam
techniques, aimed at producing not necessarily
correct answers, but 'normal' or acceptable ones,
representing 'the aptitude of an "elite" for
cutting a "brave figure" in all circumstances', a
particular example of how facial syntax is
compatible with political and social semiotics
syntaxes [just asserted]. Apparently, the
integration of language and face can take place
according to what is proper, defined by different
institutions and agencies, including
institutions. These can then feed back into
the 'collective Imaginary' (86) [Foucault on
stilts]. Faciality acts as a superego,
regulating enunciations, by making them resonate
with dominant discourses. Deviants have to
be managed, even if they arise from 'a resistance
to social learning… a rejection… of
power'. Facialized consciousness plays a key
role here: it produces a 'landscape - face', which
is apparently 'focalized in a [subjective] black
hole', the management of which results in 'the
illusion of a homogeneous world of
signification'(87). It also produces a
facial syntax, providing an 'illusion'that the
abstract machines rely on 'centralising
structures, a monosubjectivism and a
monotheism'. [There must be such regulation
in an evil system like capitalism, and therefore
there must be a mechanism: it is this that is
'discovered' in all this blurb about faciality].
'Natural sociality' [whatever that is] and
excessive machinic effects have to be
neutralized. The substance of the signifier
becomes the whole of the possible. No
rhizomatic connections are permitted, and nor are
other 'eyes'—a central, empty eye dominates
capitalist faciality [welcome to Mordor!], and it
'knows of only one thing' [an eye knows? Eye, nose
and throat?] that everything must conform to the
dominant notions. There are no mysteries to
this 'inquisitorial gaze of the signifier'.
It's just like Big Brother or other dictators.
Landscapes are facialized in this dominating way,
so that even new facialities, as in abstract art,
are themselves 'interpellated' (88) by the
dominant form in the present [apparently, Proust
attempted to return to an earlier form of human
faciality]. Only minor forms of resistance
are permitted, though—Proust's experience is like
a drug experience, beginning with a noise, speech,
or gesture, and then releasing 'an efflorescence
of intensities of desire'. These examples
show that the regulation of enunciation is never
total, but depends on 'particular contexts and
micro politics'(89). The system does its
best to focalize in such a way as to make all
forms of subjectification subject to 'the regime
of a general culpabilization'[in the sense of
responsible for, or guilty about?]. In this
way, all the specific elements can support each
other and add together to produce 'inhibition and
powerlessness'. The development of a strong
ego shows one process; 'fundamental images', and
'symbolic structures' offer other examples.
In particular, Anglo Saxon psychology domesticates
the subjectivity of the child, imposing dominant
faciality to control relations with others and her
own interior [through the '"four - eyed machine",
of eye to eye contact]
Territorialized pragmatic fields also divide an
inside from outside, of reassuring kinds to
establish harmony [the outside 'invests' the
inside, and the inside is installed
outside]. All the threatening subjective
forces are 'inscribed' on to the regulated
territory of 'social, religious, sexual and ludic
activity' (90) [Marcuse on stilts now].
Sometimes, the landscape can be represented by a
particular 'prototypical face'—Jesus, or the
President. Polyvocality is managed in this
way. All earlier territorializations are
replaced by functional substitutes such as the
nuclear family. The 'third dull I' also
colonises ethnic territories. Discrimination
is sometimes obvious, but also produced by
constellations of facialities. This is
another job of the media, to adjust facialities,
make them fit with institutional ones, without
producing dysfunctional conflicts or complacency.
It is a matter of accepting binary options, or
nothing, sense or nonsense. This is how any
new semiotic sign particles that might threaten
the system are woven back into it, even though
capitalistic faciality can produce threats of its
own [as an abstract possibility, because it
continually needs to adjust and doesn't always get
it right?]. The weaving is not always
complete, and it has to pass certain
thresholds. At the concrete level, power
formations might show certain conflicts among
themselves. The options are located only in
fuzzy sets, and need to be worked on at an
elementary level before they can be incorporated
into 'propositional dichotic operations'
(92).
The problem is that 'capitalistic messages' must
make sense to individuals, but also to the general
system. Obviously, all archaic or
animalistic facialities are deterritorialized, and
new institutional versions, appearing in a
landscape of universal reference, replace
them. However, this can also cause a crisis
for subjectivity for some individuals, 'black hole
effects—semiotic lacunae'. There is a
general problem with any fully 'unifying and
reductive fusion'[however, it always seems to work
in the end?]. Human signifiance also needs
to be maintained as something universal [Habermas
on stilts!]. Faciality does this, and so do
refrains. In this way gazes are doubly
articulated, prevented from becoming lines of
flight, but also prevented from becoming over
integrated.
This is an 'empty faciality', which acts as an
attractor to the more specific kinds, but it is
this tension that provides 'the supposedly
essential anxiety of the human condition'
(93). Specific facialities are threatened
with collapse into a black hole, or are 'subjected
to the tyranny of facial redundancies of symbolic,
personological, and Oedipal identification'.
All these options are simulacra of persons with
proper names. Capital and the libido join
together here to produce stable kinds of
individuated enunciation [but we have to
understand libido as an effect of semiotization,
and that faciality also can draw from unconscious
components --everything links to everything else
to avoid any challenging prioritization, which
makes you wonder why the fark we spent so much
time distinguishing the terms].
In this way, 'an entire syntax crowns
hierarchizes, and adjusts to the various
normalizing power formations'. There is
historical variation. Facial formulas
become 'prototypes of men, women, and children',
for example, and are seen as normal at particular
times in particular places. This is the only
kind of subjectivation compatible with capitalism,
and the formulas manage the possible and its
heterogeneity, without simply overcoding
them. Ultimately, the system is one of
'centralization, an arborifiation, a gridding, and
a finalization of all the means of expression over
the signifying substance' (94). Threats are
projected on to deviant facialities. A woman
has to adopt particular features of faciality to
become sexually available in an acceptable way,
'thus expressing her submission to phallocratic
powers'.
However, 'In 1968, a faciality with long hair
shook the world' [so what happened to break this
apparently omnipotent system?]. Some
cultural breakthrough was achieved, challenging
conventional notions and advancing new 'amazing
propositions', relating to the environment,
childhood, and homosexuality. Clothing and
ways of speaking also expressed this new view, but
these became relevant only when ' reframed on the
sensitive deterritorialized slab which has become
the face'[always?]. [Guattari leaves 1968
inexplicable here—it is not not even one of those
exceptions that prove the rule as below]
In capitalism, however 'everything must be
foreseen and made calculable'(95), so that syntax
is developed systematically so that it can arrange
faciality. Facialities, corporeality and
'landscapity' are no longer tied to local
territories but are manipulated in a 'pragmatic
syntax of bipolar standards and deviant
types'. Institutions developed to manage
deviance, and they depend on the 'laws and
jurisprudence governing the dominant
faciality'. The redundancies involved are
focused back and embodied in 'a "supreme
faciality"', and those that do not fit are ignored
by 'the empty eye of power'. New
metalanguages in psychology and law are needed to
manage this deviance. Generally 'The
universe of dominant significations does not
tolerate any escape over which it lacks control',
and all expressions have to support it or risk the
consequences: 'it's all or nothing!' (96).
Signification becomes univocal, and it gains
social truth only if it is validated by the
central system. Soft forms of control are
mobilized if harsher ones do not succeed or cannot
be repeated, through 'Ambiguity, persuasion, half
lies, and half truths'.
Focusing on specific facial movements and what
they tell us about 'facialized conscience', smiles
can be interpreted as 'an insane grimace or
insolent mockery', submission can look
underhanded, 'a pout beyond the standard will
become a mark of contempt; too old a face or too
wrinkled will inspire fear', and 'tan skin, beyond
a certain threshold, will spark mistrust'
especially if accompanied with a deviant
accent. Sexual choice is posted on the face
so that no threats to phallocratic power may arise
[that might need revising!]. Capitalistic control
even extends to 'the texture of matters of
expression' (97), using the features of certain
linguistic systems to offer a complex exercise of
power and subjection. If all was to work or
well, every expression would end up as a term on a
series of 'automated binary choices likely to be
computerized'.
Faciality explains how deterritorialization
proceeds, helping to stratify different
territories, relating inside and outside, for
example, or events to 'syntagmatic articulations'
as particular activities of the signifier.
'No new semiotic conjunction is conceivable, no
creative nomadism, no "amazing" encounter, no
flash of desire' (98) [really gloomy stuff
then—activists will be cross]. All is
controlled by the ultimate 'threat of
annihilation'. Supreme icons are developed
to manage and reduce the dimensions of
multiplicities, or anything created. This is
outside capitalistic signification and redundancy,
and thus 'order will be guaranteed forever,
everywhere'. Even really insignificant
events are colonized by faciality components, and
this is the reverse of what is normally considered
to be the transmission of information: all
concrete options within a body of messages are the
result of divisions from outside. All
statements can be reduced to binary forms, but it
should not be thought that the binary is
natural—statements have to be carefully prepared
first, by managing originality, and reducing
content to expression. The model of the
'facial "treatment" of speech' (99) is one where
particular traits of expression are mapped 1 to 1
with a definite set of semiotic objects, with all
other possibilities provisionally abandoned: a
binary treatment can then ensue [which part of the
set maps the expression—first half or second
half?].
Faciality 'creates the conditions of reduction for
the entirety of reference'—it is something taken
for granted that abstracts the value of things,
manages intensive multiplicities and their
heterogeneity, and coordinates them through
binaries [still a lot of fatuous speculation in my
view, where this 'must' follow from what has been
said earlier, and so on. It all seems to depend on
people agreeing that faces are simple and easy to
read and so everything else must be]. The
effect is to make dominant semiologies look simply
logical, and conceal their origins in relations of
power. The system works to produce discrete
objects through a 'dichotic method of
opposition'(100) [just a repetition really,
'dichotic' = 'binary']. These are not
produced either by theoretical data processing nor
by 'diagrammatic microbreaks'[which awaits below,
apparently].
So far we have been discussing facial sets at the
molar level, which produce gestalts rather than
logical or diagrammatic groups. They work like
decision trees, with 'a series of yes or no
questions'. This works because of
'synchronic waves of redundancies of resonance'[or
fairy dust], and faciality is important because it
is itself binary—I see another and therefore learn
about my own faciality, so that 'Every effect of
meaning is instituted between two
deterritorialized winks' (101) [isn't this the old
reciprocity of perspectives assumed in
interactionist sociology?]. This is how we
develop classifications of our perceptions, as a
kind of 'facial syntaxization of content', and
obviously much content is overlooked [my
term— see, I can do it!]. The system of
proper names helps to offer a suitable categories
of clusters of qualities, and this is very useful
for capitalistic semiotization: in archaic
societies, every substantive acted like a proper
name, but this has been broken by
deterritorialization and individuation-- 'nothing
appears proper to any group or any person'.
Diagrammatic faciality traits work differently,
through 'machinic redundancies and abstract
machines irreducible to data processes'. The
redundancies subject desire, and the abstract
machines release it in acceptable ways. Here
we move from trees, simulacra, and black holes to
consider rhizomes. Signifying layers are no
longer arranged in concentric zones or controlled
by empty eyes. Instead, there are lines of
flight following diagrammatic possibilities, and
'a becoming - imperceptible' which avoids the
effects of the gaze [ the old postmodern desire to
disappear, I thought, in my notes on TP]
. Signifiers are no longer tied to
referents, and we can develop new types of
'semiotic break', based on contact with matters of
expression. Material flows are in direct,
unmediated relation with systems of coding.
As a result, machinic indexes are openly
articulated, not neutralised. As a result,
they can be used to open new possibilities,
breaking with systems of stratification, linking
with each other, and 'launching semiotic bridges
between matters heterogeneous until now'
(102). They permit the emission of sign
particles and the growth of networks.
These machinic rhizomes are not simply at another
stage in the evolution of capitalistic
organizations of meaning. They already
existed in archaic societies. There are
constantly subjected to the development of new
arborescent systems, even in societies that rest
upon them [is this just the familiar argument
about revolutionary societies being open to
subsequent bureaucratization? Weber on
stilts?]. However rhizomes in archaic
societies were still territorialized, unlike
modern ones. Powerful groups now have to
constantly monitor the operation of such rhizomes,
especially focusing on 'the adaptation and
recuperation of asignifying machinisms' (103)
[computers?], so there is no fixed opposition
between machinic rhizomes and earlier semiotic
systems, no inflexibility for the first, and no
eternal resistance for the second.
Capitalistic systems were already beginning to
develop 'semiotic quantification', for example,
and this is now inseparable from 'machinic
quantification'.
As a result, it would be wrong to see the 'data
processing revolution' as inherently
radical. Nor can it be simply opposed by
'the humanistic conception of science', based on
some eternal division between human beings and
machines. 'Today, machinic
conscientalization has become inseparable from
human conscientalization'[very debatable],
computers have become more and more integrated
into enunciation, and 'it will become almost
impossible to make a distinction between human
creativity and machinic invention'. The only
barrier at the moment is an insufficiently
quantified semiotization, but computers are
developing [a note references a French theorist,
writing in 1979, predicting that computers will
soon be able to manage undecidable propositions,
relatively short and discrete theorems, and
'propositions uniquely demonstrable through
gigantic calculations'(343)]. Machinic
conceptions are already affecting human
semiotization [much more likely] . Computers
deterritorialize particular sign machines [another
note refers to fuzzy computers dealing with fuzzy
sets, 343]. All kinds of social assemblages
can be dealt with like this, leading either to
mystification or 'a different politics of the
capture of the liberating collective
consciousness' (104).
Data processing still tends to work best with
binary systems which are reductive. There is
still resistance to the idea that the future can
be calculated based on the tendencies of the past,
or that an economic base will determine
events. Enthusiasts, however, do think they
have managed the possible, by considering it in
binary terms. Nevertheless, at the moment,
capitalistic modes of thought still dominate such
enthusiasm. A revolutionary machinism would
want to deny the split between material and
semiotic processes, bring deterritorialization of
time and space back under the control of 'a new
type of assemblage of enunciation', new types of
faciality traits, new relations to bodies, 'sex,
the cosmos' (105). It might even consider
'reverse causalities and inversions of time, as
astrophysicists who study the interactions inside
black holes currently do' [gullible prat!].
Certainly, our conception of time and space will
change, and become more particular, in terms of
assemblages and context. We might pursue
more '"Internal" deterritorializations', exploring
our own notions of our perceptions of the outside
world, or our sexual behaviour, and these will be
matched by external forms relating to the
environment and society. The new 'desired
face will utilize registers as diverse as those of
singular identifying components, power formations
with standardised facialities, creative
diagrammatic faciality traits...'.
It is impossible to classify concrete machines
without looking at the 'framework of particular
arrangements specific to each type of assemblage'
(106). These are not systematically
organized. The components do not always have
the same importance, and can vary from one
situation to another. Some components are
organized as constellations, sometimes with a
cyclical mode ['sleeping, waking, meals'—this
idiot has done no sociology, and so he can only
use banal examples]. Some are organized in
central hierarchies, some have dominant
facialities or refrains with their accompanying
everyday meanings. Some can interrupt
resonances. Some can 'catalyze a rhizome',
by undoing global redundancies. Thus
considering machinic consciousness as a whole,
'nothing is determined in advance', and no
relations, such as those between molar and
molecular can be predicted. In particular,
eyes can destabilise, or dominate right at the
centre of semiotization [with a reference to a
weird avant-garde French writer, who seems to like
putting some words in capitals—where have I seen
that before?, 344].
[Thank God I've got through this chapter. I
know my man, though, and equal horrors await. The
opnly hope is that it is running down and there
will be some repetition]
Chapter five The Time of Refrains
[Refrains structure time, as when we 'beat
time'. Refrains also structure group
activity and play a major part in communication in
general, even though music can be considered to be
'asignifying'. I'll bet there's a capitalist
version which is nasty, though]
Individuals and groups share the same a 'basic
range of incantatory refrains' (107). Some
languages are atonal. Some divisions of
labour are underpinned by semiotic assemblages,
and they seem to exhaust the range, with no 'pure'
specialisms. Capitalism also has an
obsession with order and regulation of the
heterogeneous. This simplifies and
rationalizes, even automates, writing, song and
dance, or more creative elements are left to
deteriorate. In music, or complex rhythm
disappears in favour of basic rhythms, and melody
and timbre have been simplified.
Refrains are 'the basic rhythms of
temporalization'. Capitalism imposes the
same rhythms, ['it is always the same song'] and
this helps organize assemblages serially. At
the same time, specialist options within the
overall rhythms are allowed even encouraged to
develop as a kind of [bad] diagram. As a
result, refrains can be seen as micro political,
operating at the most intimate level of personal
time, and our connections to the living
world. They are always associated with a
face, as we saw, when faces and voices were
examples of 'significative redundancy'
(109). Western music claims to be a
universal model, sometimes with permitted
flourishes, such as connections with fulk music or
other genres. This followed
deterritorialization. Musical tastes and
styles have been imposed. Some people
mistake deterritorialization for a process of
abstraction and purity, increased creativity,
liberated from the limits of everyday refrains,
available to all [but this means 'mass mediated'].
As usual, it is deterritorialized material that is
individuated, with an obvious role for the mass
media: televised programmes take the place of
local nursery rhymes and lullabies, general advice
is given to the lovelorn in the form of
'antipsychotic catchphrases' (110). This
makes us feel we all belong.
Some people have advocated solitary precapitalist
songs and speaking, to escape the network, but
this is no longer easy in the 'general regime of
inter-subjective mush' (111), where everything is
mixed, including 'cosmic flows and investments of
desire' in the most banal daily newspapers.
The solitary life may no longer be possible.
This links to the triumph of the signifier in
structuralist psychoanalytics.
This could be seen as an aspect of 'The "modernist
illusion"', that sees us as having dominated all
the old traditional relations with life or
thought, through an intermediary world between
matter and image. Kafka describes the
situation, particularly in terms of 'capitalistic
sound in our relation to time'[it sounds a bit
like Huxley's morning for traditional songs in Brave
New World] Kafka describes the results as
'an unbearable hissing', and this reminds Guattari
of binary music, 'a hissing black hole'.
Western music could be seen as a fugue based on
this original empty note. [Then there is a
reference to Schumann which I do not understand]
Modern attempts to transcribe primitive music into
western terms simply failed to measure the
'singularity traits', imposing conventional
notions of rhythm, for example. Primitive
societies work to different, longer, less
consistent rhythms. We can see some of this
'by returning to the rhythms of our childhood with
the incessant breaks' (112). Institutions
like the school and the military, or corporations
mean these refrains get 'purified, ascepticized'—a
deliberate link between the modernist illusion and
public hygiene [mentioned in Foucault I
recall].
The schizoanalytic perspective does not mean
regression, but rather building on those bits of
childhood 'that associate refrain redundancies
with faciality redundancies' to inform pragmatic
fields. The original territories have been
swept away, together with their 'components of
conscientialization' (113). [All sorts of
additional links with courtly love or Nazism seem
to swarm unbidden into his head at this point --
schizo flow no doubt]. Extreme possibilities are
then on offer:
- A 'hyper territorialized
subjectification'focused on the domestic,
involving 'movements of the material couple
and their children'[closely regulated domestic
activity, a bit like the Kabylia for Bourdieu,
or time management systems?].
- New diagrammatic
possibilities leading to new technology to
produce 'chronographic enslavement of human
functions' [time and motion?].
- Rhizomatic mutations
which open new possibilities to break out of
capitalistic forms.
More generally, we can compare the redundancies of
refrains with those of faciality as before [with
all the gloomy micro politics?], But whereas it is
easy [?] to see the central role for faciality ,
refrains seen more passive, and time less
manipulable than space. However, refrains
show the same tensions between radical creativity
['diagrammatic hyperconsciousness' for Guattari]
and conformity ['opaque consciousness of
resonance']. We're going to do this in
particular when we analyse Proust, but the main
discussion here concerns 'the domain of animal
ethology'[!]
[This is going to be fun. I think the way
this is going is to say that animals must be able
to communicate. If not, he would have to go
back and revise what he said about an animal
component of human semiotic activity
earlier. I cannot follow by biology, and
wonder if anyone can either because it is so
French and obscure. I rely on Delanda, as ever,
to put this into more accessible terms, denying
that there is a blueprint either chemical or
behavioural, that guides animal behaviour, but
more a system of flows of hormones and zones of
chemical intensity that get concretized and
produce solutions to problems. I think
Guattari is a bit flustered here, judging by the
spades of bullshit, and he provides us
with the wasp-orchid cliche in the end.
There also some marvelous asides, including a
superb note 13 (345) on the courting behaviour of
peacocks. Apparently, female peacocks are
subjectified by the black eye holes on the
peacock's tail, that is turned into a female ready
to mate. Some naive behaviourists have
denied that mating behaviour leads to orgasm which
raises doubt about the communication involved:
Guattari will have none of it and argues that
peacocks enjoy 'A "courteous" orgasm [which]
attaches itself to the partner with a lure and
probably releases the hormonal components
necessary for the following events'].
It is a 'preoccupation' to deny explanations
of animal behaviour in terms of a hierarchy
of instinctive components rooted in nervous
centres, as somebody called Tinbergen
attempts. Instead, we can talk of the
emergence of certain 'spatio temporal coordinates,
social coordinates, etc.' emerging from a typical
refrain, 'between stratified systems and
diagrammatic processes'(115). Animal
behaviour is not to be explained by combinations
of inhibition and release mechanisms, although
there are lots of biologists have tried to use
these to develop hierarchies of behaviour.
There is even a tendency to deduce 'the existence
of a "soul"' in these hierarchies, illustrating
the tendency for purely functional analyses to
have to rely on 'transcendent authorities' for
their ultimate authority. [Then a superb bit
of bullshit lasting half a page, which says, I
think that the complexity of animal behaviour
cannot be explained just by specific components
attached to particular points of a
singularity]. Assemblages change as a result
of changes in 'stratified substance-form
relations' (116), and this is 'rhizomatic
creativity', which cannot be grasped by empiricism
or structuralism. It depends on 'a
rhizomatic conception of interassemblage pragmatic
fields', and these explain innovations in the
development of an animal capacities and
species. Here, the term refrain helps us to
understand better than the usual oppositions
'between the acquired and the innate', between
biological determinism and complete freedom
[educationalist have missed a trick here—they
could get all Guattarian on the old debate between
nature and nurture]. The refrain can be seen
as acting like a catalyst or an enzyme which
facilitate interactions at the molecular level, in
'spatial and rhythmic' relations: this greater
flexibility permits diagrammatic strategies and
semiotic bridges, with local links rather than a
final end ['no blueprints' is how Delanda puts
it]. We can now explore limit states, and
breaks of mechanism, diagrammatic potentialities
and creative lines of flight 'through which
evolution selects its adaptive paths' (117)
He now needs to rethink the point made earlier
about black holes as the end of creativity.
Now, black holes can produce redundancies which
help deterritorialize. They can contain
'certain innovative processes', at least in a
preliminary way. These emerge long-term,
perhaps after a million years of controlling
innovation, or as a result of specific
catastrophes. Animals sometimes encounter 'a
behaviour-crossroads' where different options
appear to preserve the species, and we see there
'interrogative pauses', or special occasions where
refrains, bodily components and facialities
interact [and this is where the delirious
diversion into peacock mating behaviour occurs
through a note]. These are examples of 'the
living rhizome' (118). These display 'complex
semiotic metabolisms' which lead to certain
assemblages, the disaggregation of others, 'sorts
of phase transitions'. None of this happens
a priori, except for some underlying desire
and life force [almost]. All concrete
strategies are found within the overall rhizome,
and none can be preferred.
For example, what is the difference between animal
and human desire? It is not just that the
latter depend on speech and law, while the former
'remain fixed within systems of ritual fascination
and ostentatious expenditure tied down to a
passive Imaginary'. The codifications of
animal desire are as rich as those of human
desire. We find the same sort of
interruptions by micropolitical black holes, as in
courting behaviour, which gets disrupted by
episodes of aggression or other sequences.
These are the same as blockages in humans which
can also produce compulsive repetitive
behaviour, 'behavioural stereotypes' which
are widely found in human affairs as in phobias or
obsessions. There may be intermediate behaviours
between animal desire and human desire. The
most difficult difference to resolve is the way in
which those 'interrogative pauses'are dealt
with—human beings often simply accept social
repression in a resigned way, unlike 'the vitality
of animal desire' (119).
Human beings have lost some of these capacities,
and have developed excessive individuated
enunciation, and this is undoubtedly helped
deterritorialization of refrain and faciality,
although it's difficult to say which happened
first. Deterritorialization then spreads
like 'gangrene'. We tend to see evolution as
creative because it has led to
deterritorialization, but we have to resist seeing
this as progress or dialectic: it is rare that the
contradictions are completely overcome, more
common to find them circumvented through
displacement of the problems, sometimes even
reviving the old territories. Nor can
deterritorialized assemblages be seen as somehow
richer or more inventive. For example,
although the 'contemporary technico-scientific
phylum' has been very creative, so has the 'living
phylum' that preceded it in human affairs.
There are no essential differences between humans
and animals, but they do have different
assemblages of semiotization, and different
components. For example, human beings have
had to invent ways to restore social order, such
as faciality and refrains, and this can also
produce 'new machinic territorialities'. But
animals also preserve order in a number of diverse
ways—scent trails, territorial songs and so
on. It is a mistake to see them as innate,
however—mottled Australian sparrows [sic] use
their colours as a code to regulate personal
space, but it is not that this machinery came
first, more that selective pressure resulted in
its introduction: again we can't see this as
progress.
What about wasps and orchids? [A favourite
example, scattered throughout their work].
Orchids develop colours that look like female
wasps, so that male wasps try to make with them
and thus transfer pollen. This seems to be a
closed, natural system, but we can see this as
originating in accidental encounters and remaining
permanent as a result of selective pressure.
There is a role to be played by 'abstract
machinisms that have been stratified to some
extent in the machinic nuclei of the genome', but
we cannot reduce this behaviour to the
genetic. Instead there is a 'pathway'
between the genetic, the behavioural, and the
ecological, producing 'collective semiotizations'
(121). New pathways are still in play.
The interaction between wasp and orchids therefore
shows 'a "surplus value of code"' (122), something
that cannot be reduced to interlocking purposes,
but which 'functions like a mutant a wasp-orchid
species', as a new 'evolutionary line of
flight'. In effect, actualized fields are
hardened and stratified to facilitate certain
consistencies and encounters, as an example of
innovative deterritorialization. This
happens with refrains as well, which get closer to
the machinic nuclei the more they are hardened or
enclosed—but this makes them even more useful for
machinic power.
[Forking hell! Now we're going to have a
chat about baboons!]. We want to look at how
the apparently opposed opposites including
acquired and innate, individual and social, and
economic and cultural need to be examined to
separate out fixed elements and 'transversalized
operators' (123). We can see the latter at
work in a more evolved animals, such as baboons
and vervets. These animals display 'three
social types of assemblages':
- an internal hierarchy,
expressed in aggression and combat, often
simulated, and favouring dominant males.
This is different from external territorial
disputes, and is not tied to a specific
territory any way.
- collective defence of the
territory, against neighbouring
troops.
- individual flight from
predators.
So the semiotization here is connected with
intrinsic sexual components, but also a social
field ['a field of inter-assemblage facility-
corporeality' (124)]: baboons are facial because
they look each other in the eye when displaying
aggression. For other species, social
behaviour comes before sexual display, so it is
wrong to assume that sex and the social are always
connected in the same way. In particular,
the 'image of sex organs' becomes a form of
intimidation only in particular spatially
determined areas. These are not 'partial
objects', but only semiotic operators, one of the
points that articulate assemblages and
action. [The term 'silhouette' makes several
appearances in this discussion, presumably as some
stripped down version of faciality? This is
actually not as innocent as it seems, because when
we come on to discuss birds we have a problem --
birds do not have faces! To talk about silhouettes
then would look a bit tactical and opportunist --
better toget it in early]. These connections
are mistakenly disconnected in laboratory
procedures, isolating particular genetic and
cultural components, sometimes inspired by
Freudian or structuralist [functionalist?]
notions. Instead, we should be referring to
various kinds of choices produced by biological
imprint, individual actions, or social relations,
so as not to 'crush the rhizome of
socio-biological assemblages' (125). Within
this rhizome there are individual components, with
biological factors; group components with
collective rituals and socialization procedures;
species components with mutations and genetic
spirals, and even 'techniques of delimitation' [a
note refers to the habits of birds in enclosing
species], and 'symbolic attachments'[surely the
most controversial of all attempts to blur the
differences between humans and animals?].
This abstract machinism [rhizome] governs
evolution for all animals, operating in all
dimensions, including chemical and chromosomal
ones. Apparently, some 'primatologists' at
least are thinking along these lines, for example
to account for altruistic behaviour [sacrifice of
an individual to preserve the chances of a
relative—the note here refers to Proust!].
This is an example of how the molecular phylum
traverses 'individuals species and milieu'(127)
and produces '"molar" casualties'.
[ I have highlighted below the bits that reject
all the usual libertarian notions of freedom and
becoming as a matter of releasing our
subjectivity]
This makes us question the notion of freedom as
somehow meaning independence from material
things: it is an option within a rhizome, and
even nervous or digestive systems display 'a
certain kind of freedom and even grace', as we
realize if things go wrong. Seeing the
semiotic system involving 'genetic or automated
regulation via a harmonious apprenticeship' has
advantages: seeing semiotics as entirely a
matter of consciousness and freedom leads to
problems with explaining 'anguished
interrogations or spontaneous blockages'.
'Freedom is not created with
subjectivity!' Machinic freedom does not
mean blind automatism, but an ability to focus
on 'capacities for life and expression…
what moves, what creates, what changes the world
and humanity, in other words, ...individual or
collective choices of desire'. This is
better than thinking of an eternal opposition
between subjectivity and biological or economic
destiny, or, between freedom and the
innate. All these dichotomies arise from
power formations and are used to divide
assemblages.
Freedom is a matter of 'the give and take of
quanta of deterritorialization emitted by
refrains, facialities, etc. and carried by
the ensemble of the components of an assemblage,
whether these quantum be material or libidinal,
individual or group - oriented, private or
public' (128). It is a matter of
negotiating degrees of freedom, especially in
'micro political confrontations', which involve
all components, both molar and molecular and
those of 'abstract consistency'. Nothing
is determined in advance. General laws never
work at the local regional level, so there is room
for 'An intelligence and even a sort of cosmic
consciousness' [when it comes to discussing the
evolution of a species]. Human societies often do
the opposite and set up hierarchies, based on
fear, and in this, they resemble 'societies of
hymenoptera (production for production's sake,
systematic segregation, generalized gulags…)'[a
note reminds us that dreams often offer more
possibilities of freedom].
Positivists are often obsessively prudent,
however, wanting to preserve rigid
categories. This is 'a completely essential,
political issue', as when Tinbergen
anthropomorphizes and thus projects his notions of
hierarchy, and sees animal behaviour as somehow
'good'. This is an ideology, and so are the
opposite views involved in 'transcendental
meditation, breathing methods etc.' (129).
At least the ethologists have helped understand
some aspects of human semiotic activity [and the
note refers to the use of techniques to help us
drive cars or play instruments]. The point
is to ask whether highly differentiated structures
must be associated with constraining and
oppressive hierarchies and the loss of personal
freedom.
[Back to Australian mottled sparrows!].
Males display and bring gifts of blades of grass,
then pretend to be a young sparrow eating the
grass. We can understand this as 'a semiotic
index' referring to a chain of behavioural
sequences, and a silhouette 'which functions here
as an equivalent of faciality'[thought so].
This could be used to understand flirting and
welcoming in human societies, which works at the
level of very fast mimicry, 'and whose encoding is
most probably hereditary' [the note refers to
raised eyebrows, or dilated pupils and so
on]. Both cases show how semiotic indices
emerge, articulated on the human face, or the
birds' use of objects as signs.
Birds have no faces, because their heads have not
been deterritorialized, but expressive machines do
not depend on faces. They all operate with
centralizing specific semiotics at the non verbal
level, followed by '"mental" territorialization '
(130) producing particular icons. What this
illustrates is the limits of Freudian
interpretations again when it comes to humans, and
the need to consider 'uncommon abstract
machinisms' (131). This is one way in
which we can illustrate 'an animal
"becoming-human" by showing us that signs and
tools do not merely belong to our own societies
after all', and a corresponding 'human
"becoming-animal"', where we realise that many
apparently human behaviours really 'relate to an
ethological montage'[so this is what becoming
amounts to? Finding analogies which make
us suspect common mechanisms, as a kind of
transcendental deduction?].
The usual version is that the activities of the
sparrow reflect some archaic residue based on
nesting behaviour. Guattari prefers to think
about 'concrete machines (machinic indexes or
diagrammatic operators) working within machinic
assemblages', but not at the level of human
intentions or enunciations. The machines use
materials locally and contingently, with no
general formula. This is a universal
deterritorialization which does not assume any
rational progress. These local concrete
deterritorializations can also produce change that
larger levels, again without seeing this as
progress. It is not that all residues have
been surpassed. They retain their semiotic
power, and emerge by accident. This can be
seen with the increase in sociability in finches
[!]. There can, however, be 'machinic
progress'(132), as various potential and
undecidable cases emerge. However such
progress is 'political and not normative'[not
related to any transcendental progress].
This depends on the creative lines of flight in a
rhizome: the solutions can be variously 'elegant'
and possess 'grace and beauty', which are not just
detectable to humans.
The grass blade is a pretty obvious sign, but
there are other components in the rhizome in the
form of various nonrepresentative and asignifying
'investments'(133), and these produce a
lifestyle. We are now going to look at birds
especially finches. These will illustrate
how the notion of the territory gets semiotized,
and how specific refrains affect detailed
behaviour—in other words, how the refrain relates
to both the social and the individuated.
As the discussion of faciality and refrains shows,
'Matters of expression' are not just passive
transmitters of information, but 'actively
participate' in overall process of
semiotization, and are equally affected by
stratifications or lines of flight. They are
components of abstract machines, and they can be
relatively deterritorialized and used in new
connections. They are sometimes held in
reserve. It is a mistake to operate just
with empirical connections and
correspondences. We need instead to consider
processes like deterritorialization, changes in
'thresholds of viscosity' (138), the effects of
black holes, the operation of rhythms and
redundancies. One consequence is that we
have to abandon the distinction between form and
matter—both are open to these
transformations. Quantification in the
normal sense needs to be accompanied with a sense
of the intensities of work. Faciality and
refrains work at both levels, within 'form,
substance and matter'. They are located in
and 'effectuate particular spaces and times'.
The example of the Australian sparrows indicates
that there are different possible relations
between material objects and processes of
deterritorialization. In this case,
deterritorialization produced a number of
heterogeneous components to provide a large
vocabulary used by different kinds of birds.
With songbirds, songs are highly territorialized,
however, and this has even produced effects on
evolution of species, since it has helped to
isolate specific populations. Songs include
alarm calls. Finches are able to mimic the
calls of the other birds when alarmed, as a kind
of 'territorial frequency jamming'(139), showing
how a particular song or call can make up an
'asignifying, behavioural language' [surely a
gross exaggeration]. Sparrows can inflect
their songs [here rendered as their 'refrains', no
doubt profiting from the ambiguity of the
term]. All this apparently indicates that
songs can become dominant inside the rhizome.
Nevertheless, although this indicates highly
ritualized behaviour, variations are still
possible [the examples given are peculiar noises
made by storks or starlings, or the apparently
risky behaviour of the nightingale with its loud
song]. Even these anomalies are explicable
though, as part of the rhizome. The mottled
sparrows [again], use grass blades as signs,
and also display a simulated return to
childhood. Two other components are also
important, highly colored plumage and stereotyped
refrain [in the sense of song. Is Guattari
simply deliberately using this word
ambiguously? Does the whole thing depend on
linguistic slippage?]. Apparently, the
sparrows have to learn this song through
apprenticeship and if raised with different birds
have different songs—indicating both imprinting
and active semiotization. Further, there is
a hormonal component, because only males sing, and
females will if you inject them with male
hormones! So there is still a combination of
deterministic components. There is possibly
an even closer link with these with
deterritorialized activity like singing.
This also explains how deterritorialized human
language has produced a tremendous power over
behaviour and environment and excellence survival
behaviour faced with external threats [I really do
not know what to make of this promiscuous
analogizing. It reads like the worst kind of
Desmond Morris type popular television].
Overall, a marvelous diagram on page 143 explains
the tremendous complexity affecting the canary's
reproductive cycle—physical, biological,
perceptive components, and closely interconnected
activities such as mating and nest building,
together with responses to external stimuli and
multiple effects.
It is artificial to distinguish between
semiotization and the constituent components which
are encoded. Elements may be arranged in
various ways, sometimes stratified, sometimes
automated, sometimes capable of generating new
assemblages. Sometimes there are 'zones of
semiotic collapse, of black holes, which in turn
can become generators of over-deterritorialized
lines of flight' (144). The convention of
establishing different orders of explanation, the
physical and the semiotic, for example ignores
transversals, and ignores material effects of
expression. Does social faciality simply
reflect 'innate faciality traits' of the kind
found in animals? [Does the Pope shit in the
woods?] . What about the connections between
free memories and involuntary memories? If
some aspects of memory, such as short term memory,
seems to have a biological base, how does this
explain free memories? We have to say that
some of the most deterritorialized aspects like
faciality, ideas, or abstract machines are
obviously material [in contact with
reality]. If not, we are led to empiricist
and positivist explanations with unexplained
escalations between the levels of chemistry and
life, or matter and spirit. Some components
of faciality and refrains can be located within
brains, but it is a mistake to assume that these
local elements explain molar levels.
'Biological assemblages depend on psychological
and social assemblages as much as the latter
depend on the former' (145). It is equally
possible to argue that components affecting
imagination faciality or music can modify the
social field, but also bodies and biological
systems. Ethology is about to adopt this
more complex perspective, and 'abandon its
childhood illnesses (taxonomism, reflexologism,
behaviourism, neo-vitalism, etc.)' (145-6).
So the great question remains—what holds
heterogeneous components together in an
assemblage? Not some transcendent hierarchy,
not an underlying physical or chemical
structure, but contingent components taking
on the role of 'transcoding and
deterritorialization (what we have called
"components of passage" or "diagrammatic
components")' (146). The discussion of
refrains does allude to some notion of how
biological rhythms are synchronized. This
has led to mistaken metaphysical arguments, based
on foundational 'vital rhythms', sometimes even
derived from some basic molecular rhythm.
This is the same sort of reductionist argument
that we found with memory and its neurological
locations.
However, it did illuminate the problem about the
articulation between the various rhythms and
cadences found in life. There are
indeed 'infra-biological molecular
rhythms'(147) as an example of machinic types of
interaction. However, it is more difficult
with complex compositions. Components of
passages here are not simply effects of transition
like this but 'the bearers of diagrammatic keys'
hidden beneath empirical consistencies. They
offer connections between 'possible worlds and
real worlds'.
Finches illustrate this [not bloody finches
again!]. The finches' song operates with
'two types of rhythmic and melodic levels' which
together articulate the song into definite stanzas
in a particular order. It is not just a
matter of social programming, nor the mysterious
vital rhythms—isolated finches can still sing like
this and seem to be able to select melodies from a
range of those used by other birds. However,
the articulation of the song relies on
apprenticeship. There is a third part 'left
to improvisation and competition', developed
through competitive singing. Overall, the
diagram indicates 'a constant entanglement
involving heredity, apprenticeship,
experimentation, and improvisation', and these
differentiated forms are the components of
passage, and produce deterritorialization and
reterritorialization, and connections between
territories, individuals, and species.
[Very dubious stuff here I reckon.Good fun to
tease the romantics with examples of animal
communication, as the behaviourists did, but all
seems to depend on a decision to use the terms
'language' and 'communication' to cover these
activities. Anthropomorphism seems endemic.
Empirical data is somehow now conclusive {finches
really do have songs divided into stanzas} even if
explanations have to be reformulated. Cases are
cherry picked. The most dubious usage is the
slippage in the term 'refrain'.
This general problem is also found in DeLanda and his
insistence that we ignore the role of human
language in constructing social order because
human language is somehow 'additional', just with
relatively unimportant extra bits like the ability
to argue, reflect, criticize and speculate!]
Chapter six Reference Points for a
Schizoanalysis
[This is the most sustained antihumanist
argument so far. There is nothing special
about human subjectivity. As with all kinds
of consciousness, it is an emergent property of
assemblages, themselves produced by
machines. An infinite number of components
are assembled, and they face towards the possible
— which seems to be in this case the
actualized—and the virtual. The implication
is that other assemblages have subjectivity too,
not just human ones. The unconscious in
particular is machinic like this, and it is
impossible to regulate it through laws or
probabilities. We need to think of all the
factors that produce the impulse to act, for
example, {as a note argues}]
The unconscious consists of machinic propositions
not semiological or scientific ones, and any
attempt to use these risks reductionism.
Existing terms all depend on some basic notion of
a pure subject confronting a pure matter, and
'concepts must be folded on to realities, not the
other way around'(149). We have to be
careful not to turn distinctions into
binaries—this can even affects the work done
earlier on faciality. There are faciality
traits that signify, in human affairs, and a
mechanical faciality that regulate perception and
desire in ethology, at the molecular level.
For that matter, the molar and the molecular must
not be seen as a conventional binary opposition
between, say, 'large-small, passive-active'.
For example, there can be faciality at the passive
molar level [the Freudian imago] but also
an active molar form [the example is in Proust, I
think it refers to constructing the image of a
woman or a conventional partner]. Similarly, at
the micro level, and referring to artistic style,
there can be important refrains or 'modular
stylistic cells' (150) that are imperceptible,
even though they control entire works. At
the molar level an entire work can be
regularized [made consistent] as
well. What is really happening is that the
conventional oppositions should be understood as
options within 'the same musical or poetic
phylum'.
The molar and molecular constantly interact and
links can be '"piloted"'either beginning with
visible assemblages, or with '"invisible powers"'
from matters of expression. At the same
time, all the normal combinations 'can be
confronted with antagonistic machinic
options'. It is not therefore a matter of
concrete assemblages passively responding to
external interactions. They are produced by
abstract machines and the plane of consistency on
the one hand, and the 'concrete machinic phylum'
on the other, and this cannot be fitted in to
macro formalism or micro probabilsm structuring an
initial randomness.
This self-management in 'life, thought, and the
socius' (151) has produced problems for scientific
theorizing. One approach has been systems
analysis, sometimes utilizing mathematical
formulae [and the example is Von
Bertalanffy]. However, 'the framework of
these theories reveals itself to be incapable of
preserving the concrete richness of its object, in
particular the attachments to micro-social
assemblages'. The analysis only works if we
assume that subsystems remain in the same category
as the main system: we can then establish
hierarchical relations between system and
subsystem, based on a notion of complexity.
However, other subsets are always possible [ in
this case 'possible' means potential -- I use it
in this sense throughout, and use the term
'actualized' to mean that which is clearly
possible because it exists], and these can 'remain
in waiting and in reserve, and become "functional"
only under certain circumstances' [the example is
chromosomal systems which can be triggered in
particular circumstances]. It is also
possible that a particular subset acts as the key
to the whole system.
The main point however, is to argue for the
preservation of multiplicity and heterogeneity,
with possible new emergences at 'new points of
metabolic crystallization'. This will help
us operate between notions of forms and notions of
chance. We have to see all populations, of
objects subjects or statements, as displaying 'the
same machinic optional matter' (152). This
produces both actualized and possible mutant
realities. Assemblages can be dominated by
elements that begin with a molecular choice or 'an
insignificant line of flight', and these can be
completely heterogeneous compared with the
structure.
At the same time, we should not see operations
taking place on some original 'cosmic pulp'.
Instead, we have to insist on a general rhizome
traversing assemblages and strata, while at the
same time explaining the emergence of 'active
machinic nuclei' producing singularities.
The notions of faciality and refrain hold the two
possibilities together, and this indicates that
material actual components are always threatened
by 'quanta of deterritorialization' which must
either be redomesticated, or allowed to lead to
new assemblages [ and some of those are
functional].
We can put the problem in terms of the relation
between 'actualized flows and codes' and 'abstract
machinic propositions' (153). In the second
case, metabolism is predominant. Machinic
choice at the nucleus of assemblages introduces an
element of creativity. It is possible to
exist without such a nuclei and to be stabilized
instead around 'redundancies [of stratification]
or black hole effects'. These provide for 'a
molar existential politics' as opposed to a
'molecular existential politics' where there are
machinic nuclei in, or close enough to affect, an
assemblage. The first case operates with
visible repetitions of fixed coordinates, while
the latter operates with 'the machinic plane of
consistency of possibles'. This is the basis
of the real difference between the molar and
molecular levels of articulation—the metabolism is
associated with machinic nuclei, and it can reach
a 'threshold of consistency'. If intensive
forces cross the threshold, machinic
deterritorialization spreads through the network,
and radical possibilities are opened [in the
dramatic prose of Guattari, there is 'another
universe [which emerges] which traverses all
visible universes in time and space', obviously
trying to pick up on the glamour of quantum
theory]. The new coordinates can be
challenged by new possibilities. However all
this can still be considered as material, which is
not confined to the actualized alone.
Similarly, general laws and singular cases never
stop interacting, and intercrossing between
assemblages goes on all the time, between
biological, semiotic and machinic components and
processes. There can be no single
transcendent law or system of laws to cover or
regulate all these possibilities.
All this helps us discuss the problem of how
different options emerge from pragmatic
transformations. We can consider this in
terms of the molar/molecular relation, and this
helps us move the discussion away from human
enunciation and human components alone to 'the
point of view of the things themselves, so to
speak' (154). This implies that there is
some 'subjectivity or a protosubjectivity in
living and material assemblages': their
components do not just interact passively.
Approaches like Freud that tried to explain
unconscious processes in terms of thermodynamic
analogies and underlying material energies are
mistaken. Freudian terms like consciousness
and inhibition are just figurations inside
'machinic unconscious', and they can play
different roles. For example, inhibitions can
produce disorder. This process can also operate at
the molar level, so that 'molar centring' can be
installed on the molecular level. Similarly,
rhizomatic assemblages at the molecular level can
produce '"molar plates"'(155), although they might
not always be stabilised.
Consistencies at both levels also relate to each
other, and differ only in terms of their
ends. Molar politics puts an end to
molecular politics. But if we begin with the
molecular, there is a risk of invading the
scientific field itself with '"micro politics" and
the "subjective"', or projecting spirit on to
matter, this time at the molecular level.
However, human subjectivity works at all stages if
we see it in machinic terms. This is not the
normal subjectivity, not the speech that produces
the world, nothing transcendental or symbolic, not
an archetype, structure or system, but something
'radically atheistic'.
What does machinic freedom look like? It is
a matter of questions of degree, thresholds and
their crossings, some notion of 'discursivity,
deliberation and choice' that does not involve the
conventional subject, codings and semiotics that
do not depend on human language. We can see
examples of such genetic knowledge and machinic
consciousness in the 'enslavement of a driver to
his car'(156) [gets rather ANT-ish here] .
Signification and desire have nonsemiotic
sources. 'A thousand machinic propositions
constantly work upon each individual, under and
over their speaking heads'. Faciality and
refrains reduce the complexity by short-circuiting
connections in rhizomes or recentralizing them
around black holes. But capitalistic
subjectivity must preserve a certain element of
freedom, even if this is only 'a certain abstract
perception of time and space'. Generally
though, the domestication of desire permits the
dominance of norms and redundancies. These
processes make it 'absurd' (157) to see
unconscious subjectivity as merely a matter of
speech and symbols.
All human notions of subjectivity and
consciousness 'coexist within biological,
economic, and machinic processes'. There is
no eternal subjectivity or super-subject uniting
these different operations, nor can we reduce it
to a series of 'standard micro subjects, localized
in the brain. There is no pure and universal
signifying substance or content. The
dominant 'white, conscious, male adult subject'
has emerged from 'the disciplining of intensive
multiplicities'. Only when we have abandoned
the notion of the controlling Cogito expressing
itself in enunciation, can we see the unconscious
as populated by 'molecular packs'. There is
an infinite number of creative assemblages,
components, lines of deterritorialization,
abstract propositional machinisms. We need
to analyze these in order to understand the
unconscious.
Sometimes complex combinations appear to be simple
or primary, as with the libido. Other
components generate much more elaborate and
conscious assemblages. Schizoanalysis should
deal with all of them, seeing them not in terms of
some subjectivity or free will, but as arising
from 'objective constraints' (158). These
can be contingent such as a particular hormonal
flow affecting a component in a refrain, or other
unnatural and astonishing combination.
'Everything is possible on condition that the
enacted connections are compatible with a set of
machinic propositions'. These in turn depend
on the choices within a machinic phylum, and
whether they can cross the threshold to become
actualized.
We can reconsider the notion of freedom and the
subject to focus on any singularity point.
Subjectivity is no longer homogeneous, but
produced by 'infinitely diversified and
complexified' nuclei. Subjects cannot be
separated from their machines. Every
material assemblage displays 'a degree of
subjectivity' (159) and there is also an element
of 'machinic enslavement' in every subjective
assemblage. We have no need to assume some
underlying subjective process or life force.
There is nothing exceptional about human
subjectivity, and other types of machines, can
'"attach" their essence' to flows and codes.
Human worlds participate in the same phyla and
planes of consistency. Molecular
subjectivity, not forms emerging from molar levels
is what we need to study—'the living, free,
creative part of machinic nuclei, and the economy
of the possible and its point of abundant growth
on the real'. This is what we mean by the
unconscious.
Developmental stage notions of the unconscious are
not the same as machinic production—sequences here
cannot be determined and are not automatic.
Particular children are parts of an 'individuated
organic totality' (160)—as when biology dominates
adolescents and releases new 'machinic indexes'and
eventually a new abstract machine, which
externalizes itself in different areas. But
even here, other components can affect this
stage. We cannot separate 'the interactions
of the social and the biological', with
humans any more than with animals [so there is a
collective or species dimension for us
too?]. The sociological and the biological
similarly interact. We see this with the
ways in which the biological stages like infancy
and adolescence are domesticated subsequently,
although they can also lead to 'collective
desiring machines' like youth cultures 'or May '68
etc.'(161), after an initial 'quick, powerless
deterritorialization'.
['Ive highlighted some of the remarks on
education]
Other examples can be found in the early attempts
at writing in a child, and how the 'school
machine' reworks the original disconnected
machinic indices [to domesticate creativity and
polyvocality]. This can be seen as a
moment 'tyrannised by an anxiety to conform with
the dominant norms'. What gives the school
semiotic assemblage such power to manage the
intensities of a child's desire? It is not a
matter of direct repression. What is
required first is an abstract machine that conveys
repression, shapes subjects, normalizes particular
competences: it is not just a matter of
psychological maturity or the management of
oedipus. Rather we need to 'study concrete
social constellations and their particular
technologies of semiotic subjection' (162),
including schools and families [with hints of
Foucault and the similarities between schools and
barracks].
We can't study abstract machines using the
conventional psychological categories or
processes. Particular children develop
particular coping strategies, which may involve
regression or archaic territorialization.
One option is to develop 'the body without
organs', an option for the 'enuretic child' [one
unable to control their flow of urine]. [So
nothing mysterious or Spinozan about the BWO
here—it is a defensive phantasy? There is a
reference to little Hans a bit lower down, and his
peepee machine]. Other ways of withdrawing
the self involve becoming overdependent on the
social circle, including those provided by the
educational and therapeutic machines with
'sado-masochistic' (163). regimes of
repression or behaviour shaping. But
none of this can be grasped by conventional
psychoanalysis of discourses. Indeed,
'readaptive procedures'like the ones above can had
seemed to offer a better understanding to the
child, unless she 'plays the game of
repression'. Even here, abstract machines
will still be able to produce new singularities to
mediate psychoanalytic procedures. There is
no overall domination of the child's personality,
even with secondary symptoms [bed wetters might be
unable to do multiple division, but perfectly
capable of other logical operations]. What
secondary symptoms reveal is the workings of the
rhizome as a kind of a 'repressive jouissance',
where school repression is somehow connected to
mechanisms of faciality preventing masturbation,
for example. These particular connections
can then be globalised, territorialized on a
particular activity like multiple division, which
then also offers a potential line of flight.
Other choices are equally possible.
Educational institutions, in families and schools
can only be affective by working on other forms of
creativity, leaving out particular
territorializations such as stammering and other
'neuroses related to etiquette' (164). [Pretty
uncritical view of schools as repressive here? No
points of deterritorialization or lines of fligbht
in the material offered in schools -- no potential
to resist offered by social science or philosophy,
or the formal equality of school regimes as in Gintis and Bowles?]
There can be no full repression of individual
semiotic activity [there you are then you prat!]
Repression can only take place if desire
first crystallizes on particular indexes and
points, and if these are then connected to a
repressive social activity. This always
takes place accompanied with the continued
activity of the 'abstract unconscious machinism'
which can proceed to generate alternative
assemblages. Adolescents, for example can
see the point of adjusting to domesticated
assemblages, and balance the intensity of desire
with the dominant form, which is why those forms
are 'metastable'. Not all machinic indexes
are actualized, and the virtual ones are
potentially threatening and revolutionary.
However, capitalistic abstractions are more
durable. But nothing can be predicted in
advance, and 'diagrammatic reactions' or 'machinic
flights of desire' can break with dominant
significations and reconnect sign machines and
social ensembles (165). In facts, three
possibilities arise: abstract unconscious machines
can dissociate fully and returned to anarchy;
stratifications can be relatively
deterritorialized, if they are seen as too
rigid; full stratification can take place
'through the affects of diagramatization'.
Unconscious abstract machines are not confined to
particular stages or modalities. Their
activity is not exhausted in objectified
structures or representations, including those of
subject and objects. They are not always
recuperated by strata, and can destratify.
There is a tendency for them to manifest
themselves constantly, including in stratified
forms, but the matter that results is not simply
passive as in formalism. Thus 'homeostatic
equilibrium' is never guaranteed (166).
Strata are threatened by machines which
deterritorialize from the outside, from other
strata, and from the inside by lines of flight.
The unconscious is not just a purely logical
construct. It results from the interactions
of codings, including chemical and genetic
ones. It uses different matters of
expression, some more territorialized than
others. It produces its own plane of
consistency to develop its machinic
potentialities. Unconscious
deterritorialization 'constitutes the essence of
politics' (167) but not just human politics—'a
transhuman, transsexual, transcosmic
politics'. Deterritorialization always
produces a remainder, residual possibilities, new
connections, and 'never stops midway'.
Abstract machines are not a matter of
psychological processes, or ideologies or
teachings. They arise 'from a politics of
desire "before" objects and subjects have been
specified'. There is no intrinsic potential
freedom among humans, nor is it found in the
qualities outside the concept in objects [to turn
this into a point made against Adorno]. We should
not see deterritorialization as a matter of
causality, nor is it inherently on the side of
open possibility.
We can use this notion to rethink Freudian theory,
including the work on the latency period: Freud
himself tells us that repression does not
extinguish all the infantile memories, even though
these become incomprehensible 'for the white,
civilized and normal adult' (168). Infantile
creativity and semiotization have been dismissed,
and the whole issue of eternal antagonism between
Eros and Thanatos really disguises 'the appearance
of repressive social assemblages'. This is an
interference in 'the child's semiotic
politics'. Why should such creativity be
confined? And how does the 'educational
abstract machine' connect to the child's own
abstract machine? How do nurseries continue
this process begun by parents [nurseries are
particularly important for dividing work and
recreation, 168-9]. Schools who demand
'writing detached from any real use' also
domesticate the creative diagram, as does their
division of space and time and the 'semiotics of
discipline' [which include grading and
competition]. Here, they link with the
conditions of factories or offices and
barracks. The real role of education is not
to transmit a culture but to transform 'the
child's semiotic coordinates' (169). So the
latency period of infantile amnesia is really a
kind of initiation into this later regime, it can
last for 15 years, and it enslaves
individuals. This repression of memory, like
later cases of amnesia, involves erasing infantile
intensity the better to 'reconstruct a childhood
according to the norms'. Neurotics can escape 'for
one reason or another', but they are then
continually subjected to normal values and
significations.
Schizoanalysis examines the 'pragmatics of the
machinic unconscious' (170). It is not focused on
the person or on lived experience as in
conventional psychoanalysis. It is not
focused on verbal material and its 'systematic "
paradigmatization"'on the basis of some abstract
structure. Instead, groups, individuals,
institutions or other social assemblages can
become analytic, especially if this also involves
'other "non - human" flows (non - human sexuality,
economic flows, material flows, etc.…)'. [Deleuze
thinks Marx has got something on non-human
sexuality but I have never traced it]
What is required is a matter of the whole
unconscious with all its strata, lines and black
holes instead of the oedipal triangle, which only
ends in transference and 'interminable
analysis'. It is not easy to unblock the
possibilities, but the potential of the abstract
machine offers a way forward: 'machinic
consistency is not totalizing but
deterritorializing' (171). We have to
understand the possibilities as rhizomes not trees
built around dichotomies [one of the consequences
of imposing a linguistic semiology], and be aware
of multiple connections, and the combination of
stratification and lines of flight. There is
no need to represent the rhizome formally, in
mathematical or particularly theoretical terms:
there is no absolute representation. The aim
is not to trace empirical states back to the
operations of an underlying unconscious which
overcodes them. Instead, we should
understand the operation as 'oriented toward an
experimentation in touch with the real'. The
point is to construct the unconscious as a series
of connected fields or bodies [stratified,
cancerous, or empty bodies without organs will
have to be unblocked—we are talking about Spinozan
substance here?] We will have to understand coding
and semiotic activity at the levels of biological,
perception, and thought. And deal with
images, categories, gestures and words, political
and social fields, writing and the arts. We
will aim at 'systems of tracing capable of being
articulated in a map of the unconscious' (172).
Tracings are useful because they show how sign
particles are connected and mutate as a kind of
experimentation. Maps are also the result of
experimental tracings. Maps oppose
structures because they are more open in all
dimensions, not fixed, and adaptable 'to all kinds
of assemblies'. Either individuals or groups
can develop a 'pragmatic map' in whatever form
suits them—a painting or political action.
The performance can itself modify the map.
The maps can guide 'collective praxis' as with
small anti- psychiatric communities, but will have
no more general significance for other
groups. Maps can indicate more or less
developed pragmatics, however, according to how
machinic molecular and deterritorialized they
are. The point is to avoid conventional
signification which limits the
possibilities. Any stratification needs to
be disrupted, for example through the 'use of
signs of a linguistic origin in domains that are
aesthetic, scientific, etc.', as a
'deterritorializing line of flight' (173)
[endorses delirious ramblings involving literature
etc?] Conventional forms cannot reveal the
forces at work, because various segments, molar
and molecular, are made to correspond.
Machinic models, however, depict 'diagrammatic
processes generating a quantified
deterritorialization via systems of signs -
particles' [we describe things in unusual
ways?].
However, there is always a link with existing
segments, and 'no universal cartography exists'
and there is no general map, no axiomatic.
Abstract machines are always tied to 'an
intentional plane'[that is not extensional].
They're always tied to specific times and
different realities. Their
deterritorialization is constantly interrupted by
reterritorializations, and subsequent
deterritorialization. Nevertheless, they do
dismantle 'dominant realities and significations:
they constitute the navel, the point of emergence
and creationism of the machinic phylum' (174).
However, subject groups and subjugated groups are
never totally opposed. The gap can be
exploited by diagrammatic politics, breaking with
any kind of fatalism, and seeing the unconscious
as a creative force. Investments of desire
have to be localized if they are to take on
bureaucracy or reified leadership and so on.
The group's body without organs should be put to
new usages and transformations, to 'challenge
every status of hegemony' in linguistics,
psychoanalysis, the human sciences and so on.
We can trace out the diagram for little Hans
[below, page 175], showing how his phobic
assemblage developed at different levels.
First we have to understand all the semiotic
productions, and how they have appeared in either
trees or rhizomes, which in turn depends on the
activities of his parents or of Professor Freud,
as well as contingencies such as the connection
with horses. We can perceive his libido as
'constrained to find shelter in the semiotization
of a becoming-horse, etc.' (176), and this helps
us see his symptoms as 'libidinal pragmatics', of
escape, to avoid the normal solutions.
At the level of molecular revolution,
schizoanalysis has a 'watchword'—'"Do it"" (176)
we must break with conventional semiotic
assemblages and their grammaticality, a refusal of
'legitimating the signifying power' of these
assemblages. Instead the need to 'fabricate
a new map of competence and new asignifying
diagrammatic coordinates'. One example is
the creation of an avant-garde party with
Leninism, to transform the masses away from
spontaneism. The development of Stalinist
bureaucracy shows the difficulty of avoiding
inversions of maps and tracings. Leninist
assemblages claim universality, by being grounded
in the First International, 'a new type of
deterritorialized working class' (177).
A micro political schizoanalysis should aim to
'abolish the individuated modes of
subjectification', by inventing a new form of
social pragmatics. This would operates
synchronically by developing connections between
different systems of 'signifying generations'[in
the sense of generating something], and might
operate with any semiotic register, like the
symbolic, intellectually signifying or "natural"
modes of encoding. The idea is to operate at
the very root of the crystallization of power
around a particular dominant 'transformational
component' (178), such as a black hole or a
particular semiotic branch or line of flight [some
extraordinary examples of such
components—'despotic signifying writing'in
'Asiatic empires', or 'the systematize signifying
delire' in paranoia]. The idea is to see
this particular enunciation as just one element in
other machinic assemblages [this can be achieved,
for example, by taking particular 'writing
machines'from their original contexts in poetry,
music or maths]. This will oppose both [a
reliance on individual?] signifiance and
individuation. Political strategies will be
needed to organise new assemblages, diachronically
as well, by pursuing a machinic rhizome.
Again, there are no general laws, but sometimes we
might find clusters of pragmatic assemblages, or
"complexes", for example '" romantic"…
"Popular front"… Resistance…
And… Leninist"'complexes', [one of his
rhizomatic diagrams on 180] and these can sustain
themselves away from their original historical
localizations, just as Freudian complexes do.
We need to consider common patterns such as the
ways in which molar levels are dominated by
territorialized segments. This looks
law-like, but it is confined nevertheless to
particular historical periods, and can be
disrupted by revolutionary situations: these
reveal subterranean machines already at
work. Nevertheless, we can pursue
politically useful links with deterritorializing
tendencies, developing for example schizophrenic
rather than paranoid lines to combat
bureaucracy. Again we need to avoid binaries
['Manichean alternatives'] and remain
experimental, pursuing tracings rather than
maps. For example, it might be necessary to
territorialize on a new body without organs in
order to generate further struggles, or follow a
particular line of flight. Generally, if we
want to generate alternatives, we should concern
ourselves with 'cancerous and empty bodies without
organs', while if we are interested in
transformations, it will be more appropriate to
work on 'full bodies without organs connected to
the machinic plane of consistency' (179).
However, everything begins with tracing
diagrammatic effects, and realizing some of
them—like writing new dreams, designing new
operations for the unconscious: this is quite
unlike conventional psychoanalysis which attempts
to explain and domesticate diagrammatic effects.
New forms of signification like this can become 'a
"war machine"'(181), although it needs to
constantly guard against domesticating tendencies
operating through 'the redundancy of
resonance'. We are not after novelty for its
own sake, but interested in increasing 'the
consistency of semiotic efficiency' in a
particular pragmatic field.
The 'matters of expression' must also be chosen
carefully, because they affects
deterritorialization and other qualities such as
viscosity, and we need to pick those which will
help us fabricate a BWO. Here it is a matter
of the right sort of 'systems of intensity' rather
than theoretical analyses or the role of
affect. For example, we can deploy a tree if
it is generative, and rhizomes if we are
interested in transformation. A generative
tree can produce a new rhizome, or 'a microscopic
element of the tree' (182) which will help develop
a new local competence permitting particular
semiotic components to 'blossom'[more
horticultural analogies!]. Their particular
intensity can develop a new 'hallucinatory'
perception, a new mutation, even 'a synsthesia',
and these will force a reassessment 'in one
stroke' of 'the hegemony of the
signifier'[optimistic rubbish, assuming we're all
philosophers].
So generative trees are useful if we open them up,
even those criticized earlier, as in
Chomsky. We can use them to generate
formative statements ['a promise or an order', or
something that change is 'the bearing' of the
situation, like an oath], which are still fully
grammatical, but can have transformative power and
become micropolitical. Again, we must attend
closely to pragmatic components, unlike structural
linguists. These pragmatic components and
assemblages of enunciation are crucial, for
example agreeing to swear an oath to tell the
truth, while reserving the right to one's own
truth. We might use this, Guattari thinks,
to reexamine the Moscow trials, or the operations
of schools, tribunals, parties or families.
We can also see how the stages [of socialization]
actually work, rather than just taking some simple
model of increasing 'sublimation'. Stages
can sometimes engage simultaneously as a resource
to threaten the system [as when childhood
playfulness emerges to combat factory or police
discipline?]. There are no law-like
connections, but rather 'a coincidence between the
maps' and certain conjunctions—and
disjunctions. There are differences in 'the
range of a signifying power' over a system,
sometimes completely overcoding or dominating, but
not always: there are always 'dialects, indeed
particular idiolects' (184), and these are subdued
by power relations, not always successfully.
So schizoanalysis involves separating out these
different components and vehicles, in order to
traverse different strata and
deterritorialize. It is not a matter of
psychoanalytic transference of its assumption of
neutral analysis. Schizoanalysis is
'implicated by its object even in its fundamental
nucleus'. It must always make micropolitical
choices to develop or restrain mutations with a
view to considering 'an inter-assemblage
transition'. There are no underlying structures to
uncover, but exploration and experimentation 'with
an unconscious in action'. It will operate both
diachronically and synchronically, as above, and
interest itself in even [trivial] 'situational
potentialities' (185). In each case, it is
necessary to ask why particular black holes or
equilibria have appeared, and what might be done
about them [all the dangers of 'extended politics'
here—do we start with disputes between
neighbours?]. Are there any credible
'rhizomatic openings'? In each case, we must
avoid reducing them to conventional theoretical
abstractions and attempt instead to 'thoroughly
grasp the points of singularity, points of
non-sense, and semiological asperities which
phenomenologically appear to be the most
irreducible'[whatever takes your fancy, then?].
There are different types according to whether we
are generating or transforming, although this is a
'slightly artificial'distinction. We do not
always do this in an "extremist" or "savage" way,
however, and we have to be more careful than
theoretical dogmatists are. It is always a
matter of observing 'compromises, retreats,
advances, breaks and revolutions', and this is our
task to 'semiotically and machinically assist
them' (186).
Generative schizoanalysis involves
'dismantling or unraveling'the existing weak
interactions between assemblages, sometimes in the
name of avoiding catastrophe. Then we need
to find indexes and lines of flight, not
deterritorializing, but rather reterritorializing
over 'long durations', until machinic processes
can eventually be deployed. Inevitably,
these efforts will be alienated in capitalism, and
also threatened by existing
'micro-mega-machinisms' like the media.
Schizoanalytic interpretations might begin by
insisting that the apparent univocal signification
in these machinisms is only a selective point of
view. The slogan of the schizoanalysis might
involve 'passwords', to show the possibility of
'new machinic sense in situations where everything
seemed played out in advance' (187). It will
be necessary to oppose [foundational terms in
theoretical analyses], conventional causes or
geneses. It would be a matter of showing how
conventional symbols have been attached to present
realities, and reawakening new possibilities
'congealed in the past'.
Transformational schizoanalysis is
different and involves radical modifications of
the mechanisms and assemblages to create new
ones. It will be necessary to pursue strong
interactions with other assemblages,
deterritorialization, and the development of
'mutant abstract machines'. There might
begin with already existing assemblages and
inter-assemblage relations, or particular
molecular populations, sometimes extracted from
old assemblages, or brought together for a
particular purpose. The micropolitics of
choice must be stressed in a molecular politics
aimed at developing 'new machinic nuclei'.
Specific transformations need to be identified,
and how they might change the functions of
existing populations or matters of
expression. The aim is to reawaken
'components of passage' and this involves:
- making components
discernible, through thinking or magnifying
[and the examples are Proust or Kafka];
- the proliferation of
components once detached from stratified
positions in assemblages;
- the development of
diagrams through interactions, say between
social economic and artistic matters of
expression. These might produce
controlled deterritorialization, aimed in each
case at demonstrating new machinic possibles
and active nuclei 'beginning from singularity
points'. Alternative consistencies can then
appear, alternative constructions of
reality. Everything depends on
developing components 'traversing petrified
stratifications'(189). The possibility
of traversing like this indicates that
existing components look stable but in fact
possess 'a surplus of
deterritorialization'. We must not see
this as simply a matter of semiotic activity,
though, since diagrammatic components must
cross particular thresholds before they can
become real.
In each case, we need to examine both 'existential
consistency' and 'semiotic efficiency' of existing
links and future transformations. We need to
think big, considering even 'the most fantastic
possible', as well as 'the most irreversible
materializations': 'everything in between is
possible!' Transformation involves making these
possibles consistent, by thinking of them as 'the
interaction of heterogeneous components'(190),
components of a machine. We need not proceed
immediately to an alternative
reterritorialization, but understand the
possibilities in deterritorialization, and produce
transformational trajectories, running through
'different consistencies of the real'. This
would help us consider all those entities which
have escaped immediate consciousness, as long as
they are machinically consistent [which is equated
with theoretical experiential, aesthetic or
fantastical consistency]. We do not need to
operate with fixed stages or universals,
transcendental ideas or structures. We do
not have to start from nothing, nor need we be
thwarted by 'the wall of the visible and the
actual'. Instead, we can isolate particular
vectors of abstraction and reality, and the more
we do this, the more we can support our
analysis. This will ground apparently
abstract machinisms which will be detectable in
and adequate to 'the body, the spirit, and the
socius'.
Schizoanalysis is not a technique or a science,
and nor does it require professional
training. Sometimes it is only possible if
mutations have already begun, in social fields or
machinic ones. The comments above should not
be seen as a set of basic principles, offering a
cure. They reflect personal experiences and
a personal trajectory.
Conventional notions of social objects or
psychiatric entities should be seen instead as an
assemblage, to avoid reductionism. Any
fact-like qualities of these objects should be
seen as arising from their machinic
territoriality. In particular, we should
always bear in mind three dimensions:
- the dimension of
components of passage which help crystallise
and sustain machinic nuclei;
- the dimension of
enunciation or semiotization, 'all the means
of expression, representation, communication
and indeed subjectification or
conscientalization which grant them a
particular capacity of recognition' (191);
- the dimension relative to
machinic nuclei and their capacity to detach
assemblages from their contexts, and connect
them to 'the entire "mechanosphere"'
(192). Everything is located at the
connection between 'a position on the
objective phylum of concrete machines', and
its position on 'a plane of consistency of
abstract machines'. The machinic nuclei
integrate these two connections in order to
enable abstract machines to manifest
themselves, while already materialized
machines can connect back with their
'metabolization', and both processes can then
be understood and described
['semiotization']. This is the way in
which we can prevent anything living or
conscious or imaginary becoming alienated.
We must focus on specific 'assemblage
"analyzers"':
- singularity points,
'contingencies irreducible to serial
generations', found in actual history beyond
structures, and including 'faciality traits,
refrains, corporeality, landscapity, and
territory escaping from the systems of
dominant redundancy';
- the body of
reference for enunciation, but as a BWO, not
something closed in, a machinic not a dominant
territoriality;
- machinic nuclei which
articulate heterogeneous components, turning
them into an internal milieu.
Between these three analysers are three types of
relation:
- relations of subjection
'(molar alienation)'relating singularity
points' to machinic nuclei, and particular
material machinisms to systematic modes of
generation [historical processes and
contexts];
- molecular enslavement
linking machinic nuclei and territorialities
[individuals produced by stratified social
relations and structures], to be combated by
elaborating abstract possibles;
- relations of desire,
which underpin deterritorializing flows and
components of passage, and which separate the
stages of machinic creativity and incarnation
[actualization], and abstract and concrete
machinisms and territorialities.
[diagram p.193 -- loads more to come!].
Eight "principles" follow [god help us]. It
would be wrong to see schizoanalysis as 'a new
cult of the machine' (194), certainly not if we
are thinking of capitalistic machines and their
'monstrous development'. Is this politics
still Marxist? -- history is not just driven by
productive and economic machines, however, but by
all machines, so they can be no single
revolution. We have to confront 'coercive
material means and micro political means of
disciplining thoughts and affects', whichever
point of the compass we turn to [the origin of the
pseudy bit about priests and points of the compass
in Thousand Plateaus?]. Is
repression always necessary in any social
organization? We can at least conceive of
other machinic possibilities, but there is no
general solution. We need to establish
'highly differentiated assemblages'. Classic
revolutionary machines have to destroy capitalist
exploitation and societies, and also break with
all the values associated with 'muscle, the
phallus, territorialized power, etc.' (195).
Schizoanalysis is a micropolitical practice,
guided by 'a gigantic rhizome of molecular
revolutions proliferating from a multitude of
mutant becomings: becoming - woman, becoming -
child, becoming - elderly, becoming - animal,
becoming - plant, becoming - cosmos, becoming -
invisible', in order to generate a new
sensibility, awareness of existence and 'a new
gentleness'. We can summarise this in the
following aphorisms:
1. 'Don't hold back', stick at the limit
'adjacent to the becoming in process' [do not
engage in interminable analysis like current
psychoanalysis]
2.'When something has happened, this proves
that something has happened', unlike the
symptomatic readings of nothing happening in
psychoanalysis. Such happenings are not
common 'in the assemblages of desire' (196), but
we have to understand them, and not in the
privileged terms of conventional
psychoanalysis. Dreams have their own
meanings. Unconscious desire is expressed
directly, without deception: 'No need here for
spokespersons or interpreters'. Most people
have 'an inexhaustible unconscious wealth', but it
is often domesticated by family and society.
At least conventional psychoanalysis reveals the
unconscious, 'than one understands very well why
psychoanalysts are paid so much!'
3. 'The best position for accessing the hiding
place of the unconscious does not necessarily
consist in remaining seated behind a couch' [no
additional comment]
4. 'The unconscious drenches those who approach
it', and the options it presents dominates
everything else that happens.
5.'Important things never happen where we
expect', so components which initiate the
change can arise anywhere, and are not usually the
same as those which actually effectuate change [so
speech gets converted into something somatic or
economic]. This means we should appreciate
the heterogeneity of 'these sorts of rhizomatic
transferences' (197) instead of sticking with set
interpretations—these are only open the
possibility of control. Thus there are no
necessarily common indicators of schizoanalytic
subjectivity. Particular components remain
inactive because they've been dominated by
existing interpretations.
6. Transferences can take different forms—'subjective
resonance, personological identification';
machinic transferences operating 'below'
signifiers and actual persons, featuring
asignifying and machinic interactions, and
producing new assemblages
7. 'Nothing is ever given' crossed or
surpassed, but everything is available to
reuse. However we must beware some of the
'downfalls', as when one black hole conceals
another. Nothing is guaranteed. It is
a matter of assemblage and reassemblage, subject
to consistency [so again no universal
psychological complexes].
8 'Any principle idea must be held suspect'
(198). Theoretical elaborations are
necessary, but must recognize that their subject
matter ["the schizoanalytic assemblage'] is
precarious.
Annex: The Molecular Transmission of Signs
[Dear god, this is almost completely
unmanageable. It seems to be a more
systematic discussion of the concepts, machinic
nuclei. consciential components etc, that have
popped up in the earlier examples, although it is
hard to know whether the 'applications' actually
came before the systematization. It is
Guattari at his worst, attempting to show how the
various terms might be defined better, usually in
such a way that they can justify his
explanations. Sometimes this is ludicrously
systematic, as in endless subtypes of the main
types. Sometimes the definitions are simply
circular, as when 'components of passage' are
supposed to be effective, but only when
assemblages have components of their own ready to
receive these components. On other
occasions, 'helpful' diagrams really just
illustrate what the words have already stated—
subjectivity in black holes spirals down to
nothingness, and the diagram shows a spiral inside
a semiological triangle Some remarks seemed to be
fairly easily translated into normal language: I
have not done this systematically, but it seems,
for example, that 'diagrammatic sign-particles'
are probably the terms in the semiological
triangle, as when signifiers get detached from one
context and used to expand the possibilities in
another, as with metaphors, analogies and tje
like. The general sources of creativity
again are not too unfamiliar — signs relate both
to specific objects and events, and are also part
of sign systems, which can then be further
elaborated {he doesn't like that notion as we will
see -- OK transferred then} in a semiotic system,
and eventually, a subjectification system.
Subjects emerge from particualr assemblages
combining semiotic ( of all kinds) components and
some give us consciousness ( the 'conscientalized'
ones).
Overall, the effect is of a science fiction world
again, with systematic taxonomies of aliens,
artificial ecologies and the like. I was
also reminded of Roussel, whom Deleuze rather
likes, with his detailed descriptions of machines
that are perfectly plausible, as long as you
accept the absurd and obsessive propositions and
initial definitions on which they are based, and
the occasional pseudo scientific description to
cover or circularity. Anglo readers might
prefer to think of Heath Robinson.
Anyone reading these notes will have to forgive
me, and go back to the original if you can handle
it.]
Linguists are wrong to think that semiotics
systems are necessarily more elaborate and
creative than simpler codes. The genetic
code, for example seems capable of generating as
much complexity as anything in the literary or
scientific phylum. Everything depends on the
actions of assemblages in arranging and
coordinating these codes [assemblages here are the
more actual and functional 'side' of abstract
machines]. Similarly, there is not a
restriction of meanings in semiological systems
contrasted with 'an amorphous mass of the
possible' (199), since the possible is also
structured [by rhizomes]. A machinic
unconsciousness acknowledges extremely diversified
components at all levels, and the 'multiple
universes of machinic creativity' (200), but we
have to move beyond the customary concepts of
form, information and message, and develop new
notions of how coding and semiotic systems work
[hence the obsessive taxonomy which follows].
Iconic components, which can be anything
from signals to refrains can be detached from one
assemblage and attached to another. This
attachment might take the form of a virtual
possibility, but it's more interesting when it
generates 'a real possible'. This is
particularly how consistencies emerge. The
component becomes integrated into the semiological
system of the new assemblage, and can take the
form of 'a morpheme' of a referent in that system
(201). Further details will be required to
understand the operation of this 'messenger
entity' [below] The real actualizations
offer the maximum amount of consistency.
Components of encoding arise when iconic
components are capable of being attached to a
series of assemblages. This requires that
all these assemblages should be able to receive
this component in the first place [!]. In
this way, components become 'transitive', and
feature 'machinic redundancy' (202).
Specific redundancies can be 'incarnated' into
discursive chains, various figures and images, or
particular systems referring to, say, 'molding,
catalysis, field induction'. Such
transitivity assumes an abstract mechanism
connecting assemblages [!] This in turn depends
on: the internal relations of the component, the
information it contains, the degree of variation
it will accept, and the threshold of consistency
required; the characteristics of the particular
series it is being attached to, including their
characteristic lines of flight, black holes,
channels of transmission and 'the "machinic
inertia" of the system'. Again, assemblages
might be virtual as well as actual.
Components of semiotization. Some
assemblages are capable of developing reflexive
relations, and here, 'semiotic redundancies' can
arise (203) [in the sense that we repeat both the
original statement and the reflection upon it, or
maybe reflect and then develop wider
applications?]. This quality can affect a
whole series of assemblages, and a ' subset
messenger' can be produced from a whole
series—this is the 'component of passage', and it
can also belong to a different series: the same
component of semiotization can produce a linear
succession between the series [which seems to be a
shape commonly imposed on the rhizomes occupied by
components of passage—because semiotization itself
is linear?]. The process is assisted when
messengers are rendered as discrete or digitalized
[an example of this annoying process of
asignification again, which means anything that is
not ordinary language?]. We then get
[artificial?] 'syntagmatic chains of designation'
(204). This only works if 'intra-component
relations' are suitable; if relations between
components and components of passage of the kind
mentioned above [reflexivity and linearity]
develop [!]; if sign systems in the component of
passage develop in a relatively autonomous
way. [All of which is simply another way of
making the same points]
Components of subjectification appear when
components of passage are deterritorialized and
differentiated in two types of content and
expression. Components of subjectification
appear if: the new morphemes of the referent also
generate redundancies; if expressions generate
'asignifying redundancies'[referred to Hjelmslev];
if there are iconic redundancies of contents
[equated to the signified in Saussure—redundancies
here specifically meaning the ability to be
applied to more than one case?]. Various
kind of secondary redundancies are also required,
and we need to refer to the semiological triangle
which this time features
symbol/reference/reference at its apexes.
The first one turns on the redundancy of
designation, and here, a note (355) refers us to
Barthes on denotation, as a first meaning,
implying that there are other designations, and
again some of them might be virtual. Things
like computerised systems, however do not feature
denotation and connotations, because they '"deal"
directly with the referent'—still not a direct
relation to the 'real world' though, but only to a
'techno - scientific order'. Apparently,
this is an example of differences in 'figures of
expression', and diagrammatic semiotics would
include all these possibilities. The second
type of secondary redundancy refers to
representation, and the third one to signification
[both processes are represented by different sides
of the semiological triangle]. Finally,
there are 'subjective redundancies'which emerge
particularly from the last three, and are depicted
in the middle of the other redundancies in a
diagram on 206. [This is because we
experience ourselves as subjects if we are able to
manipulate these particular redundancies, when we
creatively use language?]
The development of subjective redundancies depends
first on dividing semiotic components along a
continuum from' deterritorialized elements of
expression and reterritorialized elements of
content' (206). Then we need to develop 'an
angle of signifiance' (207), using one of these
components on the continuum to engage in
representation [maybe]. Some of these
originating components used in signifiance might
already itself be managed by a [domesticating]
signification process—hence the development of 'an
objectifying subjectification', where the subject
has no meaning except as a signifier. The
angle of signifiance needs to establish a space
for itself to operate [literally on the
semiological triangle drawn on page 208, below],
and this space needs to be somewhere between the
standard icons [the apexes] [the apexes and the
lines represent limits or threats to
signifiance—divinely ordained asignification, for
example, or purely nominalist designations].
Interactions between the redundancies develops
semiological consistency relating to the referent
as material reality; representations and concepts
as conforming to reality; the same for signs; the
same for 'individuated subjects'[I still prefer my
version in the last sentence of the second
paragraph above]. This consistencies can be
diverse and coexist inside a semiological
assemblage. It is perceptions of 'the modes
of dominant reality'(208) that help us harmonise
them, by modulating particular
consistencies. This happens in every type of
society and 'social subset'[the example given is
the tyranny of the French ministry of education
determining educational activities to the
hour]. Signification in particular relates
to 'brute Matter… The reality of the living
Soul… The reality of the signifying
Verb… The reality of the individuated
Subject', and these influence explicit codes and
also 'models of the social formations of the
unconscious' (209). They also appear in
'institutions - agencies of power and the media,
which are like so many operators of a "grammar" of
the unconscious'. [Very deterministic, so we
can predict reservations and waffles to ensue --
yup!]
Particular redundancies can be emphasized in
particular assemblages, but there is no general
hierarchy, and so no univocal production of
sense. Linguistic categories are required,
but only at an elementary stage of
production. Grammar is not the only
influence on the operation of a language, and
there are always more complex productions in
social assemblages, because abstract machinisms
are always more complex. Capitalistic speech
and semiology tries to 'miniaturize' and
systematize language, but even here, there is a
'degree to which social relations and relations of
production are complexified' [and must be unless
we are to give up politics altogether].
Attempts to shape the production of sense produce
subjective'"feelings of signification"'[quoting
Thom]. This is because for him there is an
'"acute resonance"'between concepts, words and
objects in the outside world. It is
necessary to critique this argument, however and
to open up possibilities—resonance like this
arises from diagrammatic possibilities, including,
of course, 'asignifying and asubjective
interactions of a metasemiological nature'
(210). The relations of social forces deeply
affect representations [they are"faked" for
Guattari], but subjectification is never fully
fixed, but operates between two limits [pessimism
and optimism, of course] : 'a fusional feeling of
appropriation', where everything is dominated by
domesticating significations; 'a feeling of
"cartographic" hyperlucidity' where we can see
transversalities, fight off black holes, extract
singularities, develop minor languages and
liberate our creative memory [defined as Proustian
'involuntary memory'] [rare moments of ecstasy,
although the latter intrudes on us all the
time—but even so, we have to learn not to repress
it but get a 12 volume novel out of it?].
Consciential components produce
subjectification, and they face outside to
referents and their morphemes, and types of
representation, and inside to 'a sort of maelstrom
or semiotic black hole'(210) [this must be the
source of all the pessimism about the dangers of
pursuing lines of flight to extremes, especially
through alcohol or drugs]. Black holes arise
from an excess of semiological redundancies which
then become empty of meaning [a kind of excessive
relativism? A bit like the vertigo of
confronting lots of philosophical
positions?]. This shows the machine at its
most powerful, even though it produces a personal
powerlessness. Nevertheless it has a
creative side as well because new 'diagrammatic
signs-particles' can be emitted. The
consciential is a counter point to the subjective
[it occurs when consciousness and thought exceeds
normal social and personal restraint?].
Dangers are presented by redundancies
differently. Redundancies of interaction can
exhibit excessive deterritorialization, which is
not controlled by relations with the usual more
territorialized forms of signification and
representation, or the persistence of iconic
reference and conventional
conceptualizations. Redundancies of
resonance arise when relations themselves produce
relativism: this is not easily reattached to more
territorialized forms, and can accelerate.
These redundancies acquire 'infinite power' but
also 'nullified efficiency' (211).
Consciential components therefore lead to a
situation where subjectivity is not grounded on
conventional references, and they produce
nothingness. Ironically, this becomes a
stage in a further 'process of subjectification
which starts to spin around itself', producing a
kind of free-floating subjectivity, and an
illusion of autonomy from all the normal objects
and supports [maybe], 'nuclei of pure self
destruction' (212). It seems impossible to
escape from 'absolute deterritorialization', and
this pure subjectivity goes on to infect all the
other semiotic productions. However, it is
'infinitely porous to sign - particles', emanating
from machines, offering 'an "escape from
[conventional thinking and] language"'.
Two kinds of micro politics are then possible,
with their intermediaries found in concrete
assemblages. In the first one, we can
construct an entire 'world of simulacra', where
all redundancies resonate together [and confirm
each other]. In the second case, machinic
inputs lead to absolute deterritorialization and
then a more relative version which we can use to
find new possibilities in existing strata, codes
and assemblages, to produce a more critical
redundancy of interaction. [A nice diagram
with the semiological triangle containing a spiral
appears on 213. It helps us translate
conventional psychoanalytic terms in to Guattari's
own language. Similarly, there are some
pathological reterritorializations of
subjectification illustrated in another diagram on
214—hysteria, paranoia, phobias and
schizos]. Psychological pathologies arise
when resonance centres on a particular node which
then controls all the other components.
Diagrammatic components. We have
seen that the subjective black hole can produce
two outcomes, and this is openly described as 'a
new type of binary machinism' (215). One set
of operations lead to the world of simulacra at
the molar level, while the other set 'diffuses a
dust of diagrammatic signs - particles'[now this
really is poetic!] at the molecular level, and
this encourages machinic potentialities.
Signs-particles are not really semiotic entities
any more, but components of referents and abstract
machines, seeming to stand apart from semiological
systems, but 'infinitely deterritorialized and
deterritorializing' (216). This makes them
able to colonize[develop a foreign policy in G's
terms] in an 'almost unlimited
semiotization', unlike icons or conventional
indexes. As a result, they are able to
destratifiy and deform, and even desubjectify and
desemiologize. This is because they display
autonomous figures of expression, produced by
diagrams not existing representations. They
act like the artificial languages of logic or
mathematics (or avant-garde music), not so much
offering morphemes of conventional referents, but
producing new ones.
This sort of diagrammatic operation breaks with
the usual connections between formal substance and
matter. The conventional connections between
signifier and signified are 'disaggregated', form
and matter are linked in a new way, formalization
itself is 'miniaturized 'and accelerated [an
obscure reference to Virillo on the new speed of
politics, assisted by miniaturized 'technical
components of data processing', 357, and an
equally obscure diagram on 217 showing some sort
of short circuit between matter and form leaving
out substance].
Different movements of deterritorialization can be
articulated in different ways. The first
option affects 'semiological sign machines', which
switch from conventional figures of expression to
those generated by the abstract machine. The
second one affects 'mental icons' of relation,
[possibly] by reconnecting them to 'asignifying
diagrammatic figures' [what would these be?
Levi-Straussian triangles?] The third one
affect morphemes of the referent as we saw, and
can generate new realities, at the levels of
chemistry and biology as well as social.
These are three vectors, and they interact or
conjoin in a cycle so it becomes impossible to
separate them, and they work to undermine
conventional signification by emptying the
semiological triangle [that is, each of these
three deterritorializes one of the apexes of the
triangle, as in the diagram on 219, and this can
be cumulative]. Apparently all this is
predicted by Hjelmslev's work on expression and
content and their forms and how they interact—but
for Guattari there is more interaction, and it is
not mechanical, but produced by a 'micro politics
which could be termed ontological' (218). In
particular, sense is not dependent just on form,
but on 'a universe of abstract machines beyond all
formalism'. This explains how sense can
emerge outside the normal forms of encoding and
syntax [which is the point of looking at non -
sense in Logic of
Sense]: there is no amorphous mass
outside awaiting the imposition of forms, but
'machinic sense', manifested as a 'spatial,
temporal, substantial, multi dimensional, and
deictic [meanings rely on context] rhizome'.
This represents all the possibilities, not just
transformations and resonances, as signs-particles
interact as 'pure potentiality' (219).
Those signs-particles have small amounts of actual
consistency, but large amounts of potential
consistency, and this helps them link the abstract
machines to the more concrete figures, and
morphemes to referents. They are
abstract. They miniaturize semiotic
vectors. They are intermediate between
absolutely abstract machines, subsets of those
machines which appear in redundant systems, but
which are not confined to them, and 'concrete
machinic subsets' appearing in actual figures of
expression, icons, faciality, or refrain and all
the other things which guide 'territorialized
redundancies' (220). Those figures are also
constrained by the redundancies.
We can now see that the consistency of an
assemblage will vary, from the inconsistent, where
concrete elements are emptied out by other
assemblages, or where mechanisms decay or become
abstract or reified, and this leads to a 'black
hole of resonance' or just a disintegration.
Consistent assemblages emerge from abstract
machines which can produce new connections and
complexities providing an energetic'"machinic
nucleus"', producing new singularities and thereby
demonstrating new possibles.
With the latter, there are three stages [sigh]
. In the first one machinic redundancies are
differentiated, and components specialized.
In the second phase, preceeding systems are
neutralized, partly by increasing resonances
through subjectification and conscientialization
[just like Durkheim—an increase in moral density
leads to more individualism and profane thinking].
In the third one, deterritorialized machinisms
proliferate and miniaturize [computers give us
more power to think of alternatives]. There
is no dialectical path or career linking the
stages.
The subject is also affected. It is
necessary to remind ourselves that
subjectification is not the same as
conscientialization. We can develop a new
subjectivity independent of conventional notions
of consciousness as in Freud, and there is also a
new one 'independent of individuated subjectivity'
which is particularly important for schizoanalysis
(221). Machinic consciousness could become a
component in new assemblages of enunciation, no
longer confined to just human subjectivity, maybe
even appearing in completely automated
systems. This is a new notion of the
unconscious, not just something interior affecting
subjectivity, but 'a hyper conscious diagrammatic
unconscious no longer maintaining anything but a
distant relationship with the significations of
dominant semiologies' (222).
We can now recapitulate the discussion of
components of passage. In general,
components are not the same as flows and strata
because they belong to assemblages.
Components of passage actually help constitute the
assemblage, because they belong to its machinic
nucleus or can affect it. Components of
passage traverse the whole set of other components
and guarantee machinic consistency, or manage the
thresholds of 'sufficient consistency'. In this
way, purely imaginary possibilities can become
mathematical possibles, and theoretical possibles
technical ones. What happens can be
explained as an increase in consistency [changes
of state, thickness, visibility, actualization and
so on], without entropy: there is no general
principle of decline with these machines.
Consistency cannot easily be quantified, but must
be seen as arising 'through assemblages of
proliferating and fuzzy subsets'(223) [in other
words he doesn't know].
Machinic possibles are turned into inputs
for other assemblages in various ways or
modalities. There can be 'a catastrophic
mode' of disintegration; a 'black hole mode' of
relative deterritorialization; a 'quantum mode of
deterritorialization', where forms, structures and
systems are transmitted to other assemblages
'through molding, catalysis, crystals of code,
informatic sequences, diagrammatic processes'; a
general association of these modalities. The
process can be supported by 'matters of expression
deterritorialized to differing degrees':
signs-particles which are fully abstract and can
escape all conventional coordinates; 'concrete
machinic propositions' which traverse substances
of expression; 'material flows and strata' which
are also expressions with 'intrinsic codings'; the
'evental possible' which is singular enough to
escape coordinates and which can attach themselves
to coordinating assemblages: luckily 'an essential
affinity [weasel] exists between the possible of
the most abstract machines and those of the most
singular points', because they are both on a
continuum of an absolute impossible, in 'the sort
of seat of radical creationism' (224), and they
can interact, as when singulars generate laws, and
'the general is singularized as concrete
manifestation'[all this is a particular example of
how philosophers go back over what they have
written in order to try and make it all
consistent, more or less at the expense of adding
characteristics to different objects so they can
relate together]. Machinic nuclei can also
support the process of input because they commonly
provide an assemblage with options and the
opportunity for 'the politics of subjectified
choices', including those which enable thresholds
to be crossed. Our job in exploring the
machinic unconscious is to examine how these
components of passage are articulated by
modalities and supports.
In assemblages of semiotization, there are
molar structures and transformational machines
which can bring 'into play asignifying
diagrammatic semiotics'. Assemblages of
enunciation territorialize, however, usually by
'fixing them on an individuated, conscious,
deliberate subject' and this helps stave off black
hole effects. However, are there are other
matters of expression which are asignifying [not
just computers this time, since objects talk to us
and the like -- cakes or pink hawthorns talked to
Proust, geological strata in TP?].
Assemblages of content do the opposite, limiting
diagrammatic processes and fixing 'paradigmatic
frameworks' (225), thereby tidying signified
matters, linking to power formations and achieving
social homogeneity.
These two processes [relating to machinic
possibilities and assemblages of semiotization]
can also be schematized: they can produce
substantial ensembles of content or expression;
particular forms of content and expression, and
matters of expression, which help extract forms
and substances [unhelpful diagram on 225].
Further, signifying components of passage produce
redundancies between matters of expression
[another reference to Hjelmslev], but passing
through a 'loop of significance' which can then
generate strata or black holes. Asignifying
components do not move through signifiance but
offer formal kinds of extraction, limited only by
a plane of consistency [I am not sure what is
being argued here, as is often the case. Is
it that the asignifying components are somehow
more objective, less open to creative signifiance
and thus capture by power, somehow directly
intuited as machinic?]. Asignifying figures of
expression 'work directly... with abstract and
concrete machinisms and singularity points' (226)
[the examples given are 'phonemes, graphemes,
mathemes and informatemes', so back to artificial
languages again, presumably tightly regulated by
definitions and logical rules. The
implication is that this makes them less open to
capture by power relations? If so, this is highly
debatable to put it mildly]
Capitalist subjectification is a particular
assemblage which features deterritorialized
flows,strata and assemblages which in turn
generates 'a global super-machinism' which then
integrates every human activity. Artificial
objects are used to reterritorialize, create modes
of subjectification which are then 'controlled by
the dominant powers'. As a result,
components of passage take the role of
integration, say between subjects and labour
power, or the integration of the unconscious in an
acceptable way, using power apparatuses of all
kinds, including the media. Components of
passage also link individual and collective
economies of desire, restricting escape through
lines of flight, providing 'indexes of every
nature'.
However, [and here comes the customary resistance
option], 'In fact, on a real terrain' [as if he
would know!] (227), this system does not operate
directly and the same components can also produce
possible deterritorialization, or stratify
apparently common territories. For example,
capitalist signification territorializes both on
'neo - archaisms' and [very modern] specific
asignifying elements [commodities as well as
computers in this case?]. We can even detect
'components of "molecular revolution" or
schizoanalysis', in the same processes' of
deterritorialization and 'artificialization', and
as usual, diagrammatic representation exceeds the
conventional divisions between realities and
territories [as anyone can see?] . Further,
capitalist politics attempts to reterritorialize
in order to manage 'machinic turmoil', but an
excess of deterritorialization threatens this
process: we must think of a way to found human and
social life on movement not on structures [sounds
like a Trotskyite refrain to me]. The free
radio movement of the early 1980s might represent
such as social tendency, because it is 'a machinic
mutation, a technical miniaturization'[how
literal!], and this can help release diagrammatic
processes by appropriating various bits of
redundancy image and exploiting 'optimal
conditions'[technological advance and permissive
legislation, presumably]. This might allow
the creation of 'new realities and new modes of
subjectification and sociality'[so why didn't it
happen?]
[I have only quickly skimmed the essays on Proust
with which this massive volume of work
concludes. I have never really liked Proust,
and I am trying to work my way through In
Search of Lost Time again { I never
got past the first 20 pages before}, allowing
myself an awful lot of skimming. I am summarizing it,
as an Monty Python fan would. It is now June
2014 -- I might return and make more comments if I
get through it. I have now -- July-August
2014. In the process, I have become aware of
a real problem in commenting on the text,apart
from its massive length and detail: it is hard to
keep separate in your mind the Narrator and Proust
himself. I think other commentators have the same
problem and I am not sure even Guattari manages it
totally. Barthes says that Proust never simply puts his life
into words but rethinks and retextualises his life
in order to make it into 'a work for which his own
book was the model' (1977: 144). Some people say
there are obviously biographical bits, and the
text is realist and has the Narrator as a
character and an off-page narrator too.
Nevertheless, I have doubtless screwed up
sometimes in saying that Proust says or does
something, whereas really it is the Narrator who
does: is Proust himself limited in his
becoming-woman by his respectable and patriarchal
stance towards Albertine, or is the Narrator who
is, while Proust cleverly shows us the
diagrammatic possibilities? Is Proust responsible
for the distanciation and the repetitive
pot-boiling bits or is he showing us how the
Narrator's memory works? ]
Proust and the other novelists D&G admire {see
the collection
in the 'clinical' project} are good at producing
'hyper-deterritorialized mental objects' (231) ,
and it is useful for philosophy -- and science--
to study them. This would provide that creative
'"perceptive overlapping"' that is crucial to the
business of creating diagrams. I suspect you need
an awful lot of cultural capital to do this
successfully, of course,and there is always a
danger of actually subordinating literature to
philosophy. To pursue the latter -- Guattari
isolates and illustrates themes and topics, but
what of the 'surplus' that is omitted, such as the
tremendous botanical detail or the obsession with
place names, aristocratic lineages or trains? --
is this just a flow of redundancies? Guattari does
return to the text as a kind of empirical
confirmation of his readings.
It is quite possible to see what Guattari getting
at, nonetheless, and the essays are really very
clever analysis [much better than the usual drivel
about how novelists' characters are unique but
also so universally applicable, or how landscapes
affect writers etc] of the structure of the great
rambling Proustfest— which is a rhizome, or map of
one, of course. The 'little phrase' in the
sonata composed by Vinteuil is obviously one of
those refrains, and Swann's obsession with the
face of Odette is clearly a matter of
...er... faciality. In fact, there is
a lot of stuff on both, and how Odette uses the
little phrase to ensnare and bind Swann, although
Guattari says it does a lot more as well, helping
the main characters to see the semiotic power of
music (or in the case of de Charlus, a gay
musician) . [The musical phrase does most of the
semiotic and philosophical work for Guattari --
but then he is very keen on music himself. Music
offers access to the diagram, but there are
obstacles to seeing it or hearing it that way,
including the way in which Morel abridges the
music and renders it as Swann and Odette's own
song, aided by Odette, so that we get conventional
readings -and the rest is just mysterious and
threatening. One potential is to show how to
become woman, but Swann gets hetero, and later,
deCharlus and Morel get bitchily homo: only Proust
sees it as becoming-woman. Music is so threatening
that Swann and many of the rest of us have to rely
on faciality instead]
Faces and how they transform are frequent
metaphors of relationships -- Odette's face is
transformed by Swann in love and then back again
as he falls out of love; the general's face is
scarred and his features become an 'asignifying
system' of their own, de Charlus has a
fierce face etc. I still think all this can be
handled by considering metaphors rather than new
concepts of faciality -- Guattari admits that
faciality is of importance mostly to Swann, a
visual artist, while the refrain covers all the
cases. The components of faciality become
components of passage as they traverse different
assemblages, Guattari's way of noting how females
with their mysterious looks and glances appear in
several contexts as bridges -- eg Gilberte
attracts the Narrator by a mysterious look which
he misunderstands; they meet near the place where
he had spied on Mlle Venteuil at Combray .
The original obsession with Mama kissing the lad
goodnight threatens to become a black hole. He
copes by deterritorializing her face, partly by
writing about it. We can see how a black hole
develops around another face as Swann loses all
his normal bearings as he falls in love, develops
an all-consuming passion (really with his image of
Odette's face, glamourized by having a portrait
imposed on it). He has to find a way out of this
'semiotic collapse' emanating from his
relationship with an unsuitable courtesan --he
can't just screw and leave her because he is in
love, he shouldn't really marry her because that
would be unthinkable socially, and anyway he is
not in love after all -- so a kind of marriage of
convenience is the way out
We can also see 'landscapity' as a major theme --
so major that I wonder if reading Proust suggested
these ideas in the first place: the terms in
D&G are not poetry but hommage? The
recovery of memory is associated with walks in the
countryside ('ways') and the landscape inspires
and organizes coherent memories, and delivers
overall 'ecstasy' -- 'pragmatic fields' for
Guattari (323), [but equally explicable as an
organized bourgeois romantic gaze.]
The attempts to understand the impact of these
events on the thinking of the characters are
analyzed as various modes of semiotization,
conducted in particular assemblages. Swann, fopr
example, is not easily reduced to Oedipus, since
his attempts to make sense of his relationship
radiate in all directions, meet dead ends, deepen
etc more in the manner of schizophrenia.
The narrative tension of the novel (such as it is,
it is far too long to have any as far as I'm
concerned) is explained in terms of these
assemblages gradually clarifying the meanings of
things like the little phrase, becoming less
fuzzy, as the characters come to some sort of self
awareness, and make connections between events
which eluded them before. It is also a break with
conventional subjectification. Various clues
in the novel can then be understood, including
some mysteries in the conduct of some of the
characters. In the case of Swann, discovery
of his own ambivalent feelings lurking beneath his
conventional sexuality for a man of his station
(eg being predatory towards working class girls)
and his apparently inconsistent tastes is
traced to some homosexual undertones, but
opportunities are not taken up, and Swann's search
for new semiotization and creativity (like the
Narrator's and Prousts) is rendered as a process
of 'becoming - woman'. This is one path in the
rhizome, pursed as others atrophy {eg becoming
homosexual}.
Proust also 'becomes-women' as he realizes the
marvellous sensuous wholeness and reality of a
group of young girls at Balbec (the 'little band')
their philosophical sensuousness, as it were,not
just sexual. In order to achive these insights,
though, actual women have to be rejected and they
usually die, [ as a kind of anticipation of Mulvey
II. In fact the double standard is much in
evidence, especially when discussing the
difference between male and female sexual
'inversion'. The narrator is terribly jealous and
dog-in-the mangerish about Albertine and her
proclivities, to the extent of wanting to marry
her despite not loving her, in order to keep her
from lesbianism]
Meanwhile, Proust's own attempts to reconcile all
these possibilities as a writer leads him to
conceive of actual events as 'diagrammatic' (the
many meanings and semiotic uses of the little
phrase, including its original association with
Odette, and then its capacity to re-energize Swann
in his search for creativity) and as resulting
from a multiplicity (the transformations of the
faces, including those from actual to idealized
objects and back again). Guattari quotes some
actual bits of Proust which use terms similar to
multiplicity, for example (286).
Deterritorialization of music and faces etc
is also implied, of course. At the same time, the
novel has to develop planes of consistency. So
--Proust manages to deterritorialize his childhood
memories to release their creative power and
realize their effect on his later life; Swann
manages to break out of specific hangups and
passions and discover music as a means of
expression; Venteuil also produces a mighty
Septet as well as his neat pretty Sonata and this
explodes into joy (steady, Dave).
[However, I also think that meanings are
stabilized in much more conventional ways too. The
romantic gaze towards the countryside and
nature contexts, dignifies and
regulates, makes respectable the more adventurous
and risky sexual semiotization and
aestheticises the more boring and
challenging encounters in salons. Trains,
lineages, place names, and the endless bitchy
processes of social distanciation, like an early
and horribly familiar version of Bourdieu on
distinction, remain constants which ground
the speculative bits. The reader is assumed to be
able to grasp the underlying issues that make some
utterances, preferences or dispositions, gaffes.
There are bits of realist commentary where an
omniscient narrator explains motives or the
meanings of events. There is a great deal of
repetition and pot boiling, including tedious
lists {not even trees!} of place-name
derivations or aristo genealogy -- pages of them
-- possibly because the full 12 volumes are blown
up from an early 3 volume effort: sometimes it
reads as if it were written as a part-work.
There are appeals to the reader to keep going, and
even farcical episodes]
Proust is able to semiotize much more
productively, and he can manage his characters --
apparently, he makes Albertine narratively
manageable [yes -- as above] as he falls out of
love with her, by reducing her more and more to a
mere appendage, and then she disappears altogether
(becoming-imperceptible). [I think this fits Swann
even better -- after two volumes based on him, he
has only walkon parts in the others, and just dies
without much further comment]. She was already
'several people' [like D&G in the intro to TP]
( 316) He wants us to realize that his early
childhood memories are real, exploiting the
asignifying properties of matters of expression
(no doubt) of flowers, streams, buildings etc, and
defends the detail in terms of showing us how it
is all plausible and consistent{!} (304) .
The bastard is doing ontology! It is also a matter
of developing ways to recall and semotize all the
trivial incidents of his childhood,in a kind of
therapy, reconsidering the near observation of
lesbian sex by Mlle Venteuil at Montjouvain, which
made him anxious, as a part of a creative
project to recall the past and understand it
machinically . It is partly the rhizome itself
driving things forward though, and the qualities
of some of the matters of expression themselves,
especially the musical refrains [we nearly
permitted subjectivity there. Guattari says Proust
himself deconstructs his fictional subjects
showing them overwhelmed by bits of signs, faces,
musical refrains etc., and comes to realize that
individuated subjectivity is a pimple on the face
of trans-subjectivity, 326]. We are talking
about far more than subjective impressions, and
the reality of these events is upheld by making
them reappear and intervene in new assemblages [the same
reason D&G develop all those obsessive
classifications, subtypes and taxonomies?].
The individual author is only a catalyst for an
assemblage (305) . Having deterritorialized
faciality and refrain components, and amassed a
whole collection of fragments, the author has to
construct a new plane of consistency or risk a
black hole from excess. Characters are seen as
puppets controlled by time [machinic faciality for
G], as singularities composed of non-individual
material forces, in a new non-personal
subjectivity. This is machinic time not empirical
time, and the latter has to be managed in a novel
[by seeing it as extension produced by intensive
machinic time?] This makes the personal effects
and the risks of a black hole likely when we root
around in subjective recall, less dangerous
because everything is more abstract and under
control?. Certainly, disturbing events are now
made 'common' and banal. This abstraction involves
more than metaphor or metonym, Guattari insists ,
and resembles 'scientifiic work' ( 330) . It also
shows the power of becoming-woman as a literary
and philosophical process, seeing all the trivial
aspects of ordinary life as 'quanta of the
possible', whether at the social or psychological
level.
Well, after all that -- back to Deleuze page
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