Deleuze's own image for a concept is not a brick, but a "toolbox".  He calls his kind of philosophy "pragmatics" because its goal is the invention of concepts that do not add up to a system of belief…  [Which]…  pack a potential in the way a crowbar in a willing hand envelops in energy of prying...  The question is not: is it true?  But: does it work?  What new thought does it make possible to think?  What new emotions does it make it possible to feel?  What's new sensations and perceptions does it open in the body?  (xv).

There are, you see, two ways of reading a book: you either see it as a box with something inside and start looking for what it signifies, and then if you’re even more perverse or depraved you set off after signifiers [ that is, try to explain the book in terms of some privileged language like marxism] ...And you annotate and interpret and question and write a book about the book [like the critic did] ... Or there’s another way: you see the book as a little non signifying machine [ that is, read it in its own terms], and the only question is “Does it work, and how does it work?” How does it work for you?  If it doesn’t work, if nothing comes through, you try another book’ (8). 

Stivale:  ...schizoanalysis is a thought without any ideological specificity, if you will; that is, either the left
    or the right can make use of it. It's this question of the tool box: a little earlier, when I questioned you about the use of
    schizoanalysis, you said, yes, in the end, I continue to work, and what people do with schizoanalysis doesn't interest me,
    they can take it or leave it, but I'm busy with our work. That's all well and good, but here is French neo-liberalism, a rightist
    intellectual using it [he shows Guattari an article]. Still again, that may not matter at all to you...


Guattari: Oh, not at all because what does it mean to attach a name like that, to hook our names onto it as a reference? Is it true, does
    it correspond to anything?...on the level of thought, it's not at all clear. Let's take a very simple example, the example of schools: I'm for free
   schools, not free schools run by priests, but I'm for the liberation of schools, I'm in favor of dismantling national education, etc. 
   So, is this a theme of the right or the left? 

Look at what happened to Little Hans already, an example of child psychoanalysis at its purest: they kept on BREAKING HIS RHIZOME and BLOTCHING HIS MAP....In the case of Little Hans,studying the unconscious would be to show how he tries to build a rhizome, with the family house but also with the line of flight of the building, the street, etc., how these lines are blocked, how the child is made to take root in the family...how then Professor Freud's intervention assures a power takeover by the signifier, a subjectification of affects; how the only escape route left to the child is ... a becoming-animal [but this is] perceived as shameful and guilty (the becoming-horse of Little Hans, truly a political option)’ (16).

.. look what Melanie Klein did to Little Richard's geopolitical maps: she developed photos from them, made tracings of them...one way or the other your rhizome will be broken

Childish gestures and play can extricate kids from tracings, like that 'dominant competence of the teacher's language - a microscopic event upsets the local balance of power'.(17)

We find reference to a  form of creativity 'confined to poets, children, and lunatics' (110)

‘Of course, the child, the woman, the black have memories; but the Memory that collects those memories is still a virile majoritarian agency treating them as “childhood memories”, as conjugal or colonial memories.’ (323)

'the trace of creation in the created', immanent movement to explain the different aspects apparent in the world.  This requires a 'childish' approach ( 372)

We reproduce microfascism, for example when 'the mother feels obliged to titillate to a child, the father becomes a mommy' (252) [a warning against the dangers of 'supples egmentation']

'the modern valorization of children's drawings, texts by the mad, and concerts of noise'.  They can be overdone and we end up 'reproducing nothing but a scribble effacing all lines, a scramble effacing all sounds', and this can prevent 'any event from happening.  All one has left is a resonance chamber well on the way to forming a black hole...'People often have too much of a tendency to reterritorialize on the child, the mad, noise'. ...'Sobriety, sobriety: that is the common prerequisite for the deterritorialization of matters, the molecularization of material, and the cosmicization of forces.  Maybe a child can do that.  But the sobriety involved is the sobriety of a becoming - child, that is not necessarily the becoming of the child, quite the contrary' (380), ...For there is no imagination outside of technique.  The modern figure is not the child or the lunatic, still less the artist, but the cosmic artisan' (381). Nevertheless, by page 386, 'the child has wings already, he becomes celestial' . 

‘A child never confines himself to playing house, to playing only at being daddy-and-mommy. He also plays at being a magician, a cowboy, a cop or a robber, a train, a little car. The problem has to do not with the sexual nature of desiring machines, but with the family nature of this sexuality’ ( Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 46)

'True pedagogical rectification consists in subordinating human relations to the relation of human beings to things' —as in the 'famous rule from Emile which demands only muscle: Never bring things to the child, bring the child to the things'.  This will avoid 'the [usual] infantile situation that gives him a stake in being mean'. (Deleuze 2004: 55)

‘it is hardly acceptable…  to run together a child’s nursery rhymes, poetic experimentations, and experiences of madness…  [And] justify the grotesque trinity of child, poet, and madmen’ (Deleuze 1990 :82-83. 

'we should take him quite literally when Godard says children are political prisoners' (Deleuze 1995: 41).

...small children have singularities without individuality, 'a smile, a gesture, a funny face' and are 'infused with an immanent life'.  (Deleuze 2005: 30)

Academic languages dealt in a ‘second order language of allusions and cultural complicities’ (Sociology Research Group, 1980: 46). This is seen as ‘second nature to intelligent and gifted individuals’, leading to seemingly ‘natural’ divisions among students. However, ‘academic judgments…in reality consecrate cultural privilege’ (Sociology Research Group, 1980: 46). There is, however, ‘a fiction that there is no misunderstanding’ (Bourdieu, Passeron and Saint Martin, 1994: 13).... There are also ‘verbal acrobatics, hermetic allusion, disconcerting references, or peremptory obscurity…  technical tricks...  such as the concealment of sources, the insertion of studied jokes…  the avoidance of compromising formulations [which might prove to be wrong]’

On the plane of consistency, semiotic components of all kinds are found, chemical, electronic, genetic and so on, and some systems emerged like wasps and orchids.  We should not consider these elements as metaphoric, because 'all that consists is Real' (77) 

Language actually moves from one saying to another.  Narrative transmits 'what one has heard, what someone else said to you.  Hearsay' (85).  This means that indirect discourse is the basis of language, with metaphors and metonyms as mere effects, presupposing indirect discourse.

Interpretance (a technique to extend dominant codings)  is the corresponding apparatus of making sense in the paradigmatic dimension, working with leaps across systems of meaning in the form of metaphor, for example (127) .

Scherer and Hocquenghem made this essential point in their reconsideration of the problem of wolf-children. Of course, it is not a question of a real production, as if the child "really" became an animal; nor is it a question of a resemblance, as if the child imitated animals that really raised it; nor is it a question of a symbolic metaphor, as if the autistic child that was abandoned or lost merely became the "analogue" of an animal. Scherer and Hocquenghem are right to expose this false reasoning, which is based on a culturalism or moralism upholding the irreducibility of the human order: Because the child has not been transformed into an animal, it must only have a metaphorical  relation to it, induced by the child’s illness or rejection ( 301)

My teeth have adapted; in fact, when I don’t eat glass or iron, my jaw aches like a young dog’s that craves to chew a bone. If we interpret the word "like" as a metaphor, or propose a structural analogy of relations (man-iron : dog-bone), we understand nothing of becoming, The word ”like" is one of those words that change  drastically in meaning and function when they are used in connection with haecceities, when they are made into expressions of becomings instead of signified states or signifying relations.  (302-3)

The conventional image operates with a dualism between true thinking from magical capture, and foundationalism, and 'a republic of free spirits...a legislative and juridical organization'(413).  The two are interrelated and necessary to one another, but this also allows for something happening between them, something outside the conventional model.  We are not operating with metaphors here - the imperium of truth and a republic of spirits are necessary components, and form a kind of interiority as a stratum.

Mumford is cited to support the view that machinism is to be taken literally not just metaphorically.  (504)

‘manipulation of the finite bunch of semantic atoms, chains of mechanically linked words... a discourse of an allusion and ellipsis... ‘magic to exorcise error...Prophylactic relativism [when nothing is ever true or false, everyone has their own opinions and so on]’ ’ ( Bourdieu et al 1994).

‘ rhetoric of despair... dualization or... resigned submission to exclusion...‘an impression of familiarity...emulating professorial rhetoric…  False generalities…  Prudent approximations of the “not even wrong”... echolalia’... (Sociology Research Group in Cultural and Education Studies 1980)